Between a Rock and a Hard Place
Lior Lotan resigned last week from his position as coordinator of government POW and MIA activities. Amir Rapaport's weekly column is devoted to the former officer of Sayeret Matkal who served in this position in the past three years, and to the future of the contacts pertaining to the MIAs
Amir Rapaport
| 01/09/2017
Photo: AP
In May 1994, Lior Lotan was involved in an unusual hand-to-hand combat encounter with the wife of Mustafa Dirani. It happened in the Diranis' bedroom in Lebanon, which Lotan had entered through a window. The wife fought tooth and nail defending her husband, who was kidnapped and taken to Israel that night, in an attempt to bring about a breakthrough in the affair of the missing Israeli airman Ron Arad.
After Lotan had already subdued the tempestuous wife, Matkal man Immanuel Moreno (who was later killed in an operation after the Second Lebanon War in 2006), who had handled Dirani himself, entered the room and rearranged the nightgown of Dirani's wife, which had slipped during the fight.
Six months after that encounter, Lior Lotan was nearly killed in the failed attempt to rescue Nachshon Wachsman in Bir-Naballah. Matkal officer Nir Poraz, who was with Lotan during the break-in, already laid dead beside him when Lotan, wounded and exhausted, placed his loaded handgun on the body of a dead terrorist. After recovering from his injuries, he was asked to provide explanations to military police investigators as to how his personal handgun had come to be in the possession of the terrorist and – naturally – he was awarded a commendation for his bravery.
In the following decade, as the commander of the negotiating team of Sayeret Matkal, Lotan commanded the prolonged siege on the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem – which included numerous operational activities inside that church. Lotan delivered the agreement, which included, among other things, the expulsion of 13 terrorists to another country.
In 2004, Lotan was intensively involved in the agreement with Hezbollah, in the context of which the reservist Elhannan Tanenbaum and the bodies of the IDF troopers kidnapped in Har-Dov in October 2000 were returned to Israel.
Before completing his military service at the rank of colonel, Lotan had served as the Head of the POW & MIA Department of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, and was about to be appointed as IDF Spokesperson by the would-be Chief of Staff Yoav Galant. His appointment never materialized, for obvious reasons.
The Appointment & the Trips
With this background, it is easy to assume that Lotan will be able to handle the media storm his resignation from the position of coordinator of government POW & MIA activities caused – a storm that included the reporting of quite a few half-truths (we will address the circumstances of Lotan's resignation in due course).
The same background also explains why Prime Minister Netanyahu had asked Lotan to accept the appointment in October 2014. This important appointment is not a fully regulated position within the Israeli defense establishment. In fact, Lotan volunteered for the job. Without pay, he drove his own car throughout the country on his way to numerous work meetings and mainly to "maintenance" talks with the families of the MIAs held by Hamas. He also made quite a few trips abroad, including attempts to employ any international element having any sort of influence on Hamas. In view of Lotan's background, it may be assumed that he did not confine himself to discussions conducted in air-conditioned rooms and that here and there he also initiated operations behind Hamas' lines, but even if such operations were actually executed – we would never know about them.
At the same time, Lotan went on with his life as a family man and as the owner of a security consulting firm (which is doing rather well).
Negotiations Destined for Failure
The list of prominent figures appointed by past Israeli prime ministers to handle the negotiations regarding the return of POWs and MIAs is long and rather distinguished. Normally, these negotiations were fairly intensive, lasted a few months and ended in a deal – or not (as in the case of Ron Arad, whose return had not been implemented while he was still being held prisoner by the relatively moderate organization Amal, owing to the trauma of the "Jibril Deal" which had preceded the deal regarding Arad).
That was not the case facing Lior Lotan over the last few years. The list of differences is fairly long. First of all, unlike Hezbollah or countries in the region capable of making decisions and negotiating a deal when required, Hamas is a Palestinian organization bound by its own commitment to bring about the release of all Palestinian "prisoners" as well as by the high price bar it had presented – and collected – in the matter of the Gilad Shalit arrangement.
Moreover, this time, no public pressure is being exerted on the Israeli Government to finalize the affair as the troopers missing in action, Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, are regarded as KIAs (Killed in Action) while the civilians being held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Avra Mengisto from Ashdod and Hisham Sha'aban al-Sayed from Hura, are regarded as relatively "strange" cases. In any case, the family from Hura directs all of its accusations at Hamas and not at the Government of Israel. Lotan had been asked to handle these families independently of the standard mechanism of the IDF Personnel Directorate, as they are civilians and not IDF servicemen.
If all of the above is not enough, the most significant difference compared to the previous negotiations is still ahead of us: this time there has been no consensus within the defense establishment or the political echelon regarding the need for a major effort, or in other words – the need to pay a high price in order to "return the boys home".
Quite the opposite. The ISA had strongly opposed even the Shalit arrangement owing to the concerns (which have materialized, at least in part) that the released terrorists would once again become involved in terrorism and collect yet another toll in human lives. Following the Shalit arrangement, the Israeli Government appointed a committee headed by the former President of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice), Meir Shamgar. This committee formulated the rules for POW release arrangements that have severely restricted negotiator Lotan.
Lotan was a Netanyahu appointment, but in effect, he cooperated closely, over the last year, mainly with Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who concentrated the conflicting positions of the various defense/security organs and did not press for a final decision, as was the case with former prime minister Ariel Sharon, who used his considerable influence in the matter of the Tanenbaum arrangement with Hezbollah.
There can be no controversy among the various Israeli organs and agencies with regard to one issue only: Israel has an interest in concluding a deal with Hamas beyond the issue of the return of the missing servicemen and civilians. Israel is interested in setting a reasonable price tag in anticipation of future deals and establishing a norm according to which every round of fighting must end with the return of KIAs and POWs.
Regrettably, Hamas has not really settled for a 'reasonable' price, and in the circumstances that emerged, Lotan – a man of charm and charisma, as well as considerable eloquence (a recording of his conversations by one of the families had gotten him into trouble somewhere along the way), was compelled to invest most of his energy not opposite Hamas, but opposite the embittered families of the MIAs. With no light visible at the end of the tunnel and without any bitterness toward anyone on the Israeli side, Lotan had exhausted all of the options, so he decided to resign.
What Next?
Lotan will once again invest his best efforts in his business activities as well as in his activity as a research fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. What about the MIAs? The new coordinator, if one is found, will have to start everything almost from square one, without much hope.
Lior Lotan resigned last week from his position as coordinator of government POW and MIA activities. Amir Rapaport's weekly column is devoted to the former officer of Sayeret Matkal who served in this position in the past three years, and to the future of the contacts pertaining to the MIAs
Photo: AP
In May 1994, Lior Lotan was involved in an unusual hand-to-hand combat encounter with the wife of Mustafa Dirani. It happened in the Diranis' bedroom in Lebanon, which Lotan had entered through a window. The wife fought tooth and nail defending her husband, who was kidnapped and taken to Israel that night, in an attempt to bring about a breakthrough in the affair of the missing Israeli airman Ron Arad.
After Lotan had already subdued the tempestuous wife, Matkal man Immanuel Moreno (who was later killed in an operation after the Second Lebanon War in 2006), who had handled Dirani himself, entered the room and rearranged the nightgown of Dirani's wife, which had slipped during the fight.
Six months after that encounter, Lior Lotan was nearly killed in the failed attempt to rescue Nachshon Wachsman in Bir-Naballah. Matkal officer Nir Poraz, who was with Lotan during the break-in, already laid dead beside him when Lotan, wounded and exhausted, placed his loaded handgun on the body of a dead terrorist. After recovering from his injuries, he was asked to provide explanations to military police investigators as to how his personal handgun had come to be in the possession of the terrorist and – naturally – he was awarded a commendation for his bravery.
In the following decade, as the commander of the negotiating team of Sayeret Matkal, Lotan commanded the prolonged siege on the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem – which included numerous operational activities inside that church. Lotan delivered the agreement, which included, among other things, the expulsion of 13 terrorists to another country.
In 2004, Lotan was intensively involved in the agreement with Hezbollah, in the context of which the reservist Elhannan Tanenbaum and the bodies of the IDF troopers kidnapped in Har-Dov in October 2000 were returned to Israel.
Before completing his military service at the rank of colonel, Lotan had served as the Head of the POW & MIA Department of the IDF Intelligence Directorate, and was about to be appointed as IDF Spokesperson by the would-be Chief of Staff Yoav Galant. His appointment never materialized, for obvious reasons.
The Appointment & the Trips
With this background, it is easy to assume that Lotan will be able to handle the media storm his resignation from the position of coordinator of government POW & MIA activities caused – a storm that included the reporting of quite a few half-truths (we will address the circumstances of Lotan's resignation in due course).
The same background also explains why Prime Minister Netanyahu had asked Lotan to accept the appointment in October 2014. This important appointment is not a fully regulated position within the Israeli defense establishment. In fact, Lotan volunteered for the job. Without pay, he drove his own car throughout the country on his way to numerous work meetings and mainly to "maintenance" talks with the families of the MIAs held by Hamas. He also made quite a few trips abroad, including attempts to employ any international element having any sort of influence on Hamas. In view of Lotan's background, it may be assumed that he did not confine himself to discussions conducted in air-conditioned rooms and that here and there he also initiated operations behind Hamas' lines, but even if such operations were actually executed – we would never know about them.
At the same time, Lotan went on with his life as a family man and as the owner of a security consulting firm (which is doing rather well).
Negotiations Destined for Failure
The list of prominent figures appointed by past Israeli prime ministers to handle the negotiations regarding the return of POWs and MIAs is long and rather distinguished. Normally, these negotiations were fairly intensive, lasted a few months and ended in a deal – or not (as in the case of Ron Arad, whose return had not been implemented while he was still being held prisoner by the relatively moderate organization Amal, owing to the trauma of the "Jibril Deal" which had preceded the deal regarding Arad).
That was not the case facing Lior Lotan over the last few years. The list of differences is fairly long. First of all, unlike Hezbollah or countries in the region capable of making decisions and negotiating a deal when required, Hamas is a Palestinian organization bound by its own commitment to bring about the release of all Palestinian "prisoners" as well as by the high price bar it had presented – and collected – in the matter of the Gilad Shalit arrangement.
Moreover, this time, no public pressure is being exerted on the Israeli Government to finalize the affair as the troopers missing in action, Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, are regarded as KIAs (Killed in Action) while the civilians being held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Avra Mengisto from Ashdod and Hisham Sha'aban al-Sayed from Hura, are regarded as relatively "strange" cases. In any case, the family from Hura directs all of its accusations at Hamas and not at the Government of Israel. Lotan had been asked to handle these families independently of the standard mechanism of the IDF Personnel Directorate, as they are civilians and not IDF servicemen.
If all of the above is not enough, the most significant difference compared to the previous negotiations is still ahead of us: this time there has been no consensus within the defense establishment or the political echelon regarding the need for a major effort, or in other words – the need to pay a high price in order to "return the boys home".
Quite the opposite. The ISA had strongly opposed even the Shalit arrangement owing to the concerns (which have materialized, at least in part) that the released terrorists would once again become involved in terrorism and collect yet another toll in human lives. Following the Shalit arrangement, the Israeli Government appointed a committee headed by the former President of the Supreme Court (Chief Justice), Meir Shamgar. This committee formulated the rules for POW release arrangements that have severely restricted negotiator Lotan.
Lotan was a Netanyahu appointment, but in effect, he cooperated closely, over the last year, mainly with Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who concentrated the conflicting positions of the various defense/security organs and did not press for a final decision, as was the case with former prime minister Ariel Sharon, who used his considerable influence in the matter of the Tanenbaum arrangement with Hezbollah.
There can be no controversy among the various Israeli organs and agencies with regard to one issue only: Israel has an interest in concluding a deal with Hamas beyond the issue of the return of the missing servicemen and civilians. Israel is interested in setting a reasonable price tag in anticipation of future deals and establishing a norm according to which every round of fighting must end with the return of KIAs and POWs.
Regrettably, Hamas has not really settled for a 'reasonable' price, and in the circumstances that emerged, Lotan – a man of charm and charisma, as well as considerable eloquence (a recording of his conversations by one of the families had gotten him into trouble somewhere along the way), was compelled to invest most of his energy not opposite Hamas, but opposite the embittered families of the MIAs. With no light visible at the end of the tunnel and without any bitterness toward anyone on the Israeli side, Lotan had exhausted all of the options, so he decided to resign.
What Next?
Lotan will once again invest his best efforts in his business activities as well as in his activity as a research fellow at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya. What about the MIAs? The new coordinator, if one is found, will have to start everything almost from square one, without much hope.
