Commentary | Nothing for Us to There: A Call for Total Disengagement from Gaza

The uncertainty facing the public is reaching a new peak this week. Will there be progress toward a hostages’ return agreement—or not? A “comprehensive” arrangement, or a phased one? What exactly does Prime Minister Netanyahu want, and what does President Trump mean? “Let’s see what happens, in two or three weeks.” Every report like this drives the public crazy and torments the minds of the hostages’ families.

Israel is occupying/taking control of Gaza—but slowly. The Chief of Staff speaks forcefully, yet follows the political leadership’s directives. Any such uncertainty infuriates the public and unnerves tens of thousands of reservists and their families. An uncertainty that is beginning to resemble chaos.

What will happen in Gaza? Humanitarian aid funded by the Israeli taxpayer, “voluntary evacuation” of over a million residents, progressing at near-zero speed. What is being planned for Gaza? Military administration as in the old days? Reconstruction of the ruined cities and neighborhoods of the Strip—who will rebuild, and who will pay?

This is the stage at which a new, revolutionary plan is possible, although it has been discussed in the past. A plan that would not be accepted by the Israeli government and part of the public, yet remains an option. Its main points: an agreement for the release of all hostages, alive and deceased; the IDF’s withdrawal from the Strip; cessation of the war; and the beginning of a new phase of complete separation between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Total and complete disengagement.

A defensive wall along the entire borders of the Strip, from the coast at Zikim to Rafah. A physical and electronic wall, with the IDF protecting the surrounding communities. No crossings. No supply of food, electricity, cement, or equipment. No worker passage. Complete separation. They are there, we are here.

The IDF will not be an occupying force in the Strip, and therefore has no international legal obligation to feed or care for the residents. The world is full of aid organizations, UN institutions, and donor countries—from Japan to Scandinavia. Some countries will agree to assist Gaza’s residents. The Israeli public will understand that the State of Israel has no obligation of any kind toward Gaza’s population.

Not only has Israel suffered for decades from terrorism originating in Gaza, culminating in the horrific events of October 7, but there is no connection between Israel’s residents and Gaza’s residents. Different religion, different language. Contrary to wishful thinking—the Gaza Strip, Khan Yunis, Rafah, and their neighborhoods are not ancestral lands, nor part of the Land of Israel. There was no Jewish settlement in Gaza’s cities. Israeli-Jewish settlements that once existed in the Strip were evacuated and are gone. Gaza is not a Jewish spiritual center, nor an entity contiguous with Israel.

On the contrary, this Strip has always been a cradle of terrorism against Israel: a base for terrorists, fedayeen, Qassam launchers, field burners, the perpetrators of October 7. Therefore, Israel has every right, after years of terrorism, to fully disengage from what is called the Gaza Strip. We have nothing to seek there.

The wider world will initially protest the disengagement initiative, the Arab world will cry out bitterly, and Israel will be condemned at the UN. It is easier to explain to the world a disengagement from Gaza than to explain remaining there, as is currently expected. Israel will find ways to protect its southern border against Gaza, which will be geographically close yet cognitively and consciously distant and separate.

Currently, Israel’s explanatory position in the “enlightened” world, among “friendly” countries, is extremely difficult. It seems that explaining total disengagement, removing responsibility from an enemy that has harassed us for generations, will not be difficult.

Like any plan, the idea of total disengagement from Gaza comes with conditions. The surrounding communities and southern cities are entitled to defense systems that will prevent terrorists from crossing the border again. These are the lessons of October 7, when defense systems “slept” during Simchat Torah. New IDF preparations will be required, full alertness and readiness for all those manning border positions: human defense—armed and equipped combat soldiers, alert units, as well as sophisticated and expensive warning and deterrence systems. Military administration in Gaza will be even more costly.

Some will say that once the IDF leaves Gaza and the war ends, a new Hamas base will be established there, and the terrorist organization will return to control the area and attack Israel. The IDF’s response will resemble the army’s posture against Hezbollah in Lebanon and terrorist organizations in the West Bank. There is no need to physically control these areas—the security systems will respond as any sovereign state responds when attacked.

Disengagement from Gaza must be total and unconditional, because one condition leads to another, and there is no limit. True, it is hard to get used to the idea of total disengagement after many years of dual reality: on one hand—wars, incidents, and mutual attacks; on the other—tens of thousands of workers who came to work and earn a living in Israel, massive quantities of goods flowing from Israel to Gaza, and billions of shekels traveling one way—from Israel to Gaza.

No more. Gaza is a foreign, hostile land, led by terrorist gangs. There is no trace of governance or organized rule. What do we have in common with them? It is certainly worth considering the option of total disengagement from Gaza. But in the end—warning: no arrangement will be established, and there will be no solution, until the last hostage, alive or deceased, returns home to Israel.