The Sale of F-35s to Turkey in Light of Israeli and U.S. Interests
As Jerusalem weighs how hard to fight the proposed sale, it must balance the Turkish challenge against higher strategic priorities– chiefly Iran – while preserving its relationship with Washington
The NATO summit in Ankara, Turkey, July 8 2026. Photo: Michael Kappeler/dpa via Reuters Connect
Israel seeks to block, or at least delay and restrict, the sale of F-35 fighter aircraft to Turkey. In doing so, it must weigh the full range of factors affecting its relationship with Turkey, the need to remain focused on Iran, and its ties with the Trump administration and its priorities. It is also important to remember the Israeli Air Force's overall advantage over its Turkish counterpart, including with respect to the F-35.
Israel officially opposes the sale of F-35s to Turkey. This differs from Israel's acceptance, at the time, of the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to sell the aircraft to the United Arab Emirates. The distinction stems from Turkey's hostile policy toward Israel. Despite the tensions between the two countries, however, they have never engaged in direct military conflict. Diplomatic relations have deteriorated significantly but have not been severed—Turkey still recognizes Israel. Economic ties have also weakened considerably but remain important. For example, up to one-third of Israel's crude oil imports arrive from Azerbaijan via Turkey.
Israel must decide how to approach the Trump administration regarding the proposed F-35 sale in a way that takes Israeli interests into account. It should formulate a carefully considered strategy, weighing factors such as how much effort should be invested in preventing the aircraft from reaching Turkey compared to pursuing far more important Israeli interests that also depend on U.S. support, particularly regarding Iran.
There is a limit to how much Israel can ask of the United States, and it must focus on its highest priorities. The harder Israel presses on the F-35 issue, the more the Trump administration may expect concessions in return, potentially in areas where meeting U.S. demands would be difficult for Israel. Israel must also consider the extent to which the Trump administration has an interest in completing the sale, especially at this time. Like previous administrations, it seeks to export American weapons both for economic gain and geopolitical influence, including as part of its strategic competition with Russia and China.
Israel is concerned that Israeli know-how incorporated into the F-35 program could leak to Turkey and from there to Arab states. This concern may not resonate strongly with the Trump administration. Therefore, Israel's most effective argument may be to emphasize an issue that already worries many in Washington: the risk that sensitive U.S. F-35 technology could find its way from Turkey to Russia or China.
Israel can also mobilize its supporters in the United States, particularly in Congress, to oppose or constrain the sale. If cancellation proves impossible, Israel may focus on delaying the deal, hoping that political developments in the United States will eventually derail it. President Trump, for example, could alter his approach toward President Erdogan if tensions with Iran escalate and Erdogan strongly opposes U.S. policy, creating friction between Washington and Ankara.
In addition, following the January 2027 congressional elections, Democrats are expected to regain control of the House of Representatives. They could oppose the sale not because of Israel, but as part of broader efforts to challenge the Trump administration and in light of Turkey's human rights record. Beyond that, a different U.S. administration could take office within a few years and oppose the transaction for its own reasons.
Turkey itself may also have a different leader in the coming years, whether due to elections or because of President Erdoğan's age and health. Even if a successor is not particularly friendly toward Israel, that leader may nevertheless prove less confrontational than Erdogan. Under such circumstances, Israel would likely be less concerned about Turkey acquiring the F-35.
Even if Turkey ultimately receives the aircraft, doing so would reduce, but not eliminate, the Israeli Air Force's significant qualitative advantage. Israel began operating the F-35 in 2016 and has accumulated extensive operational experience, particularly during the conflicts with Iran over the past two years. Turkey has no comparable experience. Israel is expected to field up to 75 F-35s and already possesses nearly two-thirds of that number. By contrast, if and when Turkey receives the aircraft, it is likely to begin with only a small number.
Despite the F-35's impressive capabilities, maximizing its effectiveness depends on many additional factors, including highly trained pilots, ground crews, logistics, intelligence, command and control, and support from the broader air force and military. In all of these areas, the Israeli Air Force currently enjoys a clear advantage over its Turkish counterpart. Some commentators describe Turkey's acquisition of the F-35 as a potential game changer, but that characterization is misleading. There is no strategic parity between the two air forces; Israel maintains a clear qualitative edge. Nevertheless, the term continues to be used frequently, often inaccurately.
The United States has previously suspended Turkey's participation in the F-35 program. Even if Turkey eventually acquires the aircraft, a serious future crisis between Washington and Ankara could once again lead the United States to cut off support. Despite Turkey's advanced defense industry, it would likely struggle to operate such a sophisticated aircraft without continued American assistance, including spare parts, munitions, software support, and maintenance.
Turkey also wields significant influence in Syria. Even if it were able to deploy F-35s there – bringing them closer to Israel – it would have to invest heavily in protecting them through air defense systems, hardened shelters, and other security measures. Ankara may hesitate before exposing such valuable assets to unnecessary risk. More broadly, despite its increasingly hostile rhetoric and actions toward Israel, Turkey may still exercise considerable caution before engaging in direct military confrontation. Nevertheless, any conflict with Turkey would constitute a serious strategic crisis that Israel should do everything possible to avoid. Turkey is a major regional military power and a member of NATO. Although many NATO members have reservations about Ankara, the alliance could still be compelled under certain circumstances to support one of its members.
Israel should continue trying to block, or at least delay, the sale of F-35 aircraft to Turkey. At the same time, it must carefully determine how much political capital to invest in this effort, particularly given the overriding need to focus on Iran. It should also bear in mind that the Israeli Air Force's qualitative advantage is likely to endure even if Turkey eventually acquires the aircraft, while recognizing that preventing such an outcome remains an important strategic objective.