Column by Amir Rapaport: The Shin Bet Under Siege

When Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) Director Ronen Bar was summoned on Sunday for a private meeting with the Prime Minister, both of them were already aware that the renewed surprise attack on Hamas and Islamic Jihad would commence later in the week.

That didn’t prevent Netanyahu from dropping a bombshell on Bar: “I’ve decided to fire you.” Nor was it entirely unexpected. Traditionally, Prime Ministers and Shin Bet directors hold one-on-one meetings every one to two weeks, but such meetings typically occur on Wednesdays or Thursdays. Netanyahu had largely avoided them in recent months, so Bar could have guessed the purpose of the summons to the Prime Minister’s Office in Jerusalem.

Since that Sunday meeting, two processes have accelerated at a dizzying pace. On one hand, the dismissal process, which was set to be approved by the cabinet on Thursday night, paving the way for legal challenges against the dismissal (“without a hearing” and, according to another claim that would be raised in the Supreme Court, involving a conflict of interest). On the other hand, the investigation into the affair in which payments suspected to have originated from Qatar were allegedly transferred to individuals in the Prime Minister’s inner circle (“Qatargate”) emerged from the shadows, with those involved beginning to speak to the media.

Is there a connection between the investigation, the political maneuvers to approve the state budget, and the dismissal? That depends on whom you ask. The Shin Bet leadership is convinced there is. The Prime Minister’s Office reiterates the official reason for the dismissal as presented to the government: a breakdown of trust between Netanyahu and Bar.

Bar’s firm decision not to resign, despite Netanyahu making it more than clear that he wanted him out, was first reported here over a month ago. At that time, Netanyahu’s intention to dismiss Bar was still under the surface, but within the Shin Bet, the wave of statements against the agency and its director—made by politicians and media outlets aligned with the coalition—was seen as a sign of things to come.

The race for succession: Who will replace Bar? And will Netanyahu surprise with an outsider appointment?

The interview given by former Shin Bet Director Nadav Argaman to Channel 12 News accelerated the process. Bar attempted to minimize the damage to the agency with a letter sent last Friday to retired Shin Bet officials, addressing Argaman’s warnings and stating that “threats are not our way.” But two days later, he received the summons for the personal meeting. Either way, if the dismissal process succeeds, it will take effect on April 20, and Bar does not appear inclined to leave earlier.

If "M," who served as Bar’s deputy until about three months ago, is appointed as the next Shin Bet director, the choice would be considered a "natural" one. M has spent the past weeks as part of the negotiation team working on the release of hostages. Before serving as deputy, he held a series of positions in the division responsible for the West Bank and Jerusalem, including as head of that division.

However, media hints suggesting that Netanyahu is considering appointing M may largely be a smokescreen for appointing either a former Shin Bet official or someone entirely outside the agency—similar to the appointment of Navy officer Major General (ret.) Ami Ayalon following Rabin’s assassination in the previous century—as long as they are perceived as "loyal" to him. 

A potential candidate fitting the profile of both a senior former Shin Bet official and a Netanyahu loyalist would have been former Deputy Shin Bet Director Meir Ben-Shabbat, who also served as National Security Council chief. However, the reality is that Ben-Shabbat is no longer close to Netanyahu.

This may explain Ben-Shabbat’s announcement this week stating that he is not a candidate for the position. But even that may not be final—he and Netanyahu could still reconcile, and Netanyahu might call his former confidant back into service.

Meanwhile, within the intelligence agency, which is not supposed to be at the center of public controversy, efforts continue to maintain routine operations, now intensified with the renewed fighting in Gaza: targeted eliminations and counterterrorism operations, alongside various investigations—including "Qatargate."

Incidentally, Bar’s current deputy, “B,” previously headed the counter-espionage division, meaning he knows a thing or two about such matters. Like M, B also rose through the ranks in the Jerusalem Division, the unit where most former Shin Bet directors have emerged. However, since he was only recently appointed as deputy, it is difficult to see him as a viable candidate for the top position.

If Bar’s dismissal takes effect before a replacement is appointed—due to disputes with the Legal Advisor to the Government over the Civil Service Commission—it could create a leadership vacuum. A similar situation is already seen in the National Cyber Directorate, where the appointment of Brigadier General (res.) Yossi Karadi as its next head has been delayed. That position remains vacant, and the same could happen with the Shin Bet leadership.

Shin Bet in crisis: Intense operations continue amid leadership uncertainty

At the same time, the debate over Bar’s dismissal is stirring former senior Shin Bet officials—both publicly and in private conversations. Many blame Nadav Argaman for expediting Bar’s dismissal and for neglecting the human intelligence operations in Gaza during his tenure, in favor of a tech-driven command center—an intelligence-gathering shift that began under Yuval Diskin’s leadership and became dominant over the years. Incidentally, Diskin himself has remained conspicuously silent. In the past, he harshly criticized Netanyahu’s handling of various issues, but he has not voiced any support for Bar, either before or after the decision to dismiss him.

In any case, the worst has happened from the perspective of the Shin Bet: an agency that for decades enjoyed favorable media coverage now finds itself at the heart of a political controversy, with tens of thousands of protesters taking to the streets against the dismissal—a scenario that would have once seemed unimaginable.

The perfect storm: A general officers' conflict, a military trust crisis, and Shin Bet politicization

For the Shin Bet, this is a perfect storm, unfolding while the IDF is grappling with its own severe crisis: a significant decline in combat unit strength, a shortage of soldiers and tech specialists, a drop in reservist participation (which official IDF statistics obscure somewhat by including thousands who are allowed to continue working while serving part-time in the reserves, thus receiving dual salaries), and a growing trust gap between troops and their commanders, despite the appointment of a new Chief of Staff. The trust issue extends to soldiers' families and their confidence in national leadership.

The next ground operation in Gaza is already in the works, but its scale remains uncertain. If the IDF once again tries to mobilize four reserve divisions for an "all-in" ground assault aimed at decisively defeating Hamas (if such a thing is possible without an alternative governing authority), according to the “Zamir Plan,” the crisis could manifest itself in unprecedented ways—even among frontline combat troops, not to mention potential mass protests within Israel. But for now, it is the dismissal of the Shin Bet director that remains at the center of attention.