"An on-going failure in the way the tunnel issue is being handled"
State Comptroller severely criticizes the Israeli defense establishment's response to the tunnel threat. "With regard to the technological effort, as with the intelligence effort and the force build-up and employment effort, the response was slow and ineffective"
Or Heller
| 01/03/2017
Photo: IDF
The Israel State Comptroller concludes that the IDF has been dealing with the underground tunnels from the Gaza Strip since the late 1980s – since the end of the First Intifada, when the Gazans started excavating tunnels between the two parts of the city of Rafah – the one inside the Gaza Strip and the other in the territory of Egypt, under the Philadelphi Route. Until the end of the 1990s, dozens of tunnels were unearthed in the Philadelphi Route area at depths between two and eight meters. During the Second Intifada, the underground tunnels evolved into an offensive asset used for kidnapping and terrorist attacks. The State Comptroller has reminded all of us that underground tunnels caused serious trouble for the IDF even when Israeli forces still occupied the Gaza Strip, before the Israeli withdrawal: five terrorist attacks in which seven IDF troopers were killed had been staged during the years of the Second Intifada in the Gaza Strip, between 2001 and 2004.
Even after the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the underground tunnels continued to present a serious problem: the State Comptroller's report reminds us that IDF trooper Gilad Shalit was kidnapped in June 2006 through a 650-meter long tunnel excavated into the Kerem-Shalom area, in what turned out to be the first terrorist attack staged into Israeli territory out of a tunnel in the Gaza Strip. The successful kidnapping of Shalit encouraged the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip – concludes the State Comptroller – to excavate additional tunnels into Israeli territory, which led the IDF to embark on a series of operations in an attempt to unearth underground tunnels over the course of eighteen months. By May 2007, the Israel Security Agency (ISA – SHABAK) and the IDF Intelligence Directorate (IID - AMAN) were already familiar with several tunnels in the Gaza Strip, under different stages of excavation.
The coup by Hamas in the Gaza Strip in June 2007 enabled Hamas to step up and enhance their tunnel excavation effort. The State Comptroller notes that as far back as during Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in December 2008, the IDF discovered an extensive infrastructure of underground tunnels, including a tunnel leading into Israeli territory. The conclusions reached by the IDF from Operation Cast Lead reasoned that the tunnel infrastructure of Hamas in the Gaza Strip had been the factor that enabled Hamas to safeguard the lives of their political leaders and military commanders and still continue to launch rockets into the Israeli rear area.
The lessons drawn by Hamas from Operation Cast Lead led them to intensify the use of tunnels, with the emphasis, since 2010, on expanding the excavation of offensive tunnels into Israeli territory. In March 2010, the intelligence section of the IDF Southern Command estimated that a larger number of tunnels entering Israeli territory existed. The State Comptroller has reminded us that Operation Pillar of Defense, staged by the IDF in the Gaza Strip in November 2011, had begun pursuant to the blowing-up of an underground tunnel by Hamas. IAF did attack tunnels during Operation Pillar of Defense, but no one really believed that the tunnel setup of Hamas had sustained a serious blow during that round of fighting.
Hamas continued to excavate and in January 2013, a Hamas tunnel was unearthed in Israeli territory, to the east of the border fence. On the day the tunnel was unearthed, Prime Minister Netanyahu met with the head of the ISA in those days, Yoram Cohen. Netanyahu instructed the ISA chief to attempt and locate tunnels inside Israeli territory using a certain method, and since then Netanyahu was briefed periodically by the ISA and the IID as to the status of the underground tunnels in the Gaza Strip. In October 2013, an IDF patrol operating along the border with the Gaza Strip found another tunnel. That is to say that during the eighteen months prior to Operation Protective Edge, three Hamas tunnels were found inside Israeli territory, which clearly demonstrated Hamas' tunnel excavating potential. This led to a quantum leap – the State Comptroller notes – in the awareness regarding the tunnel threat and in the efforts invested by the IDF and the ISA in their attempts to deal with the tunnels.
During meetings held in November and December 2013 in which Netanyahu, the Minister of Defense and the head of the ISA participated, the tunnels were addressed as a strategic threat. In March 2014, yet another tunnel was unearthed inside Israeli territory. The State Comptroller presents in his report the internal analysis by the IDF regarding the question of how the underground tunnels had been dealt with during Operation Protective Edge.
The analysis by the IDF concluded that the task of destroying the offensive tunnels was accomplished only partially, and that some offensive tunnels entering Israeli territory remained intact even after Operation Protective Edge. The IDF admitted in the analysis pursuant to Operation Protective Edge that they were taken by surprise by the effective manner in which Hamas had used their defensive or logistic tunnels inside the Gaza Strip, of which both the entrance and exit were located inside the Gaza Strip.
The analysis by the IDF concludes that the tunnels were an element that would continue to accompany future operations even more intensively. As a footnote, it should be noted that in fact, the State Comptroller relies in his report, on numerous occasions, on the report on the tunnels written by Maj. Gen. Yossi Bachar pursuant to Operation Protective Edge, in the preparation of which 37 senior officers of the IDF and the ISA had taken part. It was very clear to the IDF in 2015 that pursuant to Operation Protective Edge, Hamas continues to develop the underground tunnels as a strategic capability in anticipation of the next round of fighting.
During a training exercise conducted in 2015 by the IDF Southern Command, Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot said that the tunnel threat was the most severe short-term threat on which both the routine security operations and the preparations for war should focus, and not only in the Gaza Strip: the State Comptroller concludes in his report that "the tunnel issue is being addressed in the Lebanon sector as well."
The State Comptroller quotes from the minutes of a meeting headed by Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Yair Golan, who concluded "The basic assumption is that all of the combat battalions of our forces will be required to deal with the subterranean medium during their operations." The Deputy Chief of Staff clarified that he had no intention of repeating the ineffective manner in which the IDF had handled the tunnel threat in the south until Operation Protective Edge. It was interesting to realize that the State Comptroller's office had started investigating the tunnel issue as far back as in February 2014, about six months prior to Operation Protective Edge. The State Comptroller concludes that even today, there is still a chance that the tunnel threat will materialize in the Gaza Strip, either as an act initiated by Hamas or as a response to IDF activity.
The State Comptroller investigated whether the tunnel threat had been prioritized according to its actual severity, the solutions that were offered for the tunnels, the directives that were issued by the political echelon to the IDF and the manner in which the IDF implemented those directives. As far back as 2007, the State Comptroller had issued a report regarding the tunnel issue, which pointed to the existence of "an on-going failure in the way the tunnel issue is being handled." The State Comptroller investigated the collection of intelligence regarding the tunnels, how important that intelligence was for the IDF and the ISA, the build-up of force within the IDF for the purpose of handling the tunnels and the technological solutions offered for the tunnels.
As far as the section dealing with the tunnels is concerned, a decision was made to publish only an outline, owing to censorship considerations. The primary faults the State Comptroller identified are described below.
Over a period of ten years (!), between 2005 and 2015, the Gaza Strip had not been assigned to the exclusive intelligence responsibility of either the ISA or the IID. Even after Hamas had seized power in the Gaza Strip, the Strip was not defined by the Israeli intelligence community as a 'Target State', and no revised breakdown of intelligence responsibilities between the various agencies was considered. The ISA remained in charge of collecting intelligence and preventing terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip, along with the IID and the IDF Southern Command. In a meeting with officials from the State Comptroller's office in February 2015, the head of the ISA in those days, Yoram Cohen, admitted: "The ISA is not physically present in that territory so it is difficult for it to develop capabilities like those it possesses in places where it has access to the territory."
Only in early 2015 did Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot define the Gaza Strip as a 'Target State', stating that "Today, as far as the IID is concerned, Lebanon and Gaza are the same thing." The State Comptroller's report of 2007 concluded that the ISA and the IDF should resolve the gaps between them regarding the tunnel issue and if they fail to resolve those gaps on their own, more senior echelons should intervene, that is to say the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The State Comptroller concludes that even during the period prior to Operation Protective Edge, faults had been found in the coordination between the ISA and the IDF regarding the tunnels, which had an effect on the manner in which intelligence pertaining to the tunnels was utilized. The same was indicated by the joint analysis by the IDF and the ISA of December 2014 regarding the tunnels during Operation Protective Edge.
The State Comptroller concludes that the Minister for Intelligence Affairs should have resolved that problem. The Comptroller commends the attempts by the former head of the IID, Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi (an officer regarded as a prime candidate for the position of Chief of Staff) who tried to resolve this issue, which eventually led to an agreement, in February 2015, between the ISA and the IDF regarding the Gaza Strip. The State Comptroller further concludes, however, that even this agreement "still failed to eliminate the tensions, disputes and arguments between the IID and the ISA regarding the intelligence cooperation between them." Only in November 2016, as the Comptroller concludes, did the ISA and the IDF sign the inter-agency cooperation agreement.
The State Comptroller reveals in his report that only as late as 2009 was the tunnel issue included in the EEI (Essential Elements of Information – the priority intelligence gathering tasks) of the Israeli intelligence community, which is essential to the allocation of budgets and intelligence attention, and even then only as part of the general issue of alerts regarding terrorist attacks rather than as a standalone intelligence issue. Despite the increasing severity of the tunnel threat, even during the years 2010 through 2014 the tunnel issue was not included in the national EEI and was not addressed separately and thoroughly.
Even when Prime Minister Netanyahu, ISA chief Yoram Cohen and IID Chief Aviv Kochavi described the tunnel issue as a strategic threat in 2013, it was still not included in the national EEI for 2014 as a standalone issue. Only in early 2015 was the tunnel issue included in the EEI as a high priority, despite the fact that the Prime Minister had ordered that it be included in the national EEI in February 2014.
By 2015, the tunnel issue had already evolved into the second most important item of the national EEI. It may be assumed that the first priority was and still remains the Iranian nuclear program. This fact demonstrates, as far as the State Comptroller is concerned, the incredulity of the fact that the tunnel issue had not been included in the national EEI prior to that, as the magnitude and severity of this threat could not have changed substantially, all of a sudden, in 2015.
The State Comptroller concludes that the fact that the tunnel issue had not been included in the national EEI must have had a damaging effect on the allocation of resources by the intelligence community to this threat over the years. In the absence of any other tunnel-locating solution (here the State Comptroller hints to the absence of a technological solution – O.H.), intelligence was of the utmost importance, and the fact that the tunnel issue had not been included in the national EEI must have conveyed a message to everyone associated with the tunnels that this issue was regarded as a low priority.
The State Comptroller criticizes Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, the Head of the IID, and, as stated, a prime candidate for the position of IDF Chief of Staff, and former ISA chief Yoram Cohen: "The heads of the intelligence community are not passive participants in the shaping of the national EEI. In view of the severity of the threat over the years, and at least since 2013, the head of the IID in those days and the head of the ISA in those days, Yoram Cohen, should have exerted their influence to effect the inclusion thereof in the national EEI and should have insisted that it be prioritized in accordance with the risk it imposed as was eventually done in the EEI for 2015, although the threats had not substantially changed." The State Comptroller concludes that Prime Minister Netanyahu, former Defense Minister Ya'alon and former Chief of Staff Benny Gantz should have overseen the consolidation of the national EEI and should have reviewed and influenced it so as to enable operations aimed at locating the tunnels. The State Comptroller's report indicates that until 2013, the tunnels had not been included in the EEI of the IID. Only in February 2014 did Yoram Cohen, then ISA chief, include the tunnels in the work plan of the ISA's southern district.
Conversely, the State Comptroller's report indicates that between 2008 and Operation Protective Edge of 2014, both the IDF and the ISA had invested substantial efforts in an attempt to collect intelligence on the tunnels, particularly as of late 2013. Various intelligence resources were employed, along with technological and other resources, but faults were nevertheless found with the collection of intelligence regarding the tunnels by the IDF and the ISA:
The intelligence effort of the IID did not include a comprehensive and integrated intelligence effort by all of the layouts and units, as was also reflected from statements made by commanders of IID units, despite the fact that at a meeting in January 2008, the Deputy Chief of Staff concluded that the IID should develop a complete solution for the tunnel issue. The State Comptroller criticizes the ISA over the fact that only in 2013 did they step up their intelligence collection efforts vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip while enhancing the coordination with IDF units. Only as of 2013 did the ISA and the IID intensify their intelligence collection efforts vis-à-vis the tunnels. After having invested substantial resources, they came to possess information regarding a significant aspect of the offensive tunnels extending into Israeli territory.
However, the State Comptroller also addresses the defensive tunnels, regarding which the IDF analysis had already concluded that "The intelligence picture was incomplete with regard to the defensive tunnels. The combat elements felt the absence of that information very acutely." The State Comptroller concludes that despite the fact that the head of the IID, MG Kochavi, had included the defensive tunnels in the EEI in 2013, the IID and the IDF Southern Command failed to focus their efforts on this issue, which led to a situation where the forces of Operation Protective Edge faced a significant shortage of information regarding the defensive tunnels.
The State Comptroller concludes that whereas the head of IID, MG Aviv Kochavi, had ordered back in 2012 that the IDF Southern Command and the IDF Gaza Division should deal with the tunnels, the Analysis Division of the IID hardly initiated any analysis efforts regarding this issue. The Comptroller concludes that the way the tunnels were treated was "tactical" and not in line with their having been defined as a strategic threat. The IID did not conduct itself methodically in connection with the tunnels with all of the information that was available to it. The Comptroller commends Project IBW (Intelligence-Based Warfare) led by the head of the IID in those days, MG Aviv Kochavi, as well as the intelligence provided to the ground forces that reached the tunnels as they had been directed to do originally, based on intelligence information. The absence of the intelligence information in its entirety, concludes the Comptroller, made it difficult for the ground forces to accomplish one of the primary objectives of Operation Protective Edge and prolonged the time they required in order to accomplish it.
The State Comptroller also criticizes the situation along the border with Lebanon: only partial (intelligence) analysis processes had been initiated regarding tunnels in Lebanon. The Comptroller recommends that the ISA and the IID enhance the cooperation between them and intensify their intelligence activity vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip. The Comptroller calls on the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense to ensure that this cooperation actually takes place. Regarding the tunnels in the north: the IID and the IDF Northern Command should continue to monitor the tunnel threat in the north owing to the gaps and uncertainties regarding the strength of the enemy.
Force build-up for dealing with the tunnels:
The State Comptroller criticizes the fact that no operational concept had been consolidated for dealing with the tunnels despite an express directive issued by the Deputy Chief of Staff in February 2013. The IDF GHQ Operations Division failed to formulate a basic concept for dealing with the tunnels. Only following Operation Protective Edge, in December 2014, did the IDF Chief Paratroops & Infantry Officer's HQ issue operational procedures for conducting combat operations in the tunnels. The Combat Engineering forces consolidated an ad-hoc technique for dealing with the tunnels they encountered (for example, demolishing only a part of the tunnel).
The State Comptroller warns of the absence of relevant operational plans for dealing with the tunnels. The Comptroller criticizes the IDF Ground Arm for not having trained and prepared the warfighters for dealing with the tunnels. The warfighters had to operate in an area saturated with tunnels without the necessary weapon systems.
This was particularly evident with regard to the YAHALOM Unit – the special operations engineering unit assigned, among other things, to fight in the tunnels. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) had also failed to build-up its force in preparation for dealing with the tunnels through air strikes. The engineering elements had a hard time executing their missions owing to the air strikes. The State Comptroller also criticizes the IDF Southern Command which, despite being aware of the danger of the tunnels, had no structured plan for dealing with them.
The IDF Southern Command failed, despite the mechanical resources available to it, to unearth even a single tunnel. All of the tunnels were found pursuant to terrorist attacks or by chance. Out of the total number of offensive tunnels the IDF had intended to destroy, they actually destroyed about one half and neutralized a few others. All the other tunnels were either disrupted or remained serviceable. Consequently, the IDF failed to complete their mission in Operation Protective Edge. The State Comptroller recommends that the IDF GHQ consolidate a force build-up plan for the tunnels, under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff and his deputy.
The State Comptroller deals extensively with the absence of a technological solution for the tunnel problem, that 'Iron Dome' that would have exposed the tunnel layout built by Hamas. The State Comptroller's report indicates that IMOD's Defense R&D Directorate (MAFAT) Administration had been attempting to find a technological solution for the tunnel problem in the Gaza Strip since 1990 – a solution intended primarily to detect the tunnels. The report criticizes MAFAT over unreasonable delays that resulted in the loss of precious time. The State Comptroller's report of 2007 had concluded (even back then) that owing to the urgent need to detect the tunnels in the Gaza Strip, the IDF should have reviewed the development processes of the system.
The new State Comptroller's report concludes that some of the faults listed in the report for 2007 have not been addressed: the Comptroller reviews System A, intended to destroy tunnels, and System B, intended to detect tunnels. The project involving System B was halted in December 2009, during the operational trial stage, as the system had failed the test of reality and the project had to be started afresh. The Comptroller concludes that the planning and management processes of that project were flawed.
In 2010, Project A was initiated which should have been completed by June 2014. In effect, until Operation Protective Edge, Stage A of the project had not been completed and the IDF possessed only a limited tunnel detecting capability during Operation Protective Edge. Although the Deputy Chief of Staff had defined the project as an emergency project back in 2011, IMOD and the IDF failed to set forth the consequences that such an emergency project entails. The IDF Ground Arm and MAFAT failed to approach the IID so that it would help the project using its own capabilities. The Comptroller commends specific elements within the IID that volunteered, in the months prior to Operation Protective Edge, to deal independently with the tunnel issue even in the absence of a directive from above and without having been instructed to do so by any GHQ authority.
The State Comptroller also commends the Givati Brigade, under command of Col. Ofer Winter, which, at their own initiative, developed and acquired products that provided a solution to the tunnel problem. The Givati Brigade had developed, in the months prior to Operation Protective Edge, a measure for identifying tunnels based on an off-the-shelf product. Although the State Comptroller commends this initiative, he notes that it actually reflects poor coordination and the absence of a multi-channel effort. The Comptroller also commends the former commander of the IDF Gaza Division, Miki Edelstein (currently Major-General and the IDF Military Attaché to Washington) for his activities in the field of dealing technologically with the tunnels during Operation Protective Edge.
What has happened since Operation Protective Edge to this day?
The conclusion from Operation Protective Edge was that the various technologies should be combined. In late March 2015, the IDF started deploying the system of Project A along the border with the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that the former general officer commanding the IDF Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Sammy Turjeman, had questioned the system's effectiveness. On July 1, 2015, MG Turjeman ordered that Project A and Project B deploy along a specific section of the border with the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that the Chief of Staff and his deputy wanted the deployment to be twice as long. The Comptroller concludes that the supervision and control by Chief of Staff Eizenkot and his deputy Yair Golan were flawed.
The contents of this section of the report indicate that with regard to the technological effort, as with the two other efforts – the intelligence effort and the force build-up and employment effort, the response of the Israeli defense establishment to the development of the tunnel threat in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon was slow and ineffective and failed to pass the outcome test. Since the early 2000s and until 2010, the research and development organs dealt with the threat in a narrow manner, without developing a sufficient knowledge base, field trial sites, relevant simulation capabilities and so forth, while placing the emphasis primarily on the detection and location capability and on one major tunnel detection system – System B. After this system had failed, between 2010 and Operation Protective Edge, the R&D organs of the IDF and IMOD initiated the development of a broader and deeper solution for the threat. They conducted their operations, however, at a pace that failed to match the development of the threat and the operational need, and while paying little attention, if any, to some of the primary aspects of the ability to deal with the challenge, like the aspects of mapping, destruction and tactical weapon systems for the maneuvering elements. The inability of the IDF Ground Arm to provide support for the R&D effort, to MAFAT and to the operational elements, was particularly notable. Another notably negative phenomenon was the flawed control by the IDF Planning Directorate of the R&D effort against the threat in general, within the context of the control it was supposed to exercise over the implementation of the roadmap for fighting in the subterranean medium of 2008.
The following is MAFAT's response to the State Comptroller's report:
"IMOD's MAFAT Administration has led, developed and introduced, over the years, technological capabilities that provided and still provide a significant solution for all of the circles of dealing with the challenges of the subterranean medium, a solution the likes of which have never been developed by any other country worldwide.
"The weapon systems and technological solutions currently used by the IDF in dealing with the challenges of the subterranean medium are the products of the research and development efforts undertaken at MAFAT. These accomplishments are the product of investment, over many years, during which a groundbreaking technological infrastructure was developed.
"MAFAT had prioritized this issue substantially higher than other R&D issues, with regard to the manpower and budget aspects. In this context, numerous research processes were germinated, academic research centers and testing infrastructure facilities were established with the intention of advancing R&D processes as fast as possible and effectively creating technological capabilities for dealing with the tunnel threat. As part of the policy of MAFAT and IMOD of examining every relevant technological direction relating to the field of dealing with the tunnel challenges, MAFAT reviewed hundreds of proposals submitted by various elements from Israel and from around the world.
"The scope of the resources (invested) and the R&D accomplishments were presented during the review to the State Comptroller, who saw fit to express his appreciation and note that 'The State Comptroller's office is aware of the massive effort and hard work being invested by the various R&D organs and the operational elements in dealing with the tunnel threat in the technological field'."
State Comptroller severely criticizes the Israeli defense establishment's response to the tunnel threat. "With regard to the technological effort, as with the intelligence effort and the force build-up and employment effort, the response was slow and ineffective"
Photo: IDF
The Israel State Comptroller concludes that the IDF has been dealing with the underground tunnels from the Gaza Strip since the late 1980s – since the end of the First Intifada, when the Gazans started excavating tunnels between the two parts of the city of Rafah – the one inside the Gaza Strip and the other in the territory of Egypt, under the Philadelphi Route. Until the end of the 1990s, dozens of tunnels were unearthed in the Philadelphi Route area at depths between two and eight meters. During the Second Intifada, the underground tunnels evolved into an offensive asset used for kidnapping and terrorist attacks. The State Comptroller has reminded all of us that underground tunnels caused serious trouble for the IDF even when Israeli forces still occupied the Gaza Strip, before the Israeli withdrawal: five terrorist attacks in which seven IDF troopers were killed had been staged during the years of the Second Intifada in the Gaza Strip, between 2001 and 2004.
Even after the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the underground tunnels continued to present a serious problem: the State Comptroller's report reminds us that IDF trooper Gilad Shalit was kidnapped in June 2006 through a 650-meter long tunnel excavated into the Kerem-Shalom area, in what turned out to be the first terrorist attack staged into Israeli territory out of a tunnel in the Gaza Strip. The successful kidnapping of Shalit encouraged the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip – concludes the State Comptroller – to excavate additional tunnels into Israeli territory, which led the IDF to embark on a series of operations in an attempt to unearth underground tunnels over the course of eighteen months. By May 2007, the Israel Security Agency (ISA – SHABAK) and the IDF Intelligence Directorate (IID - AMAN) were already familiar with several tunnels in the Gaza Strip, under different stages of excavation.
The coup by Hamas in the Gaza Strip in June 2007 enabled Hamas to step up and enhance their tunnel excavation effort. The State Comptroller notes that as far back as during Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip in December 2008, the IDF discovered an extensive infrastructure of underground tunnels, including a tunnel leading into Israeli territory. The conclusions reached by the IDF from Operation Cast Lead reasoned that the tunnel infrastructure of Hamas in the Gaza Strip had been the factor that enabled Hamas to safeguard the lives of their political leaders and military commanders and still continue to launch rockets into the Israeli rear area.
The lessons drawn by Hamas from Operation Cast Lead led them to intensify the use of tunnels, with the emphasis, since 2010, on expanding the excavation of offensive tunnels into Israeli territory. In March 2010, the intelligence section of the IDF Southern Command estimated that a larger number of tunnels entering Israeli territory existed. The State Comptroller has reminded us that Operation Pillar of Defense, staged by the IDF in the Gaza Strip in November 2011, had begun pursuant to the blowing-up of an underground tunnel by Hamas. IAF did attack tunnels during Operation Pillar of Defense, but no one really believed that the tunnel setup of Hamas had sustained a serious blow during that round of fighting.
Hamas continued to excavate and in January 2013, a Hamas tunnel was unearthed in Israeli territory, to the east of the border fence. On the day the tunnel was unearthed, Prime Minister Netanyahu met with the head of the ISA in those days, Yoram Cohen. Netanyahu instructed the ISA chief to attempt and locate tunnels inside Israeli territory using a certain method, and since then Netanyahu was briefed periodically by the ISA and the IID as to the status of the underground tunnels in the Gaza Strip. In October 2013, an IDF patrol operating along the border with the Gaza Strip found another tunnel. That is to say that during the eighteen months prior to Operation Protective Edge, three Hamas tunnels were found inside Israeli territory, which clearly demonstrated Hamas' tunnel excavating potential. This led to a quantum leap – the State Comptroller notes – in the awareness regarding the tunnel threat and in the efforts invested by the IDF and the ISA in their attempts to deal with the tunnels.
During meetings held in November and December 2013 in which Netanyahu, the Minister of Defense and the head of the ISA participated, the tunnels were addressed as a strategic threat. In March 2014, yet another tunnel was unearthed inside Israeli territory. The State Comptroller presents in his report the internal analysis by the IDF regarding the question of how the underground tunnels had been dealt with during Operation Protective Edge.
The analysis by the IDF concluded that the task of destroying the offensive tunnels was accomplished only partially, and that some offensive tunnels entering Israeli territory remained intact even after Operation Protective Edge. The IDF admitted in the analysis pursuant to Operation Protective Edge that they were taken by surprise by the effective manner in which Hamas had used their defensive or logistic tunnels inside the Gaza Strip, of which both the entrance and exit were located inside the Gaza Strip.
The analysis by the IDF concludes that the tunnels were an element that would continue to accompany future operations even more intensively. As a footnote, it should be noted that in fact, the State Comptroller relies in his report, on numerous occasions, on the report on the tunnels written by Maj. Gen. Yossi Bachar pursuant to Operation Protective Edge, in the preparation of which 37 senior officers of the IDF and the ISA had taken part. It was very clear to the IDF in 2015 that pursuant to Operation Protective Edge, Hamas continues to develop the underground tunnels as a strategic capability in anticipation of the next round of fighting.
During a training exercise conducted in 2015 by the IDF Southern Command, Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot said that the tunnel threat was the most severe short-term threat on which both the routine security operations and the preparations for war should focus, and not only in the Gaza Strip: the State Comptroller concludes in his report that "the tunnel issue is being addressed in the Lebanon sector as well."
The State Comptroller quotes from the minutes of a meeting headed by Deputy Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Yair Golan, who concluded "The basic assumption is that all of the combat battalions of our forces will be required to deal with the subterranean medium during their operations." The Deputy Chief of Staff clarified that he had no intention of repeating the ineffective manner in which the IDF had handled the tunnel threat in the south until Operation Protective Edge. It was interesting to realize that the State Comptroller's office had started investigating the tunnel issue as far back as in February 2014, about six months prior to Operation Protective Edge. The State Comptroller concludes that even today, there is still a chance that the tunnel threat will materialize in the Gaza Strip, either as an act initiated by Hamas or as a response to IDF activity.
The State Comptroller investigated whether the tunnel threat had been prioritized according to its actual severity, the solutions that were offered for the tunnels, the directives that were issued by the political echelon to the IDF and the manner in which the IDF implemented those directives. As far back as 2007, the State Comptroller had issued a report regarding the tunnel issue, which pointed to the existence of "an on-going failure in the way the tunnel issue is being handled." The State Comptroller investigated the collection of intelligence regarding the tunnels, how important that intelligence was for the IDF and the ISA, the build-up of force within the IDF for the purpose of handling the tunnels and the technological solutions offered for the tunnels.
As far as the section dealing with the tunnels is concerned, a decision was made to publish only an outline, owing to censorship considerations. The primary faults the State Comptroller identified are described below.
Over a period of ten years (!), between 2005 and 2015, the Gaza Strip had not been assigned to the exclusive intelligence responsibility of either the ISA or the IID. Even after Hamas had seized power in the Gaza Strip, the Strip was not defined by the Israeli intelligence community as a 'Target State', and no revised breakdown of intelligence responsibilities between the various agencies was considered. The ISA remained in charge of collecting intelligence and preventing terrorist attacks from the Gaza Strip, along with the IID and the IDF Southern Command. In a meeting with officials from the State Comptroller's office in February 2015, the head of the ISA in those days, Yoram Cohen, admitted: "The ISA is not physically present in that territory so it is difficult for it to develop capabilities like those it possesses in places where it has access to the territory."
Only in early 2015 did Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot define the Gaza Strip as a 'Target State', stating that "Today, as far as the IID is concerned, Lebanon and Gaza are the same thing." The State Comptroller's report of 2007 concluded that the ISA and the IDF should resolve the gaps between them regarding the tunnel issue and if they fail to resolve those gaps on their own, more senior echelons should intervene, that is to say the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The State Comptroller concludes that even during the period prior to Operation Protective Edge, faults had been found in the coordination between the ISA and the IDF regarding the tunnels, which had an effect on the manner in which intelligence pertaining to the tunnels was utilized. The same was indicated by the joint analysis by the IDF and the ISA of December 2014 regarding the tunnels during Operation Protective Edge.
The State Comptroller concludes that the Minister for Intelligence Affairs should have resolved that problem. The Comptroller commends the attempts by the former head of the IID, Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi (an officer regarded as a prime candidate for the position of Chief of Staff) who tried to resolve this issue, which eventually led to an agreement, in February 2015, between the ISA and the IDF regarding the Gaza Strip. The State Comptroller further concludes, however, that even this agreement "still failed to eliminate the tensions, disputes and arguments between the IID and the ISA regarding the intelligence cooperation between them." Only in November 2016, as the Comptroller concludes, did the ISA and the IDF sign the inter-agency cooperation agreement.
The State Comptroller reveals in his report that only as late as 2009 was the tunnel issue included in the EEI (Essential Elements of Information – the priority intelligence gathering tasks) of the Israeli intelligence community, which is essential to the allocation of budgets and intelligence attention, and even then only as part of the general issue of alerts regarding terrorist attacks rather than as a standalone intelligence issue. Despite the increasing severity of the tunnel threat, even during the years 2010 through 2014 the tunnel issue was not included in the national EEI and was not addressed separately and thoroughly.
Even when Prime Minister Netanyahu, ISA chief Yoram Cohen and IID Chief Aviv Kochavi described the tunnel issue as a strategic threat in 2013, it was still not included in the national EEI for 2014 as a standalone issue. Only in early 2015 was the tunnel issue included in the EEI as a high priority, despite the fact that the Prime Minister had ordered that it be included in the national EEI in February 2014.
By 2015, the tunnel issue had already evolved into the second most important item of the national EEI. It may be assumed that the first priority was and still remains the Iranian nuclear program. This fact demonstrates, as far as the State Comptroller is concerned, the incredulity of the fact that the tunnel issue had not been included in the national EEI prior to that, as the magnitude and severity of this threat could not have changed substantially, all of a sudden, in 2015.
The State Comptroller concludes that the fact that the tunnel issue had not been included in the national EEI must have had a damaging effect on the allocation of resources by the intelligence community to this threat over the years. In the absence of any other tunnel-locating solution (here the State Comptroller hints to the absence of a technological solution – O.H.), intelligence was of the utmost importance, and the fact that the tunnel issue had not been included in the national EEI must have conveyed a message to everyone associated with the tunnels that this issue was regarded as a low priority.
The State Comptroller criticizes Maj. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, the Head of the IID, and, as stated, a prime candidate for the position of IDF Chief of Staff, and former ISA chief Yoram Cohen: "The heads of the intelligence community are not passive participants in the shaping of the national EEI. In view of the severity of the threat over the years, and at least since 2013, the head of the IID in those days and the head of the ISA in those days, Yoram Cohen, should have exerted their influence to effect the inclusion thereof in the national EEI and should have insisted that it be prioritized in accordance with the risk it imposed as was eventually done in the EEI for 2015, although the threats had not substantially changed." The State Comptroller concludes that Prime Minister Netanyahu, former Defense Minister Ya'alon and former Chief of Staff Benny Gantz should have overseen the consolidation of the national EEI and should have reviewed and influenced it so as to enable operations aimed at locating the tunnels. The State Comptroller's report indicates that until 2013, the tunnels had not been included in the EEI of the IID. Only in February 2014 did Yoram Cohen, then ISA chief, include the tunnels in the work plan of the ISA's southern district.
Conversely, the State Comptroller's report indicates that between 2008 and Operation Protective Edge of 2014, both the IDF and the ISA had invested substantial efforts in an attempt to collect intelligence on the tunnels, particularly as of late 2013. Various intelligence resources were employed, along with technological and other resources, but faults were nevertheless found with the collection of intelligence regarding the tunnels by the IDF and the ISA:
The intelligence effort of the IID did not include a comprehensive and integrated intelligence effort by all of the layouts and units, as was also reflected from statements made by commanders of IID units, despite the fact that at a meeting in January 2008, the Deputy Chief of Staff concluded that the IID should develop a complete solution for the tunnel issue. The State Comptroller criticizes the ISA over the fact that only in 2013 did they step up their intelligence collection efforts vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip while enhancing the coordination with IDF units. Only as of 2013 did the ISA and the IID intensify their intelligence collection efforts vis-à-vis the tunnels. After having invested substantial resources, they came to possess information regarding a significant aspect of the offensive tunnels extending into Israeli territory.
However, the State Comptroller also addresses the defensive tunnels, regarding which the IDF analysis had already concluded that "The intelligence picture was incomplete with regard to the defensive tunnels. The combat elements felt the absence of that information very acutely." The State Comptroller concludes that despite the fact that the head of the IID, MG Kochavi, had included the defensive tunnels in the EEI in 2013, the IID and the IDF Southern Command failed to focus their efforts on this issue, which led to a situation where the forces of Operation Protective Edge faced a significant shortage of information regarding the defensive tunnels.
The State Comptroller concludes that whereas the head of IID, MG Aviv Kochavi, had ordered back in 2012 that the IDF Southern Command and the IDF Gaza Division should deal with the tunnels, the Analysis Division of the IID hardly initiated any analysis efforts regarding this issue. The Comptroller concludes that the way the tunnels were treated was "tactical" and not in line with their having been defined as a strategic threat. The IID did not conduct itself methodically in connection with the tunnels with all of the information that was available to it. The Comptroller commends Project IBW (Intelligence-Based Warfare) led by the head of the IID in those days, MG Aviv Kochavi, as well as the intelligence provided to the ground forces that reached the tunnels as they had been directed to do originally, based on intelligence information. The absence of the intelligence information in its entirety, concludes the Comptroller, made it difficult for the ground forces to accomplish one of the primary objectives of Operation Protective Edge and prolonged the time they required in order to accomplish it.
The State Comptroller also criticizes the situation along the border with Lebanon: only partial (intelligence) analysis processes had been initiated regarding tunnels in Lebanon. The Comptroller recommends that the ISA and the IID enhance the cooperation between them and intensify their intelligence activity vis-à-vis the Gaza Strip. The Comptroller calls on the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense to ensure that this cooperation actually takes place. Regarding the tunnels in the north: the IID and the IDF Northern Command should continue to monitor the tunnel threat in the north owing to the gaps and uncertainties regarding the strength of the enemy.
Force build-up for dealing with the tunnels:
The State Comptroller criticizes the fact that no operational concept had been consolidated for dealing with the tunnels despite an express directive issued by the Deputy Chief of Staff in February 2013. The IDF GHQ Operations Division failed to formulate a basic concept for dealing with the tunnels. Only following Operation Protective Edge, in December 2014, did the IDF Chief Paratroops & Infantry Officer's HQ issue operational procedures for conducting combat operations in the tunnels. The Combat Engineering forces consolidated an ad-hoc technique for dealing with the tunnels they encountered (for example, demolishing only a part of the tunnel).
The State Comptroller warns of the absence of relevant operational plans for dealing with the tunnels. The Comptroller criticizes the IDF Ground Arm for not having trained and prepared the warfighters for dealing with the tunnels. The warfighters had to operate in an area saturated with tunnels without the necessary weapon systems.
This was particularly evident with regard to the YAHALOM Unit – the special operations engineering unit assigned, among other things, to fight in the tunnels. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) had also failed to build-up its force in preparation for dealing with the tunnels through air strikes. The engineering elements had a hard time executing their missions owing to the air strikes. The State Comptroller also criticizes the IDF Southern Command which, despite being aware of the danger of the tunnels, had no structured plan for dealing with them.
The IDF Southern Command failed, despite the mechanical resources available to it, to unearth even a single tunnel. All of the tunnels were found pursuant to terrorist attacks or by chance. Out of the total number of offensive tunnels the IDF had intended to destroy, they actually destroyed about one half and neutralized a few others. All the other tunnels were either disrupted or remained serviceable. Consequently, the IDF failed to complete their mission in Operation Protective Edge. The State Comptroller recommends that the IDF GHQ consolidate a force build-up plan for the tunnels, under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff and his deputy.
The State Comptroller deals extensively with the absence of a technological solution for the tunnel problem, that 'Iron Dome' that would have exposed the tunnel layout built by Hamas. The State Comptroller's report indicates that IMOD's Defense R&D Directorate (MAFAT) Administration had been attempting to find a technological solution for the tunnel problem in the Gaza Strip since 1990 – a solution intended primarily to detect the tunnels. The report criticizes MAFAT over unreasonable delays that resulted in the loss of precious time. The State Comptroller's report of 2007 had concluded (even back then) that owing to the urgent need to detect the tunnels in the Gaza Strip, the IDF should have reviewed the development processes of the system.
The new State Comptroller's report concludes that some of the faults listed in the report for 2007 have not been addressed: the Comptroller reviews System A, intended to destroy tunnels, and System B, intended to detect tunnels. The project involving System B was halted in December 2009, during the operational trial stage, as the system had failed the test of reality and the project had to be started afresh. The Comptroller concludes that the planning and management processes of that project were flawed.
In 2010, Project A was initiated which should have been completed by June 2014. In effect, until Operation Protective Edge, Stage A of the project had not been completed and the IDF possessed only a limited tunnel detecting capability during Operation Protective Edge. Although the Deputy Chief of Staff had defined the project as an emergency project back in 2011, IMOD and the IDF failed to set forth the consequences that such an emergency project entails. The IDF Ground Arm and MAFAT failed to approach the IID so that it would help the project using its own capabilities. The Comptroller commends specific elements within the IID that volunteered, in the months prior to Operation Protective Edge, to deal independently with the tunnel issue even in the absence of a directive from above and without having been instructed to do so by any GHQ authority.
The State Comptroller also commends the Givati Brigade, under command of Col. Ofer Winter, which, at their own initiative, developed and acquired products that provided a solution to the tunnel problem. The Givati Brigade had developed, in the months prior to Operation Protective Edge, a measure for identifying tunnels based on an off-the-shelf product. Although the State Comptroller commends this initiative, he notes that it actually reflects poor coordination and the absence of a multi-channel effort. The Comptroller also commends the former commander of the IDF Gaza Division, Miki Edelstein (currently Major-General and the IDF Military Attaché to Washington) for his activities in the field of dealing technologically with the tunnels during Operation Protective Edge.
What has happened since Operation Protective Edge to this day?
The conclusion from Operation Protective Edge was that the various technologies should be combined. In late March 2015, the IDF started deploying the system of Project A along the border with the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that the former general officer commanding the IDF Southern Command, Maj. Gen. Sammy Turjeman, had questioned the system's effectiveness. On July 1, 2015, MG Turjeman ordered that Project A and Project B deploy along a specific section of the border with the Gaza Strip, despite the fact that the Chief of Staff and his deputy wanted the deployment to be twice as long. The Comptroller concludes that the supervision and control by Chief of Staff Eizenkot and his deputy Yair Golan were flawed.
The contents of this section of the report indicate that with regard to the technological effort, as with the two other efforts – the intelligence effort and the force build-up and employment effort, the response of the Israeli defense establishment to the development of the tunnel threat in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon was slow and ineffective and failed to pass the outcome test. Since the early 2000s and until 2010, the research and development organs dealt with the threat in a narrow manner, without developing a sufficient knowledge base, field trial sites, relevant simulation capabilities and so forth, while placing the emphasis primarily on the detection and location capability and on one major tunnel detection system – System B. After this system had failed, between 2010 and Operation Protective Edge, the R&D organs of the IDF and IMOD initiated the development of a broader and deeper solution for the threat. They conducted their operations, however, at a pace that failed to match the development of the threat and the operational need, and while paying little attention, if any, to some of the primary aspects of the ability to deal with the challenge, like the aspects of mapping, destruction and tactical weapon systems for the maneuvering elements. The inability of the IDF Ground Arm to provide support for the R&D effort, to MAFAT and to the operational elements, was particularly notable. Another notably negative phenomenon was the flawed control by the IDF Planning Directorate of the R&D effort against the threat in general, within the context of the control it was supposed to exercise over the implementation of the roadmap for fighting in the subterranean medium of 2008.
The following is MAFAT's response to the State Comptroller's report:
"IMOD's MAFAT Administration has led, developed and introduced, over the years, technological capabilities that provided and still provide a significant solution for all of the circles of dealing with the challenges of the subterranean medium, a solution the likes of which have never been developed by any other country worldwide.
"The weapon systems and technological solutions currently used by the IDF in dealing with the challenges of the subterranean medium are the products of the research and development efforts undertaken at MAFAT. These accomplishments are the product of investment, over many years, during which a groundbreaking technological infrastructure was developed.
"MAFAT had prioritized this issue substantially higher than other R&D issues, with regard to the manpower and budget aspects. In this context, numerous research processes were germinated, academic research centers and testing infrastructure facilities were established with the intention of advancing R&D processes as fast as possible and effectively creating technological capabilities for dealing with the tunnel threat. As part of the policy of MAFAT and IMOD of examining every relevant technological direction relating to the field of dealing with the tunnel challenges, MAFAT reviewed hundreds of proposals submitted by various elements from Israel and from around the world.
"The scope of the resources (invested) and the R&D accomplishments were presented during the review to the State Comptroller, who saw fit to express his appreciation and note that 'The State Comptroller's office is aware of the massive effort and hard work being invested by the various R&D organs and the operational elements in dealing with the tunnel threat in the technological field'."
