The Israeli Strike in Iran: A Rehearsal for Targeting Nuclear Infrastructure?

The Israeli strike in Iran on October 26 had limited targets related to military objectives. Israel did not bomb Iran's nuclear infrastructure, despite its significant concern that Iran is nearing the capability to produce nuclear weapons. This raises the question of whether the Israeli strike indicates an ability to similarly neutralize the Iranian nuclear project.

At the strategic level, the Israeli strike may deter or accelerate Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, operationally, Israel demonstrated what its Air Force has practiced repeatedly: the ability to conduct extensive attacks within Iran. First, it had to reach there with dozens of aircraft, a challenge given the distance of over 1,000 km, necessitating drop tanks and aerial refueling, relying on very outdated refueling aircraft. Modern refueling planes are expected to arrive in the coming years, and Israel will need them to improve the chances of success and avoid problems when attacking nuclear sites in Iran.

The first wave of Israeli aircraft faced the risk of interception. The Iranian Air Force is outdated and unable to contend with Israel's most modern aircraft. Iran may expedite the integration of more advanced combat aircraft, such as the SU-35 from Russia.

Iran's air defense is equipped with advanced systems like the S-300, but on October 26, it failed to thwart the Israeli attack and did not shoot down any manned aircraft. It is possible that Iran preserved its air defense capabilities for a more serious Israeli strike on governance or nuclear sites. However, Israel may have taken a similar approach. In any case, it is clear that a single wave of Israeli strikes, albeit quite substantial, did not eliminate Iran's air defense. 

Its tactical ballistic missile infrastructure suffered a blow but was not destroyed, and it still possesses thousands of missiles and drones. Both sides will draw tactical lessons from this engagement in preparation for a much more significant campaign targeting Iranian nuclear sites.

The Israeli aircraft flew over Syria and Iraq. Syria is an ally and effectively a client state of Iran, and so is Iraq to a significant extent. The air forces of Syria and Iraq do not pose a serious challenge. Since 2012, the IDF has gained considerable and highly successful experience in suppressing air defenses in Syria, a strategy also employed during the attack in Iran. Russia has a military presence in Syria, but its attention is naturally directed towards Ukraine at the expense of Syria. Despite Russia's somewhat negative stance toward Israel over the past year, it has not acted to thwart the Israeli strike in Iran. This may change if Russia, as part of its tightening ties with Iran, assists it against Israeli strikes on nuclear sites.

There was a certain risk in flying over Iraq, especially Syria; for instance, if an Israeli aircrew had to abandon the aircraft due to a technical malfunction and parachute there, they could fall into the hands of Iranians or their allies before a rescue team could reach them. 

The advantage of flying through these countries was to avoid the need to pass over Gulf states, which would expose them to Iranian retaliation, even if they officially announced their opposition to the Israeli strike (even though they need Israel against Iran). Israel does not want to jeopardize its relations with Gulf states like the UAE and, of course, Saudi Arabia, with which there is still a chance of reaching an agreement that could be highly significant for Israel. 

The Biden administration was certainly concerned about Iranian retaliation against Gulf states, which would increase its need to intervene, something it sought to avoid. The Biden administration had a clear interest not only in limiting the scope and targets of the Israeli strike but also in the flight paths to Iran.

Destroying air defense is relatively easy in that it is above ground. The Israeli Air Force has the capability to penetrate bunkers and fortifications, including underground ones, such as those used for the production, storage, and launch of ballistic missiles. However, the fortification of some Iranian nuclear sites presents an entirely different challenge. They benefit from natural protection, being deep underground, and/or artificial protection, with particularly thick fortifications. 

Without a reasonable chance of penetrating this fortification through special and powerful munitions and appropriate tactics, it would be unwise to risk an attack. This is the main difference between the strike that occurred on October 26 and an attack on nuclear infrastructure. Israel requires American assistance in this regard. Overall, beyond military issues, it is clear that in light of the challenges and consequences of attacking nuclear infrastructure, Israel needs American political and military support, which may be more difficult and complex to obtain compared to the strike on October 26. 

A significant weakening of Hezbollah, particularly concerning the remaining arsenal threatening infrastructure in Israel, will also be a factor during an attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

In summary, Israel conducted a highly successful operation in Iran, but striking nuclear sites there will be a much tougher nut to crack.