The Day After: Strong at the Border – Israel’s Readiness Following the Campaign in Lebanon

The scope of Israel’s current campaign in Lebanon may expand, potentially significantly, but of course, at some point, the campaign will end or at least subside considerably. Israel must prepare for the day after. Hezbollah has become overly entangled and has climbed too high on the cedar tree. Israel should not behave like Hezbollah and certainly not get stuck there alongside it. Israel needs an exit strategy, which should be developed now, as it's clear that Hezbollah cannot be entirely eradicated.

Israel has fought various campaigns in Lebanon since the War of Independence, with the peak being the First Lebanon War in 1982, when the IDF advanced 90 kilometers to Beirut, an unlikely scenario now. A more limited penetration occurred during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The current campaign is not yet the Third Lebanon War. The IDF is calling it an operation, named "Northern Arrows," rather than a war (unlike "Iron Swords" in Gaza). 

The name itself suggests a limited approach, as arrows are fired from a distance, mainly through air strikes. This resembles extensive operations conducted by the IDF in the 1990s against Hezbollah. At this stage, the current campaign could be called "Grapes of Wrath / Accountability" 2, similar to the operations in 1993 and 1996, which also relied on firepower and led to similar consequences, such as the displacement of the Lebanese population towards Beirut, putting pressure on Hezbollah. This represents a return to Israel's approach of relying on firepower, akin to the rounds of conflict in Gaza, until the "Iron Swords" war.

In 2006, after successfully eliminating a significant portion of Hezbollah's high-quality rocket stockpile, Israel lost direction and hesitated about a ground offensive. Now, following another impressive aerial and intelligence achievement, Israel is once again hesitant about launching a ground attack and prefers a gradual escalation of firepower.

Regarding ground combat, Hezbollah is stronger than in 2006, although the IDF has also improved and learned valuable lessons from the Gaza war, gaining substantial combat experience. However, the cost of ground fighting in Lebanon could still be high. The challenging terrain, which is heavily wooded and familiar to Hezbollah, has been prepared for combat, both above and below ground, for many years. Additionally, there is no element of surprise.

In 1982, Israel destroyed the PLO's base in Lebanon and expelled it from the country. This won't happen now. Unlike the PLO, Hezbollah is much more entrenched in Lebanon. Hezbollah would rather fight to the end than consider sending its fighters to a country like Iran (which wouldn't want that either). This was also the case in the 1990s when Hezbollah fought Israel, and eventually, Israel withdrew from Lebanon.

If Israel now decides to deploy the IDF in southern Lebanon, it would be a return to the 1990s, but in a more demanding version. The IDF would need to establish a series of fortified outposts that would be attacked, along with the roads leading to them. Despite the blows Hezbollah would suffer, it would still be more skilled and stronger than in the 1990s, and accordingly, the toll on the IDF would be higher. At the same time, Hezbollah would continue firing, including at Israeli settlements. Additionally, Israel might face strong international pressure, especially from the United States, forcing it to withdraw from any territory the IDF conquers in southern Lebanon, possibly after only a few months. In this sense, the Israeli move could resemble "Operation Litani 2" (the original was in 1978).

In 2006, the war ended with Resolution 1701, which was supposed to prevent Hezbollah's buildup and deployment near the Israeli border, something that clearly didn't happen. However, it's important to note that from 2006 until October 8, 2023, there was tense quiet but almost no fighting on the Lebanon border. Israel managed to handle Hezbollah's buildup and deployment near the border during that period. For decades, Israel tolerated a much more massive and dangerous hostile deployment, that of the Syrian army on the Golan Heights.

There were times of high tension and constant fear of a large-scale Syrian attack, which could have led to a war with thousands of Israeli casualties. Israel could have launched a preemptive strike but refrained, relying instead on deterrence and military readiness, taking a calculated risk that ultimately proved successful. As is well known, the Syrian army was largely destroyed in the Syrian civil war, without Israel suffering any losses (this being the most significant positive shift in Israel's security, at least in terms of conventional war, since the peace agreement with Egypt). 

Israel has taken a similar approach since withdrawing from Lebanon in 2000, continuing after the 2006 war. This approach, despite its risks, is the least bad option compared to the alternatives. Hezbollah's army, like the Syrian army at the time, could weaken significantly, especially if its patron, the Iranian regime, weakens or falls, which Israel should focus on for other known reasons. Security on the northern border and in Israel as a whole depends on efforts against Iran itself.

Lebanon is at a very low point, which Hezbollah, the dominant force in this weak country, exploits, also being part of the government. Therefore, even if a political settlement is reached, it will be nearly meaningless in enforcing restrictions on Hezbollah. The significance of such a settlement would be the conclusion of the current campaign. Hezbollah would rebuild, with Iranian assistance, but this would happen anyway, as Israel is not going to conquer most of Lebanon to prevent it.

Hezbollah will continue to fight the IDF if the army stays in Lebanon. If the IDF withdraws back to the border, Hezbollah may accept a temporary end to the fighting, as it did in 2000 and 2006, after the IDF left southern Lebanon. Now, the heavy blows Hezbollah has taken and will take, the need to recover, and its and Iran's fear of an all-out war, might push Hezbollah to agree to this. 

The tension and friction will continue, and there may be incidents that exact a toll, but on a much smaller scale compared to the consequences of an IDF deployment in Lebanon. Despite the frustration and risks of this sensitive and problematic situation, it is still preferable to continue war with a deployment in Lebanon, which would cost Israel dearly on multiple fronts. Israel needs a temporary halt to the fighting to recover from the war on military, economic, political, and social levels.

Israel should already be investing as much as possible in strengthening its defensive preparations on the northern border. This means adding obstacles to disrupt and hopefully prevent the movement of Hezbollah vehicles. Sophisticated and deep minefields are also an essential component. The defensive system must also have maximum depth to block Hezbollah's ground infiltrations. Given the numerous settlements along the border, they must be fortified as much as possible.

In conclusion, Israel needs an exit strategy, which means that after delivering a maximum blow to Hezbollah, the IDF must remain strong on the border without deploying in southern Lebanon. This isn't an ideal option, but it's better than the others.