Analysis | The Road to a Stable Lebanon Runs Through Army Reform

Many in Lebanon, including the president and the prime minister, aspire to disarm Hezbollah. However, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are weaker than Hezbollah. This challenge requires a comprehensive reform of the LAF that would significantly strengthen it. Successfully completing such a process would increase the Lebanese government's ability to restrain Hezbollah from carrying out attacks against Israel that could ignite another war – one that would be devastating for Lebanon. 

It would also strengthen Lebanon's position in pressing Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory, as Lebanon would be able to demonstrate that it can effectively control its own territory and prevent it from being used as a base for attacks against Israel.

A stronger LAF would also enable the Lebanese government to deter Hezbollah from attempting to seize power by force. Ideally, Lebanon's solution should be political: neutralizing Hezbollah's military wing while allowing it to remain a political party. Such an outcome would reinforce Lebanon's stability and governance, making it easier for the country to recover from its severe economic crisis by attracting investment, loans, and international assistance.

Attempting to disarm Hezbollah now, especially without its consent, would likely lead to violent confrontation and possibly civil war. This prospect deeply concerns many Lebanese, who still remember the country's devastating civil war (1975–1990). Moreover, despite the significant blows Hezbollah has suffered in recent years, it remains a battle-hardened force capable of defeating the LAF. 

Hezbollah is also a Shiite organization, and as many as 40 percent of LAF personnel are Shiites. In the event of a confrontation, many of these soldiers might refuse to fight Hezbollah – whether openly, passively, or by deserting altogether. Some could even actively assist or join Hezbollah, particularly if the conflict were perceived as a campaign against the Shiite community.

There is therefore a clear need for a deep structural reform of the LAF to enable it to confront Hezbollah effectively. The objective would be to compel Hezbollah to disarm—preferably without military confrontation, so that it becomes like Lebanon's other political factions, all of which were required to surrender their weapons following the end of the civil war under the Taif Agreement of 1989.

The various institutional and informal ties between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah should be severed. At the same time, the LAF's relatively respected standing within Lebanese society should be strengthened to increase its legitimacy—an essential prerequisite for confronting Hezbollah.

Given Lebanon's sectarian composition, and to avoid the army being perceived as hostile to the Shiite community, Shiites should continue to be eligible for military service. However, all recruits should undergo rigorous vetting. Anyone whose loyalty is considered questionable should not be enlisted. 

Since it will not always be possible to determine this with certainty, additional safeguards should ensure that Shiite recruits whose loyalty is uncertain – as well as non-Shiites whose reliability is in doubt – are not assigned to sensitive positions, particularly command roles. Instead, they should serve in administrative and support functions rather than logistics, intelligence, or especially combat positions.

Within the Lebanese Air Force, particular care should be taken to ensure that no aircrew member with questionable loyalties is placed in control of aircraft or helicopters capable of carrying out strike missions.

Shiites could still serve in significant roles, including combat units, provided their deployment is carefully structured. For example, if a battalion contains one company composed primarily of Shiite soldiers, that company might not be considered fully reliable for operations targeting Hezbollah. 

During missions such as searching for Hezbollah weapons caches or infrastructure, responsibilities could therefore be divided. The predominantly Shiite company could secure the battalion base, supply routes, or perimeter, while the main operational task at the target site would be assigned to predominantly non-Shiite companies. Other predominantly Shiite units could be deployed to sectors considered less sensitive from the perspective of confronting Hezbollah.

The LAF's primary investment should focus on non-Shiite units, or units where non-Shiites constitute the clear majority. These formations should receive the highest level of investment in training, equipment, infrastructure, and advanced weaponry. The army's elite units – those specifically designated to confront Hezbollah if necessary – should receive the LAF's most capable assets, including its fleet of 32 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles.

Hezbollah fighters possess significant advantages over LAF soldiers, including extensive combat experience gained against a conventional military far stronger than the LAF – the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It is therefore essential to maximize the LAF's professionalism, operational skills, and motivation. 

Combined with advantages such as careful planning, surprise, numerical superiority, and other force multipliers, these improvements would strengthen the LAF's ability to deal with Hezbollah while potentially minimizing bloodshed. The objective would be to disarm Hezbollah, not wage a destructive war against it.

Before confronting Hezbollah directly, LAF units could also gain practical operational experience by dismantling Palestinian militias operating in Lebanon, particularly those affiliated with Hamas, which would present a considerably less demanding challenge.

Military service in the LAF is voluntary. To attract the highest-quality recruits, soldiers should receive salaries comparable to – or preferably slightly higher than – those offered by Hezbollah, along with superior benefits, including healthcare, housing assistance, nutritional support, and family welfare programs. The highest compensation should be reserved for the elite units expected to carry out the mission of compelling Hezbollah to disarm.

At the same time, Hezbollah is also attempting to rebuild its capabilities and may seek to undermine efforts to weaken it by targeting the LAF. The Lebanese military must prevail in this long-term competition over force development and institutional strength.

The LAF should also prepare contingency plans for direct or indirect cooperation against Hezbollah with neighboring countries, including Syria and Israel.

Implementing such reforms would require substantial Western support, particularly from the United States and France, in areas such as training, military education, procurement, and force development. Other countries—especially Arab states such as Saudi Arabia—could play a key role by financing the reform process.

Ultimately, Lebanon requires a comprehensive reform of the Lebanese Armed Forces to enable them to confront Hezbollah and bring about its disarmament, preferably without resorting to war. Building such a force will take considerable time, likely several years, which is precisely why the process must begin now, given the urgency of the challenge.

follow us -Google News