The Lessons Regarding Statistical Artillery
From the battle in Bint-Jbeil to Shuja'iyya and from the Second Lebanon War to Operation Protective Edge, how IDF employed artillery fire support arsenal and the lessons drawn regarding the artillery arsenal over the years
Benny Mehr
| 20/06/2016
IDF Artillery forces during Operation Protective Edge (Photo: IDF)
The report of the commission that reviewed Israel's defense budget for 2007 stated the following: "… During the Second Lebanon War, more than 170,000 artillery shells were fired and the feeling was that this scope of fire was excessive and unjustified." This feeling was also reflected in the report of the Brodet Commission, which came to the conclusion that "The firepower employed during the war through air strikes and artillery fire was excessive… and the benefits obtained were limited."
The 'excessive' scope of fire was the primary statement etched into the general consciousness with regard to the employment of tube artillery during the Second Lebanon War (2006), along with the questioning of the actual effectiveness of the fire and the relevance of the employment of statistical Statistical fire. offers two significant advantages as a form of support to the maneuvering elements. One is the availability of the fire and the other is the ability to cover a given area cell in the absence of accurate intelligence. In the Second Lebanon War, the lion's share of the fire employed in direct support was delivered 7 to 15 minutes from the moment of demand, as opposed to the relatively long cycles in the case of the employment of air (fighter aircraft) support. Most of the combat air support missions were executed more than one hour from the moment when the maneuvering element had submitted its demand. This time constant is not relevant to a running engagement involving a maneuvering element. In the context of the lessons drawn from that war, IAF invested a substantial effort in an attempt to improve the processes and cut down the time interval involved in the supply of direct fire support to the maneuvering elements. This improvement was evident during Operation Protective Edge, but the time constants of the close direct support for the ground forces by precision fire from the air remained irrelevant to the maneuvering battle. Quite a few examples come to mind in this context, for example, the employment of fire support by the IDF Gaza Division during Operation Protective Edge when the 'Hannibal' (emergency kidnapping situation) protocol was invoked: the artillery units engaged 7 targets simultaneously within minutes of the fire support having been demanded by the divisional HQ. The first air-delivered bomb was dropped about 50 minutes after the moment of demand, against a single target. In the case of the employment of fire to support the extrication operation in Shuja'iyya, the first air strike was executed about thirty minutes after the divisional artillery group completed the engagement of all of the targets assigned to it. The importance of availability and the significant advantage of the tube artillery with regard to this aspect are also reflected in the lessons drawn by the coalition forces that operated in Iraq and Afghanistan.
At the same time, the importance of availability is by no means superior to everything else. The use of force in general and the employment of statistical fire in particular must be done according to the principles of the Laws of War. IDF invest substantial efforts, while planning their operations, in forewarning the local population and operating according to the four basic principles of the Laws of War: the principle of military necessity, namely – the use of force is acceptable as long as it is intended to accomplish a military purpose; the principle of distinction, which prescribes the duty of distinguishing between combatants and military targets, that may be attacked in the context of the combat effort, and civilians and civil objects that may not be attacked intentionally and damage to which should be avoided as much as possible; the principle of humanity and the principle of proportionality, namely – the possibility that civilians and civil objects may be damaged in the course of combat operations notwithstanding, steps should be taken to ensure that the expected damage is not excessive in relation to the expected military benefit.
The Challenges of Asymmetrical Warfare
In asymmetrical warfare situations generally and in the asymmetrical warfare situations taking place in our region in particular, the enemy operates out of and behind the cover provided by the civilian environment. The enemy forces' tactics are not static. They do not operate out of fixed positions, but take advantage of the civilian environment to place various obstacles to hinder the advance of our own forces (explosive charges, booby traps, mine holes and so forth) and move throughout the dimensions of the ground medium: on the ground, inside and between buildings, on roofs and through upper floors, under the ground and so forth. The enemy forces attempt to compensate for their military inferiority by blending into the civilian environment, conducting their operations in a mobile manner and disappearing constantly. Their mode of operation often prevents accurate spotting and as the threats are only spotted for brief periods of time, in many cases it is impossible to employ precision fire to support the combat elements. Moreover, while the forces are advancing toward their objectives, they are required to disrupt the enemy's ability to spot and engage our own forces. The combat zone should be isolated in order to secure the operations of our own forces. For this purpose, the ability to cover a given area with fire that would 'accompany' our forces and suppress the enemy's ability to operate against our forces is required. Battlefield testimonies from all periods of history prove that the psychological effect of artillery fire is just as acute as its physical effect – and possibly even more important. The sense of helplessness experienced by soldiers who are being shelled from a distance and the mental difficulty they face when they are called upon to resume their mission were indicated repeatedly in the testimonies of soldiers who had experienced shelling. Tube artillery is more available, can cover larger areas continuously and is hardly affected by visibility and weather conditions. Additionally, owing to the natural dispersion of the shells, the employment of statistical fire does not require highly accurate, undisputable spotting of the target's position.
Examining the effectiveness of statistical fire in direct support missions is a complex undertaking, as it is not its function to destroy enemy forces or infrastructure targets, but rather to suppress the enemy troops so as to prevent them from operating against our own forces. Major Idan Karpel, who served as the fire support liaison officer of the Paratrooper Brigade reconnaissance battalion during the battle at Maroun al-Ras, described this very aptly: "We at the reconnaissance battalion had never doubted the effectiveness of artillery fire." As stated, the availability of the fire along with the diversified range of ammunition types (high explosive, smoke and illumination) are a significant advantage of the tube artillery layout and employing it proportionately for a clear and distinct military purpose – providing close support to the maneuvering elements – will remain a relevant mission of the artillery arsenal. At the same time, examining the effectiveness of the fire in the context of the direct support mission is not enough. Its efficiency should be examined as well by analyzing the scope of actual fire delivered in the context of the various direct support missions vis-à-vis the professional parameters of the IDF Artillery Corps that were the norm during the Second Lebanon War.
The conclusive report for the Second Lebanon War by the IDF Artillery Corps indicated that about 50% of the direct support fire was on a scope that exceeded the professional parameters as specified in the target engagement tables. The reasons for it may be found, among other places, in the fact that the maneuvering elements used their mortars very sparingly (some of the units had not taken their mortars with them to the battlefield). In some cases the employment was hasty and had not been preceded by a methodical battle procedure and advance target planning. Additionally, the Artillery Corps parameters fail to properly reflect the scope of fire required in order to suppress the enemy, as most of the parameters refer to a traditional objective-occupying mission against a layout of entrenched infantry. In the Second Lebanon War, the IDF tube artillery was effective in the context of the direct support mission, but of medium efficiency.
Asymmetrical warfare and the 'disappearing enemy' phenomenon make it difficult to accurately spot, in real time, each and every one of the threats imposed on the maneuvering element. Statistical fire is a part of the fire support layout, which is like an element of an orchestra made up of different instruments (precision fire from the air and from the ground and statistical fire). In the case of an orchestra that performs a piece of music, the different instruments are right there on the stage, but not all of them are actually participating throughout the performance. The same applies to the statistical fire – it is an inseparable part of the fire support layout, and it is highly important in supporting the maneuver and must be employed according to its function and advantages.
Applying Lessons to Operation Protective Edge
The manner in which artillery fire was employed during Operation Protective Edge represents the implementation of numerous lessons drawn by the IDF Artillery Corps: no attempts were made to "hunt" or disrupt the enemy's steep-trajectory fire by employing artillery fire. The primary mission of the statistical fire was a part of the operation of the maneuvering elements: preparatory fire into open areas prior to the employment of the forces and direct support during the operation of the forces. Artillery fire was employed mostly against planned targets, specified subject to clearly-defined criteria and controlled by the command elements. This was aptly described by the commander of the fire support center of the IDF Gaza Division, who had served as the commander of the fire support element of the IDF Nahal Infantry Brigade during the Second Lebanon War. This officer reported that in the Second Lebanon War, during the difficult battle at Ghanduriya, massive artillery fire was employed which had stemmed, among other things, from the fact that the artillery elements did not have a sufficient number of pre-planned targets for their fire. So, in the heat of battle, more and more targets were added and assigned to the artillery units that provided direct fire support to the elements of the brigade. During Operation Protective Edge, as the officer in charge of the divisional employment of fire, the same officer had seen to it that the forces being supported plan the targets for the artillery, located close to those forces, well in advance. This advance planning was reflected, among other things, in the employment of artillery fire when the 'Hannibal' protocol was invoked and direct support was provided to the elements of the IDF Givati Infantry Brigade during their combat operations that morning. About 85% of the fire was aimed at pre-planned targets and the fire was delivered in the form of reduced fire delivery procedures (10 rounds per procedure). The use of reduced fire delivery procedures was a characteristic of most of the situations where direct support fire was provided to the various forces during Operation Protective Edge (with the exception of the employment of fire for the benefit of the extrication of the detachment from the IDF Golani Infantry Brigade in Shuja'iyya), in accordance with the policy set forth by IDF Southern Command. This manner of employment, when done in accordance with the operational need, reflects the implementation of the principle of proportionality.
Another example of the lessons drawn regarding the employment of artillery fire between the Second Lebanon War and Operation Protective Edge may be seen in the comparison between the scope of fire delivered during the battle at Bint-Jbeil (Lebanon) and the scope of fire delivered in Shuja'iyya (Gaza). The number of casualties in the battle at Shuja'iyya was almost four times as high as the number of casualties in the fighting at Bint-Jbeil, and the casualties (in Shuja'iyya) included some of the brigade's senior commanders. On the other hand, the over-all scope of artillery fire delivered in support of the extrication of the forces in Bint-Jbeil was 3 times as high as the scope of fire delivered in Shuja'iyya.
A comparison between the two confrontations regarding the consumption of artillery ammunition per tube, per day of fighting indicates that during the Second Lebanon War, the average number of shells per tube per day of fighting was 16.5 (Brigadier-General Jacob Zigdon, "A Lot of Fire, Very Little Thought"). On the other hand, during Operation Protective Edge, the average scope of fire per tube per day of fighting was about 11 shells (according to the analysis by the IDF GHQ Planning Directorate). Moreover, according to the analysis by IDF Southern Command, the scope of actually-delivered fire per day of fighting was smaller than the planned scope and the allocation prior to the operation. The apparently surprising over-all scope of fire delivered during Operation Protective Edge stems, in this writer's view, from the gap between the small number of fighting days expected according to the plans prior to the operation and the actual number of days of fighting in Operation Protective Edge (which far exceeded the planning).
A review and a comparative analysis of all of the data relating to the employment of artillery fire in direct support missions between the Second Lebanon War and Operation Protective Edge indicate that the artillery fire was effective in direct support missions and that the efficiency of the employment of statistical fire during Operation Protective Edge was better.
Numerous lessons were drawn from the employment of artillery fire during the Second Lebanon War. Many of those lessons were implemented during Operation Protective Edge while others are yet to be implemented. Statistical fire is relevant in asymmetrical warfare situations but mainly in the context of the employment of maneuvering elements. Statistical fire offers no advantage for the execution of operational missions against enemy forces using guerrilla tactics. The availability of the artillery fire and the diversified range of ammunition are the close envelope offered to the forces being supported.
In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the statistical fire in the context of asymmetrical warfare situations, the activities outlined below will be required, among others.
Training of the forces (the firing echelon, the forward and maneuvering echelons) in the planning and employment of direct support fire in urban and complex areas.
Improving the accuracy of tube artillery fire: a mission such as "House No.57 – Fire!" is not a mission for the tube artillery layout. At the same time, improving the accuracy of the statistical fire will enable more efficient employment owing to the consumption of smaller amounts of ammunition; it will enable better implementation of the principles of proportionality and distinction and more effective employment of the tube artillery.
Improving the fire control capability: combat operations in urban areas make it difficult to range and direct the artillery units and to implement on-going fire control. Improving the fire control capability in urban areas is possible mainly by allocating artillery Radar systems to the artillery support layout. Improving the fire control capability will lead to improved fire employment efficiency.
Command & control systems: upgrading the capabilities of the forward echelon by providing it with command, control and communication systems for the employment of support fire. This will enable better quality, more controlled target planning using a common language to communicate with the fire units and ensure better availability of the support fire.
Suppression missions: the parameters of the IDF Artillery Corps regarding the engagement of targets should be reviewed and suitable procedures should be devised for the mission of suppressing the operational potential of enemy forces using guerrilla tactics.
In order to properly understand the relevance of statistical fire generally and tube artillery fire in particular, the future of this layout should be discussed as it is based on an arsenal of resources most of which are more than four decades old. Without delving into OrBat statistics and numbers of platforms, the equation that calls for an initiated renewal of the IDF artillery arsenal is very clear if we intend to ensure the continued perseverance of this arsenal over the next four decades. This explains the need for a new gun system possessing improved capabilities: a longer range, a higher rate of fire and the ability to fire advanced ammunition types. These capabilities will ensure a higher availability of the fire resources, the ability to engage targets at longer ranges and improved employment efficiency. Launching a new gun system project will also enable the attainment of the desired degree of effectiveness using a smaller OrBat.
On the day when we can tell, at any given moment, the position of each and every enemy trooper, very accurately, in all of the dimensions of the ground medium, throughout the day and under any weather conditions – on that day it would be appropriate to reexamine von Clausewitz's maxim "War is the realm of uncertainty", including the need for the employment of statistical artillery fire in the context of asymmetrical warfare situations in an urban environment.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Benny Mehr, VP Consulting Services at SBM. Former CO IDF Northern Command Artillery.
IDF Artillery forces during Operation Protective Edge (Photo: IDF)
The 'excessive' scope of fire was the primary statement etched into the general consciousness with regard to the employment of tube artillery during the Second Lebanon War (2006), along with the questioning of the actual effectiveness of the fire and the relevance of the employment of statistical Statistical fire. offers two significant advantages as a form of support to the maneuvering elements. One is the availability of the fire and the other is the ability to cover a given area cell in the absence of accurate intelligence. In the Second Lebanon War, the lion's share of the fire employed in direct support was delivered 7 to 15 minutes from the moment of demand, as opposed to the relatively long cycles in the case of the employment of air (fighter aircraft) support. Most of the combat air support missions were executed more than one hour from the moment when the maneuvering element had submitted its demand. This time constant is not relevant to a running engagement involving a maneuvering element. In the context of the lessons drawn from that war, IAF invested a substantial effort in an attempt to improve the processes and cut down the time interval involved in the supply of direct fire support to the maneuvering elements. This improvement was evident during Operation Protective Edge, but the time constants of the close direct support for the ground forces by precision fire from the air remained irrelevant to the maneuvering battle. Quite a few examples come to mind in this context, for example, the employment of fire support by the IDF Gaza Division during Operation Protective Edge when the 'Hannibal' (emergency kidnapping situation) protocol was invoked: the artillery units engaged 7 targets simultaneously within minutes of the fire support having been demanded by the divisional HQ. The first air-delivered bomb was dropped about 50 minutes after the moment of demand, against a single target. In the case of the employment of fire to support the extrication operation in Shuja'iyya, the first air strike was executed about thirty minutes after the divisional artillery group completed the engagement of all of the targets assigned to it. The importance of availability and the significant advantage of the tube artillery with regard to this aspect are also reflected in the lessons drawn by the coalition forces that operated in Iraq and Afghanistan.
At the same time, the importance of availability is by no means superior to everything else. The use of force in general and the employment of statistical fire in particular must be done according to the principles of the Laws of War. IDF invest substantial efforts, while planning their operations, in forewarning the local population and operating according to the four basic principles of the Laws of War: the principle of military necessity, namely – the use of force is acceptable as long as it is intended to accomplish a military purpose; the principle of distinction, which prescribes the duty of distinguishing between combatants and military targets, that may be attacked in the context of the combat effort, and civilians and civil objects that may not be attacked intentionally and damage to which should be avoided as much as possible; the principle of humanity and the principle of proportionality, namely – the possibility that civilians and civil objects may be damaged in the course of combat operations notwithstanding, steps should be taken to ensure that the expected damage is not excessive in relation to the expected military benefit.
The Challenges of Asymmetrical Warfare
In asymmetrical warfare situations generally and in the asymmetrical warfare situations taking place in our region in particular, the enemy operates out of and behind the cover provided by the civilian environment. The enemy forces' tactics are not static. They do not operate out of fixed positions, but take advantage of the civilian environment to place various obstacles to hinder the advance of our own forces (explosive charges, booby traps, mine holes and so forth) and move throughout the dimensions of the ground medium: on the ground, inside and between buildings, on roofs and through upper floors, under the ground and so forth. The enemy forces attempt to compensate for their military inferiority by blending into the civilian environment, conducting their operations in a mobile manner and disappearing constantly. Their mode of operation often prevents accurate spotting and as the threats are only spotted for brief periods of time, in many cases it is impossible to employ precision fire to support the combat elements. Moreover, while the forces are advancing toward their objectives, they are required to disrupt the enemy's ability to spot and engage our own forces. The combat zone should be isolated in order to secure the operations of our own forces. For this purpose, the ability to cover a given area with fire that would 'accompany' our forces and suppress the enemy's ability to operate against our forces is required. Battlefield testimonies from all periods of history prove that the psychological effect of artillery fire is just as acute as its physical effect – and possibly even more important. The sense of helplessness experienced by soldiers who are being shelled from a distance and the mental difficulty they face when they are called upon to resume their mission were indicated repeatedly in the testimonies of soldiers who had experienced shelling. Tube artillery is more available, can cover larger areas continuously and is hardly affected by visibility and weather conditions. Additionally, owing to the natural dispersion of the shells, the employment of statistical fire does not require highly accurate, undisputable spotting of the target's position.
Examining the effectiveness of statistical fire in direct support missions is a complex undertaking, as it is not its function to destroy enemy forces or infrastructure targets, but rather to suppress the enemy troops so as to prevent them from operating against our own forces. Major Idan Karpel, who served as the fire support liaison officer of the Paratrooper Brigade reconnaissance battalion during the battle at Maroun al-Ras, described this very aptly: "We at the reconnaissance battalion had never doubted the effectiveness of artillery fire." As stated, the availability of the fire along with the diversified range of ammunition types (high explosive, smoke and illumination) are a significant advantage of the tube artillery layout and employing it proportionately for a clear and distinct military purpose – providing close support to the maneuvering elements – will remain a relevant mission of the artillery arsenal. At the same time, examining the effectiveness of the fire in the context of the direct support mission is not enough. Its efficiency should be examined as well by analyzing the scope of actual fire delivered in the context of the various direct support missions vis-à-vis the professional parameters of the IDF Artillery Corps that were the norm during the Second Lebanon War.
The conclusive report for the Second Lebanon War by the IDF Artillery Corps indicated that about 50% of the direct support fire was on a scope that exceeded the professional parameters as specified in the target engagement tables. The reasons for it may be found, among other places, in the fact that the maneuvering elements used their mortars very sparingly (some of the units had not taken their mortars with them to the battlefield). In some cases the employment was hasty and had not been preceded by a methodical battle procedure and advance target planning. Additionally, the Artillery Corps parameters fail to properly reflect the scope of fire required in order to suppress the enemy, as most of the parameters refer to a traditional objective-occupying mission against a layout of entrenched infantry. In the Second Lebanon War, the IDF tube artillery was effective in the context of the direct support mission, but of medium efficiency.
Asymmetrical warfare and the 'disappearing enemy' phenomenon make it difficult to accurately spot, in real time, each and every one of the threats imposed on the maneuvering element. Statistical fire is a part of the fire support layout, which is like an element of an orchestra made up of different instruments (precision fire from the air and from the ground and statistical fire). In the case of an orchestra that performs a piece of music, the different instruments are right there on the stage, but not all of them are actually participating throughout the performance. The same applies to the statistical fire – it is an inseparable part of the fire support layout, and it is highly important in supporting the maneuver and must be employed according to its function and advantages.
Applying Lessons to Operation Protective Edge
The manner in which artillery fire was employed during Operation Protective Edge represents the implementation of numerous lessons drawn by the IDF Artillery Corps: no attempts were made to "hunt" or disrupt the enemy's steep-trajectory fire by employing artillery fire. The primary mission of the statistical fire was a part of the operation of the maneuvering elements: preparatory fire into open areas prior to the employment of the forces and direct support during the operation of the forces. Artillery fire was employed mostly against planned targets, specified subject to clearly-defined criteria and controlled by the command elements. This was aptly described by the commander of the fire support center of the IDF Gaza Division, who had served as the commander of the fire support element of the IDF Nahal Infantry Brigade during the Second Lebanon War. This officer reported that in the Second Lebanon War, during the difficult battle at Ghanduriya, massive artillery fire was employed which had stemmed, among other things, from the fact that the artillery elements did not have a sufficient number of pre-planned targets for their fire. So, in the heat of battle, more and more targets were added and assigned to the artillery units that provided direct fire support to the elements of the brigade. During Operation Protective Edge, as the officer in charge of the divisional employment of fire, the same officer had seen to it that the forces being supported plan the targets for the artillery, located close to those forces, well in advance. This advance planning was reflected, among other things, in the employment of artillery fire when the 'Hannibal' protocol was invoked and direct support was provided to the elements of the IDF Givati Infantry Brigade during their combat operations that morning. About 85% of the fire was aimed at pre-planned targets and the fire was delivered in the form of reduced fire delivery procedures (10 rounds per procedure). The use of reduced fire delivery procedures was a characteristic of most of the situations where direct support fire was provided to the various forces during Operation Protective Edge (with the exception of the employment of fire for the benefit of the extrication of the detachment from the IDF Golani Infantry Brigade in Shuja'iyya), in accordance with the policy set forth by IDF Southern Command. This manner of employment, when done in accordance with the operational need, reflects the implementation of the principle of proportionality.
Another example of the lessons drawn regarding the employment of artillery fire between the Second Lebanon War and Operation Protective Edge may be seen in the comparison between the scope of fire delivered during the battle at Bint-Jbeil (Lebanon) and the scope of fire delivered in Shuja'iyya (Gaza). The number of casualties in the battle at Shuja'iyya was almost four times as high as the number of casualties in the fighting at Bint-Jbeil, and the casualties (in Shuja'iyya) included some of the brigade's senior commanders. On the other hand, the over-all scope of artillery fire delivered in support of the extrication of the forces in Bint-Jbeil was 3 times as high as the scope of fire delivered in Shuja'iyya.
A comparison between the two confrontations regarding the consumption of artillery ammunition per tube, per day of fighting indicates that during the Second Lebanon War, the average number of shells per tube per day of fighting was 16.5 (Brigadier-General Jacob Zigdon, "A Lot of Fire, Very Little Thought"). On the other hand, during Operation Protective Edge, the average scope of fire per tube per day of fighting was about 11 shells (according to the analysis by the IDF GHQ Planning Directorate). Moreover, according to the analysis by IDF Southern Command, the scope of actually-delivered fire per day of fighting was smaller than the planned scope and the allocation prior to the operation. The apparently surprising over-all scope of fire delivered during Operation Protective Edge stems, in this writer's view, from the gap between the small number of fighting days expected according to the plans prior to the operation and the actual number of days of fighting in Operation Protective Edge (which far exceeded the planning).
A review and a comparative analysis of all of the data relating to the employment of artillery fire in direct support missions between the Second Lebanon War and Operation Protective Edge indicate that the artillery fire was effective in direct support missions and that the efficiency of the employment of statistical fire during Operation Protective Edge was better.
Numerous lessons were drawn from the employment of artillery fire during the Second Lebanon War. Many of those lessons were implemented during Operation Protective Edge while others are yet to be implemented. Statistical fire is relevant in asymmetrical warfare situations but mainly in the context of the employment of maneuvering elements. Statistical fire offers no advantage for the execution of operational missions against enemy forces using guerrilla tactics. The availability of the artillery fire and the diversified range of ammunition are the close envelope offered to the forces being supported.
In order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the statistical fire in the context of asymmetrical warfare situations, the activities outlined below will be required, among others.
Training of the forces (the firing echelon, the forward and maneuvering echelons) in the planning and employment of direct support fire in urban and complex areas.
Improving the accuracy of tube artillery fire: a mission such as "House No.57 – Fire!" is not a mission for the tube artillery layout. At the same time, improving the accuracy of the statistical fire will enable more efficient employment owing to the consumption of smaller amounts of ammunition; it will enable better implementation of the principles of proportionality and distinction and more effective employment of the tube artillery.
Improving the fire control capability: combat operations in urban areas make it difficult to range and direct the artillery units and to implement on-going fire control. Improving the fire control capability in urban areas is possible mainly by allocating artillery Radar systems to the artillery support layout. Improving the fire control capability will lead to improved fire employment efficiency.
Command & control systems: upgrading the capabilities of the forward echelon by providing it with command, control and communication systems for the employment of support fire. This will enable better quality, more controlled target planning using a common language to communicate with the fire units and ensure better availability of the support fire.
Suppression missions: the parameters of the IDF Artillery Corps regarding the engagement of targets should be reviewed and suitable procedures should be devised for the mission of suppressing the operational potential of enemy forces using guerrilla tactics.
In order to properly understand the relevance of statistical fire generally and tube artillery fire in particular, the future of this layout should be discussed as it is based on an arsenal of resources most of which are more than four decades old. Without delving into OrBat statistics and numbers of platforms, the equation that calls for an initiated renewal of the IDF artillery arsenal is very clear if we intend to ensure the continued perseverance of this arsenal over the next four decades. This explains the need for a new gun system possessing improved capabilities: a longer range, a higher rate of fire and the ability to fire advanced ammunition types. These capabilities will ensure a higher availability of the fire resources, the ability to engage targets at longer ranges and improved employment efficiency. Launching a new gun system project will also enable the attainment of the desired degree of effectiveness using a smaller OrBat.
On the day when we can tell, at any given moment, the position of each and every enemy trooper, very accurately, in all of the dimensions of the ground medium, throughout the day and under any weather conditions – on that day it would be appropriate to reexamine von Clausewitz's maxim "War is the realm of uncertainty", including the need for the employment of statistical artillery fire in the context of asymmetrical warfare situations in an urban environment.
Brig. Gen. (res.) Benny Mehr, VP Consulting Services at SBM. Former CO IDF Northern Command Artillery.
