Amir Rapaport's Column: Stopping Iran’s Nuclear Program – Military Option vs. Regime Change

While most of our attention in Israel these days is focused on the fighting in Gaza and the political crisis, the most important strategic development relates to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on the progress of Iran's nuclear program, as well as direct talks between the U.S. and Iran regarding a new nuclear agreement, which might be signed soon—or not.

According to the IAEA report, the Iranians have already enriched no less than 400 kilograms of uranium to a "military" level. This is enough to produce ten bombs, and the enrichment continues without pause. Is there a chance that Iran will agree to the U.S. demand to stop enriching uranium on its soil as part of a new nuclear deal? All intelligence agencies worldwide are united in the assessment that there is no such chance.

Either there will be an agreement that merely limits uranium enrichment—similar to the one under President Obama’s administration—or there will be no agreement at all. Does Israel have a military option to destroy Iran’s nuclear program on its own? Israel has the ability to seriously damage Iran's nuclear program, but not to destroy it completely. In fact, it has already inflicted significant damage on various components of the overall program.

This occurred during an Israeli Air Force attack in response to the second Iranian missile attack on Israel on the night of October 1, 2024. According to reports, the targets then were primarily above-ground facilities related to missile production—missiles meant to carry nuclear warheads—or the warheads themselves, if the Iranians reach the "military" phase of their nuclear program.

However, uranium enrichment facilities are much harder to strike. The last time centrifuges were damaged was before 2010, during the Stuxnet cyberattack attributed to the Israeli Mossad and other Western nations. That attack caused centrifuges to spin at extreme speed, until they collapsed. 

Since then, the Iranians have learned many lessons. They have dispersed the centrifuges across more than ten different sites, some located deep within mountains with peaks rising nearly four kilometers high. In the context of a large-scale airstrike, it is also important to understand that Iran is 80 times the size of Israel, stretching all the way to the plains of Afghanistan. The bottom line is that stopping the spinning centrifuges completely via bombing is probably not possible.

From a historical perspective, is Iran currently at a weak point that “invites” an attack? Absolutely. Iran has been weakened mainly due to the collapse of the “ring of fire” it built primarily to threaten Israel through third parties like Hezbollah in Lebanon. The collapse of Hezbollah and the revolution in Syria were severe strategic blows to Tehran.

Additionally, the fact that Iran’s air defense system was nearly destroyed in the Israeli retaliatory strike in October has left Iran more exposed than ever. However, the Iranians have already rebuilt parts of their system since the attack. It is also important to understand that despite the heavy price they paid, the October 1 attack on Israel—which included the launch of hundreds of ballistic missiles—was, in their view, also a strategic success.

The Iranians demonstrated—to themselves and to us—that they are capable of launching a direct attack on Israel, with several of their missiles breaching the country's defense systems and hitting strategic targets, despite the support of a broad international coalition led by the United States. It is possible that some of the missiles that hit Israel included technologies that helped them bypass Israel’s “Arrow” interceptors.

Even though the Iranians have lost their “ring of fire” vis-à-vis Israel, they can still exact a price by attacking it, as well as target countries like Saudi Arabia (under the pretext that Israeli Air Force planes would fly over its territory), and cause a spike in global oil prices by completely closing the Strait of Hormuz at the exit of the Persian Gulf. On its part, Israel will not be able to launch an attack without coordination with the U.S. and its allies, who maintain thousands of aircraft at regional bases.

From the Iranian perspective, is Israel also at a point of weakness? Unfortunately, yes. What appears to be a weakening of the Israel-U.S. relationship and a series of diplomatic failures undermine our deterrence. The political situation is so dire that some of Israel's closest friends, past and present—from Canada in the west to Singapore in the east—may support the establishment of a Palestinian state at the Paris summit, two weeks from now.

It will be much harder for Israel to rally an international coalition for its defense, like it did on that October night, or to get the “green light” for an attack from the anti-Iran axis led by the U.S. Given all this, what is the most effective way to stop the Iranian bomb, if the Iranians decide to go all the way and produce one?

Many in the U.S. and Israel believe that the most effective way to stop the bomb is not through an airstrike, but through a series of actions that will bring down the Ayatollah regime, which is despised by most of the Iranian people. This is likely Iran’s greatest vulnerability, and millions of Iranians are even hoping that Israel or the U.S. will topple the regime for them.