Analysis | Network-based warfare has failed on the Gaza border
Network-based warfare failed on the day of the massacre, October 7. It will not disappear from use, but the future will include backup forces on a local level
Yotam Gutman
| 25/10/2023
There is a lot of talk about concepts that collapsed on that damned Saturday. The model that needs a vigorous shake-up is network-based warfare.
The concept was initially developed for air operations and expanded to sea and, recently, to land, relying on means of communication and computing (C4I) that allow the command to centrally control the forces in the field, sometimes down to the level of the individual vessel.
The highlight of the concept is the love of UAVs. An aircraft controlled from a remote HMV allows decision-makers to see the crosshairs on a target before giving permission to release weapons.
This ability, dramatically strengthened in recent years, gives the illusion that some central army can control and direct the fighting in the field.
This illusion was shattered on Saturday, October 7, when the observations themselves were neutralized, the means of communication were silenced, and the command center itself was attacked (again, by an enemy without significant anti-aircraft and cyber capabilities).
The result was that the forces in the field "ran blindly" and fought alone. Even if the field companies’ capabilities were not damaged, there were still not enough forces in the area to control them.
If the situation is dire on the front, imagine a scenario where the rear absorbs many destructive missiles, with hundreds of foci of destruction over a large geographical area. Even if the systems functioned, there would not be enough emergency and rescue forces to reach all the trapped people.
Departmental training
What is the solution? At the military level, go back to basics. Field soldiers learn to fight as a class, then as a company, battalion, brigade, and division. Soldiers always know how to get down to ‘class’ level and fight if something goes wrong.
This is what the standby units in the settlements did, what the small forces in the field did, and what the special forces that jumped into the area did - with considerable success (while paying a hefty price in casualties).
I assume that the army quickly learned the lessons and transferred responsibility to the field commanders (something that has always been in Israel's systems and has proven itself) and instructed them to be ready to fight even with no communication with command.
At the level of civil defense, each locality should be able to respond immediately based on the residents who live there. Organized and trained on-call classes would be able to provide an answer to terror scenarios.
At the level of responding to emergencies that are not PPE (earthquakes, missile strikes, etc.), localities or regional councils in rural areas should be given rescue, evacuation, and medical capabilities—initial responses to easy rescue scenarios.
Strengthening local government
At the state level, powers and budgets must be transferred from the government ministries to the local authorities. During an emergency, we saw how the regional authorities functioned relatively well, helping their residents and those evacuated while the government offices were still in shock.
Network-based warfare will continue to exist. It has many advantages, and a modern military campaign cannot be conducted without it. However, we have experienced conclusive proof that this concept has a fundamental weakness.
It is essential that we get to know that weakness, learn what went wrong, and ascertain how it is possible to continue to fight - even without a central combat management and control system.
Civilian formations should also be prepared and used to respond to an emergency at the local level while relying on local measures, etc. While the technology is perfected, the ability to fight and react in a nuclear and regional manner should also be preserved.
Network-based warfare failed on the day of the massacre, October 7. It will not disappear from use, but the future will include backup forces on a local level
There is a lot of talk about concepts that collapsed on that damned Saturday. The model that needs a vigorous shake-up is network-based warfare.
The concept was initially developed for air operations and expanded to sea and, recently, to land, relying on means of communication and computing (C4I) that allow the command to centrally control the forces in the field, sometimes down to the level of the individual vessel.
The highlight of the concept is the love of UAVs. An aircraft controlled from a remote HMV allows decision-makers to see the crosshairs on a target before giving permission to release weapons.
This ability, dramatically strengthened in recent years, gives the illusion that some central army can control and direct the fighting in the field.
This illusion was shattered on Saturday, October 7, when the observations themselves were neutralized, the means of communication were silenced, and the command center itself was attacked (again, by an enemy without significant anti-aircraft and cyber capabilities).
The result was that the forces in the field "ran blindly" and fought alone. Even if the field companies’ capabilities were not damaged, there were still not enough forces in the area to control them.
If the situation is dire on the front, imagine a scenario where the rear absorbs many destructive missiles, with hundreds of foci of destruction over a large geographical area. Even if the systems functioned, there would not be enough emergency and rescue forces to reach all the trapped people.
Departmental training
What is the solution? At the military level, go back to basics. Field soldiers learn to fight as a class, then as a company, battalion, brigade, and division. Soldiers always know how to get down to ‘class’ level and fight if something goes wrong.
This is what the standby units in the settlements did, what the small forces in the field did, and what the special forces that jumped into the area did - with considerable success (while paying a hefty price in casualties).
I assume that the army quickly learned the lessons and transferred responsibility to the field commanders (something that has always been in Israel's systems and has proven itself) and instructed them to be ready to fight even with no communication with command.
At the level of civil defense, each locality should be able to respond immediately based on the residents who live there. Organized and trained on-call classes would be able to provide an answer to terror scenarios.
At the level of responding to emergencies that are not PPE (earthquakes, missile strikes, etc.), localities or regional councils in rural areas should be given rescue, evacuation, and medical capabilities—initial responses to easy rescue scenarios.
Strengthening local government
At the state level, powers and budgets must be transferred from the government ministries to the local authorities. During an emergency, we saw how the regional authorities functioned relatively well, helping their residents and those evacuated while the government offices were still in shock.
Network-based warfare will continue to exist. It has many advantages, and a modern military campaign cannot be conducted without it. However, we have experienced conclusive proof that this concept has a fundamental weakness.
It is essential that we get to know that weakness, learn what went wrong, and ascertain how it is possible to continue to fight - even without a central combat management and control system.
Civilian formations should also be prepared and used to respond to an emergency at the local level while relying on local measures, etc. While the technology is perfected, the ability to fight and react in a nuclear and regional manner should also be preserved.
