Commentary | Could Israel Be Drawn Into a US-Led Coalition Against China?
A Taiwan crisis could place Jerusalem under growing American pressure to contribute – militarily, cybernetically, or through humanitarian support – despite Israel’s strong interest in avoiding direct confrontation with Beijing
During his visit to China, President Trump warned that the Taiwan issue could lead to a confrontation between the two superpowers.
If China initiates a war over Taiwan, or a crisis such as imposing a blockade on the island, an international coalition led by the United States could emerge against China.
The United States might want Israel to take part in such a coalition in some capacity. The likelihood of this is fairly low, but given the significance of such an event – including its implications for US-Israel relations – and as part of Israel’s preparation for extreme scenarios in the wake of October 7, it would be prudent for Israel to think about this possibility in advance.
Israel would not want to challenge, and certainly not fight, China. Still, it cannot be ruled out that Israel might consider some form of involvement, if only because of American pressure.
In such a case, Israel would have several options, such as deploying aircraft or naval vessels, operating in less visible domains like cyber, primarily defending American assets, or limiting its role to humanitarian efforts such as sending medical teams.
If China invades Taiwan or imposes a blockade, China would be seen as the aggressor state. This could help form a coalition against China, led by the United States and including other countries that are also concerned about China. Some of these states are located near China, such as Japan, while others are farther away, including in Europe.
Against the backdrop of such an international coalition, the United States, and perhaps other countries as well, might ask Israel to participate in the coalition against China. The probability of this is fairly low, but as part of Israel’s preparation for various extreme scenarios, it is worth considering this framework already now so there is time to prepare in advance.
A different US administration would not necessarily ask Israel to join a coalition against China, but a Trump administration is exceptional. It has already demonstrated that it adopts unconventional approaches in diplomacy and warfare.
The Trump administration’s transactional approach is well known. From its perspective, Israel may be expected to prove itself as a loyal partner and a “model ally” by taking part in a coalition against China.
Likewise, Trump may believe Israel “owes” the United States, particularly because of the war against Iran. The United States could hint that this might influence future American willingness to act against Iran.
Despite China’s cautious and at times negative approach toward Israel in recent years, as well as Chinese assistance to Iran, Israel would still not want to push China into acting even more aggressively against Israel, including by increasing support for Iran.
Nevertheless, Israel could still participate in a coalition against China, primarily because of American pressure, and also because Israel may view participation as a way to strengthen its international standing, especially if it finds itself diplomatically isolated.
Therefore, some degree of Israeli involvement in a coalition against China cannot be ruled out, though it would likely be limited in scope and/or duration.
Naturally, the IDF has no bases near China, but the United States does. The first phase of a crisis or war, which would include major American preparations, especially at bases near China, could take several weeks. During this period, the United States might ask Israel to assist by joining forces assembling against China.
The Israeli Air Force has relatively little experience, certainly in recent decades, in attacking hostile warships, and especially in dealing with a navy like China’s. (A separate issue is the readiness of the Israeli Air Force to contend with a major fleet such as Egypt’s or Turkey’s, despite the low likelihood of such a confrontation.)
The Israeli Air Force does, however, have extensive experience, especially now, in long-range strikes against land targets, including long flights over the sea (during training exercises in the Mediterranean and in operational strikes in Yemen). This experience could be useful if operating from American bases near China or Taiwan and flying over the sea toward targets.
Still, this would not necessarily mean Israeli aircraft would be deployed to prepare strikes against targets on Chinese soil, such as missile launchers threatening American ships or bombarding Taiwan. Another possibility is that Israel could be asked to help in other ways, such as deploying UAVs.
Cyber is another area in which Israel could assist. Such an option, especially if used to defend American infrastructure, and particularly if Israel denied involvement, could help Israel conceal its participation in a coalition against China. The same applies to intelligence-sharing (China behaves similarly toward Iran).
Israel could also operate openly, but in a manner that might anger China less, such as sending medical teams, humanitarian aid, and similar assistance to support the coalition against China, especially American forces and civilian populations harmed by Chinese actions.
The Trump administration could raise one or another of these options with Israel as part of the negotiations already beginning over the renewal of the American aid agreement with Israel, which expires in two years. As is well known, there is a growing trend in the United States to reduce, or even end, financial grants to Israel. There is also a desire in Washington to demand greater reciprocity in return. Part of that reciprocity could therefore involve commitments for some form of Israeli assistance during a crisis or war with China.
Israel may also be required to provide compensation in other areas, such as diplomatically, especially if it refuses to participate in any way in a crisis or war involving China.
Incidentally, as is well known, the IDF has not traditionally participated in international wartime coalitions. But this could change. It is worth remembering that in the early 1950s, during another war in East Asia, the Korean War, a US-led coalition was formed. At the time, David Ben-Gurion considered joining it with an Israeli force that would fight in Korea.