Is the IDF Really Ready for War?
Against the backdrop of the controversy over the IDF’s preparedness for war, which began with a scathing report issued by the Military Ombudsman, Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Dov Tamari zooms out and discusses the significance of the broad concept of "Combat Readiness"
Dr. Dov Tamari
| 31/12/2018
Photo: IDF
The question of whether the Israeli military is fully prepared for war has been and remains a substantial question since the early 1950s to this day and into the future. The question has made the headlines pursuant to reports submitted by the IDF Ombudsman (Chief Complaints Officer), Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick to the IDF General Staff claiming – not for the first time – that the IDF is ill-prepared for war. Rejecting the Ombudsman's view, the IDF General Staff claimed, "The IDF is ready for any eventuality." Former Minister of Defense Lieberman and Prime Minister Netanyahu made the same claim.
The broad and somewhat vague concept of "Combat Readiness" should be pondered and clarified in the context of the question of whether the IDF is fully prepared (or ill-prepared) for war. I should start by saying that I am not aware of any explicit theoretical definitions of these concepts within the IDF. Two concepts are relevant to this deliberation; the first is "military competence." "Competence" is a quantitative, numerical, and technical concept. It refers to the question of whether a tank, an aircraft or any other combat platform have undergone the maintenance and logistic processes prescribed according to professional and technical criteria. This refers not just to the individual platform, but also to all of the weapon systems that make up military units and formations. Does the equipment stored in the emergency storage depots conform to the numerical standard? Have the regular and reservist units completed the training activities prescribed by their annual or long-term plans? Competence starts with the individual rifle round in the ammunition dumps and extends all the way to operational competence – the ability to fulfill a designation assigned to the unit or formation according to rigid criteria.
Maintaining competence requires constant budgeting and allocation of personnel and funds. There is a connection between the acquisition of new or additional weapon systems and competence criteria. For example, if a reservist unit that had used Merkava Mark-II tanks acquires Merkava Mark-IV tanks, it will have to receive proper instruction and training to attain the competence required by the transition from one tank model to another.
The concept of competence is similarly superimposed on the individual soldier and on groups of soldiers from the lowest to the highest echelons, in view of the respective designations of those groups as prescribed by the standing orders. The practical significance: does the unit conform to the personnel complement according to the required breakdown of military occupational skills? Have the members of the unit received the training needed to attain competence, during their regular or reserve service? Have the various specialists attended the training courses required in order to qualify? All of these elements still belong in categories of numbers, quantities, and criteria that also include levels of quality. The General Staff may and should decide that owing to budget-related considerations, Unit A must attain a higher level of competence than Unit B, despite the fact that the two units are similar.
The second concept, "readiness," is much more complex than "competence." Presenting both concepts, "competence" and "readiness" together is a categorical mistake, a mistake commonly made by the media, probably by IDF officers and, regrettably, by Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick as well.
The first question is "readiness for what?" For war? What kind of war? A series of operations in the style of the Gaza Strip? Apparently, not all wars are the same. The second question – how do we know what the next war will be like? The third question – while we have assumed and described what the next war will be like, there are opponents on the other side, and they will do whatever they can to initiate combat encounters, operations, and wars that are different from what we have assumed. How can we determine the criteria for "readiness," as they cannot be numerical and quantitative, but only conceptual? The fourth question – in the context of a qualitative examination, where are the elements of readiness? Are they present in the tactical environment, in the operational environment, or possibly, in the strategic environment that transcends the realm of the military and resides within governments and their leaders?
What is "Readiness"?
The numerical/quantitative ratio between the regular armed forces and the reserves: the shortening of the compulsory military service term, which has a gloomy history in the IDF, has affected the readiness to employ the forces in different contexts. The shortening of the compulsory service term assigns soldiers who are not sufficiently competent to their respective positions, particularly those of junior officers, in both regular and reserve service. The tradition of the IDF, where it is normal for a soldier to start officer training after a year or eighteen months of service and then qualify to command a platoon (or a larger unit) in any combat situation – has been an illusion for 70 years or more. Admittedly – that is the normal process in the IDF, but the prices paid for it were and will remain very high.
The state of knowledge, namely the manner of thinking of the intermediate and senior officer cadres: are the officers of the IDF still situated, conceptually and awareness wise, in the previous war, or previous operation? Have they realized they should detach themselves from the previous conflicts – especially the successful wars and operations – as they never repeat themselves?
Does the evolving and on-going discourse between the IDF General Staff and the government and its leaders develop new knowledge, or is it nothing more than a necessary response to a current problem? This is a universal and particularly Israeli phenomenon: governments do not develop relevant knowledge while the military does, for better and for worse. The politicians cannot always relate to the knowledge developing in the military so they may examine the emerging reality in order to decide whether to use military force – and for what.
Does the IDF, as an organ of Israeli society, manage to create among the public a sense of alliance and consent to the use of force, which normally involves casualties? Does the IDF, and the General Staff in particular, understand the roots of the conflict with the neighboring countries, with the second and third circle countries, with non-state organizations that undergo constant changes? Based on this understanding, can they see the future?
Finally, in this context, possibly the most serious phenomenon of all – the present Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and, as far as I remember, the chiefs of staff, too, stated, "The IDF is ready for any eventuality." A military that is ready for any eventuality – and there are many potential eventualities – is not properly prepared for any one of them. The resources are limited while the number of eventualities, namely – the list of threats, is constantly increasing.
Historic Review
A historic review of the wars the State of Israel and the IDF have undergone since the War of Independence, and even that first war, show that with regard to the results, both positive and negative, the competence and even the readiness according to Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick's approach were not the decisive factor but a rather marginal factor.
Here are some past examples, of which there are many.
The Kadesh Campaign of 1956 was highly successful, from a military point of view. Three IDF regular brigades with reservist reinforcements and five reservist infantry and armored brigades participated in the operation. None of the reservist brigades managed to operate effectively – possibly just one, and even that only after the Egyptian Army in Sinai had received the order to withdraw. Mobilization started intentionally late, and the general state of disorder was severe and affected the performance of all of the participating forces. IDF Southern Command failed to understand, or was not willing to accept the operational logic of the Chief of Staff and sabotaged it severely. Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan said after the war, in his conclusion of a lesson-drawing conference, "What I heard today has led me to understand that we lost the war." In conclusion, poor competence and, conversely, high military and diplomatic readiness of knowledge and understanding of the reality by the General Staff, rare operational understanding (which was not the norm in the IDF back then) – and the result was very good. The nice thing about the General Staff of those days was the fact that it focused on shaping an operation in view of the inherent weaknesses of the IDF rather than according to their competence capabilities.
The Six Day War of 1967 – the greatest victory of them all. By then, the IDF had grown quantitatively, the armored element had occupied first place in land warfare and the IAF had become the strongest and most advanced air force in the Middle East. However, since the Kadesh Campaign, the IDF had adhered to the "Holy Trinity" – initiated war, preventive war, and preemptive strike. The IDF had placed the emphasis mainly on a preventive war that should begin with a preemptive strike. The IDF General Staff erred with regard to two decisive matters: one – conducting a war of attrition against Syria in a manner that led to a crisis, which, in turn, led to the Six Day War. Two – the General Staff was confident that Eshkol's government would be ready for a preventive war and a preemptive strike as soon as a significant threat had emerged, which was a serious mistake. The IDF was just as responsible as any other element for the political and social crisis that broke out during the waiting period, as they were unwilling to understand the changes in the concept of the post-Ben-Gurion politicians (the government).
The Yom-Kippur War of 1973. The IDF had grown substantially more powerful between 1967 and 1973. One omission, which is still lamentable to this day, was the neglect of the various infantry and paratrooper units. These units had excelled in special operations during the War of Attrition but failed to understand the next war. They had fought neither for elementary mechanization, nor for methods and resources for coping with enemy armor.
Anyone believing that it was all the intelligence's fault is wrong. Without putting in a single good word for the intelligence – anyone who has carefully read the transcripts of the discussions of the IDF General Staff held between the beginning of 1973 and October 5 of that year would have realized, beyond any doubt, that the IDF General Staff and the Chief of Staff believed it was possible to defend against and block a combined Egyptian-Syrian attack using only the regular forces and the IAF. In other words, the IDF was not reasonably ready for war, but continued to rely on the success of the Six Day War, namely – reasonable competence and completely mistaken readiness.
The First Lebanon War of 1982. A high level of tactical readiness and a concept of war that ranged between the retarded and the opportunistic desire of the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff to establish a new order in the Middle East. The subsequent story is well known: eighteen years of pointless wallowing in the Lebanese mire that produced, raised, and nurtured Hezbollah.
The Second Lebanon War of 2006. Nothing much needs to be said in addition to the above. Operational ignorance at the IDF General Staff and Northern Command. It would be unfair to blame it on the IDF's degeneration in the Judea and Samaria and the implications thereof on the combat capabilities and performance demonstrated in Lebanon. When there is no appropriate direction, there can be no real tactical capabilities. What did we gain from that war – which corresponds with the preparedness and readiness in the style of Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick? Reservist commanders and troopers complained that the IDF had failed to provide them with the proper equipment they needed to succeed in that war. The terrified General Staff invested 2 billion ILS in stocking the emergency storage depots and in equipment that is similar to the equipment the regular units are using – a total waste of money.
I will settle for these examples, and now for the enterprise of Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick. I have the utmost appreciation and respect for this person. We worked together when he was the commander of the National Security College and participated in the establishment of the Operational Art Research Institute. Regrettably, in his capacity as Military Ombudsman and owing to his interpretation of his authority, he fails to understand the concept of "Combat Readiness." His reports, most of which I have read in addition to attending two detailed lectures he delivered – might be causing more harm than good. Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick shifted the concept of "Combat Readiness" to the numerical/quantitative realm, to the environment of compliance with standards and standing orders – things that are important in their own right – but in doing so, he has masked the required balanced structure of readiness in all of the fields of activity for which the military is responsible. Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick has diverted the discussion and the criticism from the conceptual weaknesses of the IDF to the numbers and quantities, and that is a mistake. No military in the world is perfectly balanced in line with the concept of "readiness." The question is what to invest in; those who invested in strategic, operational and social concepts are the ones who turned out to be the winners.
A military organization that suffers from a less-than-tragic deficiency in costly competence while excelling in over-all readiness – that is what the IDF and the State of Israel need.
***
Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Dov Tamari had an extensive military career of thirty years in the IDF, followed by a 22-year academic tenure
Against the backdrop of the controversy over the IDF’s preparedness for war, which began with a scathing report issued by the Military Ombudsman, Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Dov Tamari zooms out and discusses the significance of the broad concept of "Combat Readiness"
Photo: IDF
The question of whether the Israeli military is fully prepared for war has been and remains a substantial question since the early 1950s to this day and into the future. The question has made the headlines pursuant to reports submitted by the IDF Ombudsman (Chief Complaints Officer), Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick to the IDF General Staff claiming – not for the first time – that the IDF is ill-prepared for war. Rejecting the Ombudsman's view, the IDF General Staff claimed, "The IDF is ready for any eventuality." Former Minister of Defense Lieberman and Prime Minister Netanyahu made the same claim.
The broad and somewhat vague concept of "Combat Readiness" should be pondered and clarified in the context of the question of whether the IDF is fully prepared (or ill-prepared) for war. I should start by saying that I am not aware of any explicit theoretical definitions of these concepts within the IDF. Two concepts are relevant to this deliberation; the first is "military competence." "Competence" is a quantitative, numerical, and technical concept. It refers to the question of whether a tank, an aircraft or any other combat platform have undergone the maintenance and logistic processes prescribed according to professional and technical criteria. This refers not just to the individual platform, but also to all of the weapon systems that make up military units and formations. Does the equipment stored in the emergency storage depots conform to the numerical standard? Have the regular and reservist units completed the training activities prescribed by their annual or long-term plans? Competence starts with the individual rifle round in the ammunition dumps and extends all the way to operational competence – the ability to fulfill a designation assigned to the unit or formation according to rigid criteria.
Maintaining competence requires constant budgeting and allocation of personnel and funds. There is a connection between the acquisition of new or additional weapon systems and competence criteria. For example, if a reservist unit that had used Merkava Mark-II tanks acquires Merkava Mark-IV tanks, it will have to receive proper instruction and training to attain the competence required by the transition from one tank model to another.
The concept of competence is similarly superimposed on the individual soldier and on groups of soldiers from the lowest to the highest echelons, in view of the respective designations of those groups as prescribed by the standing orders. The practical significance: does the unit conform to the personnel complement according to the required breakdown of military occupational skills? Have the members of the unit received the training needed to attain competence, during their regular or reserve service? Have the various specialists attended the training courses required in order to qualify? All of these elements still belong in categories of numbers, quantities, and criteria that also include levels of quality. The General Staff may and should decide that owing to budget-related considerations, Unit A must attain a higher level of competence than Unit B, despite the fact that the two units are similar.
The second concept, "readiness," is much more complex than "competence." Presenting both concepts, "competence" and "readiness" together is a categorical mistake, a mistake commonly made by the media, probably by IDF officers and, regrettably, by Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick as well.
The first question is "readiness for what?" For war? What kind of war? A series of operations in the style of the Gaza Strip? Apparently, not all wars are the same. The second question – how do we know what the next war will be like? The third question – while we have assumed and described what the next war will be like, there are opponents on the other side, and they will do whatever they can to initiate combat encounters, operations, and wars that are different from what we have assumed. How can we determine the criteria for "readiness," as they cannot be numerical and quantitative, but only conceptual? The fourth question – in the context of a qualitative examination, where are the elements of readiness? Are they present in the tactical environment, in the operational environment, or possibly, in the strategic environment that transcends the realm of the military and resides within governments and their leaders?
What is "Readiness"?
The numerical/quantitative ratio between the regular armed forces and the reserves: the shortening of the compulsory military service term, which has a gloomy history in the IDF, has affected the readiness to employ the forces in different contexts. The shortening of the compulsory service term assigns soldiers who are not sufficiently competent to their respective positions, particularly those of junior officers, in both regular and reserve service. The tradition of the IDF, where it is normal for a soldier to start officer training after a year or eighteen months of service and then qualify to command a platoon (or a larger unit) in any combat situation – has been an illusion for 70 years or more. Admittedly – that is the normal process in the IDF, but the prices paid for it were and will remain very high.
The state of knowledge, namely the manner of thinking of the intermediate and senior officer cadres: are the officers of the IDF still situated, conceptually and awareness wise, in the previous war, or previous operation? Have they realized they should detach themselves from the previous conflicts – especially the successful wars and operations – as they never repeat themselves?
Does the evolving and on-going discourse between the IDF General Staff and the government and its leaders develop new knowledge, or is it nothing more than a necessary response to a current problem? This is a universal and particularly Israeli phenomenon: governments do not develop relevant knowledge while the military does, for better and for worse. The politicians cannot always relate to the knowledge developing in the military so they may examine the emerging reality in order to decide whether to use military force – and for what.
Does the IDF, as an organ of Israeli society, manage to create among the public a sense of alliance and consent to the use of force, which normally involves casualties? Does the IDF, and the General Staff in particular, understand the roots of the conflict with the neighboring countries, with the second and third circle countries, with non-state organizations that undergo constant changes? Based on this understanding, can they see the future?
Finally, in this context, possibly the most serious phenomenon of all – the present Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and, as far as I remember, the chiefs of staff, too, stated, "The IDF is ready for any eventuality." A military that is ready for any eventuality – and there are many potential eventualities – is not properly prepared for any one of them. The resources are limited while the number of eventualities, namely – the list of threats, is constantly increasing.
Historic Review
A historic review of the wars the State of Israel and the IDF have undergone since the War of Independence, and even that first war, show that with regard to the results, both positive and negative, the competence and even the readiness according to Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick's approach were not the decisive factor but a rather marginal factor.
Here are some past examples, of which there are many.
The Kadesh Campaign of 1956 was highly successful, from a military point of view. Three IDF regular brigades with reservist reinforcements and five reservist infantry and armored brigades participated in the operation. None of the reservist brigades managed to operate effectively – possibly just one, and even that only after the Egyptian Army in Sinai had received the order to withdraw. Mobilization started intentionally late, and the general state of disorder was severe and affected the performance of all of the participating forces. IDF Southern Command failed to understand, or was not willing to accept the operational logic of the Chief of Staff and sabotaged it severely. Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan said after the war, in his conclusion of a lesson-drawing conference, "What I heard today has led me to understand that we lost the war." In conclusion, poor competence and, conversely, high military and diplomatic readiness of knowledge and understanding of the reality by the General Staff, rare operational understanding (which was not the norm in the IDF back then) – and the result was very good. The nice thing about the General Staff of those days was the fact that it focused on shaping an operation in view of the inherent weaknesses of the IDF rather than according to their competence capabilities.
The Six Day War of 1967 – the greatest victory of them all. By then, the IDF had grown quantitatively, the armored element had occupied first place in land warfare and the IAF had become the strongest and most advanced air force in the Middle East. However, since the Kadesh Campaign, the IDF had adhered to the "Holy Trinity" – initiated war, preventive war, and preemptive strike. The IDF had placed the emphasis mainly on a preventive war that should begin with a preemptive strike. The IDF General Staff erred with regard to two decisive matters: one – conducting a war of attrition against Syria in a manner that led to a crisis, which, in turn, led to the Six Day War. Two – the General Staff was confident that Eshkol's government would be ready for a preventive war and a preemptive strike as soon as a significant threat had emerged, which was a serious mistake. The IDF was just as responsible as any other element for the political and social crisis that broke out during the waiting period, as they were unwilling to understand the changes in the concept of the post-Ben-Gurion politicians (the government).
The Yom-Kippur War of 1973. The IDF had grown substantially more powerful between 1967 and 1973. One omission, which is still lamentable to this day, was the neglect of the various infantry and paratrooper units. These units had excelled in special operations during the War of Attrition but failed to understand the next war. They had fought neither for elementary mechanization, nor for methods and resources for coping with enemy armor.
Anyone believing that it was all the intelligence's fault is wrong. Without putting in a single good word for the intelligence – anyone who has carefully read the transcripts of the discussions of the IDF General Staff held between the beginning of 1973 and October 5 of that year would have realized, beyond any doubt, that the IDF General Staff and the Chief of Staff believed it was possible to defend against and block a combined Egyptian-Syrian attack using only the regular forces and the IAF. In other words, the IDF was not reasonably ready for war, but continued to rely on the success of the Six Day War, namely – reasonable competence and completely mistaken readiness.
The First Lebanon War of 1982. A high level of tactical readiness and a concept of war that ranged between the retarded and the opportunistic desire of the Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff to establish a new order in the Middle East. The subsequent story is well known: eighteen years of pointless wallowing in the Lebanese mire that produced, raised, and nurtured Hezbollah.
The Second Lebanon War of 2006. Nothing much needs to be said in addition to the above. Operational ignorance at the IDF General Staff and Northern Command. It would be unfair to blame it on the IDF's degeneration in the Judea and Samaria and the implications thereof on the combat capabilities and performance demonstrated in Lebanon. When there is no appropriate direction, there can be no real tactical capabilities. What did we gain from that war – which corresponds with the preparedness and readiness in the style of Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick? Reservist commanders and troopers complained that the IDF had failed to provide them with the proper equipment they needed to succeed in that war. The terrified General Staff invested 2 billion ILS in stocking the emergency storage depots and in equipment that is similar to the equipment the regular units are using – a total waste of money.
I will settle for these examples, and now for the enterprise of Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick. I have the utmost appreciation and respect for this person. We worked together when he was the commander of the National Security College and participated in the establishment of the Operational Art Research Institute. Regrettably, in his capacity as Military Ombudsman and owing to his interpretation of his authority, he fails to understand the concept of "Combat Readiness." His reports, most of which I have read in addition to attending two detailed lectures he delivered – might be causing more harm than good. Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick shifted the concept of "Combat Readiness" to the numerical/quantitative realm, to the environment of compliance with standards and standing orders – things that are important in their own right – but in doing so, he has masked the required balanced structure of readiness in all of the fields of activity for which the military is responsible. Maj. Gen. (res.) Brick has diverted the discussion and the criticism from the conceptual weaknesses of the IDF to the numbers and quantities, and that is a mistake. No military in the world is perfectly balanced in line with the concept of "readiness." The question is what to invest in; those who invested in strategic, operational and social concepts are the ones who turned out to be the winners.
A military organization that suffers from a less-than-tragic deficiency in costly competence while excelling in over-all readiness – that is what the IDF and the State of Israel need.
***
Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Dov Tamari had an extensive military career of thirty years in the IDF, followed by a 22-year academic tenure
