Moscow on the Euphrates
In order to safeguard its global interests, the Russian government endeavors to establish a secular republic in Syria and maintain their bases of operation in the region. Special analysis of Moscow's geopolitical moves in the Middle Eastern mire
Yakov (Yasha) Kedmi
| 02/03/2018
Russian soldiers at Red Square (Photo: AP)
The Russian policy in the Middle East generally and in Syria in particular is derived from Russia's global policy. The primary characteristic of Russia's global policy is the ever-intensifying conflict with the USA. This conflict is not just diplomatic, but one that attains a more and more military nature. The turning point in the Russian situation appraisal occurred as far back as 2003, when the USA developed the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) doctrine. Russia estimated that PGS constituted a radical change in the global military strategy of the USA. While in the past the emphasis had been placed on nuclear power, now, while maintaining the nuclear potential, the emphasis shifted to the development of the PGS capability, including the future use of hundreds of thousands of unmanned airborne vehicles.
In the context of the Russian military doctrine, PGS was regarded as the most serious threat facing Russia. According to Russian estimates, the USA aspires for the capability of launching a salvo of more than 6,000 cruise missiles, within one hour, at Russia's missile bases and military and strategic objectives – to be achieved by the year 2020. Some of these missiles can carry nuclear or thermonuclear warheads. A major percentage of the missiles will have a speed of six to eight times the speed of sound.
Most of the missiles will be launched from naval platforms in the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean – of which 1,000 will be submarines. The remaining missiles will be launched from NATO bases in Romania and Poland, as well as by aircraft. According to Russian estimates, the number of US Navy vessels in the Mediterranean theater will increase to about 40 by 2020.
Russia's global strategy incorporates their general-strategic view of the Middle East. According to Russian estimates, the worldwide consumption of oil will increase by 56% by 2040. This will position the Middle East as the world's primary supplier of oil, with everything that fact entails.
The Objective: Global Command of the Sea
Russia aspires to a situation where by 2020, the Russian Navy will evolve into a factor that cannot be ignored – anywhere around the globe. The Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean are all strategically important to Russia, and Russia aspires to attain the ability to command and control all of the aerial and marine spaces associated with those waters.
The considerations associated with the threats of the US missile setups in Eastern Europe and the Sixth Fleet were among the primary factors that influenced the consolidation of Russia's policy during the Ukraine crisis and regarding the question of reinstating the Crimea and the port of Sebastopol to Russian sovereignty. This would have ensured Russia's command of the Black Sea, without which (apart from the importance of the Black Sea to the Russian Navy) the Russian Navy would have no option of operating in the Mediterranean. Today, Russia believes that it would be able to destroy the entire NATO presence in the Black Sea, as well as the US missile bases in Romania, within 15 minutes.
According to this concept, Russia decided to reestablish its Mediterranean fleet. The objective of this fleet is to cope with the threats imposed on Russia by the Sixth Fleet and the southern flank of NATO and Africa. For this purpose, Russia decided to establish the port of Tartus in Syria as the home port of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean.
According to the 49-year agreement between Russia and the Government of Syria, after the port of Tartus has been rebuilt and deepened and following the addition of docks and piers, Russia will be able to maintain in the port of Tartus up to 11 naval vessels, including vessels with a displacement of up to 10,000 tons, including nuclear submarines. Additionally, Russia reached an agreement with Egypt regarding the use of the port of Alexandria for resupply and refueling purposes. Taking into consideration the proposal of the President of Sudan regarding the establishment of a Russian naval base in one of the ports in the Red Sea, an impressive picture emerges of the Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East generally. It is reasonable to assume that Russia will have an option of using ports in Libya as well.
In addition to the port of Tartus, Russia signed a 49-year "lease" on the Khmeimim airbase. This airbase, which is to undergo reconstruction and expansion, should be used by the Russian Air Force under exclusive Russian control – just like the port of Tartus. The advanced Russian aircraft deployed at that airbase should provide aerial cover to the Russian Navy's Mediterranean fleet, and constitute a threat in the form of potential missile attacks by Russian aircraft against the Sixth Fleet as well as against strategic US and NATO targets in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Aircraft operating out of Khmeimim airbase and carrying the latest XM-101 missiles (which have a range of 5,500 km and a CEP of 10 meters) could threaten the US Navy even as far as the Atlantic Ocean. Additionally, Russia reached an agreement with Egypt regarding the use of Egyptian territory for landing and refueling its military aircraft. It is natural to expect Khmeimim airbase to serve as a basis for Russian reconnaissance flights throughout the region.
In addition to the above, Russia deployed in Syria air-defense setups, missile batteries (starting with the S-400) plus Iskander surface-to-surface missile batteries and electronic warfare units. To defend the bases, Russia deployed specialist units from the Army as well as from the Navy. It is natural to expect that intelligence layouts compatible with the tactical, operative and strategic objectives of the Russian military have been and will be deployed in Syria. At the same time, today, the Russian air-defense setups, missile defense setups and aircraft are not intended to defend the entire territory of Syria or its forces – but to defend the Russian forces and bases exclusively.
Russia deployed its forces to Syria on September 30, 2015, at the request of the Syrian Government. The objective of this deployment was to help the Syrian Government subdue the opposition and ISIS/al-Qaeda forces that threatened to dominate Syria in those days. Such a development would have denied Russia the option of establishing a home port in the Mediterranean – a hope port that was essential to Russia's strategic defense according to the doctrine and policy of the Russian military and political leadership. The initial estimate of the Russian military was that an overbalance can be achieved within three months, and that in the following months the entire Syrian territory may be liberated by the Syrian Army. Owing to the excessive weakness of the Syrian Army, ridding Syria of the forces of ISIS and the near-victory over the opposition forces took two years to achieve. By this time, the forces of ISIS have been eliminated and driven out of nearly all Syrian territories.
Inside Syria, the area around Idlib remained under the domination of Jabhat al-Nusra (the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda) and smaller forces of the various opposition organizations. The area to the east of the Euphrates River is currently dominated by Kurdish forces primarily, with a relatively small presence of the opposition supported by the USA. The Russian Army is trying to negotiate with tribal leaders and Kurdish forces deployed to the east of the Euphrates with the intention of having them reach agreements with the Syrian authorities. Additionally, the Turkish Army dominates expansive areas in northern Syria. In three small areas (including the area adjacent to the Golan Heights), a state of truce is maintained between the Syrian Army and the rebel forces. The truce is supervised by three Russian military police battalions made up entirely of Muslim troopers from the Caucasus region.
From a military point of view, Russia estimates that the fighting in Syria has ended. Only a few additional months will be required in order to complete the military operations intended to eliminate the forces of the Jihadist terrorist organizations and the opposition forces that refuse to accept the truce. According to Russian estimates, the Syrian Air Force is definitely sufficient to provide air support by attacking ground targets within those pockets of resistance, in the Idlib area as well as in the other areas. If necessary, the Syrians may be supported by Russian aerial forces far smaller than those employed in the past. Accordingly, Russia intends to significantly reduce the OrBat of the Russian forces deployed in Syria. The Russian OrBat remaining in Syria will consist primarily of forces that are essential to Russia's strategic objectives. Consequently, the main efforts of the Russian military in Syria in the next two years will focus on the reconstruction and adaptation of the port of Tartus and Khmeimim airbase for Russia's strategic needs.
Efforts to Establish a Syrian Republic
Russia's primary efforts vis-à-vis Syria focus on an attempt to start up the diplomatic process – negotiations between all of the opposition organizations and the Syrian authorities regarding the future political structure of the Syrian state. According to the Russian proposal, Syria should be a unified secular state with an authoritative central government named "The Republic of Syria" without the word "Arab." Syria regards itself as a multinational state, and the name of the future state should not include references to any particular nationality, so as to prevent national-motivated confrontations. Syria's secular orientation should abate the intensity of the religious confrontations. Russia advocates the granting of a certain degree of autonomy to the Kurdish minority, but Assad disagrees, and Turkey strongly opposes this approach.
According to the plan consolidated by Russia, which won the approval and support of the governments of Syria, Turkey and Iran, the representatives of the government and the opposition should formulate and accept the new constitution of Syria, and based on that constitution – hold new elections, all within a timeframe of about eighteen months. Until the elections, Syria will be governed by a temporary unity government made up of representatives of the government and the opposition, all under the auspices of the UN.
Russia believes that the presence of foreign forces in Syria – Iranian, Iran-sponsored and Turkish forces – endanger the stability of Syria and its government. Admittedly, the Iranian forces were invited by the Syrian Government, but only during the war and only for the purpose of fighting alongside the weakened Syrian Army. Iran is keenly interested in keeping its forces in Syria. For the first time ever, Iran has direct overland access, through Iraq and Syria, to the Mediterranean, all the way to the Lebanon coast and the border with Israel. The Iranian forces and the Shi'ite elements subordinated to them have no natural base in Syria, owing to the nearly total absence of Shi'ite population. Nor is there a population of Persian ethnic origin in Syria. The Iranian radical religious format is foreign and unpopular among nearly all of the population segments in Syria, especially in the Syrian military and officer cadre, which are predominately secular. Russia is not interested in the Iranian military presence in Syria, as it undermines Russia's influence on Syria and also because an Iranian presence constitutes an agitating factor in the region, in view of Iran's objectives and its hostility toward Israel. A confrontation between Iran and Israel could endanger Syria and the stability of the entire region, which is the precondition for the fulfillment of Russia's objectives through its strategic bases.
The continued Iranian military presence will make it difficult to dispel the units of the Turkish Army from Syria's territory. The Turkish Army operates in Syrian territory against the will of the Syrian Government. This was only made possible owing to the weakness of the Syrian Army and its inability to recapture territories dominated by the Turkish Army while driving the rebel forces out of these territories. Turkey's primary objective in Syria is to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish autonomy and the unification of the territories dominated by the Kurds along the border with Turkey. Russia is not interested in the Turkish military presence in Syria now that the fighting is over. Turkey, with its Muslim Brotherhood ideology, is currently in a state of confrontation with most of the Arab countries, as well as with the Syrian Government in Damascus. Turkey's domination of the Turkmen population in Syria and their militia forces endangers the stability and unification of Syria. The hostility between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds is an even greater danger to Syria's stability.
All of the countries of the region, including the Arab countries, Iran and Turkey, are opposed to the division of Syria owing to the high risk such a process would present to the entire region. Russia regards the dissolution of Syria as the most dangerous move for the region and for Russia and its interests and will do whatever it can to prevent the division of Syria.
Eventually, if Moscow should accomplish its objectives in Syria, a Russian strategic presence will remain in Syria for decades, and such presence may include the option of nuclear weapons that may be employed by the Russian Navy as well as by the Russian Air Force. Intelligence setups, as well as some of the world's most advanced air-defense and missile defense systems, will remain in Syria as well. It is, indeed, more likely to assume that the air-defense and missile defense setups will be deployed only to defend the Russian bases and forces in Syria, but it is not impossible that Russia, owing to its own considerations and according to actual developments, might extend those defenses to encompass the entire territory of Syria.
A Russian strategic military presence in Syria will significantly enhance the security of Syria and its government – whatever it may be. On the other hand, owing to Russia's interest in stability and tranquility in the region for the purpose of maintaining the Russian bases, Russia will prevent Syria from taking any steps that might endanger Russia's strategic interests in the region and the Russian military presence in Syria. This will contribute to stability along Israel's northern border. It should also be noted that Russia is the only country that currently maintains reasonably good – and constantly improving – relations with all of the countries in the region.
***
Yaakov (Yasha) Kedmi is the former head of Nativ
In order to safeguard its global interests, the Russian government endeavors to establish a secular republic in Syria and maintain their bases of operation in the region. Special analysis of Moscow's geopolitical moves in the Middle Eastern mire
Russian soldiers at Red Square (Photo: AP)
The Russian policy in the Middle East generally and in Syria in particular is derived from Russia's global policy. The primary characteristic of Russia's global policy is the ever-intensifying conflict with the USA. This conflict is not just diplomatic, but one that attains a more and more military nature. The turning point in the Russian situation appraisal occurred as far back as 2003, when the USA developed the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) doctrine. Russia estimated that PGS constituted a radical change in the global military strategy of the USA. While in the past the emphasis had been placed on nuclear power, now, while maintaining the nuclear potential, the emphasis shifted to the development of the PGS capability, including the future use of hundreds of thousands of unmanned airborne vehicles.
In the context of the Russian military doctrine, PGS was regarded as the most serious threat facing Russia. According to Russian estimates, the USA aspires for the capability of launching a salvo of more than 6,000 cruise missiles, within one hour, at Russia's missile bases and military and strategic objectives – to be achieved by the year 2020. Some of these missiles can carry nuclear or thermonuclear warheads. A major percentage of the missiles will have a speed of six to eight times the speed of sound.
Most of the missiles will be launched from naval platforms in the North Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean – of which 1,000 will be submarines. The remaining missiles will be launched from NATO bases in Romania and Poland, as well as by aircraft. According to Russian estimates, the number of US Navy vessels in the Mediterranean theater will increase to about 40 by 2020.
Russia's global strategy incorporates their general-strategic view of the Middle East. According to Russian estimates, the worldwide consumption of oil will increase by 56% by 2040. This will position the Middle East as the world's primary supplier of oil, with everything that fact entails.
The Objective: Global Command of the Sea
Russia aspires to a situation where by 2020, the Russian Navy will evolve into a factor that cannot be ignored – anywhere around the globe. The Barents Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean are all strategically important to Russia, and Russia aspires to attain the ability to command and control all of the aerial and marine spaces associated with those waters.
The considerations associated with the threats of the US missile setups in Eastern Europe and the Sixth Fleet were among the primary factors that influenced the consolidation of Russia's policy during the Ukraine crisis and regarding the question of reinstating the Crimea and the port of Sebastopol to Russian sovereignty. This would have ensured Russia's command of the Black Sea, without which (apart from the importance of the Black Sea to the Russian Navy) the Russian Navy would have no option of operating in the Mediterranean. Today, Russia believes that it would be able to destroy the entire NATO presence in the Black Sea, as well as the US missile bases in Romania, within 15 minutes.
According to this concept, Russia decided to reestablish its Mediterranean fleet. The objective of this fleet is to cope with the threats imposed on Russia by the Sixth Fleet and the southern flank of NATO and Africa. For this purpose, Russia decided to establish the port of Tartus in Syria as the home port of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean.
According to the 49-year agreement between Russia and the Government of Syria, after the port of Tartus has been rebuilt and deepened and following the addition of docks and piers, Russia will be able to maintain in the port of Tartus up to 11 naval vessels, including vessels with a displacement of up to 10,000 tons, including nuclear submarines. Additionally, Russia reached an agreement with Egypt regarding the use of the port of Alexandria for resupply and refueling purposes. Taking into consideration the proposal of the President of Sudan regarding the establishment of a Russian naval base in one of the ports in the Red Sea, an impressive picture emerges of the Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East generally. It is reasonable to assume that Russia will have an option of using ports in Libya as well.
In addition to the port of Tartus, Russia signed a 49-year "lease" on the Khmeimim airbase. This airbase, which is to undergo reconstruction and expansion, should be used by the Russian Air Force under exclusive Russian control – just like the port of Tartus. The advanced Russian aircraft deployed at that airbase should provide aerial cover to the Russian Navy's Mediterranean fleet, and constitute a threat in the form of potential missile attacks by Russian aircraft against the Sixth Fleet as well as against strategic US and NATO targets in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Aircraft operating out of Khmeimim airbase and carrying the latest XM-101 missiles (which have a range of 5,500 km and a CEP of 10 meters) could threaten the US Navy even as far as the Atlantic Ocean. Additionally, Russia reached an agreement with Egypt regarding the use of Egyptian territory for landing and refueling its military aircraft. It is natural to expect Khmeimim airbase to serve as a basis for Russian reconnaissance flights throughout the region.
In addition to the above, Russia deployed in Syria air-defense setups, missile batteries (starting with the S-400) plus Iskander surface-to-surface missile batteries and electronic warfare units. To defend the bases, Russia deployed specialist units from the Army as well as from the Navy. It is natural to expect that intelligence layouts compatible with the tactical, operative and strategic objectives of the Russian military have been and will be deployed in Syria. At the same time, today, the Russian air-defense setups, missile defense setups and aircraft are not intended to defend the entire territory of Syria or its forces – but to defend the Russian forces and bases exclusively.
Russia deployed its forces to Syria on September 30, 2015, at the request of the Syrian Government. The objective of this deployment was to help the Syrian Government subdue the opposition and ISIS/al-Qaeda forces that threatened to dominate Syria in those days. Such a development would have denied Russia the option of establishing a home port in the Mediterranean – a hope port that was essential to Russia's strategic defense according to the doctrine and policy of the Russian military and political leadership. The initial estimate of the Russian military was that an overbalance can be achieved within three months, and that in the following months the entire Syrian territory may be liberated by the Syrian Army. Owing to the excessive weakness of the Syrian Army, ridding Syria of the forces of ISIS and the near-victory over the opposition forces took two years to achieve. By this time, the forces of ISIS have been eliminated and driven out of nearly all Syrian territories.
Inside Syria, the area around Idlib remained under the domination of Jabhat al-Nusra (the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda) and smaller forces of the various opposition organizations. The area to the east of the Euphrates River is currently dominated by Kurdish forces primarily, with a relatively small presence of the opposition supported by the USA. The Russian Army is trying to negotiate with tribal leaders and Kurdish forces deployed to the east of the Euphrates with the intention of having them reach agreements with the Syrian authorities. Additionally, the Turkish Army dominates expansive areas in northern Syria. In three small areas (including the area adjacent to the Golan Heights), a state of truce is maintained between the Syrian Army and the rebel forces. The truce is supervised by three Russian military police battalions made up entirely of Muslim troopers from the Caucasus region.
From a military point of view, Russia estimates that the fighting in Syria has ended. Only a few additional months will be required in order to complete the military operations intended to eliminate the forces of the Jihadist terrorist organizations and the opposition forces that refuse to accept the truce. According to Russian estimates, the Syrian Air Force is definitely sufficient to provide air support by attacking ground targets within those pockets of resistance, in the Idlib area as well as in the other areas. If necessary, the Syrians may be supported by Russian aerial forces far smaller than those employed in the past. Accordingly, Russia intends to significantly reduce the OrBat of the Russian forces deployed in Syria. The Russian OrBat remaining in Syria will consist primarily of forces that are essential to Russia's strategic objectives. Consequently, the main efforts of the Russian military in Syria in the next two years will focus on the reconstruction and adaptation of the port of Tartus and Khmeimim airbase for Russia's strategic needs.
Efforts to Establish a Syrian Republic
Russia's primary efforts vis-à-vis Syria focus on an attempt to start up the diplomatic process – negotiations between all of the opposition organizations and the Syrian authorities regarding the future political structure of the Syrian state. According to the Russian proposal, Syria should be a unified secular state with an authoritative central government named "The Republic of Syria" without the word "Arab." Syria regards itself as a multinational state, and the name of the future state should not include references to any particular nationality, so as to prevent national-motivated confrontations. Syria's secular orientation should abate the intensity of the religious confrontations. Russia advocates the granting of a certain degree of autonomy to the Kurdish minority, but Assad disagrees, and Turkey strongly opposes this approach.
According to the plan consolidated by Russia, which won the approval and support of the governments of Syria, Turkey and Iran, the representatives of the government and the opposition should formulate and accept the new constitution of Syria, and based on that constitution – hold new elections, all within a timeframe of about eighteen months. Until the elections, Syria will be governed by a temporary unity government made up of representatives of the government and the opposition, all under the auspices of the UN.
Russia believes that the presence of foreign forces in Syria – Iranian, Iran-sponsored and Turkish forces – endanger the stability of Syria and its government. Admittedly, the Iranian forces were invited by the Syrian Government, but only during the war and only for the purpose of fighting alongside the weakened Syrian Army. Iran is keenly interested in keeping its forces in Syria. For the first time ever, Iran has direct overland access, through Iraq and Syria, to the Mediterranean, all the way to the Lebanon coast and the border with Israel. The Iranian forces and the Shi'ite elements subordinated to them have no natural base in Syria, owing to the nearly total absence of Shi'ite population. Nor is there a population of Persian ethnic origin in Syria. The Iranian radical religious format is foreign and unpopular among nearly all of the population segments in Syria, especially in the Syrian military and officer cadre, which are predominately secular. Russia is not interested in the Iranian military presence in Syria, as it undermines Russia's influence on Syria and also because an Iranian presence constitutes an agitating factor in the region, in view of Iran's objectives and its hostility toward Israel. A confrontation between Iran and Israel could endanger Syria and the stability of the entire region, which is the precondition for the fulfillment of Russia's objectives through its strategic bases.
The continued Iranian military presence will make it difficult to dispel the units of the Turkish Army from Syria's territory. The Turkish Army operates in Syrian territory against the will of the Syrian Government. This was only made possible owing to the weakness of the Syrian Army and its inability to recapture territories dominated by the Turkish Army while driving the rebel forces out of these territories. Turkey's primary objective in Syria is to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish autonomy and the unification of the territories dominated by the Kurds along the border with Turkey. Russia is not interested in the Turkish military presence in Syria now that the fighting is over. Turkey, with its Muslim Brotherhood ideology, is currently in a state of confrontation with most of the Arab countries, as well as with the Syrian Government in Damascus. Turkey's domination of the Turkmen population in Syria and their militia forces endangers the stability and unification of Syria. The hostility between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds is an even greater danger to Syria's stability.
All of the countries of the region, including the Arab countries, Iran and Turkey, are opposed to the division of Syria owing to the high risk such a process would present to the entire region. Russia regards the dissolution of Syria as the most dangerous move for the region and for Russia and its interests and will do whatever it can to prevent the division of Syria.
Eventually, if Moscow should accomplish its objectives in Syria, a Russian strategic presence will remain in Syria for decades, and such presence may include the option of nuclear weapons that may be employed by the Russian Navy as well as by the Russian Air Force. Intelligence setups, as well as some of the world's most advanced air-defense and missile defense systems, will remain in Syria as well. It is, indeed, more likely to assume that the air-defense and missile defense setups will be deployed only to defend the Russian bases and forces in Syria, but it is not impossible that Russia, owing to its own considerations and according to actual developments, might extend those defenses to encompass the entire territory of Syria.
A Russian strategic military presence in Syria will significantly enhance the security of Syria and its government – whatever it may be. On the other hand, owing to Russia's interest in stability and tranquility in the region for the purpose of maintaining the Russian bases, Russia will prevent Syria from taking any steps that might endanger Russia's strategic interests in the region and the Russian military presence in Syria. This will contribute to stability along Israel's northern border. It should also be noted that Russia is the only country that currently maintains reasonably good – and constantly improving – relations with all of the countries in the region.
***
Yaakov (Yasha) Kedmi is the former head of Nativ
