As if There’s No War in Ukraine: Israel’s Defense Ministry Seeks Solutions to Counter Fiber-Optic Drones

Four years into the war in Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense is just now seeking solutions.  Fiber-optic FPV drones’ ability to evade electronic warfare systems and their limited detectability are turning them into a growing threata

As if There’s No War in Ukraine: Israel’s Defense Ministry Seeks Solutions to Counter Fiber-Optic Drones

Illustration generated by Grok

The Israeli defense establishment is intensively examining new ways to counter fiber-optic drones. This, according to information request documents (RFI) published by the Directorate of Defense Research & Development (MAFAT) in the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

The request, issued in April 2026, is intended to map existing capabilities in the Israeli and international market against what is emerging as one of the most complex challenges in the modern battlefield. 

The Ministry of Defense emphasizes that the increased use by adversaries of FPV drones controlled via fiber-optic cable requires an urgent technological response, as wired control provides these systems with inherent immunity to standard electronic warfare (EW) measures based on radio-frequency jamming.

The threat in question focuses on drones operating at low altitudes of up to 100 meters and speeds of up to 40 km/h. The key advantage of fiber-optic drones lies in the fact that they do not emit transmissible signals that can be remotely blocked, making early detection and neutralization through soft-kill methods significantly more difficult.

MAFAT has defined three main operational scenarios requiring a solution: protection of maneuvering forces (armored and infantry units), protection of staging areas, and static defense of bases and permanent infrastructure. While fixed sites allow greater flexibility in system weight and power consumption, maneuvering forces require lightweight, compact systems capable of providing short-notice warning and immediate neutralization while on the move.

As part of the request, companies are required to present not only the underlying physical principle of their solution—whether detection, classification, or kinetic interception—but also proof of feasibility and data on the system’s technology readiness level (TRL). The Ministry of Defense is seeking a comprehensive picture including delivery timelines, estimated development and procurement costs, and a breakdown of the technological building blocks of each system. The goal is to identify technologies that are both innovative and sufficiently mature for rapid field deployment.

Beyond the technological aspect, the RFI imposes strict requirements regarding information security and intellectual property. All information submitted may be used as a basis for future procurement specifications (RFPs), with the ministry retaining the right to utilize the accumulated knowledge for further project development. Responding companies must be authorized suppliers of the Ministry of Defense, hold appropriate security clearances, and comply with stringent ISA (Malmab) regulations.

The deadline for submissions is set for the end of April 2026. After reviewing proposals, the ministry may invite relevant companies to present their solutions in person and conduct trials against a simulated “enemy-day” fiber-optic drone scenario within a short timeframe. This process marks an escalation in Israel’s effort to close the gap against unmanned threats that neutralize traditional EW advantages, aiming to ensure operational continuity for forces in both frontline and rear areas.