Analysis | Does the Shin Bet Believe that Hamas Hasn’t Established DR Sites Away from Gaza?
According to the head of the Shin Bet, it will take Hamas years to recover from the seizure of server farms at the UNRWA headquarters. The question arises: Is it assumed that Hamas doesn’t have data backup?
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 12/02/2024
Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi with Shin Bet head Ronen Bar at the Gaza server farm. Screenshot from IDF Spokesperson’s Unit video
In recent days, Israeli news sites have been flooded with images and videos from a tunnel beneath the UNRWA headquarters in Khan Yunis, which includes, among other things, server farms. This major media exposure is linked to an Israeli diplomatic attempt to discredit UNRWA globally after some of its employees participated in the October 7 massacre against Gaza border communities.
Israel refuses to accept UNRWA's line, claiming it deals with a few bad apples, and they want the UN Secretary-General to shut down the organization. Meanwhile, some of the donor countries to UNRWA have halted donations pending an investigation into the matter. Others continue to donate nonetheless.
Diplomacy aside, the presence of server farms in Gaza is not a surprising discovery. Already in 2018, a failed operation attributed by Hamas to an Israeli undercover unit was intended to install sensitive equipment in a Hamas facility in Gaza. The question of whether this is the facility discovered beneath the UNRWA headquarters, which the IDF recently defined as "strategic," remains unanswered.
Setting up a server farm, even a basic one like the one found beneath the UNRWA headquarters, takes several months. Equipment needs to be ordered, cables need to be laid, cooling and electrical systems need to be installed, and more. Without infrastructure, it's impossible to operate racks.
Infrastructure is indeed a security Achilles Heel. Server farms require electricity and internet connectivity, both of which Israel provides to Gaza. Therefore, Israel can know their locations. Hence, the claim that the locations of the server farms surprised Israeli intelligence should be taken with a grain of salt (even a few grains).
In one of the videos published to the Israeli public over the past weekend, the head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, claimed that it would take Hamas years to recover from this operation, from the C4I perspective. Let’s break down this claim.
Buying new equipment for several individual server cabinets takes, at most, a few months. If the tunnels between Egypt and Gaza remain open even after the war, it is not a significant logistical challenge for Hamas or any other terrorist organization to reclaim their position.
And what about the data stored on the servers? Well, Bar's claim implies the assumption or speculation that Hamas did not set up backup sites outside of Gaza. This assumption overlooks the possibility and underestimates the technological capabilities that Hamas has demonstrated in recent years.
Hamas has been in control of Gaza for 17 years. This is a long period that not only allows for the building of military power, as we have witnessed in the last four months of war, but also for the development of technological capabilities.
In recent years, Hamas hacker groups have successfully infiltrated IDF soldiers and security personnel in order to gather intelligence about the IDF and targets in Israel. In some cases, which the Shin Bet itself has published, Hamas operatives or their associates managed to recruit Jewish Israelis to conduct missions or take photographs of sites.
If that's not enough, on October 7th, Hamas possessed precise intelligence about Israeli territory, including the locations of homes belonging to senior IDF officials, Israeli server farms, base locations, IDF work routines, types of IDF ammunition, and how to deal with it, locations of IDF intelligence units, and more. Much of this intelligence gathering was done through technological means.
Where am I getting here? That if Hamas has demonstrated impressive technological capabilities in recent years, why wouldn't it have a disaster recovery (DR) system for their most crucial data collected for warfare and self-preservation purposes? In a scenario of war with Israel, including a strike on Hamas leadership, it is reasonable to assume that contingency planning would be a fundamental part of Hamas' situation assessment.
There is no problem with backing up data stored on server racks in Gaza to the cloud or to another server farm in Doha, Tehran, or even to the cloud of an American hosting company under some shell company established in the United States or Europe. And if Hamas has a disaster recovery (DR) system, the claim of the head of the Shin Bet is not really accurate. In other words, if there is a backup, Hamas could build subterranean server farms within months to a year from the moment the IDF leaves Gaza.
Realistically assuming that the data is backed up, Hamas could continue its cyber attack and collection activities from anywhere in the world. It is reasonable to assume that its technology personnel have long since left Gaza and they left even before October 7th. Technology personnel are an asset that no terrorist organization wants to lose.
To summarize, after October 7th, it would not be wise to underestimate Hamas either militarily, or in the technological dimension.
It can be estimated that its technology personnel were trained either in academia, within the Iranian security system, or by Hezbollah, which also possesses excellent technological capabilities. Therefore, it can be estimated that for every server farm seized in Gaza, there is a disaster recovery (DR) location somewhere in the world, and the assumption is that Hamas's recovery time in this aspect is expected to be lengthy, ranging from several months to a year at most.
According to the head of the Shin Bet, it will take Hamas years to recover from the seizure of server farms at the UNRWA headquarters. The question arises: Is it assumed that Hamas doesn’t have data backup?
Israeli Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi with Shin Bet head Ronen Bar at the Gaza server farm. Screenshot from IDF Spokesperson’s Unit video
In recent days, Israeli news sites have been flooded with images and videos from a tunnel beneath the UNRWA headquarters in Khan Yunis, which includes, among other things, server farms. This major media exposure is linked to an Israeli diplomatic attempt to discredit UNRWA globally after some of its employees participated in the October 7 massacre against Gaza border communities.
Israel refuses to accept UNRWA's line, claiming it deals with a few bad apples, and they want the UN Secretary-General to shut down the organization. Meanwhile, some of the donor countries to UNRWA have halted donations pending an investigation into the matter. Others continue to donate nonetheless.
Diplomacy aside, the presence of server farms in Gaza is not a surprising discovery. Already in 2018, a failed operation attributed by Hamas to an Israeli undercover unit was intended to install sensitive equipment in a Hamas facility in Gaza. The question of whether this is the facility discovered beneath the UNRWA headquarters, which the IDF recently defined as "strategic," remains unanswered.
Setting up a server farm, even a basic one like the one found beneath the UNRWA headquarters, takes several months. Equipment needs to be ordered, cables need to be laid, cooling and electrical systems need to be installed, and more. Without infrastructure, it's impossible to operate racks.
Infrastructure is indeed a security Achilles Heel. Server farms require electricity and internet connectivity, both of which Israel provides to Gaza. Therefore, Israel can know their locations. Hence, the claim that the locations of the server farms surprised Israeli intelligence should be taken with a grain of salt (even a few grains).
In one of the videos published to the Israeli public over the past weekend, the head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, claimed that it would take Hamas years to recover from this operation, from the C4I perspective. Let’s break down this claim.
Buying new equipment for several individual server cabinets takes, at most, a few months. If the tunnels between Egypt and Gaza remain open even after the war, it is not a significant logistical challenge for Hamas or any other terrorist organization to reclaim their position.
And what about the data stored on the servers? Well, Bar's claim implies the assumption or speculation that Hamas did not set up backup sites outside of Gaza. This assumption overlooks the possibility and underestimates the technological capabilities that Hamas has demonstrated in recent years.
Hamas has been in control of Gaza for 17 years. This is a long period that not only allows for the building of military power, as we have witnessed in the last four months of war, but also for the development of technological capabilities.
In recent years, Hamas hacker groups have successfully infiltrated IDF soldiers and security personnel in order to gather intelligence about the IDF and targets in Israel. In some cases, which the Shin Bet itself has published, Hamas operatives or their associates managed to recruit Jewish Israelis to conduct missions or take photographs of sites.
If that's not enough, on October 7th, Hamas possessed precise intelligence about Israeli territory, including the locations of homes belonging to senior IDF officials, Israeli server farms, base locations, IDF work routines, types of IDF ammunition, and how to deal with it, locations of IDF intelligence units, and more. Much of this intelligence gathering was done through technological means.
Where am I getting here? That if Hamas has demonstrated impressive technological capabilities in recent years, why wouldn't it have a disaster recovery (DR) system for their most crucial data collected for warfare and self-preservation purposes? In a scenario of war with Israel, including a strike on Hamas leadership, it is reasonable to assume that contingency planning would be a fundamental part of Hamas' situation assessment.
There is no problem with backing up data stored on server racks in Gaza to the cloud or to another server farm in Doha, Tehran, or even to the cloud of an American hosting company under some shell company established in the United States or Europe. And if Hamas has a disaster recovery (DR) system, the claim of the head of the Shin Bet is not really accurate. In other words, if there is a backup, Hamas could build subterranean server farms within months to a year from the moment the IDF leaves Gaza.
Realistically assuming that the data is backed up, Hamas could continue its cyber attack and collection activities from anywhere in the world. It is reasonable to assume that its technology personnel have long since left Gaza and they left even before October 7th. Technology personnel are an asset that no terrorist organization wants to lose.
To summarize, after October 7th, it would not be wise to underestimate Hamas either militarily, or in the technological dimension.
It can be estimated that its technology personnel were trained either in academia, within the Iranian security system, or by Hezbollah, which also possesses excellent technological capabilities. Therefore, it can be estimated that for every server farm seized in Gaza, there is a disaster recovery (DR) location somewhere in the world, and the assumption is that Hamas's recovery time in this aspect is expected to be lengthy, ranging from several months to a year at most.
