Way back in 1991, while the crisis of the Soviet system was leading to the disintegration of that galaxy of nations which, under the acronym of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), was the second world power in political, military and economic terms, Russia promoted and obtained the establishment of the "Commonwealth of Independent States" (CIS) in view of curbing the centrifugal force triggered by Ukraine's declaration of independence of December 1, 1991.
On December 8, 1991, all the former Soviet Republics joined the CIS, with the exception of the independent Ukraine and the Baltic States, which had been absorbed into the USSR in September 1939 thanks to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and since then had always considered themselves militarily 'occupied' by the Soviets.
Currently, after the defection of Georgia and other statelets in the Caucasus, the Commonwealth of Independent States has eight other members in addition to Russia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus.
A glance at the map shows that Russia has placed itself physically at the center of a region in which the CIS Member States play a fundamental role, not only as a free trade area covering a single market of over 180 million people, but also as an important collective security area that has ensured to Russia - which psychologically has never recovered from the Nazi aggression of 1941 - a 'buffer zone' around its territory, which is very important from a military viewpoint (all the more so after the "betrayal" of Ukraine, which, by siding militarily with NATO in 2014, helped fuel the Kremlin's paranoia about border security).
It is in this political and "psycho-political" context that the "special relationship" between Russia and Belarus was born and developed - a relationship that for some time has been showing increasingly visible cracks.
Belarus is a Presidential Republic ruled since 1994 by "President-dictator" Alexander Lukashenko.
Elected and re-elected again and again over the last 25 years after elections looked on with suspicion by all Western diplomacies, Lukashenko has been tolerated with more or less obvious annoyance by the Kremlin, which is interested in maintaining a privileged and advantageous relationship at economic and military levels, even in the face of the harshness with which the Belarusian President has been trying for years to keep the political opposition in his country under strict control with his iron fist and with instruments that appear excessive even to the certainly non-liberal Kremlin representatives.
The straw that threatens to break the camel's back and try Vladimir Putin's patience vis-à-vis his Belarusian colleague was his umpteenth re-election in August 2020 to the Presidency of the Republic with vote percentages that in the eyes of the entire West, but also of Russia, appeared to be the result of shameless electoral fraud.
Last year's August elections put the Kremlin in a very awkward and uncomfortable position.
On the one hand, continuing to support Lukashenko's discredited government diminishes the Russian government's democratic credibility not only in the eyes of Europe and the United States, but also in those of the more moderate allies in the CIS and, at the same time, risks alienating the respect and support of the pro-Russian citizens of the Belarusian Republic who are calling for more democracy in their country without undermining the friendly ties with Russia.
On the other hand, there is concern in the Kremlin's upper echelons that too openly supporting the reasons for the people’s uprising against Lukashenko and the demand for more democracy in Belarus could turn the neighboring Republic into a symbol for those who are calling for a similar expansion of democratic rules in Russia.
The cunning Lukashenko who, before the August 2020 elections had shown signs of impatience with Vladimir Putin's policies - according to reliable sources, they hate each other - going as far as to order the arrest (a few weeks before the vote) of 33 Russian "mercenaries" accused of being part of a Kremlin plot to sabotage his re-election, after having been put in difficulty by internal unrest and the international reaction to his authoritarian methods of government, backtracked vis-à-vis Russia.
Initially Belarus granted Russia exclusive rights on the use of Russian ports for Belarusian oil exports - a request that Lukashenko had resisted for years. Later he agreed to the stationing of military contingents of the Russian National Guard on his territory. Finally, on January 10, the Belarusian President publicly called for "the removal of any obstacles...to greater integration between Russia and Belarus".
In spite of the increasingly worried moves of the Belarusian autocrat, faced with the choice between supporting the Belarusian regime and trying to get rid of the troublesome neighbor with a coup – Russia is considering a third option which could safeguard the stability of a country like Belarus, which Russia deems essential not only from an economic, but above all from a military viewpoint, as basic foundation of the 'strategic depth' ensured by Belarus on the Russian borders in its important role of 'buffer state' safeguarding the security of Russia’s Western borders.
The third option is included in two documents leaked by the Kremlin at the end of last year and published by the Russian investigative website The Insider.
The first document is entitled "Strategy of Operational Intervention in the Belarusian Republic" and was drafted in September 2020, when Lukashenko's democratic reputation was at the lowest ebb, after the evident electoral fraud and the harsh repression of people’s protests.
The drafters of the document speak of the need to change the Belarusian Constitution also through "the penetration of all opposition parties and organization's" to the regime "with a view to encouraging the creation of new political forces promoting the reform of institutions", as well as through a propaganda work with the use of modern communication channels such as Telegram and YouTube.
The aim of this operation would be twofold: to turn the Belarusian Presidential Republic into a Parliamentary one and increase consensus towards the Russian ally.
The second document drafted by Kremlin strategists and skillfully leaked to The Insider talks about the foundation of a new political party in Belarus called "The People's Right", which would promote changes to the Constitution along Parliamentary lines, as well as social and economic reforms that would win citizens’ support.
The creation of this new Party has not yet been publicly announced, but its program suggests that the Kremlin hopes to divert popular support in the neighboring Republic towards a Parliamentary and democratic transition of the country, which - as a side effect - could reduce protests over electoral fraud in the last elections.
The new Party's plans envisage that, even if - at least in an initial phase - Lukashenko remains in power to enable him to save face with a dignified departure from the scene, he will be deprived of almost all his current executive powers, as his future functions will be reduced to the typical representative functions of a 'normal' President in a Parliamentary Republic.
Furthermore, the program of the new pro-Russian Party includes plans for extensive privatization of the Belarusian public sector, as well as the 'dismantling of censorship' and 'respect for the freedom and dignity of the individual'.
The first feedback to the publication of these two documents, with which the Kremlin wants to demonstrate not only an obvious interest in the stability of Belarus, but also an unexpected (at least for us in the West) attention to democratic rules and respect for human rights, have aroused very positive reactions in the Russian business world, which is obviously very interested in penetrating more deeply into a country that has a well-developed industrial sector, exports a significant quantity of goods to Europe as well as to Russia, has two excellent large oil refineries and is at the forefront in the field of information technology and IT services.
In short, it is a potentially good geopolitical achievement for Vladimir Putin and his government: limiting and frustrating the ambitions of an autocrat who does not want to give up the reins of power and, at the same time, gain credit - towards Europe and the new U.S. Administration - as promoter of Western-style democratic and economic reforms.
All this while safeguarding the role of Belarus as a "buffer zone" against a NATO that, although weakened, remains a strategic opponent in the eyes of the Kremlin.
Professor Valori is President of the International World Group