Commentary | When the War is Over – the Government Must Reach the End of Its Road
There is no doubt that, eventually, there will be an Israeli military victory and achievements of one level or another. But after that, the leaders who brought about the crisis should go home
Lior Ackerman
| 17/10/2023
Exactly fifty years after October 1973, Israel is struggling to recover from the biggest failure in its history. The October failure, where the data on the extent of the murdered and kidnapped shocked the entire country.
There is abundant justice and logic in the claim that at these times, we must focus on fighting, strengthening the forces in the field, and providing backup to the commanders in the IDF, the Shin Bet, and the police; they must carry out their duties most professionally and successfully.
This is the right move; the IDF and the other defense and security forces must be allowed to conduct the fighting until Hamas is completely defeated, as should have happened many years ago.
But an exemption for the failure is impossible. The attack by Hamas completely surprised the State of Israel – there is no debate about that.
It is also impossible and wrong to engage now in discussions on lessons learned and attempts to understand where and how the entire intelligence array has failed. How did the entire defense system along the border with the Gaza Strip collapse? How did the IDF and the Israel Police allow hundreds of armed terrorists to operate freely within the borders of the State of Israel for so many hours and without any response?
Why, for so many hours, was there no person managing the event, gathering data, fighting to save the civilians in the area, or taking back control of the kibbutzim, towns, and villages? The questions are many, deep, and extremely painful. Courageous answers and painful conclusions will be required the day after.
The extent of the failure
It is fitting to point out the massive scope and extent of Israel’s failure. The most important - and disturbing - fact, is that the Israeli government nurtured Hamas, allowing it to develop and strengthen without interruption for over seventeen years in the Gaza Strip.
Over the course of all these years, Israel initiated almost no action against Hamas; all operations responded to its attacks and were limited, contained, and without significant results.
All this was to keep the peace and to preserve the separation between the Palestinian Authority territories in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza, in a way that allowed the Israeli government to avoid dealing with the issue of any political settlement with the PA.
The misconception was that if there were three states for two peoples, there was no point in a political settlement, and therefore it was convenient for the government to preserve the rule of Hamas. This belief blew up in our face.
According to estimates, the planning of the Oct 7 attack lasted between several months to a year. Dozens of Hamas officials were involved in it and perhaps even coordinated with Iran and Hezbollah to some extent. The fact that there was no warning and that the IDF emphasized to the government that Hamas was deterred is no less than a strategic failure at the national level.
Even after the serious intelligence failure, the IDF was caught operationally unprepared. The ‘smart’ border fence was breached with disturbing ease. Hundreds of terrorists moved for hours into Israel and back, without interruption, while abducting hundreds of Israeli prisoners and moving them into the Gaza territories.
Israeli tanks were burned, and soldiers were murdered on an unprecedented scale, inside outposts and combat vehicles. This failure will require an explanation, and it is hard to assume that there is one.
There is no leadership
Another serious problem was the disappearance and complete absence of all the political and defense leadership. They avoided appearances in the media, meetings with citizens, and even visits to the hospitals and the area itself. There is no precedent in Israel for such conduct. This is a serious failure on a historical level that the leadership will be required to pay for.
The failure to organize operationally and logistically after the Hamas attack must also be investigated. Thousands of Israeli civilians were held captive and slaughtered in their homes, cities, and towns for many hours before reinforcements arrived. Enemy forces occupied a division headquarters and entire settlements, and many hours passed before the IDF regained control over them.
Currently, and considering the overwhelming American backing, the IDF must fight intensely against Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip while also defining a clear goal of destroying the entire organization, its leaders, and its ability to operate militarily and politically. American backing will not last long and without limit.
Hezbollah may also join the fighting. Such a move serves Iran and is logical against the loss of Israeli deterrence and the success of Hamas. If that happens, Israel will be required to conduct a prolonged multi-arena combat to completely change the distorted equation that has been created over the years.
There is no doubt that in the end, there will be an Israeli military victory along with achievements on one level or another. But it is already excruciatingly clear that the day after, a state commission of inquiry will be required to come to difficult and painful conclusions in the face of the political, security, and IDF failures. The entire leadership will have to take responsibility.
Lior Akerman is a senior fellow in the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at the Reichman University
There is no doubt that, eventually, there will be an Israeli military victory and achievements of one level or another. But after that, the leaders who brought about the crisis should go home
Exactly fifty years after October 1973, Israel is struggling to recover from the biggest failure in its history. The October failure, where the data on the extent of the murdered and kidnapped shocked the entire country.
There is abundant justice and logic in the claim that at these times, we must focus on fighting, strengthening the forces in the field, and providing backup to the commanders in the IDF, the Shin Bet, and the police; they must carry out their duties most professionally and successfully.
This is the right move; the IDF and the other defense and security forces must be allowed to conduct the fighting until Hamas is completely defeated, as should have happened many years ago.
But an exemption for the failure is impossible. The attack by Hamas completely surprised the State of Israel – there is no debate about that.
It is also impossible and wrong to engage now in discussions on lessons learned and attempts to understand where and how the entire intelligence array has failed. How did the entire defense system along the border with the Gaza Strip collapse? How did the IDF and the Israel Police allow hundreds of armed terrorists to operate freely within the borders of the State of Israel for so many hours and without any response?
Why, for so many hours, was there no person managing the event, gathering data, fighting to save the civilians in the area, or taking back control of the kibbutzim, towns, and villages? The questions are many, deep, and extremely painful. Courageous answers and painful conclusions will be required the day after.
The extent of the failure
It is fitting to point out the massive scope and extent of Israel’s failure. The most important - and disturbing - fact, is that the Israeli government nurtured Hamas, allowing it to develop and strengthen without interruption for over seventeen years in the Gaza Strip.
Over the course of all these years, Israel initiated almost no action against Hamas; all operations responded to its attacks and were limited, contained, and without significant results.
All this was to keep the peace and to preserve the separation between the Palestinian Authority territories in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza, in a way that allowed the Israeli government to avoid dealing with the issue of any political settlement with the PA.
The misconception was that if there were three states for two peoples, there was no point in a political settlement, and therefore it was convenient for the government to preserve the rule of Hamas. This belief blew up in our face.
According to estimates, the planning of the Oct 7 attack lasted between several months to a year. Dozens of Hamas officials were involved in it and perhaps even coordinated with Iran and Hezbollah to some extent. The fact that there was no warning and that the IDF emphasized to the government that Hamas was deterred is no less than a strategic failure at the national level.
Even after the serious intelligence failure, the IDF was caught operationally unprepared. The ‘smart’ border fence was breached with disturbing ease. Hundreds of terrorists moved for hours into Israel and back, without interruption, while abducting hundreds of Israeli prisoners and moving them into the Gaza territories.
Israeli tanks were burned, and soldiers were murdered on an unprecedented scale, inside outposts and combat vehicles. This failure will require an explanation, and it is hard to assume that there is one.
There is no leadership
Another serious problem was the disappearance and complete absence of all the political and defense leadership. They avoided appearances in the media, meetings with citizens, and even visits to the hospitals and the area itself. There is no precedent in Israel for such conduct. This is a serious failure on a historical level that the leadership will be required to pay for.
The failure to organize operationally and logistically after the Hamas attack must also be investigated. Thousands of Israeli civilians were held captive and slaughtered in their homes, cities, and towns for many hours before reinforcements arrived. Enemy forces occupied a division headquarters and entire settlements, and many hours passed before the IDF regained control over them.
Currently, and considering the overwhelming American backing, the IDF must fight intensely against Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip while also defining a clear goal of destroying the entire organization, its leaders, and its ability to operate militarily and politically. American backing will not last long and without limit.
Hezbollah may also join the fighting. Such a move serves Iran and is logical against the loss of Israeli deterrence and the success of Hamas. If that happens, Israel will be required to conduct a prolonged multi-arena combat to completely change the distorted equation that has been created over the years.
There is no doubt that in the end, there will be an Israeli military victory along with achievements on one level or another. But it is already excruciatingly clear that the day after, a state commission of inquiry will be required to come to difficult and painful conclusions in the face of the political, security, and IDF failures. The entire leadership will have to take responsibility.
Lior Akerman is a senior fellow in the Institute for Policy and Strategy (IPS) at the Reichman University
