Commentary | What Can the International Coalition Against the Houthis Achieve?
The capabilities of the coalition are limited to locating and destroying launchers through aircraft or deploying special forces for surgical operations. As long as maritime insurance is more expensive than circumventing Africa, there will be no significant change
Yotam Gutman
| 20/12/2023
The USS Eisenhower. Photo via Wikimedia Commons
The Houthis, who declared war on Israel two months ago, have recently begun targeting civilian merchant ships near the coast of Yemen.
It began with attacks on vessels identified as "Israeli," whether directly owned or indirectly linked to Israeli companies, continued with the targeting of ships passing through the area en route to Israel, and culminated in attacking vessels that are not connected to Israel in any way.
In recent days, attacks have intensified following a declaration by the Houthis that they are imposing a naval blockade at the southern entrance of the Red Sea for any maritime vessels they view as associated with Israel. They are acting resolutely on the ground and carrying out numerous attacks.
Their attack arsenal includes coastal missiles, suicide drones, the seizure of commando forces via fast boats and helicopters, and even the launch of ballistic missiles, although it's unclear if they are capable of effectively targeting vessels at sea.
The Houthis are also unafraid to attack military naval vessels securing commercial traffic in the area. In several instances, they have launched various projectiles towards military ships of the United States, Britain, and France.
The response did not take long, and several major international shipping companies announced that they would cease transiting through the Bab el Mandeb, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. Instead, they would navigate around Africa through a longer (and more expensive) route.
Approximately 10% of the world's annual oil traffic passes through the straits, along with cargo estimated at a trillion dollars. Blocking it constitutes a serious disruption to the freedom of navigation and the global supply chain.
The international community will not accept this unjustifiable act lightly, and an international coalition, led by the Americans, will be formed to combat the phenomenon. The heart of this force will be the USS Eisenhower, which until recently was stationed in the Persian Gulf and has been redeployed from there to the Arabian Sea and then off the coast of Yemen.
They will be joined by ships (and perhaps the submarine USS Florida) that are part of their mission force. Some of these, like the USS Carney, have already been in the Red Sea for over a month, engaging with the Houthis. British and French ships that are already in the area will also contribute, along with vessels from Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Bahrain, and the Seychelles Islands.
All these assets will be part of a new coalition to defend maritime routes in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, under the name Operation Prosperity Guardian.
What can such a coalition achieve?
First and foremost, deterrence and containment. While the Houthis freely target commercial maritime vessels and directly engage military ships, the deployment of numerous naval assets associated with various countries near the coasts might send a message encouraging the Houthis to reconsider. The deployment of this force, alongside the de-escalation in Gaza, could potentially lead to a cessation of Houthi hostilities and the lifting of the blockade.
Assuming that this option does not materialize, or at least not soon, and the Houthis continue wreaking havoc, the coalition will be compelled to take various actions to achieve its goal of ensuring the ability to navigate safely in the region.
The first action, already underway, is the active and reactive defense of maritime navigation in the area.
In recent weeks, naval vessels from the United States, Britain, and France have fired missiles towards attacking boats targeting merchant ships. They have assisted damaged naval vessels and captured forces attempting to take control of ships.
It is reasonable to assume that these actions will continue in the coming months, possibly in parallel with other offensive operations. The success of these actions depends largely on the composition of the coalition and its capabilities to counter Houthi attacks effectively.
As it appears, this coalition relies on an aircraft carrier carrying several attack aircraft, surface ships, and submarines armed with air-to-sea, sea-to-sea, and cruise missiles, as well as American drones deployed at various airfields in the Middle East. Additionally, special forces are likely to be involved in raiding and anti-terror missions.
For their part, the Houthis have several fast boats, helicopters, remotely controlled explosive boats, missiles, drones, and traps. The coalition does not necessarily need to attack and destroy all of the Houthi naval assets, as the Houthi forces lack many of the advanced capabilities, and their ability to operate against naval vessels at longer ranges from the shore is limited.
The main effort will be focused on neutralizing and destroying the Houthis' capabilities. The coalition will need to locate the launchers of coastal anti-ship missiles and ballistic missiles, missile depots, and launch sites, and then eliminate them.
It can be assumed that the F-18 fighter jets on the aircraft carrier will carry out most of the reconnaissance missions to locate the launchers, aided by various intelligence means regarding naval assets in the area. Subsequently, these aircraft will have the capability to launch a variety of air-to-surface munitions towards mobile targets.
Tomahawk missiles from ships and submarines of the navy, as well as Storm Shadow missiles launched from French naval vessels, can be fired towards vessels and fixed sites. Beyond that, the coalition's ability to act against coastal targets is somewhat limited.
Another means that can be employed is a special forces raid, which can be deployed from naval vessels using fast boats to land on the shore.
The situation somewhat resembles the coalition's actions against Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War and the special forces' efforts in the Iraqi desert to locate launchers and launch sites, directing airstrikes toward them.
The challenge in this scenario is the vast and taxing terrain (mountains, desert) from which the Houthis operate, making it very difficult to locate and destroy launchers before they launch munitions toward naval vessels.
Another challenge is the quantity of munitions available in Yemen compared to the defensive capabilities of the naval vessels. Ships like the USS Carney have already intercepted several dozen missiles and drones, expending a considerable amount of SM-2 missiles in response. Replenishing such munitions mid-flight is impossible and requires entering a friendly port for resupply.
It also needs to be considered that some ships may be hit by the munitions launched by the Houthis, and in such cases, they will require assistance from other naval vessels for repairs and evacuation from the area to a friendly port.
What is the end game?
After the collapse of the central government in Somalia, coastal tribes began engaging intensively in piracy along the shores. Back then, much like today, an international coalition was formed to combat the phenomenon. After some time, piracy in the Horn of Africa region weakened, and today it is not considered a significant threat.
However, the current coalition will find it challenging to replicate that achievement, as the adversary and the threat are entirely different from the situation in Somalia.
The Houthi adversary is primarily land-based, and the naval coalition has limited means to address such a threat. Therefore, it is difficult to see how this coalition can achieve significant military successes, especially not in the immediate future.
They might be able to provide some form of defense for merchant shipping in the area and impact military assets on Yemeni soil. However, whether this will be enough to eliminate the threat is doubtful.
It might be enough to restore the confidence of shipping companies, encouraging them to resume sailing through the region, especially if insurance costs are lower than those for circumventing Africa.
In any case, the deployment of the coalition and the start of its operation seems very close, and it is reasonable to assume that there will be a coordinated, albeit limited, confrontation soon.
The capabilities of the coalition are limited to locating and destroying launchers through aircraft or deploying special forces for surgical operations. As long as maritime insurance is more expensive than circumventing Africa, there will be no significant change
The USS Eisenhower. Photo via Wikimedia Commons
The Houthis, who declared war on Israel two months ago, have recently begun targeting civilian merchant ships near the coast of Yemen.
It began with attacks on vessels identified as "Israeli," whether directly owned or indirectly linked to Israeli companies, continued with the targeting of ships passing through the area en route to Israel, and culminated in attacking vessels that are not connected to Israel in any way.
In recent days, attacks have intensified following a declaration by the Houthis that they are imposing a naval blockade at the southern entrance of the Red Sea for any maritime vessels they view as associated with Israel. They are acting resolutely on the ground and carrying out numerous attacks.
Their attack arsenal includes coastal missiles, suicide drones, the seizure of commando forces via fast boats and helicopters, and even the launch of ballistic missiles, although it's unclear if they are capable of effectively targeting vessels at sea.
The Houthis are also unafraid to attack military naval vessels securing commercial traffic in the area. In several instances, they have launched various projectiles towards military ships of the United States, Britain, and France.
The response did not take long, and several major international shipping companies announced that they would cease transiting through the Bab el Mandeb, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal. Instead, they would navigate around Africa through a longer (and more expensive) route.
Approximately 10% of the world's annual oil traffic passes through the straits, along with cargo estimated at a trillion dollars. Blocking it constitutes a serious disruption to the freedom of navigation and the global supply chain.
The international community will not accept this unjustifiable act lightly, and an international coalition, led by the Americans, will be formed to combat the phenomenon. The heart of this force will be the USS Eisenhower, which until recently was stationed in the Persian Gulf and has been redeployed from there to the Arabian Sea and then off the coast of Yemen.
They will be joined by ships (and perhaps the submarine USS Florida) that are part of their mission force. Some of these, like the USS Carney, have already been in the Red Sea for over a month, engaging with the Houthis. British and French ships that are already in the area will also contribute, along with vessels from Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Bahrain, and the Seychelles Islands.
All these assets will be part of a new coalition to defend maritime routes in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, under the name Operation Prosperity Guardian.
What can such a coalition achieve?
First and foremost, deterrence and containment. While the Houthis freely target commercial maritime vessels and directly engage military ships, the deployment of numerous naval assets associated with various countries near the coasts might send a message encouraging the Houthis to reconsider. The deployment of this force, alongside the de-escalation in Gaza, could potentially lead to a cessation of Houthi hostilities and the lifting of the blockade.
Assuming that this option does not materialize, or at least not soon, and the Houthis continue wreaking havoc, the coalition will be compelled to take various actions to achieve its goal of ensuring the ability to navigate safely in the region.
The first action, already underway, is the active and reactive defense of maritime navigation in the area.
In recent weeks, naval vessels from the United States, Britain, and France have fired missiles towards attacking boats targeting merchant ships. They have assisted damaged naval vessels and captured forces attempting to take control of ships.
It is reasonable to assume that these actions will continue in the coming months, possibly in parallel with other offensive operations. The success of these actions depends largely on the composition of the coalition and its capabilities to counter Houthi attacks effectively.
As it appears, this coalition relies on an aircraft carrier carrying several attack aircraft, surface ships, and submarines armed with air-to-sea, sea-to-sea, and cruise missiles, as well as American drones deployed at various airfields in the Middle East. Additionally, special forces are likely to be involved in raiding and anti-terror missions.
For their part, the Houthis have several fast boats, helicopters, remotely controlled explosive boats, missiles, drones, and traps. The coalition does not necessarily need to attack and destroy all of the Houthi naval assets, as the Houthi forces lack many of the advanced capabilities, and their ability to operate against naval vessels at longer ranges from the shore is limited.
The main effort will be focused on neutralizing and destroying the Houthis' capabilities. The coalition will need to locate the launchers of coastal anti-ship missiles and ballistic missiles, missile depots, and launch sites, and then eliminate them.
It can be assumed that the F-18 fighter jets on the aircraft carrier will carry out most of the reconnaissance missions to locate the launchers, aided by various intelligence means regarding naval assets in the area. Subsequently, these aircraft will have the capability to launch a variety of air-to-surface munitions towards mobile targets.
Tomahawk missiles from ships and submarines of the navy, as well as Storm Shadow missiles launched from French naval vessels, can be fired towards vessels and fixed sites. Beyond that, the coalition's ability to act against coastal targets is somewhat limited.
Another means that can be employed is a special forces raid, which can be deployed from naval vessels using fast boats to land on the shore.
The situation somewhat resembles the coalition's actions against Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War and the special forces' efforts in the Iraqi desert to locate launchers and launch sites, directing airstrikes toward them.
The challenge in this scenario is the vast and taxing terrain (mountains, desert) from which the Houthis operate, making it very difficult to locate and destroy launchers before they launch munitions toward naval vessels.
Another challenge is the quantity of munitions available in Yemen compared to the defensive capabilities of the naval vessels. Ships like the USS Carney have already intercepted several dozen missiles and drones, expending a considerable amount of SM-2 missiles in response. Replenishing such munitions mid-flight is impossible and requires entering a friendly port for resupply.
It also needs to be considered that some ships may be hit by the munitions launched by the Houthis, and in such cases, they will require assistance from other naval vessels for repairs and evacuation from the area to a friendly port.
What is the end game?
After the collapse of the central government in Somalia, coastal tribes began engaging intensively in piracy along the shores. Back then, much like today, an international coalition was formed to combat the phenomenon. After some time, piracy in the Horn of Africa region weakened, and today it is not considered a significant threat.
However, the current coalition will find it challenging to replicate that achievement, as the adversary and the threat are entirely different from the situation in Somalia.
The Houthi adversary is primarily land-based, and the naval coalition has limited means to address such a threat. Therefore, it is difficult to see how this coalition can achieve significant military successes, especially not in the immediate future.
They might be able to provide some form of defense for merchant shipping in the area and impact military assets on Yemeni soil. However, whether this will be enough to eliminate the threat is doubtful.
It might be enough to restore the confidence of shipping companies, encouraging them to resume sailing through the region, especially if insurance costs are lower than those for circumventing Africa.
In any case, the deployment of the coalition and the start of its operation seems very close, and it is reasonable to assume that there will be a coordinated, albeit limited, confrontation soon.
