Commentary | Small chance of coup in Iran, Gaza or Lebanon
Against the backdrop of the popular uprising taking place these days in Iran and Russia, one might wonder whether such actions are also possible in other boiling points. Nitzan Nouriel examines the current situation and offers insights
Nitzan Nuriel
| 01/10/2022
Protests in Tehran, September 2022. Photo: WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
At the time of writing, two potentially significant civil uprisings are taking place. In light of this, one should analyze their characteristics and their chances of success.
The first uprising is the anti-hijab protest in Iran, which erupted following the death of a young Kurdish woman who visited Tehran and fell into the hands of the modesty guards, who did not approve of the so-called sloppy way she wore her hijab. The civil unrest which follows is not the first one in the country, which had experienced previous rounds due to water and electricity problems, among other civilian concerns. Therefore, we have some tools to examine the situation and try to assess how it will end.
At the basis of my claim, I would like to mention that I believe that changing the regime to be “bottom up” is not really an option in Iran or in similar locations. This is mostly due to the fact that the first to lose it all in the event of a regime change are the one in charge of defending it – who will therefore do everything to thwart such a change.
Still, one should estimate what is needed in order to reach the critical mass such an uprising requires. Currently, some 100 people have been killed across Iran during the protests, still not the highest number recorded during such events.
In order to reach the critical mass, protests must be held in at least 100 different cities across the country, with at least 5000 arrests and thousands of casualties daily, extensive strikes and – perhaps the most important point – one must start noticing hesitation in the actions of the security forces.
This point is important, as a lesson from the Arab Spring. One can say that how security forces acted in each country which experienced civil uprising had a crucial impact on its success. Therefore, one must examine how the forces conduct themselves.
I would estimate that the chances of the current wave of protests to success in creating a major change in Iran, even with outside help, are slim to none.
The second location to look at is, of course, Russia, following the Kremlin’s announcement on the recruitment of 300 thousand reserve soldiers in order to renew the offensive on Ukraine. I will employ the same “equation” here: scope and number of casualties and arrests, and the conduct of the security forces.
Unlike Iran, where the government has already demonstrated how cruel it can be towards the people – In modern Russia, given the openness to the west, social media etc., this is not as strong.
This is why a popular uprising might have a change to succeed – but the numbers must speak for themselves.
The phenomenon of fleeing Russia to avoid the draft has also been contributing to the general atmosphere. The series of defeats in Ukraine, coupled with financial sanctions, have also been contributing to the feeling that such a protest might be significant (I will not go here into the options Russian president Putin is facing).
And now, one might ask if in Lebanon, and Gaza we might see a kind of popular uprising in the near future against the de facto rulers, Hezbollah and Hamas respectively.
Given the parameters I previously presented, it would appear that the likelihood of a successful popular uprising event which will create a regime or policy change are very slim. This, mostly because those in charge of the regime’s defense and continuity will be the first losers should there be a change. Hamas and Hezbollah enjoy the good life of being in power, and there is no chance they will give this up out of their leaders’ own free will.
Against the backdrop of the popular uprising taking place these days in Iran and Russia, one might wonder whether such actions are also possible in other boiling points. Nitzan Nouriel examines the current situation and offers insights
Protests in Tehran, September 2022. Photo: WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
At the time of writing, two potentially significant civil uprisings are taking place. In light of this, one should analyze their characteristics and their chances of success.
The first uprising is the anti-hijab protest in Iran, which erupted following the death of a young Kurdish woman who visited Tehran and fell into the hands of the modesty guards, who did not approve of the so-called sloppy way she wore her hijab. The civil unrest which follows is not the first one in the country, which had experienced previous rounds due to water and electricity problems, among other civilian concerns. Therefore, we have some tools to examine the situation and try to assess how it will end.
At the basis of my claim, I would like to mention that I believe that changing the regime to be “bottom up” is not really an option in Iran or in similar locations. This is mostly due to the fact that the first to lose it all in the event of a regime change are the one in charge of defending it – who will therefore do everything to thwart such a change.
Still, one should estimate what is needed in order to reach the critical mass such an uprising requires. Currently, some 100 people have been killed across Iran during the protests, still not the highest number recorded during such events.
In order to reach the critical mass, protests must be held in at least 100 different cities across the country, with at least 5000 arrests and thousands of casualties daily, extensive strikes and – perhaps the most important point – one must start noticing hesitation in the actions of the security forces.
This point is important, as a lesson from the Arab Spring. One can say that how security forces acted in each country which experienced civil uprising had a crucial impact on its success. Therefore, one must examine how the forces conduct themselves.
I would estimate that the chances of the current wave of protests to success in creating a major change in Iran, even with outside help, are slim to none.
The second location to look at is, of course, Russia, following the Kremlin’s announcement on the recruitment of 300 thousand reserve soldiers in order to renew the offensive on Ukraine. I will employ the same “equation” here: scope and number of casualties and arrests, and the conduct of the security forces.
Unlike Iran, where the government has already demonstrated how cruel it can be towards the people – In modern Russia, given the openness to the west, social media etc., this is not as strong.
This is why a popular uprising might have a change to succeed – but the numbers must speak for themselves.
The phenomenon of fleeing Russia to avoid the draft has also been contributing to the general atmosphere. The series of defeats in Ukraine, coupled with financial sanctions, have also been contributing to the feeling that such a protest might be significant (I will not go here into the options Russian president Putin is facing).
And now, one might ask if in Lebanon, and Gaza we might see a kind of popular uprising in the near future against the de facto rulers, Hezbollah and Hamas respectively.
Given the parameters I previously presented, it would appear that the likelihood of a successful popular uprising event which will create a regime or policy change are very slim. This, mostly because those in charge of the regime’s defense and continuity will be the first losers should there be a change. Hamas and Hezbollah enjoy the good life of being in power, and there is no chance they will give this up out of their leaders’ own free will.
