Analysis | Zamir’s Choice: Obeying the Political Echelon vs. His Moral Duty to Save the Hostages

The public impression is that the Chief of Staff is more attuned to the link between Operation Gideon B and the fate of the hostages than are the members of Israel’s government

Analysis | Zamir’s Choice: Obeying the Political Echelon vs. His Moral Duty to Save the Hostages

Photo: IDF Spokesperson's Unit

“Go get a deal — get a deal with all your might,” the Israeli Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, snapped last week at the political echelon. “Why isn’t the negotiating team working on this with all their might?” — so it was reported that he demanded from those responsible for managing the negotiations for the release of the hostages. At the same time he carried out the political echelon’s decision and sent the brigades into Gaza, to fulfill Operation Gideon B. 

This is the essence of the complex, unprecedented situation in which the Chief of the General Staff finds himself these days. One should not envy the dilemma facing him. As with similar cases at the top, at the apex — the person stands alone.

A senior officeholder, whether military or civilian, who finds themselves in a situation where they oppose the orders and directives of the political level above them, is in a difficult position within a structured hierarchical society. The easiest thing to say to them is: “You don’t agree with what your bosses want you to do? Resign.” That is called “handing over the keys.” It is a relatively easy option; the alternatives are more complicated.

The acting officeholder’s dilemma is multifaceted: if he hands over the keys, he will be seen as a hero by those who agree with him and share his views. If he stays in his post, he will be seen as capitulating and as someone who cares only about his job and is in cahoots with his boss.

If he resigns from the post — who knows who will be appointed in his place. Perhaps someone undeserving but loyal to the boss will be appointed. Therefore it may be better to stay in the position and “fight from within” for the right course. If the assessment is that the situation in the organization around the boss is bad and worrying, perhaps it is appropriate for the officeholder to remain at his desk so that someone in the organization will try to salvage the situation.

Thoughts like these certainly pass through Eyal Zamir’s head. According to open-and-leaked media reports, harsh words were exchanged between the Chief of the General Staff and government ministers and their leader over the plan to seize control of Gaza and the fate of the hostages.

Eyal Zamir refrains from expressing opinions on these matters in public. He is not a talker, and as a uniformed officer — he does not give interviews, leak, or make declarations. But from published quotes it emerges that Zamir is not at peace with what he is ordering the IDF to carry out at this hour, namely the conquest of Gaza. It is possible he disagrees with parts of the operational plan rather than its entirety, and he is likely worried that the operation in Gaza will endanger the hostages’ lives.

The public impression is that the Chief of the General Staff is more connected to the link between the Gideon B tanks and the fate of the hostages than are members of the Israeli government. Zamir used the phrase “death trap,” and he probably prefers a deal to an invasion of Gaza.

In the media, in studios, among reserve generals and citizens and rank-and-file fighters — there are those calling on the Chief of the General Staff to resign, to hand over the keys. Others encourage him to stay put, not to move so as not to worsen the situation, because if he resigns — who knows who will come in his place. This is the space of deliberation for the Chief of the General Staff.

And it is not only his. We do not know the true opinions of senior subordinates to the Chief of the General Staff — such as division commanders, brigade commanders and battalion commanders, branch and corps commanders. What do they think about the operation to seize Gaza and about the dangers posed to the hostages? These are senior officers, commanders with extensive combat experience, leaders of units in Israel’s wars and responsible for the lives of tens of thousands of regular and reserve soldiers. But the mouths of these officers — at the ranks of Aluf, Tat Aluf and Aluf Mishne — are bound, because they wear uniforms and are prevented from expressing personal opinions.

When such an officer is interviewed in Gaza by a television reporter brought there in an organized way by the IDF Spokesperson, the officer will always voice patriotic statements about the righteousness of the action. From his perspective as a commander it makes sense when he addresses his fighters who are entering combat.

In the history of the IDF there have been differences of opinion between the political level — prime ministers and defense ministers — and chiefs of staff. A prime minister outlines a plan of action; naturally the chief of staff either accepts the plan or proposes alternative ideas. A chief of staff proposes a plan; naturally the political echelon either agrees or rejects it. All of this has happened.

What has not happened until now is that placed on this interface between political and military levels is the fate of civilians and soldiers who are hostages — lives and casualties — held in the enemy’s captivity. A whole nation follows every speech, every utterance, every remark and every tweet — from Washington to Jerusalem — on the fate of the hostages and what might happen to them as the Gideon B tanks advance. There is no doubt that the matter is of utmost importance not only in operational planning but also in the chief of staff’s considerations. This week he said that returning the hostages is a national and moral obligation.

Were it not for the hostage issue, it would be easier to publicly recommend that the chief of staff “hand over the keys” if he is not at peace with the decision to conquer Gaza. He might yet “take some blows” from a few soft-spoken Knesset members. But when the hostages are on the table — the dilemma is unbearable, and the supreme commander must not abandon them when there is no visible prospect for a deal to free them.

Therefore, given the range of considerations, this chief of staff, who is in an unbearably difficult situation, must decide for himself what is the best way to ensure that the hostages are released — all of them, and quickly. He must stand courageously before the political echelon and point to the military maneuvers that, in his view, are likely to save the hostages’ lives.

If the IDF is destined to enter Gaza — the task placed on Lt. Gen. Zamir is to bring the IDF soldiers and the hostages home safely and soon. That is the chief of staff’s sphere of decision, and the public can only accompany him with the blessing “Godspeed.”