Amir Rapaport’s Column: No Progress in the “Rehabilitation for Demilitarization” Plan
Israel shot itself in the foot several times this past week, but is also demonstrating resilience in Khan Yunis. Meanwhile, the Iranians are arming – and bombing. And what does Lieberman have to say?
Amir Rapaport
| 20/01/2024
Israel entered the war in Gaza with a plan already well-known to the government. In fact, a comprehensive seven-step plan to occupy the Gaza Strip and dismantle the control centers in the city of Gaza itself has been in existence for several years. Cabinet meetings were held on it long before the war.
According to the plan, taking over the control centers in Gaza City, as part of the operation in the northern part of the Strip, was supposed to take a few weeks. It served as the basis for the plan that was eventually executed with various adjustments, and its military component was more or less realized according to expectations. The subsequent ground operations of the IDF after the occupation of the city of Gaza, we are all familiar with, in hindsight.
However, there was supposed to be a continuation of the ground operation that did not take place: a declaration of a move for reconstruction in exchange for an absolute demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. The demilitarization, alongside the return of the hostages, could also be linked to the actual return of a million residents of Gaza to their homes in the northern part of the strip.
An additional pressure tactic could be the complete closure of the Gaza Strip, except for the food supply and humanitarian aid. This after Hamas, at the beginning of the war, “transferred” responsibility for the residents of the strip to Israel, also due to pressure from the United States. Primarily, it is necessary to halt the fuel supply to the Strip.
The diplomatic echelon, led by the prime minister, is supposed to kickstart this move. We haven't heard about this because Israel has not been promoting a diplomatic move that would lead to the end of the war.
This is the background for the unusual statement made by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in front of cameras last week, when he stated that "the end of the war must be anchored in diplomatic action. Diplomacy leads the military. I presented a plan to the government. It is the government's duty to discuss the matter."
The defense minister did not publicly specify which international factors are supposed to take responsibility for the Gaza Strip on the day after the war, according to his proposal. Neither did the Prime Minister. In fact, Israel has not yet presented any plan for the day after.
It would seem that Minister Gallant stated the obvious. Every basic military studies course begins with the aphorism of the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, stating that war is the continuation of politics by other means, and vice versa.
However, beyond the question of what diplomatic move is required, the fact that the defense minister conveyed his message to the prime minister and other cabinet members through a television broadcast rather than a face-to-face meeting carries significant, negative implications.
At the beginning of the war, I wrote here that the prime minister and defense minister were not speaking with each other. Since then, the situation has only worsened, and it is even reflected in Gallant leaving the war cabinet meeting on Saturday night after he was not allowed to bring his aides with him.
In the end, Gallant attended the meeting, but it is important to understand that the toxic relationships at the top of our security establishment are not merely gossip. They pose a threat to our national resilience. While disharmony is not uncommon at the highest levels of our security and political leadership, the relationship between Galant and Netanyahu, especially, is starting to resemble the mutual disdain they had in the days preceding Gallant's dismissal by Netanyahu in March of last year.
This week, there were several alarming signs regarding the conduct of both the military and diplomatic echelons. One of them was the farce regarding the supply of medications to the hostages. The details surrounding this saga were extensively published.
What is particularly concerning is that after such a prolonged war, we are still dealing with a few boxes of medications that may have reached Gaza, rather than the return of the hostages themselves. Moreover, Israel still does not seem to be in a position to dictate terms to Hamas. If this is the case, it is challenging to envision the hostages returning home. The claim that military pressure will lead to their release has not proven itself.
The threat of the Zolfaghar
Other noteworthy occurrences this past week are related to the intensification of tensions in the relations between Israel and the United States, as well as Jordan, which joined as a party to the lawsuit against Israel at the ICJ in The Hague.
On one hand, the Hashemite regime in Jordan depends on Israel for its survival. On the other hand, there are security challenges for both Israel and Jordan along the long border they share, where only a few military forces are stationed.
The diplomatic tension between Israel and Jordan will not improve the security situation along this border. Especially when there are signs that Iran is actively working to smuggle large amounts of money and potentially lethal weapons into Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). These weapons could destabilize the area and create an additional security challenge for Israel, in addition to the fighting in the Gaza Strip and the north.
Indeed, in addition to the ramming attack in Ra'anana carried out by illegal residents from Hebron, there has been an increase in alerts for potential attacks in the territories of Judea and Samaria. The IDF and the Shin Bet are working around the clock to prevent planned attacks. The main operations this past week in the Judea and Samaria region focused on Nablus and the Tul Karm area, including targeted aerial eliminations of terrorist cells, which have become almost routine, similar to the situation in Gaza.
Regarding the northern front, Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi stated this week that the risk of war with Hezbollah is growing. Rightfully so. We're almost there. Direct firing towards Kfar Yuval, in which a mother and son were murdered, and also unprecedented artillery and aerial attacks on Hezbollah targets in the Saluki Valley, could be signs of an imminent multi-dimensional war. Both sides are not interested in it yet, at least not at this time, but expectations may materialize.
Parallel to its smugglings through the Jordanian border, Iran is also intensifying its support for Hezbollah in preparation for a possible all-out war against Israel. Particularly noteworthy is the concern that Hezbollah will acquire the Zolfaghar missile, the pride and joy of the Iranian arms industry.
This missile has a range of 700 kilometers, a warhead weighing half a ton, and a guidance mechanism that can lead it to a target with an accuracy of about 60 meters. If it appears on the scene, Hezbollah is likely to attempt to launch it while simultaneously firing thousands of "dumb" rockets to complicate interception by Israeli defense systems.
“A 720-degree war”
In the Gaza Strip, the main effort is still focused on destroying the extensive tunnel infrastructure underground.
Because it would take years to destroy every meter of tunnels, if at all, this past week's focus was on the tunnels beneath the city of Khan Yunis. Severing the connection between the two parts of the Strip is essential to create a new situation, while an IDF divides the Strip from north to south, based on the Gaza River.
In the northern part of the Gaza Strip, where the IDF effectively moved to "Phase C" of the war, relatively few forces operated this week. This allowed Hamas terrorists in some areas to emerge demonstratively from the tunnels and also launch a few larger rockets toward the Israeli town of Netivot. Overall, Hamas is trying to restore the activity of 12 battalions that were allegedly disbanded by the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip.
There are also 12 battalions to the south of the Gaza River line. So far, the IDF has managed to inflict significant damage on five of them, in the area of the central camps and Khan Yunis. However, seven battalions have not been significantly affected yet. Four of them are located in the Rafah region, which has not been dealt with at all, and a permanent solution has not yet been decided upon regarding disconnecting the Gaza Strip from the Egyptian territory in tunnels beneath the Philadelphi Corridor.
Until a decision is made regarding Rafah, the main effort is focused on the city of Khan Yunis, beneath which senior Hamas members and a significant portion of the hostages may still be located.
On Wednesday, the Golani Brigade's combat team raided Hamas’ Shuhada outpost, in the southernmost part of Khan Yunis, which is also the southernmost area reached by the IDF so far. This was done during heavy tank fire and after intense artillery and air force bombardment.
Exchanges of fire with light weaponry were also significant. The open terrain in this area is extensive, and the buildings are not tall. The armored bulldozer, the D9, the IDF’s “combat king” in the Gaza Strip during this war, demolished wall after wall to allow the advancing forces to progress, while the engineering demolition team did their part. Dozens of terrorists were killed by the end of the battle. Unfortunately, also IDF forces continue suffering casualties.
The determined battle of the 4th Brigade in the heart of Khan Yunis can also provide insights into the challenge in its current form: the brigade operates under Division 98, which received the mission to occupy Khan Yunis after the hostage deal truce.
This is the only reserve armored brigade based on Merkava Mark 4 tanks, but the IDF operates with integrated combat teams that span from infantry, engineering company, and up to the battalion level, combining armored and infantry elements. In addition to tank crews, there are battalions of reservists based on paratroopers and Nahal Brigade veterans.
This is a 720-degree warzone, IDF commanders tell me, facing a unique challenge that no army has faced before in the world. The enemy can unexpectedly approach from terrain that has already been traversed, so there is a need to remain vigilant and aware of everything happening both in front and behind.
Fighting in tall buildings is conducted in parallel with the massive effort below ground. The IDF does not disclose all the methods it employs against Hamas in the tunnels, but it can be said that technologies have been developed for both detecting and destroying them.
It should be mentioned that the IDF does not use toxic gases in the tunnels due to international conventions prohibiting such actions. The use of gas arose as speculation following the deaths of hostages inside the tunnels after it was revealed that there were no signs of gunshot wounds or other physical harm on them.
The IDF believes that the name of the game is to employ lessons learned as quickly as possible. Hamas is learning its own lessons from confrontations with the IDF after each battle. The IDF centralizes the production of lessons at the general level, led by Brigadier General Guy Hazut, who returned to this role after serving as an attaché in Singapore.
In parallel, each brigade and division has its own team for extracting lessons. Commanders invest significant time in this, and some of the lessons are transmitted in real-time, even through immediate message groups on encrypted military cell phones.
One of the surprising lessons of the Armored Corps is that in addition to the Trophy active protection system being effective against Hamas’ anti-tank threat, the “reactive defense” method, based on hundreds of small explosives surrounding the tank, also gets the job done.
The reservists of the Armored Corps’ 4th Division have been on the front continuously since October 7th, and this highlights the issue of attrition in the IDF due to the prolonged war. The need for refreshment is part of the reason why the IDF reorganized its forces this week, withdrawing Brigade 36 from the central region. The brigade, including the Golan Division, which has suffered nearly 100 casualties since that bitter morning, will now prepare for the next mission – which could also take place in the north.
Lieberman's pessimism
A few days ago, I asked to speak with Knesset member Avigdor Lieberman to hear his perspective. It is clear to me, on the one hand, that Lieberman cannot be "objective" as a key political figure (Lieberman is still willing to join the government, but only for a wartime period, if he is in the war cabinet and not in the expanded cabinet).
On the other hand, he was the Defense Minister for two and a half years, and to his credit, it will always be remembered that he warned of the long-term consequences of the way Hamas was handled when he resigned from his position on November 14, 2018. Lieberman was far from being optimistic when we spoke. In fact, he was very pessimistic.
“The government has no ability to create an endgame," argued Lieberman. "Not in Gaza, not in the north, not against the Houthis. Nothing can happen with the forces currently making up the cabinet. There won't be a diplomatic move to end the war that jeopardizes the integrity of the coalition, which is above all, and the Saudis won't engage in any post-ceasefire move without involving the Palestinians
"In the current situation, the government cannot even make a decision on a pilot project for the entry of workers from Judea and Samaria. In addition, the prime minister is also under pressure from the United States. In my estimation, nothing significant will change in the situation until the National Unity party withdraws from the government. When they do, the snowball effect will begin, leading to a change."
I'd love to hear your thoughts and comments. Be in touch with me directly via Twitter and LinkedIn
Israel shot itself in the foot several times this past week, but is also demonstrating resilience in Khan Yunis. Meanwhile, the Iranians are arming – and bombing. And what does Lieberman have to say?
Israel entered the war in Gaza with a plan already well-known to the government. In fact, a comprehensive seven-step plan to occupy the Gaza Strip and dismantle the control centers in the city of Gaza itself has been in existence for several years. Cabinet meetings were held on it long before the war.
According to the plan, taking over the control centers in Gaza City, as part of the operation in the northern part of the Strip, was supposed to take a few weeks. It served as the basis for the plan that was eventually executed with various adjustments, and its military component was more or less realized according to expectations. The subsequent ground operations of the IDF after the occupation of the city of Gaza, we are all familiar with, in hindsight.
However, there was supposed to be a continuation of the ground operation that did not take place: a declaration of a move for reconstruction in exchange for an absolute demilitarization of the Gaza Strip. The demilitarization, alongside the return of the hostages, could also be linked to the actual return of a million residents of Gaza to their homes in the northern part of the strip.
An additional pressure tactic could be the complete closure of the Gaza Strip, except for the food supply and humanitarian aid. This after Hamas, at the beginning of the war, “transferred” responsibility for the residents of the strip to Israel, also due to pressure from the United States. Primarily, it is necessary to halt the fuel supply to the Strip.
The diplomatic echelon, led by the prime minister, is supposed to kickstart this move. We haven't heard about this because Israel has not been promoting a diplomatic move that would lead to the end of the war.
This is the background for the unusual statement made by Defense Minister Yoav Gallant in front of cameras last week, when he stated that "the end of the war must be anchored in diplomatic action. Diplomacy leads the military. I presented a plan to the government. It is the government's duty to discuss the matter."
The defense minister did not publicly specify which international factors are supposed to take responsibility for the Gaza Strip on the day after the war, according to his proposal. Neither did the Prime Minister. In fact, Israel has not yet presented any plan for the day after.
It would seem that Minister Gallant stated the obvious. Every basic military studies course begins with the aphorism of the Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz, stating that war is the continuation of politics by other means, and vice versa.
However, beyond the question of what diplomatic move is required, the fact that the defense minister conveyed his message to the prime minister and other cabinet members through a television broadcast rather than a face-to-face meeting carries significant, negative implications.
At the beginning of the war, I wrote here that the prime minister and defense minister were not speaking with each other. Since then, the situation has only worsened, and it is even reflected in Gallant leaving the war cabinet meeting on Saturday night after he was not allowed to bring his aides with him.
In the end, Gallant attended the meeting, but it is important to understand that the toxic relationships at the top of our security establishment are not merely gossip. They pose a threat to our national resilience. While disharmony is not uncommon at the highest levels of our security and political leadership, the relationship between Galant and Netanyahu, especially, is starting to resemble the mutual disdain they had in the days preceding Gallant's dismissal by Netanyahu in March of last year.
This week, there were several alarming signs regarding the conduct of both the military and diplomatic echelons. One of them was the farce regarding the supply of medications to the hostages. The details surrounding this saga were extensively published.
What is particularly concerning is that after such a prolonged war, we are still dealing with a few boxes of medications that may have reached Gaza, rather than the return of the hostages themselves. Moreover, Israel still does not seem to be in a position to dictate terms to Hamas. If this is the case, it is challenging to envision the hostages returning home. The claim that military pressure will lead to their release has not proven itself.
The threat of the Zolfaghar
Other noteworthy occurrences this past week are related to the intensification of tensions in the relations between Israel and the United States, as well as Jordan, which joined as a party to the lawsuit against Israel at the ICJ in The Hague.
On one hand, the Hashemite regime in Jordan depends on Israel for its survival. On the other hand, there are security challenges for both Israel and Jordan along the long border they share, where only a few military forces are stationed.
The diplomatic tension between Israel and Jordan will not improve the security situation along this border. Especially when there are signs that Iran is actively working to smuggle large amounts of money and potentially lethal weapons into Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). These weapons could destabilize the area and create an additional security challenge for Israel, in addition to the fighting in the Gaza Strip and the north.
Indeed, in addition to the ramming attack in Ra'anana carried out by illegal residents from Hebron, there has been an increase in alerts for potential attacks in the territories of Judea and Samaria. The IDF and the Shin Bet are working around the clock to prevent planned attacks. The main operations this past week in the Judea and Samaria region focused on Nablus and the Tul Karm area, including targeted aerial eliminations of terrorist cells, which have become almost routine, similar to the situation in Gaza.
Regarding the northern front, Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi stated this week that the risk of war with Hezbollah is growing. Rightfully so. We're almost there. Direct firing towards Kfar Yuval, in which a mother and son were murdered, and also unprecedented artillery and aerial attacks on Hezbollah targets in the Saluki Valley, could be signs of an imminent multi-dimensional war. Both sides are not interested in it yet, at least not at this time, but expectations may materialize.
Parallel to its smugglings through the Jordanian border, Iran is also intensifying its support for Hezbollah in preparation for a possible all-out war against Israel. Particularly noteworthy is the concern that Hezbollah will acquire the Zolfaghar missile, the pride and joy of the Iranian arms industry.
This missile has a range of 700 kilometers, a warhead weighing half a ton, and a guidance mechanism that can lead it to a target with an accuracy of about 60 meters. If it appears on the scene, Hezbollah is likely to attempt to launch it while simultaneously firing thousands of "dumb" rockets to complicate interception by Israeli defense systems.
“A 720-degree war”
In the Gaza Strip, the main effort is still focused on destroying the extensive tunnel infrastructure underground.
Because it would take years to destroy every meter of tunnels, if at all, this past week's focus was on the tunnels beneath the city of Khan Yunis. Severing the connection between the two parts of the Strip is essential to create a new situation, while an IDF divides the Strip from north to south, based on the Gaza River.
In the northern part of the Gaza Strip, where the IDF effectively moved to "Phase C" of the war, relatively few forces operated this week. This allowed Hamas terrorists in some areas to emerge demonstratively from the tunnels and also launch a few larger rockets toward the Israeli town of Netivot. Overall, Hamas is trying to restore the activity of 12 battalions that were allegedly disbanded by the IDF in the northern Gaza Strip.
There are also 12 battalions to the south of the Gaza River line. So far, the IDF has managed to inflict significant damage on five of them, in the area of the central camps and Khan Yunis. However, seven battalions have not been significantly affected yet. Four of them are located in the Rafah region, which has not been dealt with at all, and a permanent solution has not yet been decided upon regarding disconnecting the Gaza Strip from the Egyptian territory in tunnels beneath the Philadelphi Corridor.
Until a decision is made regarding Rafah, the main effort is focused on the city of Khan Yunis, beneath which senior Hamas members and a significant portion of the hostages may still be located.
On Wednesday, the Golani Brigade's combat team raided Hamas’ Shuhada outpost, in the southernmost part of Khan Yunis, which is also the southernmost area reached by the IDF so far. This was done during heavy tank fire and after intense artillery and air force bombardment.
Exchanges of fire with light weaponry were also significant. The open terrain in this area is extensive, and the buildings are not tall. The armored bulldozer, the D9, the IDF’s “combat king” in the Gaza Strip during this war, demolished wall after wall to allow the advancing forces to progress, while the engineering demolition team did their part. Dozens of terrorists were killed by the end of the battle. Unfortunately, also IDF forces continue suffering casualties.
The determined battle of the 4th Brigade in the heart of Khan Yunis can also provide insights into the challenge in its current form: the brigade operates under Division 98, which received the mission to occupy Khan Yunis after the hostage deal truce.
This is the only reserve armored brigade based on Merkava Mark 4 tanks, but the IDF operates with integrated combat teams that span from infantry, engineering company, and up to the battalion level, combining armored and infantry elements. In addition to tank crews, there are battalions of reservists based on paratroopers and Nahal Brigade veterans.
This is a 720-degree warzone, IDF commanders tell me, facing a unique challenge that no army has faced before in the world. The enemy can unexpectedly approach from terrain that has already been traversed, so there is a need to remain vigilant and aware of everything happening both in front and behind.
Fighting in tall buildings is conducted in parallel with the massive effort below ground. The IDF does not disclose all the methods it employs against Hamas in the tunnels, but it can be said that technologies have been developed for both detecting and destroying them.
It should be mentioned that the IDF does not use toxic gases in the tunnels due to international conventions prohibiting such actions. The use of gas arose as speculation following the deaths of hostages inside the tunnels after it was revealed that there were no signs of gunshot wounds or other physical harm on them.
The IDF believes that the name of the game is to employ lessons learned as quickly as possible. Hamas is learning its own lessons from confrontations with the IDF after each battle. The IDF centralizes the production of lessons at the general level, led by Brigadier General Guy Hazut, who returned to this role after serving as an attaché in Singapore.
In parallel, each brigade and division has its own team for extracting lessons. Commanders invest significant time in this, and some of the lessons are transmitted in real-time, even through immediate message groups on encrypted military cell phones.
One of the surprising lessons of the Armored Corps is that in addition to the Trophy active protection system being effective against Hamas’ anti-tank threat, the “reactive defense” method, based on hundreds of small explosives surrounding the tank, also gets the job done.
The reservists of the Armored Corps’ 4th Division have been on the front continuously since October 7th, and this highlights the issue of attrition in the IDF due to the prolonged war. The need for refreshment is part of the reason why the IDF reorganized its forces this week, withdrawing Brigade 36 from the central region. The brigade, including the Golan Division, which has suffered nearly 100 casualties since that bitter morning, will now prepare for the next mission – which could also take place in the north.
Lieberman's pessimism
A few days ago, I asked to speak with Knesset member Avigdor Lieberman to hear his perspective. It is clear to me, on the one hand, that Lieberman cannot be "objective" as a key political figure (Lieberman is still willing to join the government, but only for a wartime period, if he is in the war cabinet and not in the expanded cabinet).
On the other hand, he was the Defense Minister for two and a half years, and to his credit, it will always be remembered that he warned of the long-term consequences of the way Hamas was handled when he resigned from his position on November 14, 2018. Lieberman was far from being optimistic when we spoke. In fact, he was very pessimistic.
“The government has no ability to create an endgame," argued Lieberman. "Not in Gaza, not in the north, not against the Houthis. Nothing can happen with the forces currently making up the cabinet. There won't be a diplomatic move to end the war that jeopardizes the integrity of the coalition, which is above all, and the Saudis won't engage in any post-ceasefire move without involving the Palestinians
"In the current situation, the government cannot even make a decision on a pilot project for the entry of workers from Judea and Samaria. In addition, the prime minister is also under pressure from the United States. In my estimation, nothing significant will change in the situation until the National Unity party withdraws from the government. When they do, the snowball effect will begin, leading to a change."
I'd love to hear your thoughts and comments. Be in touch with me directly via Twitter and LinkedIn
