Analysis | How the US Might Assist in Preventing a Regional War

The exchange of blows between Israel and Hezbollah, amidst the significant escalation in their war of attrition, could at any moment spiral into a regional war between Israel and Iran. Such a war deeply concerns the Biden administration, which does not want its legacy to include a regional conflict in the Middle East. 

The administration is certainly opposed to becoming entangled in such a confrontation. While Biden's administration has been impressed by the remarkable strikes against Hezbollah over the past week, attributed to Israel, and is pleased with the elimination of a senior Hezbollah figure in Lebanon who had previously harmed Americans, it believes that this achievement would not be worthwhile if it leads to a full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah. 

This is especially true if it escalates into a regional war between Israel and Iran. Although the Biden administration has significant disagreements with Iran, such as over its nuclear program, both Biden's administration and Iran do not want a regional war, particularly one that could drag them into direct combat with each other. For the Biden administration, this also ties into the impact on the U.S. presidential election campaign.

The relationship between Israel and the United States has strengthened since the late 1960s. The U.S. provides extensive military aid to Israel. In the "Operation Iron Swords" alone, U.S. assistance amounts to $14 billion. The U.S. also provides Israel with crucial diplomatic support, such as at the UN. Both countries share an interest in weakening the Iranian axis, including Hezbollah, using force if necessary. However, the Biden administration is concerned about the escalation into a regional war.

The Biden administration does not want to be seen as preventing Israel from doing what it needs to fight Hezbollah, but also does not want to appear as if it is fueling the fire by providing military aid for a conflict in Lebanon. As a compromise, Biden's administration may focus on defensive measures. Hezbollah might carry out ground raids from Lebanon into Israel, and the U.S. might press Israel to block these raids by reinforcing the IDF's presence near the border, within Israel, rather than launching a broad offensive into Lebanon. 

At most, Israel could conduct limited ground operations in Lebanon to minimize the risk of escalation to a regional war. Another major threat posed by Hezbollah is its arsenal of up to 200,000 rockets, missiles, and drones, covering all of Israel. As part of its defensive efforts, the Biden administration is dedicating a significant portion of its assistance to Israel's “Iron Dome" and "David's Sling" missile defense systems, as well as to the development of the laser-based interception system, "Iron Beam." This helps Israel while aiming to reduce casualties and damage from Hezbollah’s arsenal, which could otherwise provoke a harsh response from Israel, increasing the likelihood of regional escalation.

Beyond the potential for regional war in Lebanon, the Biden administration faces a similar dilemma regarding the war in Gaza, which also ties into the U.S. presidential election. Unlike Gaza, only a small portion of Lebanon’s population is Palestinian, but the American concern is similar: that a war between Israel and Hezbollah could devastate Lebanon, as seen in Gaza, with all the negative consequences that entails. Gaza was in a dire state before the war, and it is now almost entirely destroyed. Lebanon is experiencing a severe economic crisis, and a war could completely collapse the country. The Biden administration is already grappling with the severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

Iran relies on Hezbollah, but it is still willing to risk Hezbollah in a limited war against Israel. Iran does not want the conflict to expand, which would overly endanger Hezbollah and could force Iran into direct involvement. Iran wishes to avoid this scenario mainly because it fears that such involvement could lead to war between Iran and the U.S., a conflict undesirable to both parties. 

This Iranian stance provides an incentive for the Biden administration to push Iran to restrain Hezbollah. Given the importance of this issue to Biden’s administration, it may pursue this policy through various means, from pressuring Iran to offering benefits such as easing some of the sanctions on it, even if only temporarily. Another option for the U.S. is to seek an end to the Gaza war between Israel and Hamas, which is a condition for Hezbollah to halt its clashes with Israel, potentially preventing the escalation of the war of attrition in Lebanon into a regional war. However, the likelihood of such a deal between Israel and Hamas is currently very low.

The Biden administration prefers to pursue diplomacy, sanctions, and other measures, but it may still feel compelled to respond militarily if Iran is the first to initiate a regional war by attacking Israel, especially if Iran inflicts civilian casualties in Israel (notably, there are half a million American citizens living in Israel, some of whom could be affected). In such a case, the Biden administration, as in the April 14 attack on Israel, would aim militarily to focus on defensive measures—helping Israel intercept missiles and drones launched at it from Iran or its allies, such as militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. 

However, if Iran continues its attacks, particularly if it also strikes American targets, such as in Iraq, and especially if it causes significant American casualties, then the Biden administration would be pressured to respond offensively.

An aggressive American approach, even if reluctantly adopted, might deter Iran and thus reduce the chances of a regional war. Iran would be concerned about a U.S. strike, even a limited one, against it. Iran is particularly worried that the U.S. might use this as an opportunity to target its nuclear infrastructure, setting back Iran’s progress toward developing nuclear weapons—a goal it has significantly advanced in recent years. 

The Biden administration has repeatedly promised throughout its tenure that Iran will not obtain nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Iran has ties with China, as it exports oil to China despite American sanctions. Iran also maintains relations with Russia, which needs Iranian weapons, such as drones, to fight in Ukraine, where U.S. support for Ukraine is well known. Iran might suspect that the U.S., if already drawn into action against Iran, would seek to use the opportunity to punish Iran for its ties with China and Russia, which have implications for the U.S.

Ultimately, the Biden administration has a clear interest in preventing the escalation of the war of attrition between Israel and Hezbollah into a regional conflict that would also involve Iran. Biden’s administration could seek to convince Israel to focus more on defensive rather than offensive measures to reduce the chances of deterioration. At the same time, it could try to push Iran to restrain Hezbollah, warning and even threatening Iran to some extent, given its fear of an American action against it.