Analysis | A Successful Air Defense Requires Awareness of Its Limitations

The interception of most of the Iranian ballistic missiles launched on October 1 is an impressive achievement for air defense, but it is important to remember its constraints and limitations, based on open sources, as Iran will learn its lessons for the next battle.

The October 1 battle once again demonstrated the vital need for Israel's close relationship with the United States in air defense. The U.S. assists Israel in areas such as early warning and interception, financial support for air defense, joint training, and more. The U.S. also gains knowledge and experience in ballistic missile defense, which benefits Israel in securing continued support. On the other hand, the reliance on the U.S. comes with a price, such as the American administration’s ability sometimes to restrain or intercept Israel's actions.

Israel's air defense is a layered system with various components. It effectively begins far from Israel, in efforts to disrupt the development, production, and deployment of Iranian missiles, such as ballistic missiles and UAVs. This strategy must also include attempts to intercept them during deployment and at the launch stage from Iran when the ballistic missiles are especially vulnerable. 

While Israeli fighter jets are useful with their availability, stealth, and speed, hypersonic missiles would be even more advantageous, particularly when the warning time is very short. Additionally, a base near Iran, such as in Azerbaijan, could launch UAVs for interception, or there could be an understanding with the U.S. to utilize its forces in the Persian Gulf to strike targets in Iran. Iran's vast territory, along with its ability to launch missiles from other countries like Iraq, makes early detection of all launches difficult.

If the missiles are already en route to Israel, they must be intercepted by the air defense systems, with the Arrow system playing a crucial role. On October 1, the air defense was on full alert, but this level of readiness is not sustainable year-round due to constraints such as maintenance, training, and other factors. Hence, timely early warning is crucial to immediately deploy most, if not all, of the air defense systems.

In the IDF, air defense is part of the air force and focuses on ground-based interception. This is an advantage because, unlike fighter jets, air defense systems do not need to take off and are not limited by time in the air, allowing them to remain on alert for extended periods. However, deployment within Israel limits the range of air defense systems.

Following the aerial battles of April 14 and October 1, Iran is expected to invest efforts in neutralizing the air defense system, particularly the Arrow. Compared to systems like Iron Dome, there are far fewer Arrow batteries. Disabling even one Arrow battery, even temporarily, could weaken and expose Israel during wartime. 

This could have existential consequences if Iran develops ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads (Iran is very close to producing a nuclear bomb, although it may take longer to mount it on a missile). Iran would likely launch as many ballistic missiles as possible, requiring all of them to be intercepted, as even one carrying a nuclear warhead could be catastrophic. This task may become nearly impossible due to Iranian efforts to disrupt, deceive, and mislead in this regard.

Iran may attempt to neutralize Israel's air defense through various means, ranging from cyberattacks to kinetic strikes using UAVs and missiles. Iran claims to possess hypersonic missiles, though this is doubtful. It is critical that Russia does not provide such missiles to Iran in exchange for Iranian support in the Ukraine war.

Iran could also use its proxies to attack Israel’s air defense, especially the Arrow system, which provides another reason to strike Hezbollah now. Arrow batteries require alternative sites in case one becomes too threatened by missiles or UAVs. Some of these sites would be decoys to mislead the enemy. The real sites must be properly fortified and well-camouflaged to avoid detection, including defensive structures.

A ground raid on an Arrow battery cannot be ruled out. An Iranian commando force, or units like Nukhba or Radwan, could attempt to infiltrate by land, necessitating the placement of Arrow batteries far from the borders or the sea. These forces could attack the battery with anti-tank missiles, mortars, or a direct assault. 

Therefore, Arrow battery sites must be heavily secured with sufficient infantry, armored vehicles, and possibly tanks, to provide superior firepower against any ground attacker. In all these scenarios, it is important to emphasize that the Arrow battery is vulnerable. Even a small missile, like an anti-tank missile or a UAV with a relatively small warhead, or even small arms fire, could partially damage one component of the battery, rendering the entire system inoperable. Hence, backup systems must be readily accessible and prepared for immediate activation.

The stockpile of Arrow missiles is limited. While more can be produced, they are expensive—Arrow 3 missiles cost around $3 million each. The previous attack on April 14 cost Israel up to 2 billion shekels. The cost of interceptions during the October 1 battle was also very high. Given the significant economic challenges facing the country, there is a clear constraint on mass production of Arrow missiles. I

Iran, by contrast, possesses several thousand ballistic missiles and could attempt to overwhelm the Arrow system. Israel must aim to neutralize as many of these missiles as possible beforehand, especially by methods that would only become apparent upon launch to prevent repairs. Iran also faces a bottleneck in terms of the number of launchers it has, which is a key weakness. Israel must strive to neutralize as many of these launchers as possible before and during the fighting to minimize the number of ballistic missiles Iran can launch.

In conclusion, despite the success of Israel’s air defense, it is crucial to recognize its limitations in order to prepare for future battles with Iran, which are likely to be more demanding and, in some cases, even existential.