Amir Rapaport’s Column: The Siege on Khan Yunis and Sinwar’s Whims
In the tunnels in Gaza, the IDF is also employing means it didn't believe would be activated. Alongside achievements in combat, several challenges have not yet been resolved, and Israel, as a state, insists on shooting itself in the foot on more than one occasion
Amir Rapaport
| 10/02/2024
In December 1944, Hitler's situation was desperate: The German army collapsed in the face of the British-led offensive advancing from the west, while the Russians continued to conquer more and more territories in the east. The surrender was supposed to be inevitable, but the megalomaniac leader ordered his last quality forces to launch an attack, against all odds, in the Ardennes in Belgium.
As expected, the attack failed. Four months later, Hitler committed suicide in his bunker. This happened only after the enemy had already reached Berlin. Germany surrendered.
This week, the likelihood increased that Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar, might also meet his end in a bunker: We are still far from any "decisive victory" over Hamas, but the response the organization conveyed to the mediators' proposal for a deal with Israel might lead to such a scenario.
On one hand, it could signify Sinwar's discontent with the situation on the ground, similar to Hitler's frustrations towards his end. Additionally, what might be driving Sinwar could be a long-term historical perspective: the Hamas leader sees himself as one of the great heroes in the history of Islam, and if he is fated to die in this war, he will fight to the end.
The possibility that this is his perception doesn't bode well for the fate of the hostages and the likelihood that most of them will return home alive. Yet, Prime Minister Netanyahu didn't just casually mention in his speech on Wednesday the prospects of negotiations with Hamas, despite the terror group's vehement rejection of the proposal.
At least there's an open channel for dialogue. Perhaps Hamas' stance will dramatically change as the majority leaders get closer to the four most sought-after "aces": Yahya Sinwar himself, his brother Mohammed, the military wing commander Marwan Issa, and Hamas's "defense minister," Mohammed Deif.
For the time being, they are still feeling safe.
On the ground, a military drama is unfolding. After four months of widespread warfare on the southern front, the focus has now shifted to the city of Khan Younis.
The 98th division is focused on this area, including the 646th Brigade, which is the last of the reserve divisions still conscripted in the south. Most of the forces operating in the city are from regular units, including Givati, Golani, the Paratroopers, and the Commando Brigade (which includes, among others, Egoz and Maglan units).
Of course, it also includes the engineering units that have already gained extensive combat experience. The 98th Division completed the takeover of the western and southern parts of Khan Younis, thereby essentially surrounding it from all sides.
In the central Gaza Strip, the Nahal Brigade is holding the axis named after the former settlement of Netzarim, from Be'eri towards the sea. In the north, this week saw a surprise operation by the Combat Engineering Battalion of the 401st Armored Corps Brigade, together with infantry and engineering forces, in an area in Shati adjacent to the sea, west of Gaza.
Shati was thus conquered for the second time. Once again, terror infrastructures – on which data from investigations of detainees or intelligence information that has been deciphered - were handled. Dozens of Hamas terrorists were killed as they were taken by surprise by the reentry of the IDF and attempted to fight back. Generally, this will be the pattern of IDF operations in the northern Gaza Strip from now on.
Breaking the fear barrier
As mentioned, the main story of the war is currently unfolding in Khan Yunis, and even if it's still not clear to Hamas or the Israeli public – this is not just another city conquered and evacuated for "Stage C" in the fighting: according to all indications, the IDF will continue to operate in the area until the "aces" are found - alive or dead (assuming they are still there and haven't escaped through tunnels unknown to the IDF towards Rafah or another hiding place).
In many respects, the IDF's operation in Khan Yunis resembles the long sieges on the Mukataa, the Palestinian Authority government building in Ramallah, where Yasser Arafat was trapped until he was evacuated in critical condition to Paris and died from severe poisoning (the Palestinians claim that Arafat was poisoned by Israel, and it is difficult to dismiss this possibility).
Yasser Arafat (who got out of a siege in Beirut in 1982 to seek refuge in Tunisia) died in November 2004, and his death largely marked the end of the Second Intifada.
The significant difference between the case of the Mukataa in Ramallah and the siege in Khan Yunis lies underground, namely, in the tunnels. In fact, after hundreds of documented siege battles throughout history (including the siege of Masada, as one notable example among many), this is the first time that a siege is conducted both above and below ground.
And here, it's important to understand something else: until just a few weeks ago, IDF commanders hadn't even considered the need to engage in physical combat underground, meaning sending human soldiers (and not just dogs and robots) to face-to-face battles inside the tunnels.
It wasn't even on the table when the ground maneuver began. The plan was to detonate openings, flood the tunnels, and fight within them, generally only from the surface level.
It's an astonishing detail, but I've learned that some of the technological capabilities for combating tunnels and operational methods were developed over a decade ago. However, the IDF never believed they would ever need them. The capabilities were developed, just in case. They are certainly being utilized these days, and additional capabilities are being developed as the operation progresses.
Looking back, the barrier of fear was broken on October 7th, perhaps due to the immense scope of the casualties that day. Perhaps the IDF's self-confidence was also temporarily bolstered by the success of the ground maneuver, which itself had many doubters.
“Faith in the maneuver is sometimes like religion, not something empirical. I think in discussions between the IDF and decision-makers at the political level, as well as within the IDF itself, trust in the concept of 'maneuver' has returned as a central, strong, dominant card," a military official told me a few days ago, candidly.
Now, with great courage, soldiers from elite units in the IDF are operating deep within tunnels, as was evident this week when the commander of the Fire Formation (98th Paratroopers Division), Colonel Dan Goldfus, was interviewed from within a "strategic tunnel," very deep and spacious, originally used by senior officials, and later converted to hold captives. These are amazing photographs, also in terms of the psychological effect.
Not everything is running smoothly, of course. Far from it. For example, the IDF has not been meeting its own expectations regarding the pace of discovery and destruction of terror infrastructure – tunnels, weapon-filled bunkers, arms factories, and workshops. Hamas still can produce its own weapons, and also still has several tunnels leading to Egypt, probably running under Rafah.
However, there is a reasonable basis for the growing confidence reflected in the speeches Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Minister Benny Gantz gave last week, regarding the results of the combats. Perhaps Galant exaggerated a bit in describing Sinwar as disconnected, escaping his pursuers tunnel after tunnel – it's reasonable to assume that not all escape routes have been closed off to him – but there is also a significant factual basis in this.
The prime minister and the ministers all promised that the IDF would also conquer Rafah later on. It seems there will be no choice but to do so, but the truth is that at this point, the security establishment prefers to focus on Khan Yunis and leave Rafah, with over a million refugees crowded there, for later. The potential occupation of Rafah is also a means of pressure in negotiations over the hostages, which may move to realistic tracks.
An intelligence factory
In the siege on Khan Yunis, everything now depends on intelligence and the ability to target Hamas leaders even beneath the ground.
To obtain the required intelligence, the Shin Bet and the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate currently have veritable "production lines" of information: hundreds, if not more, of analysts and investigators who sift through mountains of printed and digital intelligence material, with summaries of Hamas operatives' investigations arriving constantly from a facility in the Negev. When they are not being interrogated, the Gaza detainees are housed in the Kziot prison near the border with Egypt, which has been rebuilt.
Of course, above all, the goal is to figure out what is happening with the hostages. As an aside, the news published this week in The New York Times, stating that about 50 of the hostages are no longer alive is not new at all and has been well-known for some time to many in the defense establishment and even to some in the Israeli media.
Speed and efficiency are the name of the game in intelligence work. This is why some of the forces are equipped with scanners that allow them to gather various intelligence from any location and transmit it for immediate analysis.
After the hostages, locating the "aces,” with Yahya Sinwar as the crown jewel, is the ultimate goal of the war, for now. If Sinwar were to die underground, it would be an Israeli achievement in a war that began in the worst possible way. However, if the war were to end with Sinwar once again sitting freely amidst the rubble of Gaza, that would be the picture of victory he hopes for. Only that.
Ahead of Ramadan
On the other fronts of the multi-theater warfare, exchanges of blows continue, including an American attack on leaders of a Shiite militia, avenging the deaths of three US soldiers just a few days prior.
Things also weren’t quiet in the north, with Hezbollah attacking IDF targets, and IDF aircraft in the skies of Beirut. At some point, Israel will be required to stop with the signals and move to aggressive actions that will change the situation in the north fundamentally, to allow the refugees to return to their homes.
In general, the IDF is prepared for prolonged warfare throughout the year 2024, at least. The clear and immediate danger is the events of Ramadan, which will begin in the second week of March. As in every year, this is a particularly volatile month with a rise in terrorism, and this is not a normal year. The danger is far greater.
This is why in the Shin Bet and the IDF, there is a clear recommendation to release salaries for the benefit of Palestinian Authority officials in the Gaza Strip and to grant work permits to laborers under strict screening, before the economic hardship contributes to the outbreak of a third intifada.
Despite the ongoing relentless suppression operations conducted almost daily. This week, the focal point was in Nur ash-Shams, near Tulkarm, which has become a central terror hub.
The ultimate goal of Hamas towards Ramadan is to transform the conflict in Gaza from a national-territorial dispute to a religious one, pitting 15 million Jews worldwide against a billion Muslims. So far, it has not succeeded in rallying most of the Muslim world to its side.
Lashing out against President Biden
The problem is that sometimes it seems that there are quite a few factors on the Israeli side, including ministers, who play into Hamas' strategy in their statements, whether intentionally or not.
Here is the place to mention that Israel has been shooting itself in the foot, as a nation, in this crucial period of the historic conflict, in which we need to mobilize all our national and international resources.
Here’s one example: government ministers lashing out at US President, Joe Biden (for example, Itamar Ben-Gvir in the Wall Street Journal) is nothing short of stupidity.
Those who speak of "independence" when dealing with the United States may not necessarily know what they are talking about.
It's not just Israel that is entirely dependent on American weapons and equipment: the whole world operates under military and policy alliances. There is no shame in this. Even Russia, which is much stronger than us, was quick to form alliances with the outbreak of the war against Ukraine. Unfortunately, with Iran, and as a result, also with Hamas. If we delve further into history, Churchill did not hesitate to plead with the United States to stand by the side of the Allies in World War II.
The attack on Iran's Natanz nuclear facilities (probably between 2007-2010) was, according to reports, a joint operation involving the United States, Britain, and Israel. Many other cyber events, based on global cooperation, went unpublicized. In cyberspace, no country can operate alone.
Furthermore, over the years, the imagery of "the road to Washington passes through Jerusalem" has served Israel on the international stage, contributing, among other things, to the Abraham Accords. Fortunately, we are allies of the world's greatest power, the United States. This is a key component of our strength.
A public conflict with the United States, whether real or perceived, damages, accordingly, our overall strength much more than considerations of weaponry. Even Minister Ben Gvir (and his son, who tweeted a disparaging tweet about Biden and then deleted it): A little modesty has never caused harm. And some politeness.
Israel’s military-society relations
And this too: Turning commanders in the IDF, such as the Central Command Chief, Major General Yehuda Fuchs, into punching bags, is damaging in itself and does not serve the settlements. In general, these attacks are joining the wild uproar against commanders on social media platforms, in light of the events of October 7th and harsh remarks made even by politicians about personnel from the Mossad and Shin Bet. We no longer hold anything sacred.
From the IDF's perspective, departing from the consensus is nothing short of a disaster in terms of human resources. Even before the war, against the backdrop of the protest events and the suspension of volunteering, attacks on senior personnel, and difficulty in dealing with the financial temptations of the civilian world, the IDF struggled to navigate within the stormy sea of military-society relations in Israel.
That's why when a new multi-year plan called "Ma'alot" was approved at General Headquarters in August, the first clause dealt with "people above all."
And this is also related to human resources: if the government passed this week the unavoidable law extending regular service to three years, raising the exemption age from military service, and extending the duration of service days each year, an additional step is immediately required, at least declaratively, regarding the recruitment of ultra-Orthodox individuals, as a start.
On Tuesday, a conference will be held in Holon to mark 25 years since the establishment of the Nahal Haredi Battalion, originally founded by Colonel (Res.) Yehuda Duvdevani when he was Head of the Social Branch in the Ministry of Defense. Soon, the Nahal Haredi Battalion will join combat in Gaza for the first time (the battalion completed its service in the Golan Heights and this is its next mission) - but the contribution of the Haredi society to the security effort is still small. Almost negligible compared to the potential.
This abscess in the heart of Israeli society will not heal without treatment. It is on the verge of exploding.
I'd love to hear your thoughts and comments. Be in touch with me directly via Twitter and LinkedIn
In the tunnels in Gaza, the IDF is also employing means it didn't believe would be activated. Alongside achievements in combat, several challenges have not yet been resolved, and Israel, as a state, insists on shooting itself in the foot on more than one occasion
In December 1944, Hitler's situation was desperate: The German army collapsed in the face of the British-led offensive advancing from the west, while the Russians continued to conquer more and more territories in the east. The surrender was supposed to be inevitable, but the megalomaniac leader ordered his last quality forces to launch an attack, against all odds, in the Ardennes in Belgium.
As expected, the attack failed. Four months later, Hitler committed suicide in his bunker. This happened only after the enemy had already reached Berlin. Germany surrendered.
This week, the likelihood increased that Hamas leader, Yahya Sinwar, might also meet his end in a bunker: We are still far from any "decisive victory" over Hamas, but the response the organization conveyed to the mediators' proposal for a deal with Israel might lead to such a scenario.
On one hand, it could signify Sinwar's discontent with the situation on the ground, similar to Hitler's frustrations towards his end. Additionally, what might be driving Sinwar could be a long-term historical perspective: the Hamas leader sees himself as one of the great heroes in the history of Islam, and if he is fated to die in this war, he will fight to the end.
The possibility that this is his perception doesn't bode well for the fate of the hostages and the likelihood that most of them will return home alive. Yet, Prime Minister Netanyahu didn't just casually mention in his speech on Wednesday the prospects of negotiations with Hamas, despite the terror group's vehement rejection of the proposal.
At least there's an open channel for dialogue. Perhaps Hamas' stance will dramatically change as the majority leaders get closer to the four most sought-after "aces": Yahya Sinwar himself, his brother Mohammed, the military wing commander Marwan Issa, and Hamas's "defense minister," Mohammed Deif.
For the time being, they are still feeling safe.
On the ground, a military drama is unfolding. After four months of widespread warfare on the southern front, the focus has now shifted to the city of Khan Younis.
The 98th division is focused on this area, including the 646th Brigade, which is the last of the reserve divisions still conscripted in the south. Most of the forces operating in the city are from regular units, including Givati, Golani, the Paratroopers, and the Commando Brigade (which includes, among others, Egoz and Maglan units).
Of course, it also includes the engineering units that have already gained extensive combat experience. The 98th Division completed the takeover of the western and southern parts of Khan Younis, thereby essentially surrounding it from all sides.
In the central Gaza Strip, the Nahal Brigade is holding the axis named after the former settlement of Netzarim, from Be'eri towards the sea. In the north, this week saw a surprise operation by the Combat Engineering Battalion of the 401st Armored Corps Brigade, together with infantry and engineering forces, in an area in Shati adjacent to the sea, west of Gaza.
Shati was thus conquered for the second time. Once again, terror infrastructures – on which data from investigations of detainees or intelligence information that has been deciphered - were handled. Dozens of Hamas terrorists were killed as they were taken by surprise by the reentry of the IDF and attempted to fight back. Generally, this will be the pattern of IDF operations in the northern Gaza Strip from now on.
Breaking the fear barrier
As mentioned, the main story of the war is currently unfolding in Khan Yunis, and even if it's still not clear to Hamas or the Israeli public – this is not just another city conquered and evacuated for "Stage C" in the fighting: according to all indications, the IDF will continue to operate in the area until the "aces" are found - alive or dead (assuming they are still there and haven't escaped through tunnels unknown to the IDF towards Rafah or another hiding place).
In many respects, the IDF's operation in Khan Yunis resembles the long sieges on the Mukataa, the Palestinian Authority government building in Ramallah, where Yasser Arafat was trapped until he was evacuated in critical condition to Paris and died from severe poisoning (the Palestinians claim that Arafat was poisoned by Israel, and it is difficult to dismiss this possibility).
Yasser Arafat (who got out of a siege in Beirut in 1982 to seek refuge in Tunisia) died in November 2004, and his death largely marked the end of the Second Intifada.
The significant difference between the case of the Mukataa in Ramallah and the siege in Khan Yunis lies underground, namely, in the tunnels. In fact, after hundreds of documented siege battles throughout history (including the siege of Masada, as one notable example among many), this is the first time that a siege is conducted both above and below ground.
And here, it's important to understand something else: until just a few weeks ago, IDF commanders hadn't even considered the need to engage in physical combat underground, meaning sending human soldiers (and not just dogs and robots) to face-to-face battles inside the tunnels.
It wasn't even on the table when the ground maneuver began. The plan was to detonate openings, flood the tunnels, and fight within them, generally only from the surface level.
It's an astonishing detail, but I've learned that some of the technological capabilities for combating tunnels and operational methods were developed over a decade ago. However, the IDF never believed they would ever need them. The capabilities were developed, just in case. They are certainly being utilized these days, and additional capabilities are being developed as the operation progresses.
Looking back, the barrier of fear was broken on October 7th, perhaps due to the immense scope of the casualties that day. Perhaps the IDF's self-confidence was also temporarily bolstered by the success of the ground maneuver, which itself had many doubters.
“Faith in the maneuver is sometimes like religion, not something empirical. I think in discussions between the IDF and decision-makers at the political level, as well as within the IDF itself, trust in the concept of 'maneuver' has returned as a central, strong, dominant card," a military official told me a few days ago, candidly.
Now, with great courage, soldiers from elite units in the IDF are operating deep within tunnels, as was evident this week when the commander of the Fire Formation (98th Paratroopers Division), Colonel Dan Goldfus, was interviewed from within a "strategic tunnel," very deep and spacious, originally used by senior officials, and later converted to hold captives. These are amazing photographs, also in terms of the psychological effect.
Not everything is running smoothly, of course. Far from it. For example, the IDF has not been meeting its own expectations regarding the pace of discovery and destruction of terror infrastructure – tunnels, weapon-filled bunkers, arms factories, and workshops. Hamas still can produce its own weapons, and also still has several tunnels leading to Egypt, probably running under Rafah.
However, there is a reasonable basis for the growing confidence reflected in the speeches Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Minister Benny Gantz gave last week, regarding the results of the combats. Perhaps Galant exaggerated a bit in describing Sinwar as disconnected, escaping his pursuers tunnel after tunnel – it's reasonable to assume that not all escape routes have been closed off to him – but there is also a significant factual basis in this.
The prime minister and the ministers all promised that the IDF would also conquer Rafah later on. It seems there will be no choice but to do so, but the truth is that at this point, the security establishment prefers to focus on Khan Yunis and leave Rafah, with over a million refugees crowded there, for later. The potential occupation of Rafah is also a means of pressure in negotiations over the hostages, which may move to realistic tracks.
An intelligence factory
In the siege on Khan Yunis, everything now depends on intelligence and the ability to target Hamas leaders even beneath the ground.
To obtain the required intelligence, the Shin Bet and the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate currently have veritable "production lines" of information: hundreds, if not more, of analysts and investigators who sift through mountains of printed and digital intelligence material, with summaries of Hamas operatives' investigations arriving constantly from a facility in the Negev. When they are not being interrogated, the Gaza detainees are housed in the Kziot prison near the border with Egypt, which has been rebuilt.
Of course, above all, the goal is to figure out what is happening with the hostages. As an aside, the news published this week in The New York Times, stating that about 50 of the hostages are no longer alive is not new at all and has been well-known for some time to many in the defense establishment and even to some in the Israeli media.
Speed and efficiency are the name of the game in intelligence work. This is why some of the forces are equipped with scanners that allow them to gather various intelligence from any location and transmit it for immediate analysis.
After the hostages, locating the "aces,” with Yahya Sinwar as the crown jewel, is the ultimate goal of the war, for now. If Sinwar were to die underground, it would be an Israeli achievement in a war that began in the worst possible way. However, if the war were to end with Sinwar once again sitting freely amidst the rubble of Gaza, that would be the picture of victory he hopes for. Only that.
Ahead of Ramadan
On the other fronts of the multi-theater warfare, exchanges of blows continue, including an American attack on leaders of a Shiite militia, avenging the deaths of three US soldiers just a few days prior.
Things also weren’t quiet in the north, with Hezbollah attacking IDF targets, and IDF aircraft in the skies of Beirut. At some point, Israel will be required to stop with the signals and move to aggressive actions that will change the situation in the north fundamentally, to allow the refugees to return to their homes.
In general, the IDF is prepared for prolonged warfare throughout the year 2024, at least. The clear and immediate danger is the events of Ramadan, which will begin in the second week of March. As in every year, this is a particularly volatile month with a rise in terrorism, and this is not a normal year. The danger is far greater.
This is why in the Shin Bet and the IDF, there is a clear recommendation to release salaries for the benefit of Palestinian Authority officials in the Gaza Strip and to grant work permits to laborers under strict screening, before the economic hardship contributes to the outbreak of a third intifada.
Despite the ongoing relentless suppression operations conducted almost daily. This week, the focal point was in Nur ash-Shams, near Tulkarm, which has become a central terror hub.
The ultimate goal of Hamas towards Ramadan is to transform the conflict in Gaza from a national-territorial dispute to a religious one, pitting 15 million Jews worldwide against a billion Muslims. So far, it has not succeeded in rallying most of the Muslim world to its side.
Lashing out against President Biden
The problem is that sometimes it seems that there are quite a few factors on the Israeli side, including ministers, who play into Hamas' strategy in their statements, whether intentionally or not.
Here is the place to mention that Israel has been shooting itself in the foot, as a nation, in this crucial period of the historic conflict, in which we need to mobilize all our national and international resources.
Here’s one example: government ministers lashing out at US President, Joe Biden (for example, Itamar Ben-Gvir in the Wall Street Journal) is nothing short of stupidity.
Those who speak of "independence" when dealing with the United States may not necessarily know what they are talking about.
It's not just Israel that is entirely dependent on American weapons and equipment: the whole world operates under military and policy alliances. There is no shame in this. Even Russia, which is much stronger than us, was quick to form alliances with the outbreak of the war against Ukraine. Unfortunately, with Iran, and as a result, also with Hamas. If we delve further into history, Churchill did not hesitate to plead with the United States to stand by the side of the Allies in World War II.
The attack on Iran's Natanz nuclear facilities (probably between 2007-2010) was, according to reports, a joint operation involving the United States, Britain, and Israel. Many other cyber events, based on global cooperation, went unpublicized. In cyberspace, no country can operate alone.
Furthermore, over the years, the imagery of "the road to Washington passes through Jerusalem" has served Israel on the international stage, contributing, among other things, to the Abraham Accords. Fortunately, we are allies of the world's greatest power, the United States. This is a key component of our strength.
A public conflict with the United States, whether real or perceived, damages, accordingly, our overall strength much more than considerations of weaponry. Even Minister Ben Gvir (and his son, who tweeted a disparaging tweet about Biden and then deleted it): A little modesty has never caused harm. And some politeness.
Israel’s military-society relations
And this too: Turning commanders in the IDF, such as the Central Command Chief, Major General Yehuda Fuchs, into punching bags, is damaging in itself and does not serve the settlements. In general, these attacks are joining the wild uproar against commanders on social media platforms, in light of the events of October 7th and harsh remarks made even by politicians about personnel from the Mossad and Shin Bet. We no longer hold anything sacred.
From the IDF's perspective, departing from the consensus is nothing short of a disaster in terms of human resources. Even before the war, against the backdrop of the protest events and the suspension of volunteering, attacks on senior personnel, and difficulty in dealing with the financial temptations of the civilian world, the IDF struggled to navigate within the stormy sea of military-society relations in Israel.
That's why when a new multi-year plan called "Ma'alot" was approved at General Headquarters in August, the first clause dealt with "people above all."
And this is also related to human resources: if the government passed this week the unavoidable law extending regular service to three years, raising the exemption age from military service, and extending the duration of service days each year, an additional step is immediately required, at least declaratively, regarding the recruitment of ultra-Orthodox individuals, as a start.
On Tuesday, a conference will be held in Holon to mark 25 years since the establishment of the Nahal Haredi Battalion, originally founded by Colonel (Res.) Yehuda Duvdevani when he was Head of the Social Branch in the Ministry of Defense. Soon, the Nahal Haredi Battalion will join combat in Gaza for the first time (the battalion completed its service in the Golan Heights and this is its next mission) - but the contribution of the Haredi society to the security effort is still small. Almost negligible compared to the potential.
This abscess in the heart of Israeli society will not heal without treatment. It is on the verge of exploding.
I'd love to hear your thoughts and comments. Be in touch with me directly via Twitter and LinkedIn
