Analysis | Saudi Arabia’s New Alliance: A Threat to Iran, Not Yet to Israel

The agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not an immediate challenge to Israel, but primarily to Iran. Even with regard to Iran, however, there is considerable doubt that Turkey and Pakistan would agree to fight on Saudi Arabia’s behalf. Despite the tensions between Israel and Turkey, some form of relationship still exists between the two countries, and the situation could improve after the Erdogan era. With regard to Pakistan, Israel should exercise caution, including in relation to India, given Pakistan’s rivalry with it.

Over the years, the Middle East has seen various defense alliances, some of which were intended to counter Israel. For example, in 1966 Syria and Egypt signed a defense agreement. About a year later, one of the factors that contributed to the outbreak of the Six-Day War was Egypt’s deployment of additional forces in Sinai, following false intelligence it had received that Israel was preparing to attack Syria. In other cases, such alliances had little or no practical significance.

The current agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is not necessarily directed against Israel, but rather against Iran, despite statements denying this.

In any case, the agreement is unlikely to have much significance as a defense alliance. It could help strengthen ties, including in the security sphere and, for example, in the arms industry. But it is unlikely to translate into a willingness to fight together.

In September 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a defense agreement. Pakistan subsequently deployed fighter jets and forces to Saudi Arabia, but in practice did not come to Saudi Arabia’s aid against Iran. Pakistan shares a border with Iran, has a large military and possesses nuclear weapons. It could have threatened Iran but chose not to do so. There is also debate over whether, and to what extent, Pakistan provides Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella.

Turkey has now joined the alliance. This means that Pakistan and Turkey would theoretically be expected to fight on Saudi Arabia’s behalf if it were attacked, for example by Iran. But the likelihood of that happening is low.

Turkey has a growing defense industry and is investing heavily in air defense. It still does not, however, have the proven capabilities of Israel or the United States needed to effectively defend Saudi Arabia against Iranian missiles and drones. Alternatively, Turkey could threaten Iran with air or even ground attacks in an attempt to persuade Tehran to halt attacks on Saudi Arabia, but the likelihood of this is very low.

As long as Iran does not attack Saudi Arabia, the next test will be whether Turkey and/or Pakistan provide assistance, and to what extent, if Saudi Arabia continues to come under attack from the Houthis or from Iraq. If Turkey and/or Pakistan fail to help Saudi Arabia even against pro-Iranian groups, without having to fight Iran itself, that would demonstrate the fragility — if not the largely symbolic nature — of the alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan.

For Israel, the Turkish-Pakistani-Saudi alliance is something to monitor, but it does not represent a real threat, certainly not at present.

Even if the prospects for normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia remain low, the two countries still maintain ties, including security ties. Both are far more concerned about Iran. Israel and Saudi Arabia have also never fought one another, have no territorial dispute, and lack many of the other sources of conflict that exist between Israel and the Palestinians or Syria.

For Israel, Pakistan has traditionally played almost no role in the Middle East, which is a major relief. Israel does not want to confront Pakistani power in general, and its nuclear capabilities in particular. Over the years, there have been various contacts between Israel and Pakistan.

Israel would of course prefer to have positive relations with Pakistan, or at least for Pakistan not to act against Israel. Pakistan’s defense minister has recently made strong statements against Israel, but he is not a decisive figure in Pakistan’s decision-making process.

The strengthening of ties between Israel and India over recent decades could create friction between Israel and Pakistan, given the well-known rivalry between India and Pakistan. This will depend on whether and when Pakistan comes to view Israel as seeking to align itself with India against Pakistan, rather than simply assisting India, for example through arms sales.

Like Pakistan, Turkey is a large Muslim, non-Arab, Sunni-majority country. Unlike Pakistan, however, Turkey has ambitions in the Middle East that concern both Arab states and Israel.

Tensions between Turkey and Israel have persisted over the Palestinian issue and other matters. Despite this, the two countries still maintain diplomatic relations, albeit at a low level, as well as economic ties. Most importantly, they have never fought one another, and considerable effort should be made to keep it that way.

Preventing friction between Turkey and Israel is particularly important in Syria, where both countries have established a presence. Since Israel is not necessarily opposed to the new government in Damascus, given its anti-Iranian stance, there is room for an understanding with Turkey on the issue.

Erdogan is 72 and suffers from health problems. It is possible that within a few years, whether because of his health or for another reason, he will no longer be in power. Unlike Iran, Turkey does not have a large and powerful elite determined to fight Israel to the bitter end. Nor does it have an institution comparable to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. If anything, the Turkish military — despite the purges it has undergone — is unlikely to want to fight Israel, and some within it may even favor renewing security cooperation with Israel.

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