INSS: Egypt Deepens Its Role in US–Iran Mediation

Egypt played an active but secondary role in mediation efforts aimed at securing a ceasefire between the United States and Iran, as part of the broader regional diplomatic initiative led by Pakistan. According to a new INSS publication by Ofir Winter and Yehuda Diskin, Cairo’s involvement reflects both economic pressures and a strategic effort to shape a new regional order through an emerging Arab-Islamic coordination mechanism alongside Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

The INSS study, “More Than a Mediator: The Egyptian Stake in Ending the War with Iran,” describes how the four states have begun consolidating a “Quartet” framework intended to leverage their combined political, economic, and demographic weight. The mechanism, which convened in Riyadh, Islamabad, and Antalya, is presented as an attempt to build a counterbalance to both Israel and Iran while increasing regional autonomy in crisis management.

According to Winter and Diskin, Egypt joined mediation efforts early in the escalation, calling consistently for de-escalation following the outbreak of Operation Roaring Lion. Cairo reportedly maintained diplomatic channels with both Washington and Tehran, while Egyptian intelligence services sustained indirect communication with the IRGC in an effort to support ceasefire negotiations.

The report notes that Egypt’s participation also reflects its ambition to expand its mediation profile beyond the Gaza conflict, building on earlier engagement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency. President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi publicly welcomed the eventual ceasefire, describing it as a step toward regional stability and economic recovery.

Economically, INSS highlights significant pressure on Egypt stemming from the conflict, including losses in Suez Canal revenues due to reduced shipping traffic, declining tourism, currency depreciation, and disruptions to energy imports and agricultural supply chains. These factors, the authors argue, strengthened Cairo’s incentive to push for a rapid end to hostilities.

Politically and strategically, Egypt is portrayed as balancing competing interests: maintaining coordination with Gulf partners and Western allies while avoiding full alignment against Iran. The report suggests that Cairo views Iran as a less immediate threat than Gulf states do, enabling a more flexible diplomatic posture and support for negotiated rather than military outcomes.

Winter and Diskin further note that the emerging Quartet could evolve into a broader Arab-Islamic framework influencing post-war regional architecture. However, it cautions that structural differences among the member states may limit its effectiveness. They warn that if the Quartet consolidates and Israel does not adjust its regional policies accordingly, it could contribute to increased tensions between Jerusalem and Cairo and deepen Israel’s regional isolation amid shifting diplomatic alignments.