Amir Rapaport's Column: Is Now the Right Time to Pursue a Ceasefire - or to Crush Hezbollah?

Let's start with the very positive side: whether there will be a ceasefire with Hezbollah in the north or not – the last two weeks have been the best for the IDF and other security bodies since October 7, 2023, and perhaps even in many years.

It's not just the pager attack attributed to Israel and the stunning assassinations that have decimated Hassan Nasrallah's closest circle, but also the massive strikes on thousands of targets meticulously gathered over the years, which were highly effective. The Lebanese public is in panic, and in Arab eyes, Hezbollah has been humiliated. The mere fact that Nasrallah is reportedly considering halting attacks on Israel while the IDF is still deeply engaged in Gaza is an embarrassing retreat for him.

And there's this: In Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), the IDF and Shin Bet have managed to curb the wave of terror, at least for now, thanks to a series of offensive measures. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas appears to be on the ropes (although the truth is that it is taking advantage of the IDF's focus to the north to strengthen its civilian grip on areas that have been thinned out of Israeli forces).

Now, the question at hand is whether to leverage the momentum from the major successes in Lebanon to continue crushing Hezbollah, or rather to seek a ceasefire on attacks in the north for 21 days, which will likely be extended significantly. Hezbollah will likely need considerable time to lick its wounds and restore its capabilities and command structure.

To address this, we can begin by asking two fundamental questions.

One question is whether Israel has already restored its deterrence thanks to recent military and intelligence achievements. The answer is a resounding yes. After the October 7th attack, and especially following Iran's attack on Israel on April 14th, it appeared that Israel was at its weakest point, with even the smallest players in the Middle East daring to launch at UAVs at us. However, this is no longer the case. 

Through a series of decisive actions—ranging from the strike on the Houthi ports in Yemen to the operation, which according to foreign reports was carried out by the General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal), on the missile factory in Syria, and of course, the unprecedented penetration into Hezbollah’s core, resulting in massive damage to its personnel and capabilities—Israel’s deterrence has largely been restored.

In this context, it is important to understand that, militarily, deterrence is perceived as the multiplication of one’s capabilities with the willingness to enact them. For example, if a state holds immense power but is unwilling to use it under any scenario, its deterrence would be null. In contrast, Israel’s willingness to go "all in" against Hezbollah, especially after being attributed with a strike in the heart of Tehran (to which the Iranians are still hesitant to respond), has shifted the reality on the ground.

Undoubtedly, Israel’s deterrence has improved compared to the dismal days before October 7th, when we didn’t even dare to dismantle a tent Hezbollah had set up on the Israeli side of the border fence or respond to the terrorist who detonated an explosive device near Megiddo. This is in addition to the recently exposed attempt to target Moshe (Bogie) Ya'alon.

The next fundamental question is whether a military resolution can be achieved through air operations alone, meaning, in our case, without a ground maneuver deep into Lebanese territory. The answer to this question is less definitive. Historically, there are few cases worldwide where a resolution has been achieved solely through air power. Similarly, in the Second Lebanon War, IDF had to undertake a ground operation about three weeks after the air campaign began.

Still, it seems that this time, the combination of Israel's intelligence penetration into the heart of Hezbollah, the near-total elimination of its senior leaders, the disruption of its command and control chain, alongside exceptional airstrikes, will likely be recorded in the annals of military history as an unprecedented air-intelligence operation in terms of its achievements. Certainly, the IDF has already shattered the "equation" method that Nasrallah has boasted about since the Second Lebanon War.

Regarding the question of whether Hezbollah has responded relatively mildly compared to the blows it has suffered because it did not want to unleash greater firepower, or because its actual capabilities are limited – it seems the answer is both. Just as we have underestimated Hamas over the years, officers who assessed Hezbollah's capabilities this week believe in hindsight that we have overestimated its arsenal of weapons, although its capabilities are still considerable.

Either way, back to the question: Is it time to intensify the attack on Hezbollah?

Why yes? It appears that Hezbollah is indeed in a difficult position, and this is a unique opportunity to eliminate the threat it poses almost from the ground up. Furthermore, the residents of the northern border will not return to their homes without addressing the issue of the Radwan Force cruising right by their houses.

Also, it has been proven that Security Council Resolution 1701, issued after the Second Lebanon War, is ineffective. In the event of a ceasefire, it’s only a matter of time before Radwan operatives return to their positions south of the Litani River in civilian attire. Should fighting resume, a 21-day ceasefire would allow Hezbollah to regroup and could exact a painful toll on us.

Moreover, the interest in not "wasting" Hezbollah as an ace primarily belongs to Iran, which built the organization as a force to threaten Israel in the event of an attack on its nuclear facilities. Once Iran has its first nuclear bomb, Israel will find it much more challenging to address this threat. Our interest is necessarily to deal with the Hezbollah threat and the Iranian threat before a bomb exists.

And why is it time for a ceasefire? Because precisely at the height of euphoria, it’s important to remember that resilience is not eternal. The Second Lebanon War also began with Israeli successes, but then came the strike on the Navy ship INS Hanit, followed by a series of moves that ended the war in a bitter stalemate.

Another reason is because a ground operation deep into Lebanese territory could shift the fighting from the aerial-intelligence arena, where we have a clear advantage, to the mountains and valleys of southern Lebanon, where thousands of advanced Kornet missiles and suicide drones await IDF forces. This is a battlefield that could play into Hezbollah's hands. It is significantly more challenging than the confined space where the IDF operates against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, where our forces have also suffered substantial losses. The IDF will arrive fatigued for ground maneuvers in Lebanon after a year of fighting in the south.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that success in prolonged warfare depends on our internal cohesion and international alliances. The state of cohesion, as is known, is quite dire. Regarding alliances, we primarily rely on the willingness of the United States to supply us with an unlimited quantity of armaments, and it is very difficult to count on that.

Israel is indeed working on developing independent armament capabilities (and has even begun planning the establishment of a Missile Corps, as Avigdor Lieberman proposed when he was Minister of Defense in 2018), but it will not be able to sustain a war without an end date against Hezbollah without complete American backing. America, two months before the presidential elections, has its own considerations.

By the way, regarding international alliances, while the U.S. is imposing difficulties in supplying ammunition to Israel, I learned this week that the ally standing firmly by our side, openly and also through covert cooperation, without any “maybe” or “perhaps,” is Germany. This is the ironic twist of history. In contrast, the most disappointing ally from an Israeli perspective is Britain. The security dialogue with them has become almost hostile.

All these are considerations that will determine whether it is time for a ceasefire in the North or rather for an escalation of the military blitz. Until a decision is made, primarily by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, it is advisable not to take too seriously the statements of politicians for or against an agreement, nor the statements of military commanders about a maneuver that is, supposedly, imminent.

All the statements are part of the psychological, social engineering warfare. The maneuver is certainly an option, but it is primarily a 'stick' within the framework of the pressure being applied to Hezbollah. In the meantime, the orders for relative restraint are reaching Hassan Nasrallah even from Tehran.

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