Towards a Turning Point in the War? Dramatic Developments in Khan Yunis, Beirut, and Tehran
The efforts to bring the hostages home have hit a wall for now, but it seems that Israel has, finally, become the initiator on several fronts. What should we expect in the week to come
Amir Rapaport
| 06/01/2024
For the first time since October 7th, two of Israel's major adversaries, Hezbollah and Iran, are facing two tough alternatives.
Until now, the necessity to choose between very bad options for action was mainly on Israel’s side. Is this a significant turning point in the multi-front war? We may know even in a few days, depending on the moves that will be taken.
In Lebanon, the event cornering Hassan Nasrallah is, of course, the assassination of Salah al-Arouri, deputy head of the political bureau of Hamas, in one hat, and the commander of the organization's terror cells in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) - in another.
The assassination, for which Israel did not take responsibility, took place in the heart of Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut, the famous Dahiyeh neighborhood, which was destroyed by Israel during the Second Lebanon War and has since been rebuilt.
From the perspective of Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Israel violated the equation he created on October 8, which includes Israeli fire retaliating to Lebanese fire only from both sides of the northern border and below a threshold that would lead to a comprehensive war – a scenario in which Nasrallah appears not to be interested.
So far, Nasrallah’s policy has yielded a significant symbolic achievement - the evacuation of dozens of Israeli settlements over time – for the first time since the establishment of the state, and the containment of large IDF forces in the northern arena, as part of an effort to assist Hamas. This, in his view, was enough to justify the decision not to fully join Hamas in the war.
This past week, the overall picture has changed dramatically: the attack in the heart of Dahiyeh is much more than just a humiliation from Nasrallah's perspective – it was carried out despite repeated threats that an attack on Beirut would be intolerable to him, even if the target is not Hezbollah members themselves.
Now, he needs to take a significant response towards Israel if he wants to maintain his “street cred” and deterrence against Israel. On the other hand, he may consider that Israel is now prepared to escalate the conflict to the point of a full-on war in Lebanon.
Nasrallah certainly knows what the cost will be for Lebanon in such a case, and he lacks the domestic mandate to bring about total destruction. Lebanon is already in the midst of an economic collapse, and a war against Israel is the last thing it needs."
A few more insights following the dramatic assassination;
The goal and the execution
It is important to understand that although Salah al-Arouri was assassinated in Lebanon and not in Gaza, the West Bank, or within the borders of the State of Israel (the “regular” operational zones of the Shin Bet), it is still considered a classic target from the list of Israel’s assassinations October 7th, due to his responsibility for terrorism in the West Bank.
The head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, even stated, “We will eliminate senior Hamas figures. It will take years, but that is the mission of our generation” in the leaked recording from the government meeting, which surfaced about two months ago. The execution may be related to that declaration.
In any case, the execution is nothing short of stunning, both operationally and intelligence-wise. It required highly precise intelligence regarding the exact location of Salah al-Arouri's apartment in the heart of Dahiyeh and pinpoint timing to strike when he was inside with the top echelons of Hamas in Lebanon, all without the presence of Hezbollah members or Lebanese civilians in the vicinity.
The assassination was likely carried out using several missiles with a highly sophisticated activation mechanism that caused them to explode only after passing through the outer wall of the targeted apartment.
In this way, significant damage is ensured within the target’s apartment, while causing minimal harm to the surrounding apartments. Despite the extensive destruction seen in Beirut, there were no additional casualties.
In hindsight, it has been suggested that a similar operational opportunity was within Israel's reach earlier stages of the war, but it was not implemented for fear that the Lebanese front would combust prematurely, from Israel's perspective.
Arouri is not the only casualty. Among the five Hamas members killed alongside him, the most significant is Samir Pundi, who built the Hamas infrastructure near the city of Tyre and was responsible for launching dozens of rockets toward Israel during the last Passover holiday.
Azzam al-Akhras, who was also killed, was also no small potato. He was responsible for the Hamas infrastructure in Lebanon and coordinated with Hezbollah and Iran. Salah al-Arouri himself had been a prominent figure at the top of the official Hamas hierarchy for years, and the man behind orchestrating attacks against Israel.
Perhaps the most infamous attack was the abduction and murder of the teenagers Gil-Ad Shaer, Naftali Fraenkel, and Eyal Yifrah in June 2014, before Operation Protective Edge in Gaza. Since October 7th, Salah al-Arouri has successfully orchestrated two shooting attacks resulting in Israeli deaths.
And also this: at the right time, we will need to ask ourselves again (among countless other tough questions) how it happened that the relentless terrorist Salah al-Arouri, who had been in Israeli administrative detention for many years, was released abroad in 2010?
The delusional release occurred during the days when Hamas still held Gilad Shalit in captivity, and Israel did not even find it appropriate to use al-Arouri as a bargaining chip for his release.
How will Hamas and Hezbollah react to the assassination in Lebanon?
This question remains open at the time of writing. It is estimated (cautiously, following October 7th), that Nasrallah will try to stay below the threshold of war this time as well but may still execute an “out of the box” move against Israel.
For example, the possibility that Hezbollah will activate its foreign soil attack mechanism is the reason why the security preparedness at all Israeli representations worldwide has been raised to the highest possible level. Beyond that, there is a reasonable chance that the main response will be carried out by members of Hamas in Lebanon, who lost their leadership, or through attacks from Judea and Samaria, where the anger over the assassination is particularly high.
Regarding Hamas in Lebanon, it is important to remember that at the beginning of the war, Khalil Kharaz, a senior figure in the rocket system, was also assassinated.
Regarding the West Bank, starting from October 7th, Israel has removed all restrictions in its war against Hamas. The Shin Bet and other security forces have already carried out 1,500 quality arrests from Jenin to the southern Hebron Hills and have assassinated 20 Hamas operatives responsible for attacks from Judea and Samaria – some based in Gaza.
During this timeframe, the IDF and the Border Police have also been directing their operations in the West Bank with airstrikes, including the use of precision bombs dropped from fighter jets in exceptional cases. They systematically target refugee camps, considered Hamas strongholds, where no one used to dare to enter – one after another.
So, on Wednesday last week, it was the turn of the refugee camp of Nur ash-Shams near Tulkarm to face a large-scale military incursion. Hamas in Judea and Samaria is already under systematic attack from the security forces of the Palestinian Authority, for its own reasons – not out of affection for Israel.
A blitz on Iran?
And now, the developments vis-à-vis Iran also face Tehran with a major dilemma. Last week, I wrote that the assassination of the senior Al-Quds Force officer Raza Musawi in Damascus could indicate a shift to the “real deal,” signifying a significant escalation in the direct confrontation between Israel and Iran. While Israel did not officially claim responsibility for the assassination of Musavi, Iran will attribute the elimination to Israel without any doubt.
The assassination of Musavi comes a week after a cyberattack that disabled fuel stations in Iran was attributed to Israel, and after Iran itself hinted at a drone attack on a ship linked to Israel, 200 kilometers off the coast of India. It has also been reported that Iran has increased its uranium enrichment levels, advancing towards a bomb. The attack near the building of the Israeli embassy in New Delhi was attributed to Iran, with no casualties reported.
As it would appear, all of that was just the beginning. On Wednesday the major attack at Qasem Soleimani’s memorial ceremony in Kerman took place, for which ISIS claimed responsibility. Israel, of course, did not claim responsibility, but Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi quickly declared that it would regret this. A day later, reports came out about a drone attack against a militia supported by Iran in Iraq. The sequence of events does not seem coincidental.
In this context, it is important to note that Iran is in the midst of a significant effort to provide advanced weaponry to its proxy organizations throughout the Middle East – from the Houthi rebels in Yemen to Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and, of course, to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza through the Philadelphi Route (we'll get to that), as well as in West Bank.
The breach for smuggling weapons into the West Bank is the nearly 300-kilometer border Israel shares with Jordan, where security is quite lax. This defense concept will need to be reassessed after the war.
It is also important to understand that Qasem Soleimani, assassinated by the United States in 2020, was the architect of the “ring of fire” Iran-backed terrorist organizations surrounding Israel.
This perception was explicit from Iran's perspective, so it can be assumed that it was no less than evident from Israel's and its Western allies' point of view to train and arm organizations opposing the Iranian regime, a regime whose domestic popularity is already very low.
Within Iran, some of the significant enemies are millions of people from the Baloch ethnic group in the eastern part of the country, and the Azeris in the north. There are also Iranian Muslims who despise the regime of the Ayatollahs and label themselves as “Mojaheedeen-e Khalq.”
Generally, from both an intelligence and operational standpoint, Iran is a much more challenging theater than Lebanon due to its significant distance. It falls under the "mandate" of the Mossad, with assistance from the IDF Intelligence Directorate.
After the attack in Kerman, the head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, Major General Aharon Haliva, stated that "our intelligence brings about a broad impact on our enemies - from Gaza to Iran.” Mossad Director David (Dadi) Barnea, utilized the eulogy he gave on Wednesday at former director Zvi Zamir’s funeral to convey the message that Mossad is committed to holding accountable all of those involved in the murderous attacks of October 7th.
What might Iran’s reaction be?
It seems that Iran will likely try to exact a price without getting entangled in a comprehensive confrontation with Israel and the United States. However, this week, strangely, there were reports that the U.S. is bringing the USS Ford back home. It was also reported that Iran introduced a military destroyer into the Red Sea routes.
On another front, it appears that the US-led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen is becoming more productive. The Houthis have continued their attempts to attack ships affiliated with Israel, despite losing several of their attack boats this week to the task force this past week. A painful price could also be exerted at the Sana’a air and sea ports. The Houthis and their operators are entangled in this area.
Khan Yunis – the real deal
In the main battleground, facing Hamas in Gaza, every day this week brought the IDF closer to the most significant target of the war – the underground tunnels in Khan Yunis, beneath which the leaders of Hamas and some of the hostages might be found. What we know about what is happening in Khan Yunis is mainly that the IDF has concentrated there no less than seven brigades under the command of Division 98.
Regarding the tunnels, foreign sources have claimed that Israel has been using a flooding system in addition to other technological means, which can only be imagined. The move is carried out with the utmost caution and patience. It is reasonable to assume that Yahya Sinwar and his associates in the leadership of Hamas still have several escape routes - probably to the south.
To the north of Khan Yunis, forces from the 36th Division have been operating in areas like the Dir al-Balah and Nusseirat refugee camps. Rocket fire towards the central Erez area was carried out this week from areas in the center that had not been reached yet - between the forces and the sea.
In the northern part of the Gaza Strip, the IDF, in essence, moved to the third and more limited phase of fighting, which allows for the release of thousands of reserve soldiers. In the less intensive fighting there, Hamas terrorists continue to carry out sporadic attacks either individually or in very small groups – using anti-tank missiles and explosives.
The results sometimes depend on luck as well. Here's an example from an event that wasn't made public and happened just one hour before the battle in which nine soldiers, including Golani's 13th Battalion commander, Lt. Col. Tomer Greenberg, were killed in Shuja'iyya.
It turns out that in the same place, a missile was fired that narrowly missed Golani Brigade Commander Colonel Yair Pelai and Brigadier General (res.) Moshe 'Chico' Tamir, who serves in a senior role in the Southern Command during the war. Pelai and Tamir, positioned side by side, were unharmed, although they were close enough to feel the missile’s heat.
Parallel to the fighting, the “Perimeter” is starting to be constructed. It is a kilometer-wide area where any Gazan approaching after the war will encounter fire. It is still unclear whether this Perimeter will be controlled from the security fence or if the IDF will establish outposts.
Regarding the hostages, also this past week did not bring any good news. Regardless of the assassination in Beirut, contacts regarding a release deal now seem to have low chances of success. Hamas climbed up a tall branch, claiming that it would not agree to return additional hostages without a complete cessation of fighting and the withdrawal of all forces back to Israel. In the meantime, it remains on that branch. Despite the differences, channels with Hamas are preserved—through Qatar led by the Mossad, and through Egypt, led by the Shin Bet.
Egypt is key
The head of Mossad, Ronen Bar, speaks often with the Egyptian Minister of Intelligence Abbas Kamel.
The Egyptians are a key player in another issue that requires a solution from Israel - how to build a barrier along the Philadelphi Corridor that separates the Gaza Strip from the Sinai Peninsula.
Changes in the modes of operation along the Philadelphi Corridor may require updates to the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt since 1979, but the main problem is that in the Rafah area, masses of Palestinians are crowded, many of whom have been displaced from the northern Gaza Strip according to IDF instructions at the beginning of the fighting. The construction of an underground barrier, similar to the one built between the Gaza Strip and Israel, will be a costly and prolonged project.
A barrier must be in place, in any case; otherwise, it will be impossible to contain the Gaza Strip in the long run. This is clear to all the involved parties. Meanwhile, Egypt is flooding the tunnel area with seawater in case there are still active smuggling tunnels there.
The Philadelphi issue is also related to the question of the comprehensive arrangement that will be in the Gaza Strip after the war, which is a political challenge for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, will visit Israel this week to discuss this issue as well.
The military echelon still does not know what the “day after’ in Gaza will look like. A similar situation occurred after 23 days of fighting within the Gaza Strip, towards the end of Operation Cast Lead in January 2010.
The Chief of Staff at the time, Major General Gabi Ashkenazi, sought clear instructions from the government headed by Ehud Olmert but did not receive them. Ashkenazi told the Prime Minister and ministers that “the IDF is not the detonator of the government's explosions.” Eventually, he decided to withdraw the forces and the government declared a unilateral ceasefire, which lasted only a short while.
Now, as Israel enters its 14th week of war, the IDF is still preparing for ongoing combat, with changing intensity. What will be the goal for the "day after" this time?
The efforts to bring the hostages home have hit a wall for now, but it seems that Israel has, finally, become the initiator on several fronts. What should we expect in the week to come
For the first time since October 7th, two of Israel's major adversaries, Hezbollah and Iran, are facing two tough alternatives.
Until now, the necessity to choose between very bad options for action was mainly on Israel’s side. Is this a significant turning point in the multi-front war? We may know even in a few days, depending on the moves that will be taken.
In Lebanon, the event cornering Hassan Nasrallah is, of course, the assassination of Salah al-Arouri, deputy head of the political bureau of Hamas, in one hat, and the commander of the organization's terror cells in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) - in another.
The assassination, for which Israel did not take responsibility, took place in the heart of Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut, the famous Dahiyeh neighborhood, which was destroyed by Israel during the Second Lebanon War and has since been rebuilt.
From the perspective of Hezbollah's Secretary-General, Israel violated the equation he created on October 8, which includes Israeli fire retaliating to Lebanese fire only from both sides of the northern border and below a threshold that would lead to a comprehensive war – a scenario in which Nasrallah appears not to be interested.
So far, Nasrallah’s policy has yielded a significant symbolic achievement - the evacuation of dozens of Israeli settlements over time – for the first time since the establishment of the state, and the containment of large IDF forces in the northern arena, as part of an effort to assist Hamas. This, in his view, was enough to justify the decision not to fully join Hamas in the war.
This past week, the overall picture has changed dramatically: the attack in the heart of Dahiyeh is much more than just a humiliation from Nasrallah's perspective – it was carried out despite repeated threats that an attack on Beirut would be intolerable to him, even if the target is not Hezbollah members themselves.
Now, he needs to take a significant response towards Israel if he wants to maintain his “street cred” and deterrence against Israel. On the other hand, he may consider that Israel is now prepared to escalate the conflict to the point of a full-on war in Lebanon.
Nasrallah certainly knows what the cost will be for Lebanon in such a case, and he lacks the domestic mandate to bring about total destruction. Lebanon is already in the midst of an economic collapse, and a war against Israel is the last thing it needs."
A few more insights following the dramatic assassination;
The goal and the execution
It is important to understand that although Salah al-Arouri was assassinated in Lebanon and not in Gaza, the West Bank, or within the borders of the State of Israel (the “regular” operational zones of the Shin Bet), it is still considered a classic target from the list of Israel’s assassinations October 7th, due to his responsibility for terrorism in the West Bank.
The head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, even stated, “We will eliminate senior Hamas figures. It will take years, but that is the mission of our generation” in the leaked recording from the government meeting, which surfaced about two months ago. The execution may be related to that declaration.
In any case, the execution is nothing short of stunning, both operationally and intelligence-wise. It required highly precise intelligence regarding the exact location of Salah al-Arouri's apartment in the heart of Dahiyeh and pinpoint timing to strike when he was inside with the top echelons of Hamas in Lebanon, all without the presence of Hezbollah members or Lebanese civilians in the vicinity.
The assassination was likely carried out using several missiles with a highly sophisticated activation mechanism that caused them to explode only after passing through the outer wall of the targeted apartment.
In this way, significant damage is ensured within the target’s apartment, while causing minimal harm to the surrounding apartments. Despite the extensive destruction seen in Beirut, there were no additional casualties.
In hindsight, it has been suggested that a similar operational opportunity was within Israel's reach earlier stages of the war, but it was not implemented for fear that the Lebanese front would combust prematurely, from Israel's perspective.
Arouri is not the only casualty. Among the five Hamas members killed alongside him, the most significant is Samir Pundi, who built the Hamas infrastructure near the city of Tyre and was responsible for launching dozens of rockets toward Israel during the last Passover holiday.
Azzam al-Akhras, who was also killed, was also no small potato. He was responsible for the Hamas infrastructure in Lebanon and coordinated with Hezbollah and Iran. Salah al-Arouri himself had been a prominent figure at the top of the official Hamas hierarchy for years, and the man behind orchestrating attacks against Israel.
Perhaps the most infamous attack was the abduction and murder of the teenagers Gil-Ad Shaer, Naftali Fraenkel, and Eyal Yifrah in June 2014, before Operation Protective Edge in Gaza. Since October 7th, Salah al-Arouri has successfully orchestrated two shooting attacks resulting in Israeli deaths.
And also this: at the right time, we will need to ask ourselves again (among countless other tough questions) how it happened that the relentless terrorist Salah al-Arouri, who had been in Israeli administrative detention for many years, was released abroad in 2010?
The delusional release occurred during the days when Hamas still held Gilad Shalit in captivity, and Israel did not even find it appropriate to use al-Arouri as a bargaining chip for his release.
How will Hamas and Hezbollah react to the assassination in Lebanon?
This question remains open at the time of writing. It is estimated (cautiously, following October 7th), that Nasrallah will try to stay below the threshold of war this time as well but may still execute an “out of the box” move against Israel.
For example, the possibility that Hezbollah will activate its foreign soil attack mechanism is the reason why the security preparedness at all Israeli representations worldwide has been raised to the highest possible level. Beyond that, there is a reasonable chance that the main response will be carried out by members of Hamas in Lebanon, who lost their leadership, or through attacks from Judea and Samaria, where the anger over the assassination is particularly high.
Regarding Hamas in Lebanon, it is important to remember that at the beginning of the war, Khalil Kharaz, a senior figure in the rocket system, was also assassinated.
Regarding the West Bank, starting from October 7th, Israel has removed all restrictions in its war against Hamas. The Shin Bet and other security forces have already carried out 1,500 quality arrests from Jenin to the southern Hebron Hills and have assassinated 20 Hamas operatives responsible for attacks from Judea and Samaria – some based in Gaza.
During this timeframe, the IDF and the Border Police have also been directing their operations in the West Bank with airstrikes, including the use of precision bombs dropped from fighter jets in exceptional cases. They systematically target refugee camps, considered Hamas strongholds, where no one used to dare to enter – one after another.
So, on Wednesday last week, it was the turn of the refugee camp of Nur ash-Shams near Tulkarm to face a large-scale military incursion. Hamas in Judea and Samaria is already under systematic attack from the security forces of the Palestinian Authority, for its own reasons – not out of affection for Israel.
A blitz on Iran?
And now, the developments vis-à-vis Iran also face Tehran with a major dilemma. Last week, I wrote that the assassination of the senior Al-Quds Force officer Raza Musawi in Damascus could indicate a shift to the “real deal,” signifying a significant escalation in the direct confrontation between Israel and Iran. While Israel did not officially claim responsibility for the assassination of Musavi, Iran will attribute the elimination to Israel without any doubt.
The assassination of Musavi comes a week after a cyberattack that disabled fuel stations in Iran was attributed to Israel, and after Iran itself hinted at a drone attack on a ship linked to Israel, 200 kilometers off the coast of India. It has also been reported that Iran has increased its uranium enrichment levels, advancing towards a bomb. The attack near the building of the Israeli embassy in New Delhi was attributed to Iran, with no casualties reported.
As it would appear, all of that was just the beginning. On Wednesday the major attack at Qasem Soleimani’s memorial ceremony in Kerman took place, for which ISIS claimed responsibility. Israel, of course, did not claim responsibility, but Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi quickly declared that it would regret this. A day later, reports came out about a drone attack against a militia supported by Iran in Iraq. The sequence of events does not seem coincidental.
In this context, it is important to note that Iran is in the midst of a significant effort to provide advanced weaponry to its proxy organizations throughout the Middle East – from the Houthi rebels in Yemen to Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and, of course, to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza through the Philadelphi Route (we'll get to that), as well as in West Bank.
The breach for smuggling weapons into the West Bank is the nearly 300-kilometer border Israel shares with Jordan, where security is quite lax. This defense concept will need to be reassessed after the war.
It is also important to understand that Qasem Soleimani, assassinated by the United States in 2020, was the architect of the “ring of fire” Iran-backed terrorist organizations surrounding Israel.
This perception was explicit from Iran's perspective, so it can be assumed that it was no less than evident from Israel's and its Western allies' point of view to train and arm organizations opposing the Iranian regime, a regime whose domestic popularity is already very low.
Within Iran, some of the significant enemies are millions of people from the Baloch ethnic group in the eastern part of the country, and the Azeris in the north. There are also Iranian Muslims who despise the regime of the Ayatollahs and label themselves as “Mojaheedeen-e Khalq.”
Generally, from both an intelligence and operational standpoint, Iran is a much more challenging theater than Lebanon due to its significant distance. It falls under the "mandate" of the Mossad, with assistance from the IDF Intelligence Directorate.
After the attack in Kerman, the head of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, Major General Aharon Haliva, stated that "our intelligence brings about a broad impact on our enemies - from Gaza to Iran.” Mossad Director David (Dadi) Barnea, utilized the eulogy he gave on Wednesday at former director Zvi Zamir’s funeral to convey the message that Mossad is committed to holding accountable all of those involved in the murderous attacks of October 7th.
What might Iran’s reaction be?
It seems that Iran will likely try to exact a price without getting entangled in a comprehensive confrontation with Israel and the United States. However, this week, strangely, there were reports that the U.S. is bringing the USS Ford back home. It was also reported that Iran introduced a military destroyer into the Red Sea routes.
On another front, it appears that the US-led coalition against the Houthis in Yemen is becoming more productive. The Houthis have continued their attempts to attack ships affiliated with Israel, despite losing several of their attack boats this week to the task force this past week. A painful price could also be exerted at the Sana’a air and sea ports. The Houthis and their operators are entangled in this area.
Khan Yunis – the real deal
In the main battleground, facing Hamas in Gaza, every day this week brought the IDF closer to the most significant target of the war – the underground tunnels in Khan Yunis, beneath which the leaders of Hamas and some of the hostages might be found. What we know about what is happening in Khan Yunis is mainly that the IDF has concentrated there no less than seven brigades under the command of Division 98.
Regarding the tunnels, foreign sources have claimed that Israel has been using a flooding system in addition to other technological means, which can only be imagined. The move is carried out with the utmost caution and patience. It is reasonable to assume that Yahya Sinwar and his associates in the leadership of Hamas still have several escape routes - probably to the south.
To the north of Khan Yunis, forces from the 36th Division have been operating in areas like the Dir al-Balah and Nusseirat refugee camps. Rocket fire towards the central Erez area was carried out this week from areas in the center that had not been reached yet - between the forces and the sea.
In the northern part of the Gaza Strip, the IDF, in essence, moved to the third and more limited phase of fighting, which allows for the release of thousands of reserve soldiers. In the less intensive fighting there, Hamas terrorists continue to carry out sporadic attacks either individually or in very small groups – using anti-tank missiles and explosives.
The results sometimes depend on luck as well. Here's an example from an event that wasn't made public and happened just one hour before the battle in which nine soldiers, including Golani's 13th Battalion commander, Lt. Col. Tomer Greenberg, were killed in Shuja'iyya.
It turns out that in the same place, a missile was fired that narrowly missed Golani Brigade Commander Colonel Yair Pelai and Brigadier General (res.) Moshe 'Chico' Tamir, who serves in a senior role in the Southern Command during the war. Pelai and Tamir, positioned side by side, were unharmed, although they were close enough to feel the missile’s heat.
Parallel to the fighting, the “Perimeter” is starting to be constructed. It is a kilometer-wide area where any Gazan approaching after the war will encounter fire. It is still unclear whether this Perimeter will be controlled from the security fence or if the IDF will establish outposts.
Regarding the hostages, also this past week did not bring any good news. Regardless of the assassination in Beirut, contacts regarding a release deal now seem to have low chances of success. Hamas climbed up a tall branch, claiming that it would not agree to return additional hostages without a complete cessation of fighting and the withdrawal of all forces back to Israel. In the meantime, it remains on that branch. Despite the differences, channels with Hamas are preserved—through Qatar led by the Mossad, and through Egypt, led by the Shin Bet.
Egypt is key
The head of Mossad, Ronen Bar, speaks often with the Egyptian Minister of Intelligence Abbas Kamel.
The Egyptians are a key player in another issue that requires a solution from Israel - how to build a barrier along the Philadelphi Corridor that separates the Gaza Strip from the Sinai Peninsula.
Changes in the modes of operation along the Philadelphi Corridor may require updates to the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt since 1979, but the main problem is that in the Rafah area, masses of Palestinians are crowded, many of whom have been displaced from the northern Gaza Strip according to IDF instructions at the beginning of the fighting. The construction of an underground barrier, similar to the one built between the Gaza Strip and Israel, will be a costly and prolonged project.
A barrier must be in place, in any case; otherwise, it will be impossible to contain the Gaza Strip in the long run. This is clear to all the involved parties. Meanwhile, Egypt is flooding the tunnel area with seawater in case there are still active smuggling tunnels there.
The Philadelphi issue is also related to the question of the comprehensive arrangement that will be in the Gaza Strip after the war, which is a political challenge for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, will visit Israel this week to discuss this issue as well.
The military echelon still does not know what the “day after’ in Gaza will look like. A similar situation occurred after 23 days of fighting within the Gaza Strip, towards the end of Operation Cast Lead in January 2010.
The Chief of Staff at the time, Major General Gabi Ashkenazi, sought clear instructions from the government headed by Ehud Olmert but did not receive them. Ashkenazi told the Prime Minister and ministers that “the IDF is not the detonator of the government's explosions.” Eventually, he decided to withdraw the forces and the government declared a unilateral ceasefire, which lasted only a short while.
Now, as Israel enters its 14th week of war, the IDF is still preparing for ongoing combat, with changing intensity. What will be the goal for the "day after" this time?
