The Ukrainian Solution Against the Iranian Shahed 136
In the past two years, Ukrainian cities have become targets for thousands of Iranian-made anti-tank guided missiles, primarily of the Shahed 136 model, which were acquired by Russia from Iran
Cmdr. (res.) Eyal Pinko
| 16/04/2024
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=138324174
In the past two years, Ukrainian cities have become targets for thousands of Iranian ATGMs, primarily of the Shahed 136 model, which were acquired by Russia from Iran.
The Shahed 136 was the model that took part in the Iranian attack on Israel. It entered operational service around 2019 and gained significant operational experience in Syria, Iraq, and in attacks carried out by Houthi rebels from Yemen against Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This weapon was also used in attacks on naval vessels in the Gulf of Oman, including the attack on the CMA CGM SYMI cargo ship owned by the Ofer family in November 2023.
This drones carries a warhead weighing approximately 50 kilograms, travels at a speed of about 180 kilometers per hour, and can operate at ranges of up to 2500 kilometers. It should be noted that the Shahed 136 is very similar to a similar model developed by the Israel Aerospace Industry, known as the Harpy, which was sold to China in the 1990s. China developed its own model, the ASN-301, through reverse engineering, and it is reasonable to assume that the Iranian version, the Shehad 136, is a product of collaboration between China and Iran.
The early versions of the ATGM were in a fire-and-forget configuration. Before launch, its route was programmed to the target, and its automatic guidance system, using GPS and GLONASS receivers, directed the drone to its target.
In a different configuration, the drone is equipped with a semi-active laser seeker head, which locks onto laser emissions and guides the drone toward its target. This configuration, for example, allowed the Iranians to target sailing merchant ships.
In the fragments of more advanced versions located in Ukraine in 2022, it was found that these weapons were equipped with GPS jamming systems. These systems incorporated antennas with seven receivers controlled by a programmable component (FPGA), which detected GPS jamming and interference, enabling the drone to counteract them.
In a 2023 British report to the UN, it was presented that the drones were integrated with SIM cards, allowing communication with satellite satellites and 4G cellular networks.
These communication components allow Iranians and Russians to drive the drones to their targets. The Ukrainians, who studied the capabilities of the Iranian drones, realized that disrupting them required an electronic warfare system with high-power output in a wide frequency range, which would enable the jamming of various satellite navigation systems as well as communication channels.
Over the past two years, the Ukrainians have realized that GPS jamming alone is not sufficient to deter the drones. The Ukrainian innovation showcased at its peak in the war against Russia led to the development of a mobile device, carried by a soldier and activated with simplicity whenever a threat is detected. The device is activated manually for just a few minutes and enables a complete blockade of the Russian/Iranian drones.
According to their reports, the Ukrainians achieved significant success in countering the Iranian drones using this, which is relatively simple to manufacture and has a very low cost.
In the past two years, Ukrainian cities have become targets for thousands of Iranian-made anti-tank guided missiles, primarily of the Shahed 136 model, which were acquired by Russia from Iran
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=138324174
In the past two years, Ukrainian cities have become targets for thousands of Iranian ATGMs, primarily of the Shahed 136 model, which were acquired by Russia from Iran.
The Shahed 136 was the model that took part in the Iranian attack on Israel. It entered operational service around 2019 and gained significant operational experience in Syria, Iraq, and in attacks carried out by Houthi rebels from Yemen against Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This weapon was also used in attacks on naval vessels in the Gulf of Oman, including the attack on the CMA CGM SYMI cargo ship owned by the Ofer family in November 2023.
This drones carries a warhead weighing approximately 50 kilograms, travels at a speed of about 180 kilometers per hour, and can operate at ranges of up to 2500 kilometers. It should be noted that the Shahed 136 is very similar to a similar model developed by the Israel Aerospace Industry, known as the Harpy, which was sold to China in the 1990s. China developed its own model, the ASN-301, through reverse engineering, and it is reasonable to assume that the Iranian version, the Shehad 136, is a product of collaboration between China and Iran.
The early versions of the ATGM were in a fire-and-forget configuration. Before launch, its route was programmed to the target, and its automatic guidance system, using GPS and GLONASS receivers, directed the drone to its target.
In a different configuration, the drone is equipped with a semi-active laser seeker head, which locks onto laser emissions and guides the drone toward its target. This configuration, for example, allowed the Iranians to target sailing merchant ships.
In the fragments of more advanced versions located in Ukraine in 2022, it was found that these weapons were equipped with GPS jamming systems. These systems incorporated antennas with seven receivers controlled by a programmable component (FPGA), which detected GPS jamming and interference, enabling the drone to counteract them.
In a 2023 British report to the UN, it was presented that the drones were integrated with SIM cards, allowing communication with satellite satellites and 4G cellular networks.
These communication components allow Iranians and Russians to drive the drones to their targets. The Ukrainians, who studied the capabilities of the Iranian drones, realized that disrupting them required an electronic warfare system with high-power output in a wide frequency range, which would enable the jamming of various satellite navigation systems as well as communication channels.
Over the past two years, the Ukrainians have realized that GPS jamming alone is not sufficient to deter the drones. The Ukrainian innovation showcased at its peak in the war against Russia led to the development of a mobile device, carried by a soldier and activated with simplicity whenever a threat is detected. The device is activated manually for just a few minutes and enables a complete blockade of the Russian/Iranian drones.
According to their reports, the Ukrainians achieved significant success in countering the Iranian drones using this, which is relatively simple to manufacture and has a very low cost.
