Analysis | IMEC: The Prosperity Corridor
The India-Middle East-Europe corridor could provide an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz, but faces significant regional and political challenges
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a trade corridor linking India with the Arab countries and Israel, and from there to Europe. In light of the continued tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, alternatives to this route should be considered, including the IMEC project. It should be examined from several perspectives relating to the United States, Iran and the Arab states.
The IMEC project could be referred to not only by its official name but also by a shorter and more memorable name: the “Prosperity Corridor.” The purpose would be to highlight its enormous potential, in various areas, for the economies and societies of a number of countries, including Israel. This is particularly important in the United States.
Throughout their history, Americans have developed a tendency to use short, memorable names for various projects, such as the New Deal in the 1930s, Star Wars in the 1980s, and the Board of Peace in relation to Gaza. Incidentally, the international effort led by the United States to protect trade routes in the Red Sea against the Houthis in December 2023 was called Operation Prosperity Guardian. Thus, a certain continuity could be created here.
Despite the differences between Democrats and Republicans in the United States, they still share common interests, including the pursuit of stability in the Middle East, which would reduce the need for American involvement, particularly involvement that is demanding in general and military in particular. This is where the importance of the “Prosperity Corridor” lies: it could increase stability in the Middle East. Another point of consensus in the United States is competition with China. The “Prosperity Corridor” could serve as a response to, and a competing initiative with, China’s enormous Belt and Road Initiative.
The ongoing attacks and disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz increase the likelihood that many countries, including the United States, will take greater interest in alternatives such as IMEC. However, if Iran opposes the project, then as long as Iran and organizations affiliated with it in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere possess missiles, UAVs and other capabilities, they will be able to disrupt its construction and operation. UAVs could suddenly attack in the middle of the night, striking a railway, train or truck, cargo and other targets, including without Iran or its proxies taking responsibility for the attack.
President Trump has good relations with Erdoğan, who is developing projects that would compete with IMEC. It is therefore necessary to make clear to President Trump the importance of this corridor to his administration, so that he does not allow Erdoğan to use his influence over Trump to disrupt the project. It is possible that the Trump administration will consider whether IMEC could be harnessed to the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip, within the Board of Peace framework.
Saudi Arabia may condition its participation in this project on progress along the political track between Israel and the Palestinians. Saudi Arabia may refrain from doing so if IMEC becomes economically important to the kingdom, and also if the Trump administration does not truly support its condition. The Trump administration could also make a civilian nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia conditional on its participation.
The United Arab Emirates may be more flexible and energetic than Saudi Arabia. The continuing rivalry between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, including in the economic sphere, could shake and even bring down the entire project.
The stability of the Arab countries involved in the project, such as Jordan, should be monitored continuously. The Trump administration and its successors could be encouraged to continue providing economic assistance to Jordan, given its economic difficulties, at least until the new corridor helps Jordan recover economically.
At the same time, the serious internal problems in Iraq and its fragile stability point to the difficulty of investing in it as an alternative route. Nevertheless, given the enormous U.S. investment in Iraq since 2003, the United States will not want to see Iraq become a lost cause.
Syria could also be part of the alternative to the “Prosperity Corridor.” However, Syria and its new regime are extremely fragile. One or both could collapse, including unexpectedly—for example, if al-Jolani were assassinated, given that he has many enemies. It is therefore difficult to rely on Syria as an alternative route.
Israel has its own economic and political problems, which affect its stability. Clearly, Israel must address these issues, among other reasons because of the negative impact they could have on its standing in the United States, including in relation to the project.
In conclusion, the “Prosperity Corridor” has significant potential, as well as many challenges that must be taken into consideration.