Why the IDF has Stopped Attacking the Iranian Weapon Systems
After we have grown accustomed to "routine" attacks against Iranian weapon systems and installations in Syria and Iraq that were attributed to Israel, these attacks appear to have stopped. why is this happening? Here are a few possible explanations. Commentary
Ami Rojkes Dombe
| 31/10/2019
Photo: AP
Apparently, the attacks attributed to IDF against arms warehouses and missile plants in Syria have stopped completely in the last few weeks. As this reflects an irregular change of behavior compared to previous months, the question arises why IDF stopped attacking Iranian infrastructures in Syria. Well, several reasons come to mind.
The Iranians have despaired and given up. One thesis maintains that the Iranians have despaired of establishing logistic buffers in Syria. In the past, before the tranquility of the last few weeks, the Iranians would build warehouses and IDF, according to foreign sources, would bomb them, and so forth. This was also the case with regard to shipments by air from Iran to airports in Syria. According to this thesis, the Iranians have probably stopped building warehouses or shipping weapon systems into Syria by air. They may have switched to some other logistic buffering method, possibly one that would lead to more collateral damage if attacked, thereby restricting the ability to respond against it.
An order from Russia. Another thesis maintains that President Putin decided that he had had enough of those air strikes attributed to Israel in Syria "every other day". The situation reflects badly on Assad's public image and presents Damascus as a regime that is unable to control its own sovereign territory. It also contradicts the Russian desire to show that Syria is just about to regain control over her entire sovereign territory.
Damascus – out, Baghdad – in. Yet another thesis maintains that the Iranians relocated their logistic buffering from Syria to Iraq. Several attacks against ammunition warehouses in Iraq have been attributed to Israel recently. If that is the case, the Iranians may have estimated that Israel would be less inclined to operate in Iraq, as it would in Syria. If that was, indeed, the estimate, and the Iranians actually built logistic centers in Iraq – they were wrong. However, they have not returned to Syria – a logistic enigma in the making.
IDF are concerned about a possible response. A different thesis maintains that Israel had received credible reports to the effect that future attacks against Iranian infrastructures in Syria would be met with a decisive response against population centers in Israel. The recent Iranian attack against the oil installations in Saudi Arabia confirmed existing concerns in Israel regarding Iranian missile capabilities, and the concerns regarding a possible response by Tehran may have increased the price of future Israeli operations.
Not worth the effort anymore. This thesis maintains that the entire campaign of air strikes against Iranian infrastructures in Syria had been intended primarily for public relations purposes. In other words, IDF, allegedly under instructions from Jerusalem, attacked targets in Syria and attributed them to Iran for the purpose of exerting international pressure to draw the attention of the Americans and the Europeans to the activities of Iran in Syria. In effect, no evidence has ever been presented of the existence of arms warehouses or missile plants in Syria (the Head of the Analysis Department of the IDF Intelligence Directorate even denied a similar allegation regarding Lebanon). Accordingly, the campaign had its effect, it managed to draw the required attention of people in high places, and then it came to an end. No longer relevant – not worth the effort anymore.
Without a doubt, the cessation of the air strikes raises questions. How do you switch from a state of regular attacks against Iranian infrastructures in Syria to a state of zero attacks? The assumption that the Iranians had stopped smuggling arms to Syria or through Syria will probably receive a low probability rating, so it may be assumed that a more covert mode of war has been selected against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Another assumption maintains that no Iranian missile warehouses or plants ever existed in Syria, and that in fact, all of the 'noise' was intended for predetermined political purposes. When the objectives changed, the roar of jet engines died along with them.
After we have grown accustomed to "routine" attacks against Iranian weapon systems and installations in Syria and Iraq that were attributed to Israel, these attacks appear to have stopped. why is this happening? Here are a few possible explanations. Commentary
Photo: AP
Apparently, the attacks attributed to IDF against arms warehouses and missile plants in Syria have stopped completely in the last few weeks. As this reflects an irregular change of behavior compared to previous months, the question arises why IDF stopped attacking Iranian infrastructures in Syria. Well, several reasons come to mind.
The Iranians have despaired and given up. One thesis maintains that the Iranians have despaired of establishing logistic buffers in Syria. In the past, before the tranquility of the last few weeks, the Iranians would build warehouses and IDF, according to foreign sources, would bomb them, and so forth. This was also the case with regard to shipments by air from Iran to airports in Syria. According to this thesis, the Iranians have probably stopped building warehouses or shipping weapon systems into Syria by air. They may have switched to some other logistic buffering method, possibly one that would lead to more collateral damage if attacked, thereby restricting the ability to respond against it.
An order from Russia. Another thesis maintains that President Putin decided that he had had enough of those air strikes attributed to Israel in Syria "every other day". The situation reflects badly on Assad's public image and presents Damascus as a regime that is unable to control its own sovereign territory. It also contradicts the Russian desire to show that Syria is just about to regain control over her entire sovereign territory.
Damascus – out, Baghdad – in. Yet another thesis maintains that the Iranians relocated their logistic buffering from Syria to Iraq. Several attacks against ammunition warehouses in Iraq have been attributed to Israel recently. If that is the case, the Iranians may have estimated that Israel would be less inclined to operate in Iraq, as it would in Syria. If that was, indeed, the estimate, and the Iranians actually built logistic centers in Iraq – they were wrong. However, they have not returned to Syria – a logistic enigma in the making.
IDF are concerned about a possible response. A different thesis maintains that Israel had received credible reports to the effect that future attacks against Iranian infrastructures in Syria would be met with a decisive response against population centers in Israel. The recent Iranian attack against the oil installations in Saudi Arabia confirmed existing concerns in Israel regarding Iranian missile capabilities, and the concerns regarding a possible response by Tehran may have increased the price of future Israeli operations.
Not worth the effort anymore. This thesis maintains that the entire campaign of air strikes against Iranian infrastructures in Syria had been intended primarily for public relations purposes. In other words, IDF, allegedly under instructions from Jerusalem, attacked targets in Syria and attributed them to Iran for the purpose of exerting international pressure to draw the attention of the Americans and the Europeans to the activities of Iran in Syria. In effect, no evidence has ever been presented of the existence of arms warehouses or missile plants in Syria (the Head of the Analysis Department of the IDF Intelligence Directorate even denied a similar allegation regarding Lebanon). Accordingly, the campaign had its effect, it managed to draw the required attention of people in high places, and then it came to an end. No longer relevant – not worth the effort anymore.
Without a doubt, the cessation of the air strikes raises questions. How do you switch from a state of regular attacks against Iranian infrastructures in Syria to a state of zero attacks? The assumption that the Iranians had stopped smuggling arms to Syria or through Syria will probably receive a low probability rating, so it may be assumed that a more covert mode of war has been selected against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Another assumption maintains that no Iranian missile warehouses or plants ever existed in Syria, and that in fact, all of the 'noise' was intended for predetermined political purposes. When the objectives changed, the roar of jet engines died along with them.
