And Now, Iran: A Fateful Week in an Escalating War
Iran has transitioned to a direct confrontation with Israel and is attempting to sway Sudan in the Red Sea | Israel is tightening the siege on the leadership of Hamas, but some of its moves are playing in favor of Hamas’ plan. Amir Rapaport’s weekly column
Amir Rapaport
| 30/12/2023
As things currently stand, it seems that Israel does not meet the expectations of its allies in the moderate Sunni world. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan expect nothing less than for us to eliminate Hamas. This is also in their own interest.
The leaders of these countries have been giving Israel the leeway to manage the situation in the Gaza Strip. But in the Arab world’s public court of public opinion, it seems that Hamas is still standing on its feet even after three months of fighting. In fact, Israel is perceived as the one yearning for negotiations for the hostages’ return, while Hamas is playing hard to get.
Another worrisome development is emerging: Israel may soon lose the recent peace accord with Sudan. This week, desperate pleas were sent from the East African country,
grappling with internal unrest. The warning highlighted Iranian efforts to influence Sudan in its favor by offering generous assistance, which also aims to establish a foothold on the African side of the Red Sea. This is in addition to Iran’s grip on the strategic Houthi areas in Yemen. As Sudan sees things, the United States and Israel are not responding to calls for help, and we may pay a high price for this.
Furthermore, this week may be remembered as when the direct war between Israel and Iran began. We will delve into this more in this column. The Israel-Iran war is the real deal. But let’s start with the drama in Khan Yunis.
The significance of Khan Yunis
what is unfolding there these days will have major implications for the ongoing campaign against Hamas and Israel’s ability to meet its war goals: the dismantling of Hamas's military capabilities and the weakening of its power, at the very least, and the return of the hostages.
The fighting in Khan Yunis is led by the 98th Division, which is considered one of the elite units of the IDF and is known for its rapid mobility. Under the command of Colonel Dan Goldfus, the division initiated the raid on Khan Yunis immediately following the truce, during which some of the hostages were brought back to Israel.
The main effort in Khan Yunis is currently being conducted beneath the surface, where the four most senior wanted members of Hamas might be located: Yahya Sinwar, first and foremost, alongside the head of the military wing, Mohammed Deif, who is effectively commanding the Al-Qassam Brigades; Marwan Issa, and Yahya Sinwar's brother, Muhammad Sinwar, a senior commander in his own right.
There is also a reasonable chance that many of the hostages are also being held in Khan Yunis, perhaps even as human shields for the leadership of Hamas.
As part of the effort, the IDF bolstered its combat forces in Khan Yunis last week with a sixth brigade, thereby accumulating an unprecedented force magnitude for a single division.
How is Israel attempting to operate in the depths of the tunnels? Much remains undisclosed here. In the international media, it has been reported that one of the methods is flooding. Likely, additional methods are employed.
Israel’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, stated last week that the IDF will reach the leadership of Hamas within weeks or months. He no longer speaks in terms of years, like the 10 years it took the United States to eliminate al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden after the attacks on the World Trade Center.
Unlike the densely populated northern part of the Gaza Strip, in the Khan Yunis area, the buildings are low, and there are many open spaces. One of the most challenging aspects is related to the presence of numerous civilians.
Major General Eliezer Toledano, the commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, presented a map to the cabinet last Sunday that indicates when Israel instructs residents of various areas to evacuate, based on defined neighborhoods and compounds. However, the actual implementation of population evacuation proves to be very challenging.
One of the objectives of the operation this past week was also the village of Khazaa, east of Khan Yunis, from which the terrorists left to attack the neighboring kibbutz, Nir Oz. In this attack, a quarter of the residents were murdered or abducted, without any gunfire from Israeli forces. Simply put, the forces did not reach Nir Oz on that horrific morning of October 7th.
The refugee camps in central Gaza
Simultaneously with the fighting in Khan Yunis, this past week saw the incursion of Brigade 36 into the refugee camp area in the center of the Gaza Strip, north of Khan Yunis but still south of the Gaza River line.
Since the onset of the ground maneuver in October the 36th Divison, including the Golani Brigade, has been conducting combat operations in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, in the eastern sectors of the city of Gaza, including the capture of Zeytoun and Saja'iya. However, the focus has now shifted.
From the camps in the central area, such as Al-Bureij, Dir Al-Balah, and Nusseirat, numerous rocket launches towards the center of the country have been carried out. One of the objectives of the incursion is the removal of the rocket threat to Israel, which has significantly diminished anyway. In addition, there is currently a systematic dismantling of the remaining terrorist infrastructure here – lathes, weapon caches, and the clearing of tunnels.
In the area north of the Gaza River line, the 162nd Division is still operational, as it has been since the beginning of the war. The current focus is on the villages of Dir Al-Balah and Tufah, on the seamline between the jurisdiction of Brigade 162 and Brigade 36 and therefore they have not been taken care of until now.
On Tuesday, I met in the heart of this area with the commander of the 460th Armor Colonel Dvir Edri, who leads a combat team that includes, in addition to tanks, Givati’s “Zabar” battalion and the 50th Battalion of the Nahal Brigade, as well as combat engineering forces.
The integration of infantry, armor, and engineering forces trickles down from the division level to the battalions and then to the platoons. Tank crews are never without infantry and engineering personnel by their side, and vice versa.
As the fighting continues, both sides - Hamas and the IDF - are constantly studying each other. For example, in an attempt to overcome the “Trophy” anti-tank missile defense system, Hamas terrorists try to jump out of the tunnels and attach magnetic explosive charges to tanks. For their part, the IDF combatants attempt to thwart this maneuver. The combat engineering fighters, on their part, deal with explosive charges and the tunnel shafts, and also demolish houses.
Mosques, clinics, and UNRWA
The destruction is enormous. A quick glance allows one to discern which house was demolished earlier by combat engineering detonation and which was targeted remotely by fighter jet-launched one-ton bombs. Houses demolished from a high altitude tend to collapse to the sides rather than implode into themselves like the targets destroyed by the engineering corps.
Colonel Edri tells me that in a previous battle, when his brigade seized the Kamal Adwan Hospital in Jabalia, hundreds of Hamas terrorists surrendered. Some of them were taken by surprise and couldn't reach their fighting positions due to the heavy artillery shelling they endured. In the Hamas stronghold of Daraj Tuffah, not many have surrendered as of yet, but it does appear that the terror organization has lost most of its command-and-control abilities.
Hamas terrorists attempted to exploit the full moon this past week to attack our forces, but generally, they avoid fighting during the night hours due to the significant advantage that the IDF has with night vision capabilities.
According to Edri, after long weeks in the field, the IDF can already anticipate that most of the terrorist infrastructure of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad will be found within mosques, clinics, or UNRWA facilities, considered immune to IDF fire until October 7th.
"In our view, it's the holy trinity," Edri said, adding that "after 70 days of being underground, we also encounter terrorists when they are truly exhausted. There was a case of a terrorist who tried to return home to drink some water because he was completely dehydrated, and that's where we apprehended him.
What about combat fatigue?
The stories I heard from the paratroopers who took a short break last weekend for the first time since the beginning of the war revealed that one of the significant challenges in prolonged fighting is the inability to shower, resulting in fungal infections and chafing. In the entire region, there is no running water or electricity for a long. The fighters have learned to enjoy beef jerky and Mentos, which are provided in abundance.
In operational terms, the name of the game is still constant movement as much as possible, avoiding getting trapped in static positions for too long, which the enemy may study and then launch an attack against.
The Deputy Commander of the 460th Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Eitan Samuel, tells me that the mission is still clear to all the fighters, regular and reservists alike, and that spirits are high.
This is also the impression I received from the Merkava APC team, which comprises Givati Bridage fighters Aviad Koren from the Karnei Shomron; Tavel Abraham from moshav Bitha in the Negav; and Yonatan Arsef from Modi'in. The APC also includes reservist Vladimir Ashurov from Holon and combat medic Dr. Stas Steinnberg from Petah Tikva, who, before the war, specialized as a trauma physician at the Sheba Medical Center.
They have a cooler box inside the APC where they keep soda cans alongside three units of blood for treating casualties, if necessary. Unfortunately, there are casualties in the fighting from time to time. During my visit, two combatants from the Nahal Brigade's 931st Battalion were killed by an anti-tank missile fired at them in the nearby area.
A long war, plagued by several vulnerabilities
The determination and thoroughness of the IDF's activity in dismantling terrorist infrastructure are impressive, but the cost is high: in this week's fighting, there were dozens of fatalities and hundreds of injuries. On the home front, it's difficult to get used to the death announcements, published almost every morning.
The growing number of casualties raises the question of whether the IDF isn't inadvertently playing into Hamas's hands, by allowing the terror organization to exploit its advantages in guerrilla warfare. Most of the time, Hamas fighters hide underground, avoiding direct confrontations with the IDF.
Another weak spot: In areas evacuated by the IDF after it is done dealing with terror infrastructure, Hamas terrorists reemerge from its underground tunnels. This has occurred recently even in Jabalia and Saja'iya. There is also a trickle of civilians returning to the northern areas from southern Gaza, using roundabout, undesignated ways.
Most of them are shocked by the extent of the damage: the overwhelming majority of homes are no longer suitable for habitation. It will take a long time to rebuild the cities in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, and it is evident that Gaza will continue to pay a heavy price for the heinous events of October 7th.
One of the gaps in the IDF's plans is related to its lack of operation in the Philadelphi Corridor, which separates the Gaza Strip from Egypt. There, underground tunnels may still be active between the two parts of the city of Rafah.
A long-term military solution to dismantle Hamas from its weapons will likely require the construction of an underground barrier along the corridor, similar to the one built around the Gaza Strip border with Israel. It is still unclear whether Egypt will allow Israel to build this wall on its side of Philadelphi, or whether Israel will need to conquer Rafah for this purpose.
The prolongation of the war is a vulnerability in itself. It has already been going on for much longer than the IDF could have initially prepared for.
Accordingly, supplies and ammunition from the United States and other places around the world are constantly brought into Gaza via trucks and ships. Everything that can be obtained, even at inflated prices. Shipments in recent days have even included 150,000 sets of uniforms from the United States. We need that too, not just ammunition.
Will the hostages return?
The biggest gap for the IDF is still related to achieving the war goal of returning the hostages. Last week, I wrote that there is a certain gap between reality and what has repeatedly been said to the public, that the release of some of the captives during the truce was achieved solely due to the military pressure on Hamas.
Yes, the military pressure certainly contributed, but it was not the sole reason for the hostage deal. This time, Hamas may insist on a complete ceasefire, not just a lull, in any scenario involving the release of additional hostages. This is the ace up Hamas’ sleeve in its attempt to survive, and it brings Israel’s two main war goals – releasing the hostages and annihilating Hamas – into direct conflict. Meanwhile, Hamas’ leadership continues to play hard to get, as Israel intensifies its efforts to open a channel of dialogue through Qatar or Egypt.
In the coming week, the representative of the United States, Antony Blinken, will return to our region. It doesn't seem that he will be able to bring about a breakthrough regarding the hostages.
Blinken will also address the broader picture of the multi-theater system, which is connected to the conflict with Iran and its proxies in Yemen, Iraq, and, of course, Hezbollah in Lebanon.
This past week, an Egyptian initiative was published regarding the return of hostages within the framework of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, while Hamas still maintains its presence in the region in one form or another. The chances of this initiative seem slim, not only because a conclusion image like that would be considered a defeat in the eyes of the Israeli public.
Meanwhile, despite American pressure on the matter, it is challenging to justify the fact that Israel continues to supply fuel to the Gaza Strip, which is desperately needed by Hamas for the continuation of the war—even passing through the Kerem Shalom crossing, within Israeli territory.
Indeed, if Hamas can continue to sustain itself as a fighting force until the IDF withdraws its forces backward, it would be a significant achievement from its perspective, even a victory. Even if Israel does not want to starve the population of Gaza and continue to allow the entry of food, it must avoid supplying fuel.
The next phase has already begun
As the public has already been told, the IDF is now preparing for the third stage of the war, which includes withdrawing forces in a few weeks, discharging most of the reserve forces, and launching occasional raids of the battalion level, in the heart of the Gaza Strip, to continue pulverizing the terror infrastructure. Like the operations in the West Bank following Operation Defensive Shield (2002), this phase could take many months, perhaps years.
In actuality, the third phase had already begun with the start of the engineering preparation of the "Perimeter" – a stretch of land about a kilometer wide that Gazans will not be allowed to enter after the IDF withdrawal. It is adjacent to the border with Israel. Anyone entering will be killed. The IDF has also started releasing some reserve units.
The war with Iran
Back to Iran. The assassination of Raza Musawi, a senior commander of the Revolutionary Guards, who was killed in an attack in Damascus on Monday, is the most dramatic development in the war this week.
From the Iranian perspective, there is no doubt that Israel is behind the assassination of the man who was formally responsible for "coordinating military relations between Iran and Syria." In practice, he led large arms shipments to the region, primarily to Hezbollah, which intensified in recent weeks.
Musawi’s assassination comes after Israel was attributed to a cyberattack last week that disabled fuel stations in Iran, and after Iran itself launched a drone attack on a ship linked to Israel, 200 km off the coast of India, last Sunday. Unlike the attacks carried out by the Houthis, this time the drone was launched directly by the Iranians.
This week, it was also reported that Iran increased its uranium enrichment levels at its nuclear facilities, moving closer to a potential bomb. Regardless, hours after the assassination of Musawi, there was an attempted terror attack near the building of the Israeli embassy in New Delhi. Luckily, there were no casualties.
Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, participated in the mass funeral held for Musawi in Tehran on Thursday along with hundreds of thousands of Iranians. Retaliation against Israel has been strongly vowed, though the specific form of this retaliation has not been disclosed.
Yet, one must not forget the presence of significant U.S. forces in the region, along with other Western nations deploying fighter jets to any possible airfield in the Persian Gulf. It is possible that the confrontation between Iran and Israel may involve more than just these two countries. Alternatively, the Iranians might decide to step back from their provocations and de-escalate for now. We will find out soon.
Contact Amir directly @AmirRapaport1
Iran has transitioned to a direct confrontation with Israel and is attempting to sway Sudan in the Red Sea | Israel is tightening the siege on the leadership of Hamas, but some of its moves are playing in favor of Hamas’ plan. Amir Rapaport’s weekly column
As things currently stand, it seems that Israel does not meet the expectations of its allies in the moderate Sunni world. Countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan expect nothing less than for us to eliminate Hamas. This is also in their own interest.
The leaders of these countries have been giving Israel the leeway to manage the situation in the Gaza Strip. But in the Arab world’s public court of public opinion, it seems that Hamas is still standing on its feet even after three months of fighting. In fact, Israel is perceived as the one yearning for negotiations for the hostages’ return, while Hamas is playing hard to get.
Another worrisome development is emerging: Israel may soon lose the recent peace accord with Sudan. This week, desperate pleas were sent from the East African country,
grappling with internal unrest. The warning highlighted Iranian efforts to influence Sudan in its favor by offering generous assistance, which also aims to establish a foothold on the African side of the Red Sea. This is in addition to Iran’s grip on the strategic Houthi areas in Yemen. As Sudan sees things, the United States and Israel are not responding to calls for help, and we may pay a high price for this.
Furthermore, this week may be remembered as when the direct war between Israel and Iran began. We will delve into this more in this column. The Israel-Iran war is the real deal. But let’s start with the drama in Khan Yunis.
The significance of Khan Yunis
what is unfolding there these days will have major implications for the ongoing campaign against Hamas and Israel’s ability to meet its war goals: the dismantling of Hamas's military capabilities and the weakening of its power, at the very least, and the return of the hostages.
The fighting in Khan Yunis is led by the 98th Division, which is considered one of the elite units of the IDF and is known for its rapid mobility. Under the command of Colonel Dan Goldfus, the division initiated the raid on Khan Yunis immediately following the truce, during which some of the hostages were brought back to Israel.
The main effort in Khan Yunis is currently being conducted beneath the surface, where the four most senior wanted members of Hamas might be located: Yahya Sinwar, first and foremost, alongside the head of the military wing, Mohammed Deif, who is effectively commanding the Al-Qassam Brigades; Marwan Issa, and Yahya Sinwar's brother, Muhammad Sinwar, a senior commander in his own right.
There is also a reasonable chance that many of the hostages are also being held in Khan Yunis, perhaps even as human shields for the leadership of Hamas.
As part of the effort, the IDF bolstered its combat forces in Khan Yunis last week with a sixth brigade, thereby accumulating an unprecedented force magnitude for a single division.
How is Israel attempting to operate in the depths of the tunnels? Much remains undisclosed here. In the international media, it has been reported that one of the methods is flooding. Likely, additional methods are employed.
Israel’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, stated last week that the IDF will reach the leadership of Hamas within weeks or months. He no longer speaks in terms of years, like the 10 years it took the United States to eliminate al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden after the attacks on the World Trade Center.
Unlike the densely populated northern part of the Gaza Strip, in the Khan Yunis area, the buildings are low, and there are many open spaces. One of the most challenging aspects is related to the presence of numerous civilians.
Major General Eliezer Toledano, the commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, presented a map to the cabinet last Sunday that indicates when Israel instructs residents of various areas to evacuate, based on defined neighborhoods and compounds. However, the actual implementation of population evacuation proves to be very challenging.
One of the objectives of the operation this past week was also the village of Khazaa, east of Khan Yunis, from which the terrorists left to attack the neighboring kibbutz, Nir Oz. In this attack, a quarter of the residents were murdered or abducted, without any gunfire from Israeli forces. Simply put, the forces did not reach Nir Oz on that horrific morning of October 7th.
The refugee camps in central Gaza
Simultaneously with the fighting in Khan Yunis, this past week saw the incursion of Brigade 36 into the refugee camp area in the center of the Gaza Strip, north of Khan Yunis but still south of the Gaza River line.
Since the onset of the ground maneuver in October the 36th Divison, including the Golani Brigade, has been conducting combat operations in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, in the eastern sectors of the city of Gaza, including the capture of Zeytoun and Saja'iya. However, the focus has now shifted.
From the camps in the central area, such as Al-Bureij, Dir Al-Balah, and Nusseirat, numerous rocket launches towards the center of the country have been carried out. One of the objectives of the incursion is the removal of the rocket threat to Israel, which has significantly diminished anyway. In addition, there is currently a systematic dismantling of the remaining terrorist infrastructure here – lathes, weapon caches, and the clearing of tunnels.
In the area north of the Gaza River line, the 162nd Division is still operational, as it has been since the beginning of the war. The current focus is on the villages of Dir Al-Balah and Tufah, on the seamline between the jurisdiction of Brigade 162 and Brigade 36 and therefore they have not been taken care of until now.
On Tuesday, I met in the heart of this area with the commander of the 460th Armor Colonel Dvir Edri, who leads a combat team that includes, in addition to tanks, Givati’s “Zabar” battalion and the 50th Battalion of the Nahal Brigade, as well as combat engineering forces.
The integration of infantry, armor, and engineering forces trickles down from the division level to the battalions and then to the platoons. Tank crews are never without infantry and engineering personnel by their side, and vice versa.
As the fighting continues, both sides - Hamas and the IDF - are constantly studying each other. For example, in an attempt to overcome the “Trophy” anti-tank missile defense system, Hamas terrorists try to jump out of the tunnels and attach magnetic explosive charges to tanks. For their part, the IDF combatants attempt to thwart this maneuver. The combat engineering fighters, on their part, deal with explosive charges and the tunnel shafts, and also demolish houses.
Mosques, clinics, and UNRWA
The destruction is enormous. A quick glance allows one to discern which house was demolished earlier by combat engineering detonation and which was targeted remotely by fighter jet-launched one-ton bombs. Houses demolished from a high altitude tend to collapse to the sides rather than implode into themselves like the targets destroyed by the engineering corps.
Colonel Edri tells me that in a previous battle, when his brigade seized the Kamal Adwan Hospital in Jabalia, hundreds of Hamas terrorists surrendered. Some of them were taken by surprise and couldn't reach their fighting positions due to the heavy artillery shelling they endured. In the Hamas stronghold of Daraj Tuffah, not many have surrendered as of yet, but it does appear that the terror organization has lost most of its command-and-control abilities.
Hamas terrorists attempted to exploit the full moon this past week to attack our forces, but generally, they avoid fighting during the night hours due to the significant advantage that the IDF has with night vision capabilities.
According to Edri, after long weeks in the field, the IDF can already anticipate that most of the terrorist infrastructure of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad will be found within mosques, clinics, or UNRWA facilities, considered immune to IDF fire until October 7th.
"In our view, it's the holy trinity," Edri said, adding that "after 70 days of being underground, we also encounter terrorists when they are truly exhausted. There was a case of a terrorist who tried to return home to drink some water because he was completely dehydrated, and that's where we apprehended him.
What about combat fatigue?
The stories I heard from the paratroopers who took a short break last weekend for the first time since the beginning of the war revealed that one of the significant challenges in prolonged fighting is the inability to shower, resulting in fungal infections and chafing. In the entire region, there is no running water or electricity for a long. The fighters have learned to enjoy beef jerky and Mentos, which are provided in abundance.
In operational terms, the name of the game is still constant movement as much as possible, avoiding getting trapped in static positions for too long, which the enemy may study and then launch an attack against.
The Deputy Commander of the 460th Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Eitan Samuel, tells me that the mission is still clear to all the fighters, regular and reservists alike, and that spirits are high.
This is also the impression I received from the Merkava APC team, which comprises Givati Bridage fighters Aviad Koren from the Karnei Shomron; Tavel Abraham from moshav Bitha in the Negav; and Yonatan Arsef from Modi'in. The APC also includes reservist Vladimir Ashurov from Holon and combat medic Dr. Stas Steinnberg from Petah Tikva, who, before the war, specialized as a trauma physician at the Sheba Medical Center.
They have a cooler box inside the APC where they keep soda cans alongside three units of blood for treating casualties, if necessary. Unfortunately, there are casualties in the fighting from time to time. During my visit, two combatants from the Nahal Brigade's 931st Battalion were killed by an anti-tank missile fired at them in the nearby area.
A long war, plagued by several vulnerabilities
The determination and thoroughness of the IDF's activity in dismantling terrorist infrastructure are impressive, but the cost is high: in this week's fighting, there were dozens of fatalities and hundreds of injuries. On the home front, it's difficult to get used to the death announcements, published almost every morning.
The growing number of casualties raises the question of whether the IDF isn't inadvertently playing into Hamas's hands, by allowing the terror organization to exploit its advantages in guerrilla warfare. Most of the time, Hamas fighters hide underground, avoiding direct confrontations with the IDF.
Another weak spot: In areas evacuated by the IDF after it is done dealing with terror infrastructure, Hamas terrorists reemerge from its underground tunnels. This has occurred recently even in Jabalia and Saja'iya. There is also a trickle of civilians returning to the northern areas from southern Gaza, using roundabout, undesignated ways.
Most of them are shocked by the extent of the damage: the overwhelming majority of homes are no longer suitable for habitation. It will take a long time to rebuild the cities in the northern part of the Gaza Strip, and it is evident that Gaza will continue to pay a heavy price for the heinous events of October 7th.
One of the gaps in the IDF's plans is related to its lack of operation in the Philadelphi Corridor, which separates the Gaza Strip from Egypt. There, underground tunnels may still be active between the two parts of the city of Rafah.
A long-term military solution to dismantle Hamas from its weapons will likely require the construction of an underground barrier along the corridor, similar to the one built around the Gaza Strip border with Israel. It is still unclear whether Egypt will allow Israel to build this wall on its side of Philadelphi, or whether Israel will need to conquer Rafah for this purpose.
The prolongation of the war is a vulnerability in itself. It has already been going on for much longer than the IDF could have initially prepared for.
Accordingly, supplies and ammunition from the United States and other places around the world are constantly brought into Gaza via trucks and ships. Everything that can be obtained, even at inflated prices. Shipments in recent days have even included 150,000 sets of uniforms from the United States. We need that too, not just ammunition.
Will the hostages return?
The biggest gap for the IDF is still related to achieving the war goal of returning the hostages. Last week, I wrote that there is a certain gap between reality and what has repeatedly been said to the public, that the release of some of the captives during the truce was achieved solely due to the military pressure on Hamas.
Yes, the military pressure certainly contributed, but it was not the sole reason for the hostage deal. This time, Hamas may insist on a complete ceasefire, not just a lull, in any scenario involving the release of additional hostages. This is the ace up Hamas’ sleeve in its attempt to survive, and it brings Israel’s two main war goals – releasing the hostages and annihilating Hamas – into direct conflict. Meanwhile, Hamas’ leadership continues to play hard to get, as Israel intensifies its efforts to open a channel of dialogue through Qatar or Egypt.
In the coming week, the representative of the United States, Antony Blinken, will return to our region. It doesn't seem that he will be able to bring about a breakthrough regarding the hostages.
Blinken will also address the broader picture of the multi-theater system, which is connected to the conflict with Iran and its proxies in Yemen, Iraq, and, of course, Hezbollah in Lebanon.
This past week, an Egyptian initiative was published regarding the return of hostages within the framework of a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, while Hamas still maintains its presence in the region in one form or another. The chances of this initiative seem slim, not only because a conclusion image like that would be considered a defeat in the eyes of the Israeli public.
Meanwhile, despite American pressure on the matter, it is challenging to justify the fact that Israel continues to supply fuel to the Gaza Strip, which is desperately needed by Hamas for the continuation of the war—even passing through the Kerem Shalom crossing, within Israeli territory.
Indeed, if Hamas can continue to sustain itself as a fighting force until the IDF withdraws its forces backward, it would be a significant achievement from its perspective, even a victory. Even if Israel does not want to starve the population of Gaza and continue to allow the entry of food, it must avoid supplying fuel.
The next phase has already begun
As the public has already been told, the IDF is now preparing for the third stage of the war, which includes withdrawing forces in a few weeks, discharging most of the reserve forces, and launching occasional raids of the battalion level, in the heart of the Gaza Strip, to continue pulverizing the terror infrastructure. Like the operations in the West Bank following Operation Defensive Shield (2002), this phase could take many months, perhaps years.
In actuality, the third phase had already begun with the start of the engineering preparation of the "Perimeter" – a stretch of land about a kilometer wide that Gazans will not be allowed to enter after the IDF withdrawal. It is adjacent to the border with Israel. Anyone entering will be killed. The IDF has also started releasing some reserve units.
The war with Iran
Back to Iran. The assassination of Raza Musawi, a senior commander of the Revolutionary Guards, who was killed in an attack in Damascus on Monday, is the most dramatic development in the war this week.
From the Iranian perspective, there is no doubt that Israel is behind the assassination of the man who was formally responsible for "coordinating military relations between Iran and Syria." In practice, he led large arms shipments to the region, primarily to Hezbollah, which intensified in recent weeks.
Musawi’s assassination comes after Israel was attributed to a cyberattack last week that disabled fuel stations in Iran, and after Iran itself launched a drone attack on a ship linked to Israel, 200 km off the coast of India, last Sunday. Unlike the attacks carried out by the Houthis, this time the drone was launched directly by the Iranians.
This week, it was also reported that Iran increased its uranium enrichment levels at its nuclear facilities, moving closer to a potential bomb. Regardless, hours after the assassination of Musawi, there was an attempted terror attack near the building of the Israeli embassy in New Delhi. Luckily, there were no casualties.
Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, participated in the mass funeral held for Musawi in Tehran on Thursday along with hundreds of thousands of Iranians. Retaliation against Israel has been strongly vowed, though the specific form of this retaliation has not been disclosed.
Yet, one must not forget the presence of significant U.S. forces in the region, along with other Western nations deploying fighter jets to any possible airfield in the Persian Gulf. It is possible that the confrontation between Iran and Israel may involve more than just these two countries. Alternatively, the Iranians might decide to step back from their provocations and de-escalate for now. We will find out soon.
Contact Amir directly @AmirRapaport1
