Analysis | Navigating U.S.-Israel Relations in the Second Trump Administration
Balancing competing agendas: How U.S. policy shifts on Ukraine, Iran, and Saudi relations could reshape Israel's strategic landscape
The second Trump administration is expected to focus primarily on domestic issues such as tax cuts, immigration, and similar matters. Regarding foreign policy, the Trump administration includes differing and sometimes opposing schools of thought, such as isolationist and hawkish approaches. Trump has appointed hawks to key positions, including Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Advisor, who have expressed strong support for Israel in its war in Gaza, its conflict with Iran, and other areas. While the two nations will agree on many issues, full alignment may not always be achieved, and disagreements could arise.
Trump is expected to push for an end to, or at least a significant reduction in, the war in Ukraine. Such a development could benefit Israel in several ways. The U.S. debate over whether and how much to assist Ukraine has at times impacted aid packages to Israel, as support for both nations was often bundled together. Additionally, in certain areas of military assistance, such as artillery shells, Israel and Ukraine have found themselves competing for the attention of the U.S. administration.
If Trump reduces aid to Ukraine as part of efforts to pressure it into accepting a ceasefire agreement, Israel could benefit. However, in some circumstances, Trump might leverage aid to Israel to impose his conditions on it. This will be especially critical for Israel in the coming years when the U.S.-Israel aid agreement signed in 2016, which is currently a grant, expires. During negotiations for a new agreement, the Trump administration might demand that some or all of the aid take the form of loans, potentially under favorable terms, but no longer as outright grants. Much will depend on Israel's willingness to meet Trump’s demands leading up to and during those negotiations.
Another significant issue is that even a partial or temporary resolution of the war in Ukraine could reduce cooperation between Russia and Iran—a partnership that concerns both the U.S. and Israel. For instance, Russia might assist Iran with advanced weapon systems like fighter jets and air defenses, as well as support its nuclear program, including blocking international measures against Iran at the UN Security Council.
Dr. Mike Evans has stated that Iran’s main vulnerability lies in its economy, such as its oil industry infrastructure, which could be targeted. Israel might take such action if Iran attacks it again, as Iran threatened to do following Israel’s strike on October 26. Iran is also acutely aware of its current exposure, especially after that Israeli strike destroyed its S-300 air defense systems, some of the most advanced in its arsenal. Following Trump’s election, Iran is likely to act more cautiously and may opt to strike Israel indirectly, avoiding clear attribution. This could include a terrorist attack on an Israeli target somewhere in the world, such as in South America.
The Trump administration aims to avoid war, including with Iran. Instead, it is expected to revive its "maximum pressure" policy, as seen in the past. This would involve imposing heavy sanctions on Iran and isolating it diplomatically to force it into accepting stringent restrictions on its nuclear and missile infrastructure, as well as its support for groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. The goal would be to curb Iran's aggressive regional activities. While this approach would benefit Israel, it remains uncertain whether Iran would comply or choose instead to pursue nuclear weapons in response. In such a scenario, the Trump administration might resort to military action to prevent this or authorize Israel—either officially or tacitly—to act. Much will depend on the level and type of U.S. support Israel receives, both militarily and diplomatically.
The Trump administration is also likely to pursue a "Abraham Accords 2.0," aiming to bring Saudi Arabia into the fold. Israel shares this interest, but such an agreement would likely require significant Israeli concessions. Saudi Arabia may seek advanced U.S. weapon systems or even a civilian nuclear program in return, and it might demand a formal Israeli commitment to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Israel could potentially navigate these demands to secure a deal that it finds reasonably acceptable. Much will depend on how important this agreement is to the Trump administration and the pressure it exerts on Israel, which will seek to avoid conflict with Washington.
The Trump administration is expected to adopt a tough stance on China. Israel may be required to unequivocally side with the U.S. in its global competition with China. This could be complicated by Chinese investments in Israel, such as in critical infrastructure like the Haifa port, which also serves the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
The U.S. has previously expressed concerns about Chinese involvement in Israel, a sensitivity that has been repeatedly conveyed to Israeli officials. Israel is also wary of China using its foothold in Israel for espionage, particularly given China’s ties to Iran. Sensitive information about Israel could potentially flow to Iran through China. Additionally, over the past year, amid fighting in Gaza and Lebanon, China has adopted a sometimes critical and even hostile stance toward Israel. While Israel seeks to benefit from its ties with China and its vast economy, it must tread carefully and clearly align with the U.S. to avoid jeopardizing this critical relationship. Israel depends far more on the U.S. than on China or any other nation.
It is also important to consider that unexpected major crises—whether health-related, economic, or military—could emerge, such as a North Korean attack on South Korea or a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Such events could dramatically shift priorities, consuming the Trump administration’s attention and resources at the expense of Middle East issues. This would mean less American pressure on Israel to make concessions but also reduced interest and capacity to assist Israel in addressing its critical concerns.