Amir Rapaport’s Column: Lessons to be Learned from the Al-Maghazi Tragedy
The terrible incident which cost the lives of 21 IDF soldiers tells us something about the military’s resilience, as well as what is expected in the next phases of the war in Gaza
Amir Rapaport
| 25/01/2024
The tragedy of the building collapse in Al-Maghazi begins with a severe shortage of standard explosive materials, such as TNT, worldwide. This shortage is a result of the Russia-Ukraine war and has been exacerbated significantly due to the conflict in Gaza and preparations for a potential full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah.
This week, 19 reserve soldiers were killed in the collapse of two buildings in Al-Maghazi , in the Gaza Strip, where 10 old landmines were hidden as a substitute for TNT. The landmines were triggered ahead of the planned time due to the firing of two RPG missiles towards the buildings, which were seized by our forces. Two more reserve soldiers were killed by a direct hit from another RPG on their armored tank.
The destruction of the buildings is part of the creation of a buffer zone, the kilometer-wide perimeter along the entire length of the barrier surrounding the Gaza Strip. The plan is that any Palestinian who attempts to enter the buffer zone after the war will immediately be targeted by gunfire.
The problem is that along the buffer zone, thousands of buildings need to be demolished. If the forces had access to easily deployable explosive material like TNT, they could move relatively quickly from house to house.
TNT is considered a "stable" material, meaning it is generally not dangerous until it is intentionally activated using a detonator. Alternatives, such as old landmines or other materials, can be much more cumbersome to activate and at times pose risks to the forces even when transporting them from one place to another.
The longer the installation time, the greater the risk: on the disaster on Monday, the ten landmines were connected to each other using tripwires to facilitate their activation. Many soldiers were involved in this process. The extended organization time allowed Hamas to prepare its lethal attack. The high number of soldiers inside the collapsed buildings increased the dimensions of the disaster. Like any event of warfare, the Al-Maghazi disaster can yield professional lessons alongside long-term insights.
On the professional side, it is once again evident that there is a significant shortage of skilled combat engineering forces in the Gaza Strip. No blame can be placed on the soldiers who lost their lives in the demolition mission; their proficiency in such activities is basic.
The combatants are part of Brigade 261, established by Aharon Haliva (currently the head of Military Intelligence) when he was the commander of the Officers' Training School. It is based on the instructors and cadets alongside the reserve battalion, whose fighters were hit. Most of their knowledge and experience in demolition tasks is accumulated "on the move."
In fact, the IDF has only one unit that specializes in explosive-related engineering activities – Yahalom (Special Missions Engineering Unit). If compared internationally, Yahalom's professional knowledge is not extraordinary, but the unit is considered one of the best in the world due to its extensive combat experience.
The problem is that most Yahalom forces, particularly those in the reserves, are currently engaged in the complex mission of detonating underground tunnels. Therefore, the task of demolishing the numerous buildings in the buffer zone must be carried out by less specialized forces in this particular mission.
It is important to understand that there are similarities between the disaster on Monday and an earlier incident where six soldiers were killed and 24 others injured (including singer Idan Amedi), in an explosion that took place during a mission to clear a terror tunnel tunnel in Al-Bureij on January 8. However, there are also significant differences.
The similarity lies in the fact that the explosive material was handled by our forces. So, the goal was to detonate a tunnel. The significant difference is that in Al-Bureij, the reason for the large explosion was tank fire from Israeli forces toward a suspected target.
The firing generated an electrical induction. The explosive material was of a different type, and the large explosion occurred due to a rare combination of circumstances that was difficult to predict. In contrast, the disaster in Al-Maghazi could have been anticipated as a possible action by Hamas.
Why weren't the buildings detonated from the air without risking ground forces? One of the reasons is that each precision-guided bomb is very expensive.
Using ground-based explosive devices to demolish buildings has many advantages. When a structure is destroyed from the air, it often tilts to one side, making it very difficult to complete the demolition using heavy equipment afterward. On the other hand, by using ground-based explosives, each building collapses directly into itself. In the next stage, bulldozers can then level the ground.
Now, for a broader understanding: the major incident this week occurred in a relatively rural sector, very close to the border with Israel, under the jurisdiction of Regional Brigade 143 which is responsible for defense along the Gaza border, not under Brigade 98, which carries out offensive missions in the heart of Khan Yunis. In other words, it is a combat zone that is expected to be much less dangerous.
In fact, it is the same division that collapsed on the morning of October 7 under the Nuhba attack. Its commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, was considered missing at that morning and eventually was found alive and well inside the division’s headquarters. Rosenfeld headed Monday’s rescue mission.
The search and rescue efforts were conducted under a relentless downpour of illumination shells, fired by artillery forces to turn the night into day. For the rescue operation, forces from Home Front Command units were called in, along with the Air Force's Unit 669 and civilian search and rescue forces, led by the National Fire and Rescue Authority, which operated tirelessly for one day.
The location of the explosive incident is only 600 meters from the perimeter fence surrounding the Gaza Strip, not far from Kibbutz Kissufim. It has been reported the IDF has been in control of this area for quite some time.
And here is an important conclusion: in every part of the Gaza Strip, there are still independent cells of Hamas operating autonomously, acting as guerrilla forces. This threat will persist over time. The IDF will continue to confront such cells as long as it maintains security control physically within the Gaza Strip. The danger may subside over time, but will never disappear entirely.
After all, even during continuous IDF operations within the Gaza Strip before the disengagement, and even today in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), there are still attacks. From every event, lessons must be learned to prepare for the next direct encounter with Hamas forces.
I'd love to hear your thoughts and comments. Be in touch with me directly via Twitter and LinkedIn
The terrible incident which cost the lives of 21 IDF soldiers tells us something about the military’s resilience, as well as what is expected in the next phases of the war in Gaza
The tragedy of the building collapse in Al-Maghazi begins with a severe shortage of standard explosive materials, such as TNT, worldwide. This shortage is a result of the Russia-Ukraine war and has been exacerbated significantly due to the conflict in Gaza and preparations for a potential full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah.
This week, 19 reserve soldiers were killed in the collapse of two buildings in Al-Maghazi , in the Gaza Strip, where 10 old landmines were hidden as a substitute for TNT. The landmines were triggered ahead of the planned time due to the firing of two RPG missiles towards the buildings, which were seized by our forces. Two more reserve soldiers were killed by a direct hit from another RPG on their armored tank.
The destruction of the buildings is part of the creation of a buffer zone, the kilometer-wide perimeter along the entire length of the barrier surrounding the Gaza Strip. The plan is that any Palestinian who attempts to enter the buffer zone after the war will immediately be targeted by gunfire.
The problem is that along the buffer zone, thousands of buildings need to be demolished. If the forces had access to easily deployable explosive material like TNT, they could move relatively quickly from house to house.
TNT is considered a "stable" material, meaning it is generally not dangerous until it is intentionally activated using a detonator. Alternatives, such as old landmines or other materials, can be much more cumbersome to activate and at times pose risks to the forces even when transporting them from one place to another.
The longer the installation time, the greater the risk: on the disaster on Monday, the ten landmines were connected to each other using tripwires to facilitate their activation. Many soldiers were involved in this process. The extended organization time allowed Hamas to prepare its lethal attack. The high number of soldiers inside the collapsed buildings increased the dimensions of the disaster. Like any event of warfare, the Al-Maghazi disaster can yield professional lessons alongside long-term insights.
On the professional side, it is once again evident that there is a significant shortage of skilled combat engineering forces in the Gaza Strip. No blame can be placed on the soldiers who lost their lives in the demolition mission; their proficiency in such activities is basic.
The combatants are part of Brigade 261, established by Aharon Haliva (currently the head of Military Intelligence) when he was the commander of the Officers' Training School. It is based on the instructors and cadets alongside the reserve battalion, whose fighters were hit. Most of their knowledge and experience in demolition tasks is accumulated "on the move."
In fact, the IDF has only one unit that specializes in explosive-related engineering activities – Yahalom (Special Missions Engineering Unit). If compared internationally, Yahalom's professional knowledge is not extraordinary, but the unit is considered one of the best in the world due to its extensive combat experience.
The problem is that most Yahalom forces, particularly those in the reserves, are currently engaged in the complex mission of detonating underground tunnels. Therefore, the task of demolishing the numerous buildings in the buffer zone must be carried out by less specialized forces in this particular mission.
It is important to understand that there are similarities between the disaster on Monday and an earlier incident where six soldiers were killed and 24 others injured (including singer Idan Amedi), in an explosion that took place during a mission to clear a terror tunnel tunnel in Al-Bureij on January 8. However, there are also significant differences.
The similarity lies in the fact that the explosive material was handled by our forces. So, the goal was to detonate a tunnel. The significant difference is that in Al-Bureij, the reason for the large explosion was tank fire from Israeli forces toward a suspected target.
The firing generated an electrical induction. The explosive material was of a different type, and the large explosion occurred due to a rare combination of circumstances that was difficult to predict. In contrast, the disaster in Al-Maghazi could have been anticipated as a possible action by Hamas.
Why weren't the buildings detonated from the air without risking ground forces? One of the reasons is that each precision-guided bomb is very expensive.
Using ground-based explosive devices to demolish buildings has many advantages. When a structure is destroyed from the air, it often tilts to one side, making it very difficult to complete the demolition using heavy equipment afterward. On the other hand, by using ground-based explosives, each building collapses directly into itself. In the next stage, bulldozers can then level the ground.
Now, for a broader understanding: the major incident this week occurred in a relatively rural sector, very close to the border with Israel, under the jurisdiction of Regional Brigade 143 which is responsible for defense along the Gaza border, not under Brigade 98, which carries out offensive missions in the heart of Khan Yunis. In other words, it is a combat zone that is expected to be much less dangerous.
In fact, it is the same division that collapsed on the morning of October 7 under the Nuhba attack. Its commander, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, was considered missing at that morning and eventually was found alive and well inside the division’s headquarters. Rosenfeld headed Monday’s rescue mission.
The search and rescue efforts were conducted under a relentless downpour of illumination shells, fired by artillery forces to turn the night into day. For the rescue operation, forces from Home Front Command units were called in, along with the Air Force's Unit 669 and civilian search and rescue forces, led by the National Fire and Rescue Authority, which operated tirelessly for one day.
The location of the explosive incident is only 600 meters from the perimeter fence surrounding the Gaza Strip, not far from Kibbutz Kissufim. It has been reported the IDF has been in control of this area for quite some time.
And here is an important conclusion: in every part of the Gaza Strip, there are still independent cells of Hamas operating autonomously, acting as guerrilla forces. This threat will persist over time. The IDF will continue to confront such cells as long as it maintains security control physically within the Gaza Strip. The danger may subside over time, but will never disappear entirely.
After all, even during continuous IDF operations within the Gaza Strip before the disengagement, and even today in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), there are still attacks. From every event, lessons must be learned to prepare for the next direct encounter with Hamas forces.
I'd love to hear your thoughts and comments. Be in touch with me directly via Twitter and LinkedIn
