Deterrence in the Era of New Wars
Deterrence in the Era of New Wars
David Ivry
| 20/02/2015
The last decade has witnessed low intensity conflicts (LICs) and the War on Terror. The question is whether deterrence remains firm and abiding under these conditions.
One way of explaining deterrence’s effect is to quantify its components according to the formula: deterrence equals force times the willingness to use it, when all the components represent the image perceived by the enemy. Deterrence(D)=Intent (I)xPower(P) In general, (P) has not perceptibly changed in the era of LICs. The IDF has the same number of tanks and planes that it has had for many years, and performance has even improved.
But the concept of power has changed. For example, the daily friction between IDF soldiers and the West Bank and Gaza populations revealed our limitations, and our capabilities (P) were perceived more realistically and less imaginatively. The main turnabout has been in intent (I) and the willingness to apply force. This is due to the limitations in LICs that stems from a change in the game rules, such as sensitivity to the media, public opinion, and civilian casualties. Thus, tanks cannot be used to disperse demonstrations, even when the crowds grow violent.
If TV cameras are present, Palestinian children are not afraid to approach a tank and chuck stones at it. The terrifying steel monster no longer deters them since they’ve learned that with the media in the area, the tank’s willingness to move against them is nullified.
The children act instinctively according to the deterrence equation: when the media is present, weapons that compromise innocent civilians are not used, nor are they employed against civilians or holy places even when terrorists use the former as human shields. In these cases deterrence is rendered null and void (both sides of the equation are equalized) because of normative restrictions in the use of force. Thus, in LICs the weak side employs normative limitations in tactical situations in order to neutralize the stronger side’s deterrence. At the same time, the stronger side’s overall strategic deterrence remains apparently unaffected. Therefore, the question is whether deterrence’s erosion in LICs, due to the rules of the game, affects overall strategic deterrence.
If, in the distant past, deterrence was regarded as a major strategic component for preventing total war, then today deterrence might be lost in a certain area. For example, there may be no deterrence against rocket attacks until an effective response to this threat is found.
In other words, the side that provokes incidents also dictates the rules of the game. It challenges the stronger side and the stronger side cannot make full use of its capabilities. Therefore limited conflicts test our intent and willingness to apply force (I) on a daily basis and also reveal our power and capabilities (P). The failures aggregately influence the perception of our capabilities, just as political and normative limitations influence our intent (I).
Let there be no mistake, the overall strategic perspective has also been affected by the incremental erosion of deterrence. Nevertheless, deterrence is not a goal in itself. While it constitutes a major element in national security, the goal remains to improve all the elements involved in national security. When national security is strengthened, deterrence, too, is indirectly enhanced.
The last decade has witnessed low intensity conflicts (LICs) and the War on Terror. The question is whether deterrence remains firm and abiding under these conditions.
One way of explaining deterrence’s effect is to quantify its components according to the formula: deterrence equals force times the willingness to use it, when all the components represent the image perceived by the enemy. Deterrence(D)=Intent (I)xPower(P) In general, (P) has not perceptibly changed in the era of LICs. The IDF has the same number of tanks and planes that it has had for many years, and performance has even improved.
But the concept of power has changed. For example, the daily friction between IDF soldiers and the West Bank and Gaza populations revealed our limitations, and our capabilities (P) were perceived more realistically and less imaginatively. The main turnabout has been in intent (I) and the willingness to apply force. This is due to the limitations in LICs that stems from a change in the game rules, such as sensitivity to the media, public opinion, and civilian casualties. Thus, tanks cannot be used to disperse demonstrations, even when the crowds grow violent.
If TV cameras are present, Palestinian children are not afraid to approach a tank and chuck stones at it. The terrifying steel monster no longer deters them since they’ve learned that with the media in the area, the tank’s willingness to move against them is nullified.
The children act instinctively according to the deterrence equation: when the media is present, weapons that compromise innocent civilians are not used, nor are they employed against civilians or holy places even when terrorists use the former as human shields. In these cases deterrence is rendered null and void (both sides of the equation are equalized) because of normative restrictions in the use of force. Thus, in LICs the weak side employs normative limitations in tactical situations in order to neutralize the stronger side’s deterrence. At the same time, the stronger side’s overall strategic deterrence remains apparently unaffected. Therefore, the question is whether deterrence’s erosion in LICs, due to the rules of the game, affects overall strategic deterrence.
If, in the distant past, deterrence was regarded as a major strategic component for preventing total war, then today deterrence might be lost in a certain area. For example, there may be no deterrence against rocket attacks until an effective response to this threat is found.
In other words, the side that provokes incidents also dictates the rules of the game. It challenges the stronger side and the stronger side cannot make full use of its capabilities. Therefore limited conflicts test our intent and willingness to apply force (I) on a daily basis and also reveal our power and capabilities (P). The failures aggregately influence the perception of our capabilities, just as political and normative limitations influence our intent (I).
Let there be no mistake, the overall strategic perspective has also been affected by the incremental erosion of deterrence. Nevertheless, deterrence is not a goal in itself. While it constitutes a major element in national security, the goal remains to improve all the elements involved in national security. When national security is strengthened, deterrence, too, is indirectly enhanced.
