Commentary | What is the connection between floating flammable dust and a country's food security?
Flour stations and silos are under constant threat of fires and explosions because of floating and flammable dust | Will Israel's Fire Authority align itself according to American standards?
IsraelDefense
| 03/01/2024
chat.openai.com
By Danny Kronenberg
Since time immemorial, fires and explosions due to floating, flammable dust have occurred around the world in grain silos and flour plants. They have also occurred in other industries (food, pharmaceuticals & medicine, chemistry, woodworking, etc.) where suspended dust is combustible.
Dust extraction and removal, ignition prevention, and avoidance of static electricity accumulation are among the most important safety measures in such facilities.
In December 2023, the American Chemical Safety Board (“CSB”) published a report on the series of massive explosions that occurred at the Didion Milling plant in the state of Wisconsin on May 31, 2017.
The accident caused five deaths, 14 injuries, and extensive property damage, exceeding NIS 57 million. The explosions were caused by cornmeal. Several buildings were destroyed, causing the flour station to be shut down for about two years until it was restored.
During the incident, after an initial explosion, secondary explosions spread throughout the plant via the dust extraction system. According to applicable American National Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”) standards, the Didion Milling plant did not have the required systems in place to release pressures and prevent the further spread of detonations; this caused serious structural damage.
CSB researchers discovered many failures that caused the accident; it is imperative to draw the necessary and relevant lessons and apply them here in Israel.
To start, the Didion company failed in risk management. They did not identify risk factors, so the planning did not include the required safety measures. Had enough been installed, some of the destruction or injuries could have been reduced; perhaps even the accident itself could have been prevented.
An example of missed risk factors was the connection between separate production systems through the same vacuum piping. This link was the direct cause of the explosions spread between different systems.
There was also an accumulation of dust inside the vacuum piping due to incorrect design, miscalculated piping diameters, other poor system features, and lack of maintenance of the vacuuming system itself. These elements worsened the impact of the incident.
Instructions were not followed
In 2015, the NFPA ordered an analysis of dust as a risk factor in the Didion facilities. This was done to identify safety weak points and install any required safety systems. Didion did not perform the analysis.
NFPA standards specify that various systems must be installed to prevent the ignition and explosion of combustible dust and to prevent the spread of fire and explosions throughout susceptible facilities. These standards relate to detection systems, fire, and explosion prevention systems, explosion pressure release systems, fire and explosion isolation systems, fire and explosion suppression systems, fire and explosion containment systems, and the like.
With a precise and effective combination of such systems, it is possible to prevent fires and explosions of combustible dust and reduce any damages that might occur.
The absence of these systems in Didion's facility allowed the initiation of the 2017 incident and its rapid spread throughout the plant.
The CSB report stated that the facility buildings were not designed in a way to allow for the quick release of the pressure created by the initial explosions. The "confinement of pressure" caused further spread of the event and the collapse of affected structures.
A disregard for safety and lack of safety leadership at Didion meant that there were no investigations into "small" safety incidents and "almost-incidents" (e.g. small fires and cases where they detected a burning smell). Within the company, warning signs were ignored, incidents were not investigated, no lessons were learned, and no improvements were ever made.
In addition, the CSB report assessed the emergency procedures at the facility as ‘poor.’ This meant that, during the explosion and incident, the process of effectively evacuating the workers failed, leading to a high number of casualties.
Beyond the lessons directly learned from the incident, the report detailed the investigation findings. It specifically referred to an interesting phenomenon of recurring flame intensity fluctuations (“oscillating flame”) observed during the incident.
Similar phenomena were also noted in past studies involving similar scenarios under certain conditions. This is of particular importance for facilities with floating dust that can potentially create an explosive atmosphere and for those who investigate work accidents.
Responsibility of the owners of facilities that have an increased risk of explosion due to floating and flammable dust
Owners of these facilities with a risk of explosion due to flammable dust are responsible for taking all necessary safety steps pursuant to all regulations. They are also obligated, according to their best knowledge and most updated technology, to try and prevent fires and explosions.
One must hope that the managers of all the silos, flour plants, and factories with flammable dust will study the accident report and conduct a formal inspection to prevent hazards that could cause such a disaster in the future.
Managers and members of the boards of directors in these companies must demonstrate leadership in the field of safety and make sure that all measures required by law and regulation are followed - to protect the employees, the property, the environment, and, for no other reason, to protect themselves from criminal prosecution.
Responsibility of Regulators in Israel
Regarding preventing fires and explosions due to an explosive atmosphere caused by flammable dust, the most important regulatory body in Israel is the National Fire and Rescue Authority.
In the Law on Arrangements for the State Economy for 2021 and in Government Resolution 222 of August 1, 2021, on the subject of "Balance and Improvement of the Regulatory System in the Fire and Rescue Authority," it was determined, among other things, that by the end of 2025, the regulation of fire protection must be completed based on the international standards set by the American NFPA.
The law of the National Fire and Rescue Authority has already been amended. In section 126G(a) of the law, it was established: "Regulations, instructions of the commissioner, procedures and instructions according to this law (in this section - regulations and instructions), which have the effect of regulating the field of fire safety, shall be established as a rule based on a standard of the American National Fire Protection Association, NFPA."
The National Fire and Rescue Authority must officially announce that it has adopted the relevant NFPA standards regarding an explosive atmosphere caused by combustible dust. The Authority must translate them into Hebrew while making the necessary adjustments for Israel, publish them as binding standards, and, after a short transition period, enforce compliance with them.
This topic is the authority and responsibility of the Fire Brigade, and in Section 4B(6a) of the Fire and Rescue Law, it is established that "[t]he regulation of instructions relating to fire safety and rescue shall be promoted."
The Authority has a heavy responsibility, and it must act according to all the provisions of the regulation that exists here today and ensure the installation of proper protections against explosions that may be caused by an explosive atmosphere. This is also the case of audits performed in preparation for issuing firefighting permits, a prerequisite to a business license.
Another regulatory body with powers and responsibilities regarding risk reduction from explosive atmospheres caused by combustible dust is the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the Department of Labor. It also bears responsibility for addressing within its guidelines the safety issue of an explosive atmosphere caused by combustible dust.
I believe that the regulators must issue clear instructions in Hebrew that will be accessible to the public while also providing tools and information to professionals.
Written by Danny Kronenberg. The author is a consulting engineer in the field of safety and hazardous materials who prepared several expert opinions regarding explosive atmosphere risks due to flammable dust for various bodies.
Full disclosure: The author of the article is currently conducting a legal proceeding against the National Fire and Rescue Authority on an issue related to handling procedures for hazardous materials incidents and has also filed an administrative petition against the National Fire and Rescue Authority demanding that it publish all its procedures to the public, as required by the Freedom of Information Law.
Flour stations and silos are under constant threat of fires and explosions because of floating and flammable dust | Will Israel's Fire Authority align itself according to American standards?
chat.openai.com
By Danny Kronenberg
Since time immemorial, fires and explosions due to floating, flammable dust have occurred around the world in grain silos and flour plants. They have also occurred in other industries (food, pharmaceuticals & medicine, chemistry, woodworking, etc.) where suspended dust is combustible.
Dust extraction and removal, ignition prevention, and avoidance of static electricity accumulation are among the most important safety measures in such facilities.
In December 2023, the American Chemical Safety Board (“CSB”) published a report on the series of massive explosions that occurred at the Didion Milling plant in the state of Wisconsin on May 31, 2017.
The accident caused five deaths, 14 injuries, and extensive property damage, exceeding NIS 57 million. The explosions were caused by cornmeal. Several buildings were destroyed, causing the flour station to be shut down for about two years until it was restored.
During the incident, after an initial explosion, secondary explosions spread throughout the plant via the dust extraction system. According to applicable American National Fire Protection Association (“NFPA”) standards, the Didion Milling plant did not have the required systems in place to release pressures and prevent the further spread of detonations; this caused serious structural damage.
CSB researchers discovered many failures that caused the accident; it is imperative to draw the necessary and relevant lessons and apply them here in Israel.
To start, the Didion company failed in risk management. They did not identify risk factors, so the planning did not include the required safety measures. Had enough been installed, some of the destruction or injuries could have been reduced; perhaps even the accident itself could have been prevented.
An example of missed risk factors was the connection between separate production systems through the same vacuum piping. This link was the direct cause of the explosions spread between different systems.
There was also an accumulation of dust inside the vacuum piping due to incorrect design, miscalculated piping diameters, other poor system features, and lack of maintenance of the vacuuming system itself. These elements worsened the impact of the incident.
Instructions were not followed
In 2015, the NFPA ordered an analysis of dust as a risk factor in the Didion facilities. This was done to identify safety weak points and install any required safety systems. Didion did not perform the analysis.
NFPA standards specify that various systems must be installed to prevent the ignition and explosion of combustible dust and to prevent the spread of fire and explosions throughout susceptible facilities. These standards relate to detection systems, fire, and explosion prevention systems, explosion pressure release systems, fire and explosion isolation systems, fire and explosion suppression systems, fire and explosion containment systems, and the like.
With a precise and effective combination of such systems, it is possible to prevent fires and explosions of combustible dust and reduce any damages that might occur.
The absence of these systems in Didion's facility allowed the initiation of the 2017 incident and its rapid spread throughout the plant.
The CSB report stated that the facility buildings were not designed in a way to allow for the quick release of the pressure created by the initial explosions. The "confinement of pressure" caused further spread of the event and the collapse of affected structures.
A disregard for safety and lack of safety leadership at Didion meant that there were no investigations into "small" safety incidents and "almost-incidents" (e.g. small fires and cases where they detected a burning smell). Within the company, warning signs were ignored, incidents were not investigated, no lessons were learned, and no improvements were ever made.
In addition, the CSB report assessed the emergency procedures at the facility as ‘poor.’ This meant that, during the explosion and incident, the process of effectively evacuating the workers failed, leading to a high number of casualties.
Beyond the lessons directly learned from the incident, the report detailed the investigation findings. It specifically referred to an interesting phenomenon of recurring flame intensity fluctuations (“oscillating flame”) observed during the incident.
Similar phenomena were also noted in past studies involving similar scenarios under certain conditions. This is of particular importance for facilities with floating dust that can potentially create an explosive atmosphere and for those who investigate work accidents.
Responsibility of the owners of facilities that have an increased risk of explosion due to floating and flammable dust
Owners of these facilities with a risk of explosion due to flammable dust are responsible for taking all necessary safety steps pursuant to all regulations. They are also obligated, according to their best knowledge and most updated technology, to try and prevent fires and explosions.
One must hope that the managers of all the silos, flour plants, and factories with flammable dust will study the accident report and conduct a formal inspection to prevent hazards that could cause such a disaster in the future.
Managers and members of the boards of directors in these companies must demonstrate leadership in the field of safety and make sure that all measures required by law and regulation are followed - to protect the employees, the property, the environment, and, for no other reason, to protect themselves from criminal prosecution.
Responsibility of Regulators in Israel
Regarding preventing fires and explosions due to an explosive atmosphere caused by flammable dust, the most important regulatory body in Israel is the National Fire and Rescue Authority.
In the Law on Arrangements for the State Economy for 2021 and in Government Resolution 222 of August 1, 2021, on the subject of "Balance and Improvement of the Regulatory System in the Fire and Rescue Authority," it was determined, among other things, that by the end of 2025, the regulation of fire protection must be completed based on the international standards set by the American NFPA.
The law of the National Fire and Rescue Authority has already been amended. In section 126G(a) of the law, it was established: "Regulations, instructions of the commissioner, procedures and instructions according to this law (in this section - regulations and instructions), which have the effect of regulating the field of fire safety, shall be established as a rule based on a standard of the American National Fire Protection Association, NFPA."
The National Fire and Rescue Authority must officially announce that it has adopted the relevant NFPA standards regarding an explosive atmosphere caused by combustible dust. The Authority must translate them into Hebrew while making the necessary adjustments for Israel, publish them as binding standards, and, after a short transition period, enforce compliance with them.
This topic is the authority and responsibility of the Fire Brigade, and in Section 4B(6a) of the Fire and Rescue Law, it is established that "[t]he regulation of instructions relating to fire safety and rescue shall be promoted."
The Authority has a heavy responsibility, and it must act according to all the provisions of the regulation that exists here today and ensure the installation of proper protections against explosions that may be caused by an explosive atmosphere. This is also the case of audits performed in preparation for issuing firefighting permits, a prerequisite to a business license.
Another regulatory body with powers and responsibilities regarding risk reduction from explosive atmospheres caused by combustible dust is the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the Department of Labor. It also bears responsibility for addressing within its guidelines the safety issue of an explosive atmosphere caused by combustible dust.
I believe that the regulators must issue clear instructions in Hebrew that will be accessible to the public while also providing tools and information to professionals.
Written by Danny Kronenberg. The author is a consulting engineer in the field of safety and hazardous materials who prepared several expert opinions regarding explosive atmosphere risks due to flammable dust for various bodies.
Full disclosure: The author of the article is currently conducting a legal proceeding against the National Fire and Rescue Authority on an issue related to handling procedures for hazardous materials incidents and has also filed an administrative petition against the National Fire and Rescue Authority demanding that it publish all its procedures to the public, as required by the Freedom of Information Law.
