Analysis | Did the U.S. and Israeli Strikes Eliminate Iran’s Nuclear Program?

The joint strike by the United States and Israel on Iran’s key nuclear facilities—Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—raises critical questions about the future of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. According to open-source reports, the main site at Fordow suffered significant damage but was not completely destroyed. The sites at Natanz and Isfahan were also targeted, but an open question remains: where is the stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium, a quantity Western estimates say is sufficient to produce approximately ten nuclear bombs?

The most prominent question following the strikes is whether Iran possesses another secret enrichment facility that has yet to be discovered. While this is a plausible hypothesis, it must be approached with caution. So far, no Western intelligence agency has provided conclusive evidence of an active secret site enriching uranium at advanced levels—though suspicions have always lingered.

Assuming Iran does maintain such a hidden facility, it is likely capable of rapidly enriching its 60% uranium stockpile to weapons-grade (90%). This would be especially feasible if the facility uses advanced IR-6 centrifuges, which are significantly faster than older models. A small facility with hundreds of these centrifuges, if operational and outside the range of the recent strike, could complete the final enrichment step in a very short time. The existence of such a site would therefore pose a serious threat, even if the known facilities have been disabled.

According to the IAEA's May 2025 report, between May 27 and August 29, 2024, Iran installed about 3,226 centrifuges across 19 cascades—marking the highest rate ever reported in a single monitoring period. In addition, nearly 14,689 advanced centrifuges were installed at Natanz and Fordow, most of them at Natanz’s main enrichment facility (FEP). These include the IR-2m, IR-4, and IR-6 models. The shift from the older IR-1 models to advanced systems allows for faster enrichment and narrows the window for detection and international response.

Iran currently possesses a substantial quantity of highly enriched uranium. As of May 17, its stockpile of 60%-enriched uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) stood at 408.6 kg (uranium mass), or 604.4 kg in compound mass. This marks a net increase of 133.8 kg from the previous period. The figure also includes 6.5 kg of uranium enriched above 20% but below 60%, which was not collected as a final product but instead flushed into a discard tank.

Estimates suggest that Iran could convert its 60% stockpile into approximately 233 kg of weapons-grade uranium (WGU) in just three weeks at the Fordow facility—enough for nine nuclear bombs based on a 25 kg per bomb standard. In other words, the gap between Iran’s material stockpile and a functional nuclear weapon now hinges primarily on a political decision. How many such capabilities remain today is an open question. If such capabilities still exist or can be quickly restored, one must ask whether Iran has decided—following the U.S. and Israeli strikes—to pursue an operational bomb.

Another critical issue concerns Iran’s technological ability to convert enriched uranium from gas to metal form and cast it into bomb cores. This step is complex and requires specialized infrastructure and advanced engineering expertise. These facilities may have been damaged in the recent strikes, potentially slowing the Iranian nuclear program significantly—even if not eliminating it entirely. On the other hand, if such infrastructure remains intact, this represents a serious concern.

Even targeted strikes cannot fully halt a nuclear program pursued by a state unwilling to cooperate with inspections. According to the IAEA report, since February 2021, the agency has faced restricted access to cameras, data, and sampling at key facilities. Iran has also failed to provide satisfactory explanations for nuclear material remnants found at four former military sites—such as Marivan—highlighting major monitoring gaps. This means even the data in the most recent IAEA report relies largely on estimates, not a full picture of Iran’s status prior to the Israeli strike.

Politically, it must be acknowledged that Iran has complex motivations to continue its nuclear program. The regime in Tehran may see nuclear weapons as a guarantee of its survival, especially given the clear attempts by Israel and the U.S. to push for regime change—even if official declarations claim this is not the goal of the war that began last Friday.

Another possible strategy for Tehran is to sign a new agreement with Donald Trump and avoid violating it during his term—thereby securing a temporary reprieve from pressure. After Trump’s term ends, the regime might then proceed with a nuclear test, assuming a different U.S. president would be less inclined to respond militarily. This is a calculated strategy that could offer Iran significant room to maneuver, without being immediately seen as breaching any agreements.

This point also requires attention to the internal power dynamics within Iran. The Iranian regime is not monolithic; it includes moderate and hardline factions vying for influence. The regime’s response to the recent events will be shaped by these internal struggles, adding to the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s future intentions.

Bottom line: The U.S. and Israeli strikes have dealt a severe blow to Iran’s nuclear capabilities in the short term, but whether they have fully eliminated the nuclear threat remains an open question. The accelerated deployment of centrifuges, increased stockpiles of enriched uranium, and restrictions on inspector access all suggest that the gap between capability and an operational bomb is narrowing. Iran’s political decisions, combined with its recovery capabilities and international response, will determine whether this moment represents a temporary setback—or the beginning of a more dangerous new era in the region.