Israel and the Civil War in Syria
During the 1973 war, Syria attempted to recapture the Golan Heights from Israel but failed. Since then, both countries have refrained from reigniting the war. As the war in Syria rages on, would the Israeli-Syrian front remain quiet?
UN peacekeepers and Israeli soldiers patrol the border with Syria (Photo: AP)
Since 2011, a civil war has been raging in Syria. In late May 2015, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon said that Israel’s policy regarding Syria “is on the one hand not to intervene, and on the other hand to keep our interests. We have three red lines: One is not to allow the delivery of advanced weapons to any terror organization, whether by Iran or by Syria. Second, not to allow delivery of chemical agents or weapons to any terror faction. The third is not to allow any violation of our sovereignty, especially in the Golan Heights. When it happens, we act."
Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israel has launched several strikes on Syria, despite the risk of a Syrian retribution – short and limited as it may be. Still, this could deteriorate into a much larger confrontation. However, Assad, who has barely managed to survive his enemies inside Syria, cannot afford such a war.
In 1967, Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria. During the 1973 war, Syria attempted to recapture the Golan Heights but failed. Since then, while Syria could have tried again, it did not. Israel too could have initiated a preventive war or a preemptive strike aiming to stop a possible future Syrian offensive, but it similarly restrained itself. Thus, a war that could have cost thousands of lives on both sides was avoided, and from 1974, there was a complete quiet in the Golan Heights.
Since 2011, there have been dozens of incidents – albeit minor – on the border between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights. Most occurred when fire, such as mortar shells, from the fighting inside Syria, accidently hit the Israeli side, occasionally resulting in light casualties among Israelis. Though Israel fired back, it did so in a very selective way. In addition, there has been tension between Israel and Hezbollah on the border in the Golan Heights, where several Hezbollah operatives were killed by an Israeli air bombardment in late January 2015.
Since the civil unrest in Syria, Syrian outfits, including radical organizations like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, have seized control of most of that border area, a potential springboard to attack Israel. While these groups do not present a real challenge for Israel, as the Syrian military has since 1974, this could turn the Golan Heights into a frontline, just as the Gaza Strip has been since 2005. The ongoing friction in the Golan Heights might, therefore, lead to an escalation that neither Israeli nor Syrian outfits stationed there seek, at least for now. Thus, if Israel absorbs heavy losses due to attack from Syria, it could be dragged into the Syrian quagmire.
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This article is based on Ehud Eilam’s article: “Israel in the Face of Evolving Security Challenges,” the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2015
During the 1973 war, Syria attempted to recapture the Golan Heights from Israel but failed. Since then, both countries have refrained from reigniting the war. As the war in Syria rages on, would the Israeli-Syrian front remain quiet?
Since 2011, a civil war has been raging in Syria. In late May 2015, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon said that Israel’s policy regarding Syria “is on the one hand not to intervene, and on the other hand to keep our interests. We have three red lines: One is not to allow the delivery of advanced weapons to any terror organization, whether by Iran or by Syria. Second, not to allow delivery of chemical agents or weapons to any terror faction. The third is not to allow any violation of our sovereignty, especially in the Golan Heights. When it happens, we act."
Since the start of the Syrian civil war, Israel has launched several strikes on Syria, despite the risk of a Syrian retribution – short and limited as it may be. Still, this could deteriorate into a much larger confrontation. However, Assad, who has barely managed to survive his enemies inside Syria, cannot afford such a war.
In 1967, Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria. During the 1973 war, Syria attempted to recapture the Golan Heights but failed. Since then, while Syria could have tried again, it did not. Israel too could have initiated a preventive war or a preemptive strike aiming to stop a possible future Syrian offensive, but it similarly restrained itself. Thus, a war that could have cost thousands of lives on both sides was avoided, and from 1974, there was a complete quiet in the Golan Heights.
Since 2011, there have been dozens of incidents – albeit minor – on the border between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights. Most occurred when fire, such as mortar shells, from the fighting inside Syria, accidently hit the Israeli side, occasionally resulting in light casualties among Israelis. Though Israel fired back, it did so in a very selective way. In addition, there has been tension between Israel and Hezbollah on the border in the Golan Heights, where several Hezbollah operatives were killed by an Israeli air bombardment in late January 2015.
Since the civil unrest in Syria, Syrian outfits, including radical organizations like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, have seized control of most of that border area, a potential springboard to attack Israel. While these groups do not present a real challenge for Israel, as the Syrian military has since 1974, this could turn the Golan Heights into a frontline, just as the Gaza Strip has been since 2005. The ongoing friction in the Golan Heights might, therefore, lead to an escalation that neither Israeli nor Syrian outfits stationed there seek, at least for now. Thus, if Israel absorbs heavy losses due to attack from Syria, it could be dragged into the Syrian quagmire.
***
This article is based on Ehud Eilam’s article: “Israel in the Face of Evolving Security Challenges,” the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2015
