Amir Rapaport’s Column: The IDF Is Intensifying the Escalation on the Northern Front while Seeking “Victory” in Gaza
The military plans had a fundamental flaw concerning the meaning of victory, which was supposed to be swift. Now, Israel is attempting to expedite the (temporary) conclusion of the war, at least against Hezbollah
Amir Rapaport
| 13/01/2024
The most significant events this past week occurred in Israel’s northern arena. The series of assassinations and attacks attributed to Israel there, in turn, raised the threshold of Hezbollah's response.
These are the most significant attacks attributed to Israel in Lebanon: the assassination of Ali Hassan Braj, commander of Hezbollah's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system in his hometown of Hirbat Salim. This occurred just days after the assassination of Radwan Force commander Wissam al-Tawil.
This happened just a week after the assassination of Salah al-Aruri in the heart of Dahiyeh in Beirut, also attributed to Israel, and after the assassination of senior Iranian Quds Force commander Reza Musawi on Syrian soil.
For its part, Hezbollah launched a powerful missile attack last Saturday toward the Israel Air Force control unit in Meron, followed by a drone attack on the Northern Command headquarters near Safed on Tuesday.
Most of the missiles were intercepted. One drone exploded in the parking lot of the command without causing damage or casualties. It's possible that Hezbollah has not yet uttered the final word in its revenge plans.
In any case, the acceleration of the escalation is not necessarily contrary to Israeli interests. To understand why, one can go back to October 8th when Nasrallah joined the fray and opened a northern front against Israel.
Hezbollah’s “bonus”
Hezbollah’s stated goal was to draw significant IDF forces to the north, thereby contributing to its "brothers" from Hamas, but not necessarily more than that.
The plan succeeded, with an additional "bonus" for Hezbollah: a strategic psychological achievement based on the fact that tens of thousands of Israelis from dozens of communities along the northern border have been displaced from their homes for over three months now.
Thus, a security belt has been created within Israeli territory instead of within Lebanon. This marks the first evacuation of communities in the north since the early days of Zionism.
In hindsight, many in the defense establishment believe that the evacuation, including that of the city of Kiryat Shmona, was hasty and wrong. It is possible that it was precisely this move that gave Hezbollah the legitimacy to launch anti-tank guided missiles and rockets toward civilian homes, something that might not have occurred if they were still populated.
At the same time, the declarations by the political echelon stating that the residents of the north would not return to their homes without Hezbollah's Radwan Forcs moving north beyond the Litani River created a problem for Israel. It is challenging to envision such developments occurring solely due to international efforts, which continued this week under the leadership of the American mediator Amos Hochstein and behind-the-scenes French diplomats.
From Hezbollah's perspective, the confrontation with Israel, "below the threshold of full-scale war," is supposed to continue as long as the war against Hamas in Gaza persists. However, as the direction of the fighting in Gaza is expected to continue for a long time, with intensity rising and falling, Israel, on its side, must break this connection to enable the return of residents of the north to their homes. But how can this be done?
Here is the place to mention a few fundamental assumptions regarding the northern front: Hezbollah is not Hamas, for better or worse. For worse, its military capabilities are significantly greater, and the topography for warfare in Lebanon, if required, is much more challenging (except for the issue of tunnels, where the military challenge in Gaza is unparalleled globally).
However, Hezbollah does not intend to fight until the last drop of blood for the sake of Yahya Sinwar. Unlike Hamas, which has succeeded, partly due to its audacity and to a large extent because of the naivety of the United States, in deflecting responsibility for the supply of food and basic conditions for the population in Gaza onto its doorstep (to the point where we are facing trial at the International Court of Justice and how this fanatical terror organization) Hezbollah has a state-like responsibility. Hezbollah indeed lacks any internal legitimacy to open a comprehensive war against Israel. The leaders of other communities in Lebanon have already made this crystal clear.
A problematic timing for another war
There are indeed more reasons why this is a very inconvenient time for Hezbollah to open a war against Israel. One of them is that Hamas has taken away Hezbollah's significant element of surprise.
The IDF will not be caught so completely off guard again, as it was on October 7th. Iran also would not want Hezbollah to roll into a full-scale war against Israel before it declares that it has a nuclear bomb in its possession. Iran is currently increasing its uranium enrichment, raising concerns, but it seems that it will take at least another couple of years for it to become officially nuclear, if it decides to go that route.
Now is also not a good time for Israel to face a full-out war with Hezbollah. We lack a potential advantage of surprise at the moment, like the opening move of the Second Lebanon War.
At that time, it was possible to destroy Hezbollah's entire Fajr missile system in one fell swoop, unlike the remaining Kornet missiles in their possession. Additionally, the winter weather conditions pose a challenge for the IDF since it is a factor in play, even though it does not completely negate its technological advantage.
This enabled the destruction of Hezbollah's Fajr missile array at one go, unlike the remaining Katyusha missiles in its possession. The winter weather conditions also pose a problem for the IDF, even if it does not completely negate its technological advantage.
The IDF, of course, also needs time to focus on the Gaza front, replenish ammunition stockpiles, and rehabilitate reserve forces (as well as the economy). If there is no other option, a full-scale war against Hezbollah will be waged immediately. However, it is preferable for Israel that the war does not start before the next summer.
However, how do we achieve calm on the northern border and return residents to their homes, at least until then?
Israel, it seems, is sending signals through attributed assassinations, conveying a message that it is willing to lay all the cards on the table and engage in a full-scale war after all.
In the imaginary poker game, Nasrallah is now the one who needs to decide whether to increase his bet or fold. This is while he understands the intelligence penetration of his organization and when he himself could be one of the next targets for assassination (finally).
To sharpen a few more "signals," the Northern Command is also operating the "Influence Unit." It may coordinate some of its actions with the head of the Upper Galilee Regional Council, Giora Saltz, who surprised this week by stating that the residents of the north would agree to return to their homes if Hezbollah is effectively pushed beyond the direct firing range of anti-tank missiles towards Israeli communities (about six kilometers). He did not repeat the condition of withdrawal beyond the Litani River as a prerequisite for the return.
In the event of recurrent bombardments, the IDF is actively working to destroy any position associated with Hezbollah within the mentioned six-kilometer perimeter, and Hezbollah is indeed relocating northward from them.
The IDF may transform this area into a de facto “kill zone.” Is this the new reality that the IDF is shaping on the northern border? Whether it will be sufficient to bring residents back to their homes remains to be seen. Time, perhaps not a long time, will tell.
Disinformation regarding the hostages
While Israel has taken the initiative on the northern front, it must be acknowledged that when it comes to the goal of the battle related to the return of hostages from Gaza, it is far from a breakthrough.
On this matter, all of us should approach media publications with a degree of skepticism. Most reports on the subject, whether from media outlets worldwide or from "official sources" in Israel, are primarily disinformation, part of the psychological warfare between Israel and Hamas.
What is the truth? There are initial talks towards a new deal between Israel and Hamas, possibly mediated by Qatar or Egypt, but there is no practical proposal on the table. There is no offer, as purportedly published, suggesting that Israel will cease hostilities in exchange for the exile of Yehiya Sinwar and other top Hamas figures from the Gaza Strip, along with a prisoner exchange for captives. It seems to be more of wishful thinking from certain elements in Israel than a practical possibility.
Experience teaches us that Hamas intends to carry out what it states regarding the hostages it is holding. Thus, shortly after Gilad Shalit was kidnapped in 2006, Hamas demanded the release of 1000 prisoners held by Israel in exchange for his release. It took Israel five years to agree to the initially proposed deal, ultimately releasing 1057 prisoners, including Yahya Sinwar himself.
Now, Hamas is demanding the release of all prisoners held by Israel in exchange for our captives, alongside a complete cessation of the war.
This message is credible, and therefore Israel has two main options for the return of the hostages: either acquiesce to most of Hamas's demands, if not all, where the implication is a failure to achieve the goals of the war, if not outright defeat, or deepen the pursuit in the tunnels in Khan Yunis. The ultimate goal here is to physically reach Yahya Sinwar and the sought-after figures accompanying him – his brothers Mohammed, Marwan Issa, and Mohammed Deif.
The hope is that when their lives are genuinely at risk, or after they are assassinated, it will be possible to save at least some of the captives. By the way, the assassination in the Bureij refugee camp of Salah al-Aruri, the head of the military wing of Hamas in the West Bank, in addition to his role as Deputy Chairman of the Political Bureau, is likely aimed at illustrating to Sinwar and his associates the danger in assassinations and assisting in the issue of returning the captives. In the meantime, the chances of rescuing the captives are not high. This is the true and not encouraging picture of this difficult issue.
A dramatic battle in Khan Yunis
The fighting in Khan Yunis has been led since the end of the ceasefire by the 98th Division. We are approaching the peak of one of the battles that will undoubtedly enter world military history: no less than seven brigades operate under the division's command, under the leadership of Colonel Dan Goldfus, within an urban warfare zone – its underground part is much deeper than the height of the structures above the ground. The height of the buildings mostly reaches 2-3 floors, not more. The tunnels extend dozens of meters in depth.
A glimpse into the incomprehensible complexity of this underground subterranean network could be seen on Wednesday, when the IDF released footage from a tunnel where cages were discovered, presumably holding several captives before the IDF arrived: the tunnel branches in countless directions and includes a massive number of levels, some connected by ladders. Its maximum depth is about 20 meters. Above the tunnel lies the center of the city of Khan Yunis, bustling with life on ordinary days.
According to the IDF, dozens of tunnels have been destroyed in the Khan Yunis area alone, as well as around 300 shafts. Destruction of shafts and tunnels is also taking place in the adjacent combat zones near the refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip, north of Khan Yunis, led by Brigade 36. It was there that the incomprehensible disaster occurred, where six soldiers were killed and dozens were injured by the premature detonation of explosives prepared for the destruction of a tunnel, activated prematurely due to tank fire.
This tragedy, in which singer Idan Amedi was also injured, highlights, on the one hand, the incomprehensible bravery of the combat engineering soldiers in carrying out their various tasks. On the other hand, it also underscores the fact that the IDF faces serious safety challenges, including the risk of accidental explosions and the inherent danger of our forces engaging our own forces.
Meanwhile, concurrently, in the heart of the Gaza Strip, the 99th Division is deploying, crossing between the southern and northern parts based on the Gaza River line, between the area facing Kibbutz Be'eri and the sea. In the northern part of the Gaza Strip, forces have been significantly reduced, as the IDF has entered “Phase C” of the war, which will concentrate on raids from inside Israel or the “separation zone.”
The IDF’s weak point continues to be the fact that it has not yet taken ground action in the Rafah area, where underground tunnels may still exist for the smuggling of people and weapons between Egyptian and Palestinian territory. This is despite the Egyptians flooding the area with seawater.
Before the war concludes, Israel will need to find a way to ensure a thorough closure of the underground in the Rafah area, so that the Gaza Strip remains demilitarized. On the other hand, as the international legal proceedings unfold in The Hague, Israel's hands are tied to a large extent. In Rafah, hundreds of thousands of refugees are crowded, who fled earlier from the north, following IDF instructions.
Any ground operation there would endanger the lives of thousands. Beyond that, in the long run, it is preferable for Israel not to control the Philadelphi Corridor that separates Sinai from the Gaza Strip, so that it can argue that it has no international legal responsibility for what happens in the Gaza Strip, under international law.
Therefore, the key to the southern border of the Gaza Strip lies in the hands of Egypt, whose interests largely overlap with ours, but past attempts have shown that it is not within its capability (or the will of some of its commanders) to prevent infiltrations.
In any case, it is important to know that beyond talks with Egypt and the fifth visit this past week of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, significant discussions are taking place with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which will contribute substantial funds to the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip if only an arrangement is found that removes Hamas from the picture. If the cabinet conducts the anticipated discussions and presents the desired conclusion image of the war, despite the political risk involved for Benjamin Netanyahu, these financial contributions may become a reality.
A victory image
And from the political to the military perspective. The war has entered its 15th week, despite one of the goals of the multi-year IDF plans being to shorten the duration of wars as much as possible.
When the previous Chief of Staff, Aviv Kochavi, presented this multi-year plant to the political echelon, he also wrote to the IDF commanders that "the goal is to erode the enemy's perception and build military capabilities that will prove to the enemy that its perception is no longer effective. The goal will be achieved through adapting the capabilities, methods of warfare, and the structure of the IDF. The essence of the change is to create the most improved combat capability that will lead to high strategic and military achievements in a short time and at acceptable costs."
Kochavi stated that this goal will be implemented through three main ways during the activation of forces: multidimensional maneuvering into enemy territory; precise and multidimensional firepower; and strong multidimensional defense. All three will be executed together, benefiting from closer synergy, leveraging their advantages in the air, intelligence, and data processing to expose and destroy the hidden enemy at a high pace.
To conclude, the IDF has built its capabilities for a relatively short war, anticipating that combined firepower from the air, land, and sea will compel any adversary to seek a ceasefire within days. However, Hamas does not operate according to these plans, and there is no "victory" despite Hezbollah, being significantly stronger, and not fully engaging in the conflict.
Today, it is clear that there were contradictions between the operational plans of the IDF and the way the force was built – and between the goal of achieving a swift victory. I discussed some of these issues in previous weeks, but I will delve further into the main failures in the IDF's "victory concept" soon.
I'd love to hear your thoughts and comments. Be in touch with me directly via Twitter and LinkedIn
The military plans had a fundamental flaw concerning the meaning of victory, which was supposed to be swift. Now, Israel is attempting to expedite the (temporary) conclusion of the war, at least against Hezbollah
The most significant events this past week occurred in Israel’s northern arena. The series of assassinations and attacks attributed to Israel there, in turn, raised the threshold of Hezbollah's response.
These are the most significant attacks attributed to Israel in Lebanon: the assassination of Ali Hassan Braj, commander of Hezbollah's unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) system in his hometown of Hirbat Salim. This occurred just days after the assassination of Radwan Force commander Wissam al-Tawil.
This happened just a week after the assassination of Salah al-Aruri in the heart of Dahiyeh in Beirut, also attributed to Israel, and after the assassination of senior Iranian Quds Force commander Reza Musawi on Syrian soil.
For its part, Hezbollah launched a powerful missile attack last Saturday toward the Israel Air Force control unit in Meron, followed by a drone attack on the Northern Command headquarters near Safed on Tuesday.
Most of the missiles were intercepted. One drone exploded in the parking lot of the command without causing damage or casualties. It's possible that Hezbollah has not yet uttered the final word in its revenge plans.
In any case, the acceleration of the escalation is not necessarily contrary to Israeli interests. To understand why, one can go back to October 8th when Nasrallah joined the fray and opened a northern front against Israel.
Hezbollah’s “bonus”
Hezbollah’s stated goal was to draw significant IDF forces to the north, thereby contributing to its "brothers" from Hamas, but not necessarily more than that.
The plan succeeded, with an additional "bonus" for Hezbollah: a strategic psychological achievement based on the fact that tens of thousands of Israelis from dozens of communities along the northern border have been displaced from their homes for over three months now.
Thus, a security belt has been created within Israeli territory instead of within Lebanon. This marks the first evacuation of communities in the north since the early days of Zionism.
In hindsight, many in the defense establishment believe that the evacuation, including that of the city of Kiryat Shmona, was hasty and wrong. It is possible that it was precisely this move that gave Hezbollah the legitimacy to launch anti-tank guided missiles and rockets toward civilian homes, something that might not have occurred if they were still populated.
At the same time, the declarations by the political echelon stating that the residents of the north would not return to their homes without Hezbollah's Radwan Forcs moving north beyond the Litani River created a problem for Israel. It is challenging to envision such developments occurring solely due to international efforts, which continued this week under the leadership of the American mediator Amos Hochstein and behind-the-scenes French diplomats.
From Hezbollah's perspective, the confrontation with Israel, "below the threshold of full-scale war," is supposed to continue as long as the war against Hamas in Gaza persists. However, as the direction of the fighting in Gaza is expected to continue for a long time, with intensity rising and falling, Israel, on its side, must break this connection to enable the return of residents of the north to their homes. But how can this be done?
Here is the place to mention a few fundamental assumptions regarding the northern front: Hezbollah is not Hamas, for better or worse. For worse, its military capabilities are significantly greater, and the topography for warfare in Lebanon, if required, is much more challenging (except for the issue of tunnels, where the military challenge in Gaza is unparalleled globally).
However, Hezbollah does not intend to fight until the last drop of blood for the sake of Yahya Sinwar. Unlike Hamas, which has succeeded, partly due to its audacity and to a large extent because of the naivety of the United States, in deflecting responsibility for the supply of food and basic conditions for the population in Gaza onto its doorstep (to the point where we are facing trial at the International Court of Justice and how this fanatical terror organization) Hezbollah has a state-like responsibility. Hezbollah indeed lacks any internal legitimacy to open a comprehensive war against Israel. The leaders of other communities in Lebanon have already made this crystal clear.
A problematic timing for another war
There are indeed more reasons why this is a very inconvenient time for Hezbollah to open a war against Israel. One of them is that Hamas has taken away Hezbollah's significant element of surprise.
The IDF will not be caught so completely off guard again, as it was on October 7th. Iran also would not want Hezbollah to roll into a full-scale war against Israel before it declares that it has a nuclear bomb in its possession. Iran is currently increasing its uranium enrichment, raising concerns, but it seems that it will take at least another couple of years for it to become officially nuclear, if it decides to go that route.
Now is also not a good time for Israel to face a full-out war with Hezbollah. We lack a potential advantage of surprise at the moment, like the opening move of the Second Lebanon War.
At that time, it was possible to destroy Hezbollah's entire Fajr missile system in one fell swoop, unlike the remaining Kornet missiles in their possession. Additionally, the winter weather conditions pose a challenge for the IDF since it is a factor in play, even though it does not completely negate its technological advantage.
This enabled the destruction of Hezbollah's Fajr missile array at one go, unlike the remaining Katyusha missiles in its possession. The winter weather conditions also pose a problem for the IDF, even if it does not completely negate its technological advantage.
The IDF, of course, also needs time to focus on the Gaza front, replenish ammunition stockpiles, and rehabilitate reserve forces (as well as the economy). If there is no other option, a full-scale war against Hezbollah will be waged immediately. However, it is preferable for Israel that the war does not start before the next summer.
However, how do we achieve calm on the northern border and return residents to their homes, at least until then?
Israel, it seems, is sending signals through attributed assassinations, conveying a message that it is willing to lay all the cards on the table and engage in a full-scale war after all.
In the imaginary poker game, Nasrallah is now the one who needs to decide whether to increase his bet or fold. This is while he understands the intelligence penetration of his organization and when he himself could be one of the next targets for assassination (finally).
To sharpen a few more "signals," the Northern Command is also operating the "Influence Unit." It may coordinate some of its actions with the head of the Upper Galilee Regional Council, Giora Saltz, who surprised this week by stating that the residents of the north would agree to return to their homes if Hezbollah is effectively pushed beyond the direct firing range of anti-tank missiles towards Israeli communities (about six kilometers). He did not repeat the condition of withdrawal beyond the Litani River as a prerequisite for the return.
In the event of recurrent bombardments, the IDF is actively working to destroy any position associated with Hezbollah within the mentioned six-kilometer perimeter, and Hezbollah is indeed relocating northward from them.
The IDF may transform this area into a de facto “kill zone.” Is this the new reality that the IDF is shaping on the northern border? Whether it will be sufficient to bring residents back to their homes remains to be seen. Time, perhaps not a long time, will tell.
Disinformation regarding the hostages
While Israel has taken the initiative on the northern front, it must be acknowledged that when it comes to the goal of the battle related to the return of hostages from Gaza, it is far from a breakthrough.
On this matter, all of us should approach media publications with a degree of skepticism. Most reports on the subject, whether from media outlets worldwide or from "official sources" in Israel, are primarily disinformation, part of the psychological warfare between Israel and Hamas.
What is the truth? There are initial talks towards a new deal between Israel and Hamas, possibly mediated by Qatar or Egypt, but there is no practical proposal on the table. There is no offer, as purportedly published, suggesting that Israel will cease hostilities in exchange for the exile of Yehiya Sinwar and other top Hamas figures from the Gaza Strip, along with a prisoner exchange for captives. It seems to be more of wishful thinking from certain elements in Israel than a practical possibility.
Experience teaches us that Hamas intends to carry out what it states regarding the hostages it is holding. Thus, shortly after Gilad Shalit was kidnapped in 2006, Hamas demanded the release of 1000 prisoners held by Israel in exchange for his release. It took Israel five years to agree to the initially proposed deal, ultimately releasing 1057 prisoners, including Yahya Sinwar himself.
Now, Hamas is demanding the release of all prisoners held by Israel in exchange for our captives, alongside a complete cessation of the war.
This message is credible, and therefore Israel has two main options for the return of the hostages: either acquiesce to most of Hamas's demands, if not all, where the implication is a failure to achieve the goals of the war, if not outright defeat, or deepen the pursuit in the tunnels in Khan Yunis. The ultimate goal here is to physically reach Yahya Sinwar and the sought-after figures accompanying him – his brothers Mohammed, Marwan Issa, and Mohammed Deif.
The hope is that when their lives are genuinely at risk, or after they are assassinated, it will be possible to save at least some of the captives. By the way, the assassination in the Bureij refugee camp of Salah al-Aruri, the head of the military wing of Hamas in the West Bank, in addition to his role as Deputy Chairman of the Political Bureau, is likely aimed at illustrating to Sinwar and his associates the danger in assassinations and assisting in the issue of returning the captives. In the meantime, the chances of rescuing the captives are not high. This is the true and not encouraging picture of this difficult issue.
A dramatic battle in Khan Yunis
The fighting in Khan Yunis has been led since the end of the ceasefire by the 98th Division. We are approaching the peak of one of the battles that will undoubtedly enter world military history: no less than seven brigades operate under the division's command, under the leadership of Colonel Dan Goldfus, within an urban warfare zone – its underground part is much deeper than the height of the structures above the ground. The height of the buildings mostly reaches 2-3 floors, not more. The tunnels extend dozens of meters in depth.
A glimpse into the incomprehensible complexity of this underground subterranean network could be seen on Wednesday, when the IDF released footage from a tunnel where cages were discovered, presumably holding several captives before the IDF arrived: the tunnel branches in countless directions and includes a massive number of levels, some connected by ladders. Its maximum depth is about 20 meters. Above the tunnel lies the center of the city of Khan Yunis, bustling with life on ordinary days.
According to the IDF, dozens of tunnels have been destroyed in the Khan Yunis area alone, as well as around 300 shafts. Destruction of shafts and tunnels is also taking place in the adjacent combat zones near the refugee camps in the central Gaza Strip, north of Khan Yunis, led by Brigade 36. It was there that the incomprehensible disaster occurred, where six soldiers were killed and dozens were injured by the premature detonation of explosives prepared for the destruction of a tunnel, activated prematurely due to tank fire.
This tragedy, in which singer Idan Amedi was also injured, highlights, on the one hand, the incomprehensible bravery of the combat engineering soldiers in carrying out their various tasks. On the other hand, it also underscores the fact that the IDF faces serious safety challenges, including the risk of accidental explosions and the inherent danger of our forces engaging our own forces.
Meanwhile, concurrently, in the heart of the Gaza Strip, the 99th Division is deploying, crossing between the southern and northern parts based on the Gaza River line, between the area facing Kibbutz Be'eri and the sea. In the northern part of the Gaza Strip, forces have been significantly reduced, as the IDF has entered “Phase C” of the war, which will concentrate on raids from inside Israel or the “separation zone.”
The IDF’s weak point continues to be the fact that it has not yet taken ground action in the Rafah area, where underground tunnels may still exist for the smuggling of people and weapons between Egyptian and Palestinian territory. This is despite the Egyptians flooding the area with seawater.
Before the war concludes, Israel will need to find a way to ensure a thorough closure of the underground in the Rafah area, so that the Gaza Strip remains demilitarized. On the other hand, as the international legal proceedings unfold in The Hague, Israel's hands are tied to a large extent. In Rafah, hundreds of thousands of refugees are crowded, who fled earlier from the north, following IDF instructions.
Any ground operation there would endanger the lives of thousands. Beyond that, in the long run, it is preferable for Israel not to control the Philadelphi Corridor that separates Sinai from the Gaza Strip, so that it can argue that it has no international legal responsibility for what happens in the Gaza Strip, under international law.
Therefore, the key to the southern border of the Gaza Strip lies in the hands of Egypt, whose interests largely overlap with ours, but past attempts have shown that it is not within its capability (or the will of some of its commanders) to prevent infiltrations.
In any case, it is important to know that beyond talks with Egypt and the fifth visit this past week of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, significant discussions are taking place with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which will contribute substantial funds to the rehabilitation of the Gaza Strip if only an arrangement is found that removes Hamas from the picture. If the cabinet conducts the anticipated discussions and presents the desired conclusion image of the war, despite the political risk involved for Benjamin Netanyahu, these financial contributions may become a reality.
A victory image
And from the political to the military perspective. The war has entered its 15th week, despite one of the goals of the multi-year IDF plans being to shorten the duration of wars as much as possible.
When the previous Chief of Staff, Aviv Kochavi, presented this multi-year plant to the political echelon, he also wrote to the IDF commanders that "the goal is to erode the enemy's perception and build military capabilities that will prove to the enemy that its perception is no longer effective. The goal will be achieved through adapting the capabilities, methods of warfare, and the structure of the IDF. The essence of the change is to create the most improved combat capability that will lead to high strategic and military achievements in a short time and at acceptable costs."
Kochavi stated that this goal will be implemented through three main ways during the activation of forces: multidimensional maneuvering into enemy territory; precise and multidimensional firepower; and strong multidimensional defense. All three will be executed together, benefiting from closer synergy, leveraging their advantages in the air, intelligence, and data processing to expose and destroy the hidden enemy at a high pace.
To conclude, the IDF has built its capabilities for a relatively short war, anticipating that combined firepower from the air, land, and sea will compel any adversary to seek a ceasefire within days. However, Hamas does not operate according to these plans, and there is no "victory" despite Hezbollah, being significantly stronger, and not fully engaging in the conflict.
Today, it is clear that there were contradictions between the operational plans of the IDF and the way the force was built – and between the goal of achieving a swift victory. I discussed some of these issues in previous weeks, but I will delve further into the main failures in the IDF's "victory concept" soon.
I'd love to hear your thoughts and comments. Be in touch with me directly via Twitter and LinkedIn
