Amir Rapaport's Weekly Column: A Third Lebanon War Can Be Prevented
Can Israel truly "return Lebanon to the Stone Age"? | How do two types of Israeli policy in the Middle East contradict each other? | Will the government stop the "Israelization" of its Arab citizens? | Is normalization with Saudi Arabia really worth its price?
Amir Rapaport
| 10/08/2023
Galant and Netanyahu in the Knesset earlier this month. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen
1. Delaying the Dahieh
The political figure closest to the Minister of Defense, Yoav Galant, does not come from the Likud party. It is Member of Knesset Aryeh Deri, who came to his rescue in March to save him from being dismissed.
The two often engage in conversation. Highly experienced Deri has been showing Galant empathy. More than most ministers, he understands the predicament in which the IDF finds itself, both internally and facing its enemies – who revel in seeing Israel tear itself apart.
In the defense establishment, Galant is very close with the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi. Their consultations are genuine, sometimes taking place even in the small hours of the night. The former heads of Israel’s naval commando and the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit hold each other in high regard.
Both are also faced with the same problem: they know that the crisis in the IDF’s reserve units is more severe than it is shown to be in the media, and is quickly permeating the standing army units. Eventually, it will also reach the conscript units – though the conscription of those born in the year of Gaza disengagement, 2005, started this week, and relatively smoothly. And yes, both Galant and Halevi believe that the IDF still holds its operational capability. For now.
Israel's immediate defense challenges do not stem from the collapse of the "people's army" model. Above all, military Intelligence has been warning against a war in the north, at the highest probability since the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
To look at things simplistically, Galant's combative declaration at the northern border this week can be seen as an attempt to prevent Hezbollah’s chief, Hassan Nasrallah, from reaching the conclusion that he has a great opportunity to initiate an attack given that the IDF is weaker than ever (mainly due to the suspension of the volunteer service of hundreds of reservist Air Force pilots).
"We will return Lebanon to the Stone Age," Galant threatened on Monday. The last to use this terminology was then-Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, in the early days of the Second Lebanon War. Galant's hint is clear: a miscalculation by Hezbollah will cost Nasrallah a renewed destruction of its quarter in Beirut, the Dahieh, just like in 2006. Whether Nasrallah has fully recovered from that trauma is debatable.
However, reality tends to be far from simple. In the crisis with Lebanon, there is more than one factor influencing the scene – and more than one possible outcome.
Thus, if things depended solely on Nasrallah and on his patrons in Tehran, they would have probably aimed for a severe blow to Israel, without assuming responsibility or descending into an all-out war, as was the case with the Megiddo Junction terror attack, and the massive rocket fire towards Israel during the peak of its social crisis during the Spring.
On their part, Hezbollah and the Iranians have several good reasons to settle the score with Israel, primarily seeking vengeance for the assassinations of senior Iranian figures, attributed to Israel by the global media, as well as for the recurring attacks in Syria, including this week.
Hezbollah has also been trying to signal to Israel that it does not agree with the work carried out by the Ministry of Defense along the Purple Line – the international border between Israel and Lebanon established after World War I, part of which is disputed. Hezbollah also undoubtedly disagrees with the de-facto unification that Israel had carried out in the northern segment of the village of Ghajar, on the slopes of Mount Dov, whose northern part is clearly situated in Lebanese sovereign territory.
For its part, Israel currently prefers to turn a blind eye to the tent that Hezbollah erected in the country’s sovereign territory, beyond the security fence, and to present only two options for the foreseeable future: either complete calm on the northern border, or Hezbollah will suffer a serious blow, with all of the severe implications this will have on Israel as well, as Galant had "promised.”
And there’s that: Hezbollah lacks even a shred of internal legitimacy to engage in war against Israel, as the Lebanese economy is in shambles, and most citizens are convinced that they are paying the price instead of Iran. The latter, however, might not rush to "squander" the military force it has built in Lebanon, mainly intended to deter Israel and the US from attacking Iranian soil.
For Israel, there are ample reasons for not wanting to engage in a war: the number of missiles in Lebanon is much larger today than it was in 2006, with over 10,000 of them carrying warheads that could accurately target strategic locations in Israel.
Such a massive amount would pose a challenge for defense systems, such as Iron Dome, to provide comprehensive protection over the entire country, and strategic sites would take precedence over cities.
Furthermore, it's almost certain that any future conflict will be a multi-front one. One can already see the interconnectivity between the various arenas, even on a day-to-day basis. For instance, in the announcement by the Shin Bet this week, that it had captured a terrorist cell activated from Lebanon by the Popular Front's operative, Alaa Kabha, who was originally expelled to Gaza in the Gilad Shalit deal.
So, what will come out of the boiling stew that has reached yet another peak this week? The Israeli defense establishment still believes that a third Lebanon war can be prevented – but not everything is within our control, and every escalation has its own dynamics. God forbid.
2. Pressure Cooker
Herzi Halevi and Yoav Galant were also the ones who pressed the launch of the “Home and Garden” operation in Jenin about two months ago. The decision to launch was made by the cabinet almost at midnight, not wholeheartedly. The major concern was the fear of many casualties from the Palestinian side, and from our side as well. Eventually, the operation ran much smoother than expected, but its achievements have been far from drying up the well of terror. As expected.
Thus, on Monday, the IDF and Shin Bet forces eliminated a terror cell from Jenin that was on its way to carry out an attack – but they missed the sought-after individual from Jenin who was wandering about Tel Aviv on Saturday night, and ended up murdering security officer, Chen Amir, before being killed by Amir’s partner.
The Shin Bet knows that there still is a lot of weaponry, not only in Jenin but also in other areas, and a fair number of suspects. The Palestinian Authority has been taking hesitant steps to demonstrate its presence there, but its capabilities are diminished.
Allegedly, the Palestinian Authority had severed its security coordination with Israel at the start of the year. In practice, though, the coordination has been continuing in some form or another due to the shared enemy – Hamas.
One can learn just how important to preventing attacks this security coordination is, from something a senior officer recently said in an internal discussion: "We need to award Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] the Israel Defense Prize – because without him, we would have been in the midst of a third Intifada by now."
Perhaps he is exaggerating, but history has taught us that in the weeks after the security coordination began in 2005, following Yasser Arafat's death, the number of terror incidents in the West Bank dropped dramatically, and the Second Intifada came to an end.
The perception that strengthening the Palestinian Authority and preserving security coordination is highly accepted not only by the Central Command Commander, Major General Yehuda Fuchs, who grew up as a Haredi, and became close with Galant when he served under him in the Southern Command, but also by the Shin Bet and on the 14th floor of the Ministry of Defense building in Tel Aviv, where Galant sits.
According to this approach, the incident in the Palestinian village of Burqa on Saturday night, where a 19-year-old Palestinian was killed and two Jews were injured, is more than just shooting oneself in the foot – from Israel’s perspective, and especially from the perspective of the settlers.
However, on the 15th floor, one floor above Galant, Defense Ministry Minister Betzalel Smotrich is taking steps aimed at weakening the Palestinian Authority – meaning, that Israel now has two types of policy in Judea and Samaria, which are contradictory, for the first time since 1967.
3. Between (Mahmoud) Abbas and (Mansour) Abbas
Even as Israel’s Minister of Finance, Smotrich's decision to freeze budgets for Arab authorities in Israel and support for the education of East Jerusalem residents is causing security-related controversy.
The Shin Bet's perspective (which received mild public support from Prime Minister Netanyahu this week, against the backdrop of criticism following the events in Burqa and the Tel Aviv attack) is that Arab citizens of Israel are far from being a single group.
For years, the Shin Bet has been monitoring not only terror cells within the Arab-Israeli population but also the social dynamics within Arab society.
According to this viewpoint, and despite incidents like the “Guardian of the Walls," events that exposed the depth of animosity towards Jews in Israel’s mixed cities, the Arab citizens of Israel are undergoing a clear process of "Israelization." They now travel abroad much more than they did in the past (observe your surroundings next time you're at the Ben Gurion Airport), engage more in leisure activities, adopt additional symbols of the Israeli-Western culture, and have fewer children – only 2.9 children per woman, fewer than among the Jewish population.
Looking through rose-colored glasses, the active involvement of Arab citizens of Israel in terrorism is minimal – only a fraction of a percent of the total population. This is one of the greatest achievements of Israel and the Zionist movement, if we consider the early years of the state when Arab citizens were under military rule.
However, the trend toward general integration can change. It depends on the government’s steps, but not solely.
4. The Path to Normalization
There used to be a saying that the road to Washington passes through Jerusalem. Everyone understood that to achieve success with the United States, the world's sole superpower, one needed to get close to Israel.
This is not the current situation. Contrary to the approach during the Abraham Accords negotiations, this time Israel is a secondary player for both Saudi Arabia and the US.
Against the backdrop of this week’s publications about alleged progress in negotiations towards normalization, it is important to note that both Biden’s US and Mohammad bin Salman, the de facto Saudi ruler, have interests of their own in achieving an agreement.
Saudi Arabia seeks a civilian nuclear program in light of Iran's military program, an alliance with the US, and perhaps advanced fighter jets. President Biden needs a diplomatic achievement before the 2024 elections and is interested in countering the increasing influence of China and Iran in the Persian Gulf.
Israel also has a clear interest in a normalization agreement, especially given its internal political crisis. However, the price – a civilian nuclear program and advanced weaponry for Saudi Arabia – might not necessarily be worth it. According to this view, Israel is already enjoying the main fruits of a future normalization – commercial aerial freedom, and extensive trade with Saudi Arabia.
Can Israel truly "return Lebanon to the Stone Age"? | How do two types of Israeli policy in the Middle East contradict each other? | Will the government stop the "Israelization" of its Arab citizens? | Is normalization with Saudi Arabia really worth its price?
Galant and Netanyahu in the Knesset earlier this month. Photo: REUTERS/Amir Cohen
1. Delaying the Dahieh
The political figure closest to the Minister of Defense, Yoav Galant, does not come from the Likud party. It is Member of Knesset Aryeh Deri, who came to his rescue in March to save him from being dismissed.
The two often engage in conversation. Highly experienced Deri has been showing Galant empathy. More than most ministers, he understands the predicament in which the IDF finds itself, both internally and facing its enemies – who revel in seeing Israel tear itself apart.
In the defense establishment, Galant is very close with the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi. Their consultations are genuine, sometimes taking place even in the small hours of the night. The former heads of Israel’s naval commando and the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit hold each other in high regard.
Both are also faced with the same problem: they know that the crisis in the IDF’s reserve units is more severe than it is shown to be in the media, and is quickly permeating the standing army units. Eventually, it will also reach the conscript units – though the conscription of those born in the year of Gaza disengagement, 2005, started this week, and relatively smoothly. And yes, both Galant and Halevi believe that the IDF still holds its operational capability. For now.
Israel's immediate defense challenges do not stem from the collapse of the "people's army" model. Above all, military Intelligence has been warning against a war in the north, at the highest probability since the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
To look at things simplistically, Galant's combative declaration at the northern border this week can be seen as an attempt to prevent Hezbollah’s chief, Hassan Nasrallah, from reaching the conclusion that he has a great opportunity to initiate an attack given that the IDF is weaker than ever (mainly due to the suspension of the volunteer service of hundreds of reservist Air Force pilots).
"We will return Lebanon to the Stone Age," Galant threatened on Monday. The last to use this terminology was then-Chief of Staff Dan Halutz, in the early days of the Second Lebanon War. Galant's hint is clear: a miscalculation by Hezbollah will cost Nasrallah a renewed destruction of its quarter in Beirut, the Dahieh, just like in 2006. Whether Nasrallah has fully recovered from that trauma is debatable.
However, reality tends to be far from simple. In the crisis with Lebanon, there is more than one factor influencing the scene – and more than one possible outcome.
Thus, if things depended solely on Nasrallah and on his patrons in Tehran, they would have probably aimed for a severe blow to Israel, without assuming responsibility or descending into an all-out war, as was the case with the Megiddo Junction terror attack, and the massive rocket fire towards Israel during the peak of its social crisis during the Spring.
On their part, Hezbollah and the Iranians have several good reasons to settle the score with Israel, primarily seeking vengeance for the assassinations of senior Iranian figures, attributed to Israel by the global media, as well as for the recurring attacks in Syria, including this week.
Hezbollah has also been trying to signal to Israel that it does not agree with the work carried out by the Ministry of Defense along the Purple Line – the international border between Israel and Lebanon established after World War I, part of which is disputed. Hezbollah also undoubtedly disagrees with the de-facto unification that Israel had carried out in the northern segment of the village of Ghajar, on the slopes of Mount Dov, whose northern part is clearly situated in Lebanese sovereign territory.
For its part, Israel currently prefers to turn a blind eye to the tent that Hezbollah erected in the country’s sovereign territory, beyond the security fence, and to present only two options for the foreseeable future: either complete calm on the northern border, or Hezbollah will suffer a serious blow, with all of the severe implications this will have on Israel as well, as Galant had "promised.”
And there’s that: Hezbollah lacks even a shred of internal legitimacy to engage in war against Israel, as the Lebanese economy is in shambles, and most citizens are convinced that they are paying the price instead of Iran. The latter, however, might not rush to "squander" the military force it has built in Lebanon, mainly intended to deter Israel and the US from attacking Iranian soil.
For Israel, there are ample reasons for not wanting to engage in a war: the number of missiles in Lebanon is much larger today than it was in 2006, with over 10,000 of them carrying warheads that could accurately target strategic locations in Israel.
Such a massive amount would pose a challenge for defense systems, such as Iron Dome, to provide comprehensive protection over the entire country, and strategic sites would take precedence over cities.
Furthermore, it's almost certain that any future conflict will be a multi-front one. One can already see the interconnectivity between the various arenas, even on a day-to-day basis. For instance, in the announcement by the Shin Bet this week, that it had captured a terrorist cell activated from Lebanon by the Popular Front's operative, Alaa Kabha, who was originally expelled to Gaza in the Gilad Shalit deal.
So, what will come out of the boiling stew that has reached yet another peak this week? The Israeli defense establishment still believes that a third Lebanon war can be prevented – but not everything is within our control, and every escalation has its own dynamics. God forbid.
2. Pressure Cooker
Herzi Halevi and Yoav Galant were also the ones who pressed the launch of the “Home and Garden” operation in Jenin about two months ago. The decision to launch was made by the cabinet almost at midnight, not wholeheartedly. The major concern was the fear of many casualties from the Palestinian side, and from our side as well. Eventually, the operation ran much smoother than expected, but its achievements have been far from drying up the well of terror. As expected.
Thus, on Monday, the IDF and Shin Bet forces eliminated a terror cell from Jenin that was on its way to carry out an attack – but they missed the sought-after individual from Jenin who was wandering about Tel Aviv on Saturday night, and ended up murdering security officer, Chen Amir, before being killed by Amir’s partner.
The Shin Bet knows that there still is a lot of weaponry, not only in Jenin but also in other areas, and a fair number of suspects. The Palestinian Authority has been taking hesitant steps to demonstrate its presence there, but its capabilities are diminished.
Allegedly, the Palestinian Authority had severed its security coordination with Israel at the start of the year. In practice, though, the coordination has been continuing in some form or another due to the shared enemy – Hamas.
One can learn just how important to preventing attacks this security coordination is, from something a senior officer recently said in an internal discussion: "We need to award Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] the Israel Defense Prize – because without him, we would have been in the midst of a third Intifada by now."
Perhaps he is exaggerating, but history has taught us that in the weeks after the security coordination began in 2005, following Yasser Arafat's death, the number of terror incidents in the West Bank dropped dramatically, and the Second Intifada came to an end.
The perception that strengthening the Palestinian Authority and preserving security coordination is highly accepted not only by the Central Command Commander, Major General Yehuda Fuchs, who grew up as a Haredi, and became close with Galant when he served under him in the Southern Command, but also by the Shin Bet and on the 14th floor of the Ministry of Defense building in Tel Aviv, where Galant sits.
According to this approach, the incident in the Palestinian village of Burqa on Saturday night, where a 19-year-old Palestinian was killed and two Jews were injured, is more than just shooting oneself in the foot – from Israel’s perspective, and especially from the perspective of the settlers.
However, on the 15th floor, one floor above Galant, Defense Ministry Minister Betzalel Smotrich is taking steps aimed at weakening the Palestinian Authority – meaning, that Israel now has two types of policy in Judea and Samaria, which are contradictory, for the first time since 1967.
3. Between (Mahmoud) Abbas and (Mansour) Abbas
Even as Israel’s Minister of Finance, Smotrich's decision to freeze budgets for Arab authorities in Israel and support for the education of East Jerusalem residents is causing security-related controversy.
The Shin Bet's perspective (which received mild public support from Prime Minister Netanyahu this week, against the backdrop of criticism following the events in Burqa and the Tel Aviv attack) is that Arab citizens of Israel are far from being a single group.
For years, the Shin Bet has been monitoring not only terror cells within the Arab-Israeli population but also the social dynamics within Arab society.
According to this viewpoint, and despite incidents like the “Guardian of the Walls," events that exposed the depth of animosity towards Jews in Israel’s mixed cities, the Arab citizens of Israel are undergoing a clear process of "Israelization." They now travel abroad much more than they did in the past (observe your surroundings next time you're at the Ben Gurion Airport), engage more in leisure activities, adopt additional symbols of the Israeli-Western culture, and have fewer children – only 2.9 children per woman, fewer than among the Jewish population.
Looking through rose-colored glasses, the active involvement of Arab citizens of Israel in terrorism is minimal – only a fraction of a percent of the total population. This is one of the greatest achievements of Israel and the Zionist movement, if we consider the early years of the state when Arab citizens were under military rule.
However, the trend toward general integration can change. It depends on the government’s steps, but not solely.
4. The Path to Normalization
There used to be a saying that the road to Washington passes through Jerusalem. Everyone understood that to achieve success with the United States, the world's sole superpower, one needed to get close to Israel.
This is not the current situation. Contrary to the approach during the Abraham Accords negotiations, this time Israel is a secondary player for both Saudi Arabia and the US.
Against the backdrop of this week’s publications about alleged progress in negotiations towards normalization, it is important to note that both Biden’s US and Mohammad bin Salman, the de facto Saudi ruler, have interests of their own in achieving an agreement.
Saudi Arabia seeks a civilian nuclear program in light of Iran's military program, an alliance with the US, and perhaps advanced fighter jets. President Biden needs a diplomatic achievement before the 2024 elections and is interested in countering the increasing influence of China and Iran in the Persian Gulf.
Israel also has a clear interest in a normalization agreement, especially given its internal political crisis. However, the price – a civilian nuclear program and advanced weaponry for Saudi Arabia – might not necessarily be worth it. According to this view, Israel is already enjoying the main fruits of a future normalization – commercial aerial freedom, and extensive trade with Saudi Arabia.
