Analysis | What the Middle East Might Teach Us About Iran’s Potential Fate

In 1981, the nuclear reactor in Iraq was destroyed by F-16 jets that had just arrived in Israel. The United States officially disapproved of the strike but eventually came to terms with it. Throughout the 1980s, Iraq worked to rebuild its nuclear program, which suffered a heavy blow again in 1991 following its war against the U.S.-led coalition. 

In 2007, Israel destroyed another nuclear reactor, this time in Syria, after the Bush administration refused to carry out the strike itself but ultimately accepted the Israeli action. The Assad regime did not rebuild its nuclear infrastructure, particularly as Syria plunged into civil war in 2011, which prevented Assad from focusing on and allocating resources to a nuclear program.

Two weeks ago, Israel – with American approval – struck Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. More than a week later, the United States itself bombed nuclear facilities in Iran. Iran’s nuclear program suffered a major blow, though it may still retain the capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, albeit possibly only with limited operational capability.

Israel will continue to monitor and attempt to hinder Iran’s recovery—not only regarding the nuclear program, but also its ballistic missiles (SRBMs/MRBMs), drones, and air defense systems. Conventional warhead-equipped ballistic missiles are already a serious threat, as Israel has recently experienced firsthand, and even more so if they were to be equipped with nuclear warheads. The same is true for Iranian drones. Iran’s air defense network must be rebuilt in order to block or at least disrupt Israeli strikes inside Iran. Therefore, Iran may also seek to restore its air force.

Israel can address these challenges through various means—overt and covert, military, diplomatic, and economic. As part of this effort, Israel should seek various forms of cooperation with other nations, foremost among them the United States.

Another approach is to gradually destabilize the Iranian regime in order to weaken or even overthrow it. Several scenarios exist. Perhaps the most common scenario is the Tunisian/Egyptian model from 2011—the fall of the regime following mass protests. Like Mubarak at the time, Khamenei has ruled his country since the 1980s. Khamenei is currently at a low point, and due to his advanced age, it is possible that a new leader will rise in the coming years—or even soon. 

Still, the Iranian regime may begin to show signs of collapse, while simultaneously increasing its repression. This may trigger another wave of protest in Iran, one stronger and more determined than previous ones, and one that could topple the regime. Israel could support the Iranian opposition both in advance and during the protest movement—especially if it evolves into an open rebellion. 

There is also the Libyan scenario—not in the current sense of a complete dismantling of the nuclear program, but rather a rapid regime collapse following a violent uprising with foreign (mainly Western and American) support. 

US President Donald Trump has already stated that regime change in Iran is possible, and he might support it if Iran refuses to accept his terms. One cannot rule out the possibility of Israeli aerial support—unofficially—for the Iranian opposition during combat in Iran. Signs of such support were seen in the June 2025 war, such as the bombing of a prison holding regime opponents.

Other scenarios include the Syrian model—a prolonged civil war ultimately leading to regime collapse; the Jordanian model—a short civil war (as occurred there in 1970), after which the regime survives for many years; or the Yemeni model—a civil war leading to state fragmentation. A less likely scenario is the Iraqi one: an American invasion that topples the regime. However, the aftermath is more predictable—a civil war and the emergence of a new regime, weaker and less dangerous to Israel. Israel attempted a somewhat similar model to Iraq’s in Lebanon in 1982—an unsuccessful attempt to forcibly install a pro-Israel regime.

Such a plan is not practical for Iran, especially due to the lack of a shared border. Nevertheless, if Iran provokes Israel and the U.S. through terrorist attacks or by pursuing nuclear weapons, it may not face total destruction like Gaza, but its nuclear program could still be subjected to heavy bombing with severe consequences. Lastly, there is also the Turkish scenario—a gradual regime transformation, but in reverse: from Islamist to secular, following elections.

The Trump administration may pursue one of these scenarios. It is worth noting the campaign the Trump administration led in Yemen between March and May this year. In contrast to the singular but impressive American strike on Iranian nuclear facilities, the Yemen operation was relatively prolonged. It had elements similar to Israel’s campaign in Iran. The U.S. relied on air power against the Houthis, targeting senior figures, air defense systems, ballistic missiles, and more. Like Israel in Iran, the U.S. lost several drones. There were also clear differences—for example, the Houthis failed to damage American ships, unlike the strikes on Israel.

Ultimately, the financial cost of the Yemen campaign and the inability to defeat or topple the Houthi regime led the Trump administration to terminate the campaign. Israel faced similar considerations in its war with Iran in June 2025. It is especially important for Israel to remember that the Trump administration abruptly ended its military involvement in Yemen—and may do so again in the future if continuing the war no longer serves its interests. 

In Yemen, the Trump administration effectively left Israel to deal alone with continued Houthi rocket fire. Similarly, Israel may be left on its own in the face of Iran. Israel must take this into account in advance—alongside other potential issues with the Trump administration regarding Iran. Naturally, Israel should strive to coordinate its strategy with that of the Trump administration as much as possible.