Amir Rapaport’s Weekly Column: The Aerial Fire Dilemma
Is the IDF increasing the risk to soldiers to minimize harming uninvolved Palestinian civilians? This is what it looks like from the perspectives of the both ground and air forces
Amir Rapaport
| 14/12/2023
Is it possible to reduce the risk to ground forces fighting in the heart of Gaza through the “flattening” of additional structures and buildings? This week, this question was raised more strongly than before.
Let's start by describing two events that highlighted the dilemma.
On Sunday, five officers and soldiers from Battalion 8111 were killed in the village of Karrara, east of Khan Yunis. The force was in the midst of an operation targeting a compound that housed a school, from which gunfire had been directed shortly before.
Preceding the infantry operation was an aerial bombardment, but Hamas terrorists, who had concealed the explosives, emerged on the ground from a tunnel shortly thereafter.
In addition to the five fatalities, the reserve force also suffered one severely wounded soldier (In this conflict, the IDF generally does not report injuries at lower severity levels.)
Two days later, nine fighters were killed in another Gaza Strip battle, including the commander of the Golani Brigade’s13th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Greenberg, and Colonel Yitzhak Ben Basat. The latter was already set to retire from his career service, but decided to join the Golani commander’s war command and head it during the war.
The battle took place right in the heart of the fortified area of Saja'iya, considered one of the toughest strongholds of Hamas throughout the Gaza Strip, if not the toughest. There were many painful encounters this week, which, with the wisdom of hindsight, perhaps could have been avoided.
From discussions with ground commanders as well as a visit to the Ramat David Airbase, I could understand how complex the dilemma of using aerial firepower is.
The ground forces׳ perspective
In essence, the use of aerial and artillery firepower as a preparation for any ground action is practically unlimited, especially in areas north of the Gaza River, which the IDF had called on civilians to evacuate. Anyone present in those areas is likely to be considered a Hamas operative – even if they are not directly affiliated with Hamas but have chosen not to leave.
"Clearing the area and achieving the goals of the war cannot only be done from the air," ground forces commanders say. "During the aerial bombardments, Hamas is hiding in the underground tunnels, and without reaching their openings – we will not be able to destroy it.”
Clearing the area involves entering homes or facilities such as schools and training camps to seize weapons, rocket launchers, intelligence information, and perhaps even find signs or clues that might lead to the hostages.
“Even after the ‘attrition’ phase (aerial fire, before the ground maneuver), during the cleansing itself, there is a close aerial fire that covers us. The only consideration for avoiding the use of air firepower from fighter jets, unmanned aerial vehicles, or helicopters is solely to prevent harm to our forces or captives – if such concerns exist."
Personnel from the ground forces highlight several painful instances in the war, where fighters were accidentally killed by friendly fire from air assets, including an incident where a house where paratroopers were located was "tagged". As a result, it was attacked by an Apache helicopter. In another event, a drone launched a precise missile toward an IDF infantry unit.
As a rule, not only during the attrition phase but also during the clearing itself, the combined forces of remote ground artillery operations and the forces on the ground can "call in" immediate air support whenever needed.
In the Saja'iya case, there was concern about the potential abduction of four soldiers who were injured during the initial stage of the battle, and contact with them was lost. Therefore, it was not possible to delay the rescue until a heavy bombardment of the area from the air. Such a bombardment would inevitably have affected our forces as well.
Nevertheless, the IDF emphasizes that when it comes to combat in the Khan Yunis area, the use of remote firepower is more complex than in the northern part of the Gaza Strip due to the presence of two million civilians, which also includes those who have fled to there from the north, following the IDF’s directive.
Although the IDF instructs residents to evacuate various combat zones in the Khan Yunis area according to an interactive map, the concern for causing harm to uninvolved civilians is greater there – and taken into account.
“In the south, there is a need for more careful consideration before any aerial attack, unlike the north, because the area is not necessarily devoid of civilians. However, even here, the enemy is attacked remotely whenever possible," said one of the commanders with whom I spoke.
The Ramat David Airbase, Northern Israel, Wednesday
From the Air Force’s perspective, collaboration with ground forces has never been more precise, and aerial firepower has never been as closely coordinated with ground forces as it is now. This is true not only in the context of the war in Gaza but also worldwide.
The commander of Ramaat David, Colonel A., was formerly the head of a special Air Force headquarters division established in 2014 during Operation Protective Edge to improve close air support for ground forces.
In the past, the ground forces in the IDF used to refer to the Air Force as "our friendliest foreign army." In recent years, such statements have been heard less and less.
Collaboration now extends to a deep personal familiarity between "blue" (Air Force) and "green" (Ground Forces) commanders. For example, most squadron commanders in the Air Force were deeply shocked by the news from Saja'iya yesterday, partly because they knew Tomer Greenberg, who studied with them at the Command and Staff College. Colonel A. was a combat companion of Colonel Ben Basat, and they studied together at the National Security College.
According to Air Force personnel, there has been no significant change in the guidelines for aerial attacks since the beginning of the war. This contrasts with the claim that the IDF prioritizes the lives of Palestinians over the lives of its own fighters, which is repeatedly posed on social media.
"Attacks are considered daily, based on a long list of considerations and lessons learned, with the primary goal remaining the achievement of war objectives and minimizing harm to our forces – above all and before everything else," I was told.
All of this, however, is happening simultaneously with the effort to avoid harming non-combatants, especially in areas like the UNRWA compound. This consideration is also taken into account throughout the entire process.
“When the Air Force accidentally hits our ground forces, the pain is immense.
"This only underscores how intricate and complex the coordination is. The most effective means of targeting these terrorists are airstrikes with bombs weighing up to a ton, and sometimes several of these bombs simultaneously.
"In the case of fighter jets, the need to maintain safe distances from our forces is the most significant, as any mistake could result in numerous casualties, especially due to the power of the explosions."
A one-ton bomb, just 80 meters away
As an example of close involvement in combat, in one of the battles, the Air Force dropped a one-ton bomb just 80 meters away from our forces, when they required immediate and critical assistance. This, despite the standard safety margin being 250 meters and the minimum accepted safety margin being 130 meters.
The complexity of the Gaza conflict is evident.
The conclusion regarding the dilemma of employing aerial firepower in Gaza, based on what I heard this week from both the "blues" and the "greens,” is that there is still no prohibition to "flatten" buildings in areas where ground forces are operating.
The consideration of when to do this is operational. The attempt to avoid harming uninvolved civilians is a relevant consideration, especially in the densely populated areas of southern Gaza. The need to avoid risking soldiers takes precedence.
If the location of explosives or a trapped house is known, remote detonation is employed without a shadow of a doubt. Ground and air forces work together to maximize gains in combined warfare.
Indeed, there is still room for improvement. There is no substitute for "boots on the ground." And the toll will continue to rise.
Is the IDF increasing the risk to soldiers to minimize harming uninvolved Palestinian civilians? This is what it looks like from the perspectives of the both ground and air forces
Is it possible to reduce the risk to ground forces fighting in the heart of Gaza through the “flattening” of additional structures and buildings? This week, this question was raised more strongly than before.
Let's start by describing two events that highlighted the dilemma.
On Sunday, five officers and soldiers from Battalion 8111 were killed in the village of Karrara, east of Khan Yunis. The force was in the midst of an operation targeting a compound that housed a school, from which gunfire had been directed shortly before.
Preceding the infantry operation was an aerial bombardment, but Hamas terrorists, who had concealed the explosives, emerged on the ground from a tunnel shortly thereafter.
In addition to the five fatalities, the reserve force also suffered one severely wounded soldier (In this conflict, the IDF generally does not report injuries at lower severity levels.)
Two days later, nine fighters were killed in another Gaza Strip battle, including the commander of the Golani Brigade’s13th Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Greenberg, and Colonel Yitzhak Ben Basat. The latter was already set to retire from his career service, but decided to join the Golani commander’s war command and head it during the war.
The battle took place right in the heart of the fortified area of Saja'iya, considered one of the toughest strongholds of Hamas throughout the Gaza Strip, if not the toughest. There were many painful encounters this week, which, with the wisdom of hindsight, perhaps could have been avoided.
From discussions with ground commanders as well as a visit to the Ramat David Airbase, I could understand how complex the dilemma of using aerial firepower is.
The ground forces׳ perspective
In essence, the use of aerial and artillery firepower as a preparation for any ground action is practically unlimited, especially in areas north of the Gaza River, which the IDF had called on civilians to evacuate. Anyone present in those areas is likely to be considered a Hamas operative – even if they are not directly affiliated with Hamas but have chosen not to leave.
"Clearing the area and achieving the goals of the war cannot only be done from the air," ground forces commanders say. "During the aerial bombardments, Hamas is hiding in the underground tunnels, and without reaching their openings – we will not be able to destroy it.”
Clearing the area involves entering homes or facilities such as schools and training camps to seize weapons, rocket launchers, intelligence information, and perhaps even find signs or clues that might lead to the hostages.
“Even after the ‘attrition’ phase (aerial fire, before the ground maneuver), during the cleansing itself, there is a close aerial fire that covers us. The only consideration for avoiding the use of air firepower from fighter jets, unmanned aerial vehicles, or helicopters is solely to prevent harm to our forces or captives – if such concerns exist."
Personnel from the ground forces highlight several painful instances in the war, where fighters were accidentally killed by friendly fire from air assets, including an incident where a house where paratroopers were located was "tagged". As a result, it was attacked by an Apache helicopter. In another event, a drone launched a precise missile toward an IDF infantry unit.
As a rule, not only during the attrition phase but also during the clearing itself, the combined forces of remote ground artillery operations and the forces on the ground can "call in" immediate air support whenever needed.
In the Saja'iya case, there was concern about the potential abduction of four soldiers who were injured during the initial stage of the battle, and contact with them was lost. Therefore, it was not possible to delay the rescue until a heavy bombardment of the area from the air. Such a bombardment would inevitably have affected our forces as well.
Nevertheless, the IDF emphasizes that when it comes to combat in the Khan Yunis area, the use of remote firepower is more complex than in the northern part of the Gaza Strip due to the presence of two million civilians, which also includes those who have fled to there from the north, following the IDF’s directive.
Although the IDF instructs residents to evacuate various combat zones in the Khan Yunis area according to an interactive map, the concern for causing harm to uninvolved civilians is greater there – and taken into account.
“In the south, there is a need for more careful consideration before any aerial attack, unlike the north, because the area is not necessarily devoid of civilians. However, even here, the enemy is attacked remotely whenever possible," said one of the commanders with whom I spoke.
The Ramat David Airbase, Northern Israel, Wednesday
From the Air Force’s perspective, collaboration with ground forces has never been more precise, and aerial firepower has never been as closely coordinated with ground forces as it is now. This is true not only in the context of the war in Gaza but also worldwide.
The commander of Ramaat David, Colonel A., was formerly the head of a special Air Force headquarters division established in 2014 during Operation Protective Edge to improve close air support for ground forces.
In the past, the ground forces in the IDF used to refer to the Air Force as "our friendliest foreign army." In recent years, such statements have been heard less and less.
Collaboration now extends to a deep personal familiarity between "blue" (Air Force) and "green" (Ground Forces) commanders. For example, most squadron commanders in the Air Force were deeply shocked by the news from Saja'iya yesterday, partly because they knew Tomer Greenberg, who studied with them at the Command and Staff College. Colonel A. was a combat companion of Colonel Ben Basat, and they studied together at the National Security College.
According to Air Force personnel, there has been no significant change in the guidelines for aerial attacks since the beginning of the war. This contrasts with the claim that the IDF prioritizes the lives of Palestinians over the lives of its own fighters, which is repeatedly posed on social media.
"Attacks are considered daily, based on a long list of considerations and lessons learned, with the primary goal remaining the achievement of war objectives and minimizing harm to our forces – above all and before everything else," I was told.
All of this, however, is happening simultaneously with the effort to avoid harming non-combatants, especially in areas like the UNRWA compound. This consideration is also taken into account throughout the entire process.
“When the Air Force accidentally hits our ground forces, the pain is immense.
"This only underscores how intricate and complex the coordination is. The most effective means of targeting these terrorists are airstrikes with bombs weighing up to a ton, and sometimes several of these bombs simultaneously.
"In the case of fighter jets, the need to maintain safe distances from our forces is the most significant, as any mistake could result in numerous casualties, especially due to the power of the explosions."
A one-ton bomb, just 80 meters away
As an example of close involvement in combat, in one of the battles, the Air Force dropped a one-ton bomb just 80 meters away from our forces, when they required immediate and critical assistance. This, despite the standard safety margin being 250 meters and the minimum accepted safety margin being 130 meters.
The complexity of the Gaza conflict is evident.
The conclusion regarding the dilemma of employing aerial firepower in Gaza, based on what I heard this week from both the "blues" and the "greens,” is that there is still no prohibition to "flatten" buildings in areas where ground forces are operating.
The consideration of when to do this is operational. The attempt to avoid harming uninvolved civilians is a relevant consideration, especially in the densely populated areas of southern Gaza. The need to avoid risking soldiers takes precedence.
If the location of explosives or a trapped house is known, remote detonation is employed without a shadow of a doubt. Ground and air forces work together to maximize gains in combined warfare.
Indeed, there is still room for improvement. There is no substitute for "boots on the ground." And the toll will continue to rise.
