Amir Rapaport’s Column: The World’s First Tunnel War
The big story of the Gaza War is unfolding beneath the surface, still largely shrouded in secrecy. Meanwhile, these are the main gaps that remain in the fight against Hamas
Amir Rapaport
| 03/02/2024
When Yahya Sinwar sent the Nukhba forces to attack Israel, he did not expect the IDF to fight against them in direct face-to-face battles within the 'metro' of Gaza. But here is an amazing detail: The IDF did not anticipate that either. The technological means and methods employed by the most elite units of the IDF in recent days were developed amid actual combat
Still much remains hidden from the public eye, but it is clear that we are dealing with an underground warfare capability like never before, unmatched anywhere else in the world. We will delve into what is known, starting with the historical context.
The Viet Cong in Vietnam
In an extensive review of tunnel warfare published by the IDF History Department over 20 years ago, it was noted that the use of 'subterranean warfare' began as early as the biblical period and was also used in ancient China.
Tunnels were also utilized for warfare in the 20th-century world wars. After World War II, for example, three prominent examples were found, highlighting that combat tunnels significantly challenged the operations of organized armies.
The most well-known example is that of the Viet Cong fighters in Vietnam. The tunnels they constructed were numerous, and intricate, and most of them had a significant depth of eight meters. Their total length: is approximately 240 kilometers.
A few years later, Red Army soldiers faced the phenomenon of tunnels in battles against Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan. Some of these tunnels were later utilized by Al-Qaeda to evade the long arm of the United States."
The caves and tunnels in Afghanistan and Vietnam were mostly constructed in open terrain. In contrast, the Chechens built a network of tunnels beneath their capital, Grozny, and fought underground against Russia.
From these examples, it is evident that tunnels provide an advantage for guerrilla fighters, but not necessarily the ability to overcome a significantly stronger enemy.
In the end, in most cases, strength prevails. For example, we all know that the tunnels did not save the fighters of Bar Kokhba against the Roman legionnaires in the rebellion that ended in one of our great tragedies. Nor did the tunnels save ISIS fighters in battles against the United States in Mosul, Iraq - in an example most similar to what unfolds in Gaza.
Operation Cast Led
In hindsight, one might wonder why the IDF needs to develop new means for tunnel warfare during the conflict itself, considering the historical review was written long ago. After all, the threat of tunnels was known, and it only gained momentum after Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. The IDF knew then that the network Hamas was building included tunnels of two types – for attack and defense.
In November 2008, the Paratroopers Brigade launched Operation Double Challenge against a terror tunnel that originated inside Gaza and led into Israeli territory.
At the time, the commander of the Paratroopers Brigade was Herzi Halevy, the current chief of staff. The commander of the reconnaissance battalion that carried out the operation in practice was Yaron Finkelman, who is now the Southern Command’s commander – a position which then was manned by Yoav Gallant, the current minister of defense. Operation Double Challenge led to an escalation that unfolded within six weeks into Operation Cast Lead.
Against the threat of offensive, terror tunnels, which also made headlines in 2014 during Operation Protective Edge, the IDF and the Ministry of Defense erected the barrier surrounding Gaza from above and below ground. On October 7th, the barrier was easily breached in its upper part. Against defensive tunnels, the IDF simply did not intend to fight from the inside.
While various methods have been planned over the years to cope with all types of tunnels, such as entrance detonation or sealing, no one imagined a scenario where IDF soldiers would maneuver inside the tunnels themselves – attempting to locate hostages and eliminate terrorists.
The defensive tunnel challenge
In practice, the challenge of defensive tunnels is on an unprecedented scale globally. In the IDF, there is astonishment to discover that the 'metro' beneath the Gaza Strip includes hundreds of kilometers cumulatively, much more than estimated and more than what the Viet Cong created in all of Vietnam.
The underground communication means in Gaza are sophisticated, as are the tunnel entrances. Hamas can stay in the tunnels for an almost unlimited period: they generate electricity from generators and extract water from underground sources. Each tunnel includes numerous levels and branches, complicating the enemy's operations within them.
And yet, the IDF General Staff decided to send soldiers into the tunnels. To engage in direct underground combat. This has no historical precedent, as in all previous cases, armies preferred to fight against tunnel dwellers using methods like starvation or fire. In any case, from above. The IDF didn’t even consider using toxic gases, which would contradict the Geneva Convention or any other means that might put the lives of the hostages at risk.
The intent was to flow water into the tunnels. The IDF confirmed this week, for the first time, the publication in the global media about a system that has been developed and activated to pump water into the tunnels (one of the challenges, beyond the military aspect, is not to pollute the groundwater of Gaza with saltwater).
In hindsight, although it seems that the water flow system does not drown Hamas within the tunnels, it may have additional advantages such as mapping the 'metro' and its branches based on the flow pattern.
But what about fighting inside the tunnels themselves? From exposed methods, it can be learned that the IDF uses advanced tunnel combat techniques, including dogs, many of which have been harmed, and remotely operated means, such as robots – some, probably, armed. The highlight is the entry of special forces into the subterranean frontlines. Beyond being a global precedent, this marks the first time in the history of the IDF that the most elite units play such a central role in warfare.
Typically, special forces are reserved for specific, targeted missions in periods between wars. The burden placed on special forces in this conflict also results in casualties.
The people’s economy
As mentioned, most of the underground warfare stories are still classified. However, it is apparent that the main drama has been unfolding in the vicinity of the Khan Yunis area, where perhaps some of the most wanted figures of Hamas, along with several of the hostages, are still believed to be located.
The style of warfare employed by the IDF in Gaza these days, especially in the Khan Yunis area, has generated significant interest among friendly armies worldwide. It was possible to learn about this through a remote discussion held this week between senior officials of Fort Sill, the artillery center of the U.S. Army, and the Chief Artillery Officer of the IDF, Colonel Yair Natanz.
It seems that the Americans are highly impressed by the way the IDF successfully integrates firepower from the sea, air, and land, and the rapid progress - relative to the time it took them to capture Mosul.
The warfare in the Khan Yunis area is conducted by Brigade 98, both above and below ground. The necessity to operate in tunnels leads to every action being carried out with caution and thoroughness. Above ground, the brigades continue to dismantle Hamas' capabilities, despite the rocket fire towards Tel Aviv and the Gush Dan area this week, the first in weeks.
In the northern part of the Strip, where the IDF is already operating as part of 'Stage C' of the war, meaning raids based on relatively small-scale forces, a raid was conducted this week in the Shati area, near the beach.
In the central region of the Gaza Strip, the completion of the takeover of the Strip is being carried out by Brigade 99, between the north and the south. The division between the north and the south is based on the axis leading from the area of Kibbutz Be'eri to the sea, near the junction of the former settlement of Nezarim.
One of the brigades of Brigade 99, the reserve Paratrooper Brigade 179, completed its mission a few days ago and was replaced by the Nahal Brigade. Its fighters were discharged. I took the opportunity to ask the brigade commander, Colonel Itzik Alpasi, from Kibbutz Be'erot Yitzhak, about the main insights he takes with him from four months together with his reservists.
His main conclusion is related to the need to preserve the length of the soldiers' service, for the next recruitment expected for them. In the IDF, there are already those who refer to the management of human resources for the next stages of the war as 'people's economy.’
“People come out of there with a sense of satisfaction and tactical success in everything they did," says Colonel Alpasi. "It's amazing, but there is no team in the brigade, in the reconnaissance battalion, or in the Givati Brigade that has not experienced an encounter with terrorists or a battle. We came out victorious from every encounter.
“We eradicated underground spaces, including operations to manufacture rockets and missiles aimed at Israel; we killed at least 100 terrorists. Towards the end, there were reservists already thinking about the release. But, in general, the fighters are already waiting for the continuation of the battle. There is a date for their next recruitment. Everyone will return to serve. Meanwhile, the goal is to use the time for rest and to strengthen the home front.”
From the overall perspective of the IDF, the "People's Economy" is already causing the IDF to extend the regular service of combat soldiers from two years and eight months to three years (before the war, the intention was to shorten it to two and a half years).
Additionally, it was decided to advance the recruitment of 1,300 yeshiva students and pre-military academy graduates to March, a month earlier than originally planned for August. The IDF currently needs every soldier.
Simultaneously, a procurement effort has begun to expand the capabilities of combat units across various systems – from combat helicopters (the Director-General of the Ministry of Defense promoted this procurement in the United States last week) to rocket launchers and a new precision rocket named "Bar" for use by artillery units, which the IDF will equip in substantial quantities.
Gaps on the way to victory
From a broader perspective, the achievements of the IDF in the conflict still do not mean that Israel is close to winning the war against Hamas or bringing back the hostages. This, despite the renewed negotiations, mediated by the United States, Egypt, and Qatar.
It is still challenging to see clear signs on the ground indicating that Hamas is on the verge of collapsing due to the tunnel warfare or the relentless pressure it faces. Agreeing to Israeli terms regarding the nature of the demilitarization in exchange for the return of some of the hostages remains uncertain.
Apparently, Hamas is also employing a "Stage C" in the war. Currently, it operates by trying to avoid direct clashes as much as possible to "buy time" until the majority of the IDF forces withdraw from the area.
According to this plan, when it happens, Sinwar will again settle into a dusty sofa and declare triumph, as he has done in the past. It is imperative that this does not occur.
Another gap in the conflict is related to the difficulty of the IDF and Shin Bet in eliminating the top leaders of both Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Instead, they settle for targeting relatively lower-level figures, such as the recent killing of a finance official of PIJ. Improvement in this area is possible with each passing day.
The IDF is eagerly awaiting directives from the political echelon regarding future arrangements in the territories that have already been occupied, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. There is also an anticipation for guidance on the most critical issue at the moment – a green light for action in Rafah. However, Egypt is concerned that Israeli operations in that area may trigger an influx of Palestinians into its territory.
On the other hand, it is clear that declaring a demilitarization of Hamas and preventing the transfer of weapons from Egyptian territory to Gaza in the future may not be feasible without significant action in the area that separates the Gaza Strip from Egypt.
Preparing for war in the north
The IDF apologizes for the reduction in the level of fighting in the Gaza Strip, and also to enhance preparations for an inevitable war in the north. As part of these preparations, unit training is intensifying, and the Minister of Defense met with senior officials in the city of Haifa this week.
This is an attempt to convey the delicate message that it is necessary to prepare the home front for a war that will be much more challenging than the sporadic firing from Gaza, which has almost ceased entirely, without causing widespread panic among the public.
The concern within the security apparatus regarding the entry of the Zolfagher missile into the arena has been discussed in recent weeks. This missile has a range of up to 700 kilometers, a warhead weighing half a ton, and navigation capabilities with a precision of up to 60 meters. Additionally, there is the "Yakhont" (P-800 Oniks) coastal anti-ship missile, which can rapidly fly at sea level to its target at high speed.
Now, there is preparation for another threat: the launching of explosive drones from Lebanon, specifically the "Shehad" type, manufactured in Iran. These drones are resistant to electronic interference.
Now we are preparing for another threat: the launching of exploding drones from Lebanon, known as "Shehab" drones manufactured by Iran. This type of drone is resistant to electronic interference. As with the case of the tunnels, one might wonder why the security system is putting most of its efforts into dealing with this threat only after Hezbollah has already initiated a limited operation against Hamas.
The damage caused by Iranian-made kamikaze drones, of various types, has already been evident in recent years in conflicts in Ukraine (where Iran supplied the devices to Russia) and in sporadic attacks by Houthis on oil fields in Saudi Arabia.
As part of preparations for a potential conflict in Lebanon, the IDF continuously works on enhancing the capabilities of the Iron Dome system. This week, the security apparatus successfully conducted a test for "Version 9" of the Iron Dome system.
Meanwhile, on “Fauda”
The operation against wanted individuals that took place this week at a hospital in Jenin provides insights that seem to be taken from an episode of "Fauda.” Firstly, the operation underscores the intensity of the ongoing daily struggle against terrorism in Judea and Samaria, which persists thanks to continuous counter-terrorism operations that do not cease.
Within the defense establishment, there is a genuine concern about the potential outbreak of a significant wave of terrorism. The warnings sharpen the debate within the government about whether to allow Palestinian workers from the West Bank to continue working in Israel.
And one more thing: After the operation in Jenin, the IDF, Shin Bet, and the police issued a joint statement detailing the role of each force in the operation.
It includes several fairly classified capabilities of the Yamam, the police counter-terrorism unit, which excels itself from week to week. The statement creates the impression of "excess information" that could be used by terrorists in the next operation. This is something some of the fighters themselves might be concerned about.
The big story of the Gaza War is unfolding beneath the surface, still largely shrouded in secrecy. Meanwhile, these are the main gaps that remain in the fight against Hamas
When Yahya Sinwar sent the Nukhba forces to attack Israel, he did not expect the IDF to fight against them in direct face-to-face battles within the 'metro' of Gaza. But here is an amazing detail: The IDF did not anticipate that either. The technological means and methods employed by the most elite units of the IDF in recent days were developed amid actual combat
Still much remains hidden from the public eye, but it is clear that we are dealing with an underground warfare capability like never before, unmatched anywhere else in the world. We will delve into what is known, starting with the historical context.
The Viet Cong in Vietnam
In an extensive review of tunnel warfare published by the IDF History Department over 20 years ago, it was noted that the use of 'subterranean warfare' began as early as the biblical period and was also used in ancient China.
Tunnels were also utilized for warfare in the 20th-century world wars. After World War II, for example, three prominent examples were found, highlighting that combat tunnels significantly challenged the operations of organized armies.
The most well-known example is that of the Viet Cong fighters in Vietnam. The tunnels they constructed were numerous, and intricate, and most of them had a significant depth of eight meters. Their total length: is approximately 240 kilometers.
A few years later, Red Army soldiers faced the phenomenon of tunnels in battles against Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan. Some of these tunnels were later utilized by Al-Qaeda to evade the long arm of the United States."
The caves and tunnels in Afghanistan and Vietnam were mostly constructed in open terrain. In contrast, the Chechens built a network of tunnels beneath their capital, Grozny, and fought underground against Russia.
From these examples, it is evident that tunnels provide an advantage for guerrilla fighters, but not necessarily the ability to overcome a significantly stronger enemy.
In the end, in most cases, strength prevails. For example, we all know that the tunnels did not save the fighters of Bar Kokhba against the Roman legionnaires in the rebellion that ended in one of our great tragedies. Nor did the tunnels save ISIS fighters in battles against the United States in Mosul, Iraq - in an example most similar to what unfolds in Gaza.
Operation Cast Led
In hindsight, one might wonder why the IDF needs to develop new means for tunnel warfare during the conflict itself, considering the historical review was written long ago. After all, the threat of tunnels was known, and it only gained momentum after Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007. The IDF knew then that the network Hamas was building included tunnels of two types – for attack and defense.
In November 2008, the Paratroopers Brigade launched Operation Double Challenge against a terror tunnel that originated inside Gaza and led into Israeli territory.
At the time, the commander of the Paratroopers Brigade was Herzi Halevy, the current chief of staff. The commander of the reconnaissance battalion that carried out the operation in practice was Yaron Finkelman, who is now the Southern Command’s commander – a position which then was manned by Yoav Gallant, the current minister of defense. Operation Double Challenge led to an escalation that unfolded within six weeks into Operation Cast Lead.
Against the threat of offensive, terror tunnels, which also made headlines in 2014 during Operation Protective Edge, the IDF and the Ministry of Defense erected the barrier surrounding Gaza from above and below ground. On October 7th, the barrier was easily breached in its upper part. Against defensive tunnels, the IDF simply did not intend to fight from the inside.
While various methods have been planned over the years to cope with all types of tunnels, such as entrance detonation or sealing, no one imagined a scenario where IDF soldiers would maneuver inside the tunnels themselves – attempting to locate hostages and eliminate terrorists.
The defensive tunnel challenge
In practice, the challenge of defensive tunnels is on an unprecedented scale globally. In the IDF, there is astonishment to discover that the 'metro' beneath the Gaza Strip includes hundreds of kilometers cumulatively, much more than estimated and more than what the Viet Cong created in all of Vietnam.
The underground communication means in Gaza are sophisticated, as are the tunnel entrances. Hamas can stay in the tunnels for an almost unlimited period: they generate electricity from generators and extract water from underground sources. Each tunnel includes numerous levels and branches, complicating the enemy's operations within them.
And yet, the IDF General Staff decided to send soldiers into the tunnels. To engage in direct underground combat. This has no historical precedent, as in all previous cases, armies preferred to fight against tunnel dwellers using methods like starvation or fire. In any case, from above. The IDF didn’t even consider using toxic gases, which would contradict the Geneva Convention or any other means that might put the lives of the hostages at risk.
The intent was to flow water into the tunnels. The IDF confirmed this week, for the first time, the publication in the global media about a system that has been developed and activated to pump water into the tunnels (one of the challenges, beyond the military aspect, is not to pollute the groundwater of Gaza with saltwater).
In hindsight, although it seems that the water flow system does not drown Hamas within the tunnels, it may have additional advantages such as mapping the 'metro' and its branches based on the flow pattern.
But what about fighting inside the tunnels themselves? From exposed methods, it can be learned that the IDF uses advanced tunnel combat techniques, including dogs, many of which have been harmed, and remotely operated means, such as robots – some, probably, armed. The highlight is the entry of special forces into the subterranean frontlines. Beyond being a global precedent, this marks the first time in the history of the IDF that the most elite units play such a central role in warfare.
Typically, special forces are reserved for specific, targeted missions in periods between wars. The burden placed on special forces in this conflict also results in casualties.
The people’s economy
As mentioned, most of the underground warfare stories are still classified. However, it is apparent that the main drama has been unfolding in the vicinity of the Khan Yunis area, where perhaps some of the most wanted figures of Hamas, along with several of the hostages, are still believed to be located.
The style of warfare employed by the IDF in Gaza these days, especially in the Khan Yunis area, has generated significant interest among friendly armies worldwide. It was possible to learn about this through a remote discussion held this week between senior officials of Fort Sill, the artillery center of the U.S. Army, and the Chief Artillery Officer of the IDF, Colonel Yair Natanz.
It seems that the Americans are highly impressed by the way the IDF successfully integrates firepower from the sea, air, and land, and the rapid progress - relative to the time it took them to capture Mosul.
The warfare in the Khan Yunis area is conducted by Brigade 98, both above and below ground. The necessity to operate in tunnels leads to every action being carried out with caution and thoroughness. Above ground, the brigades continue to dismantle Hamas' capabilities, despite the rocket fire towards Tel Aviv and the Gush Dan area this week, the first in weeks.
In the northern part of the Strip, where the IDF is already operating as part of 'Stage C' of the war, meaning raids based on relatively small-scale forces, a raid was conducted this week in the Shati area, near the beach.
In the central region of the Gaza Strip, the completion of the takeover of the Strip is being carried out by Brigade 99, between the north and the south. The division between the north and the south is based on the axis leading from the area of Kibbutz Be'eri to the sea, near the junction of the former settlement of Nezarim.
One of the brigades of Brigade 99, the reserve Paratrooper Brigade 179, completed its mission a few days ago and was replaced by the Nahal Brigade. Its fighters were discharged. I took the opportunity to ask the brigade commander, Colonel Itzik Alpasi, from Kibbutz Be'erot Yitzhak, about the main insights he takes with him from four months together with his reservists.
His main conclusion is related to the need to preserve the length of the soldiers' service, for the next recruitment expected for them. In the IDF, there are already those who refer to the management of human resources for the next stages of the war as 'people's economy.’
“People come out of there with a sense of satisfaction and tactical success in everything they did," says Colonel Alpasi. "It's amazing, but there is no team in the brigade, in the reconnaissance battalion, or in the Givati Brigade that has not experienced an encounter with terrorists or a battle. We came out victorious from every encounter.
“We eradicated underground spaces, including operations to manufacture rockets and missiles aimed at Israel; we killed at least 100 terrorists. Towards the end, there were reservists already thinking about the release. But, in general, the fighters are already waiting for the continuation of the battle. There is a date for their next recruitment. Everyone will return to serve. Meanwhile, the goal is to use the time for rest and to strengthen the home front.”
From the overall perspective of the IDF, the "People's Economy" is already causing the IDF to extend the regular service of combat soldiers from two years and eight months to three years (before the war, the intention was to shorten it to two and a half years).
Additionally, it was decided to advance the recruitment of 1,300 yeshiva students and pre-military academy graduates to March, a month earlier than originally planned for August. The IDF currently needs every soldier.
Simultaneously, a procurement effort has begun to expand the capabilities of combat units across various systems – from combat helicopters (the Director-General of the Ministry of Defense promoted this procurement in the United States last week) to rocket launchers and a new precision rocket named "Bar" for use by artillery units, which the IDF will equip in substantial quantities.
Gaps on the way to victory
From a broader perspective, the achievements of the IDF in the conflict still do not mean that Israel is close to winning the war against Hamas or bringing back the hostages. This, despite the renewed negotiations, mediated by the United States, Egypt, and Qatar.
It is still challenging to see clear signs on the ground indicating that Hamas is on the verge of collapsing due to the tunnel warfare or the relentless pressure it faces. Agreeing to Israeli terms regarding the nature of the demilitarization in exchange for the return of some of the hostages remains uncertain.
Apparently, Hamas is also employing a "Stage C" in the war. Currently, it operates by trying to avoid direct clashes as much as possible to "buy time" until the majority of the IDF forces withdraw from the area.
According to this plan, when it happens, Sinwar will again settle into a dusty sofa and declare triumph, as he has done in the past. It is imperative that this does not occur.
Another gap in the conflict is related to the difficulty of the IDF and Shin Bet in eliminating the top leaders of both Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Instead, they settle for targeting relatively lower-level figures, such as the recent killing of a finance official of PIJ. Improvement in this area is possible with each passing day.
The IDF is eagerly awaiting directives from the political echelon regarding future arrangements in the territories that have already been occupied, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. There is also an anticipation for guidance on the most critical issue at the moment – a green light for action in Rafah. However, Egypt is concerned that Israeli operations in that area may trigger an influx of Palestinians into its territory.
On the other hand, it is clear that declaring a demilitarization of Hamas and preventing the transfer of weapons from Egyptian territory to Gaza in the future may not be feasible without significant action in the area that separates the Gaza Strip from Egypt.
Preparing for war in the north
The IDF apologizes for the reduction in the level of fighting in the Gaza Strip, and also to enhance preparations for an inevitable war in the north. As part of these preparations, unit training is intensifying, and the Minister of Defense met with senior officials in the city of Haifa this week.
This is an attempt to convey the delicate message that it is necessary to prepare the home front for a war that will be much more challenging than the sporadic firing from Gaza, which has almost ceased entirely, without causing widespread panic among the public.
The concern within the security apparatus regarding the entry of the Zolfagher missile into the arena has been discussed in recent weeks. This missile has a range of up to 700 kilometers, a warhead weighing half a ton, and navigation capabilities with a precision of up to 60 meters. Additionally, there is the "Yakhont" (P-800 Oniks) coastal anti-ship missile, which can rapidly fly at sea level to its target at high speed.
Now, there is preparation for another threat: the launching of explosive drones from Lebanon, specifically the "Shehad" type, manufactured in Iran. These drones are resistant to electronic interference.
Now we are preparing for another threat: the launching of exploding drones from Lebanon, known as "Shehab" drones manufactured by Iran. This type of drone is resistant to electronic interference. As with the case of the tunnels, one might wonder why the security system is putting most of its efforts into dealing with this threat only after Hezbollah has already initiated a limited operation against Hamas.
The damage caused by Iranian-made kamikaze drones, of various types, has already been evident in recent years in conflicts in Ukraine (where Iran supplied the devices to Russia) and in sporadic attacks by Houthis on oil fields in Saudi Arabia.
As part of preparations for a potential conflict in Lebanon, the IDF continuously works on enhancing the capabilities of the Iron Dome system. This week, the security apparatus successfully conducted a test for "Version 9" of the Iron Dome system.
Meanwhile, on “Fauda”
The operation against wanted individuals that took place this week at a hospital in Jenin provides insights that seem to be taken from an episode of "Fauda.” Firstly, the operation underscores the intensity of the ongoing daily struggle against terrorism in Judea and Samaria, which persists thanks to continuous counter-terrorism operations that do not cease.
Within the defense establishment, there is a genuine concern about the potential outbreak of a significant wave of terrorism. The warnings sharpen the debate within the government about whether to allow Palestinian workers from the West Bank to continue working in Israel.
And one more thing: After the operation in Jenin, the IDF, Shin Bet, and the police issued a joint statement detailing the role of each force in the operation.
It includes several fairly classified capabilities of the Yamam, the police counter-terrorism unit, which excels itself from week to week. The statement creates the impression of "excess information" that could be used by terrorists in the next operation. This is something some of the fighters themselves might be concerned about.
