Amir Rapaport’s Column | The Moment of Truth is Approaching: A Third Lebanon War is Probable, Yet Still Avoidable

The pager attack on Hezbollah, followed by explosions of additional communication devices, can be placed among the top opening strikes in global wars. It certainly stands alongside Operation Density, which aimed to destroy long-range rocket launchers at the outset of the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and even with Operation Focus, which destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground at the onset of the Six-Day War.

The primary goal of opening strikes is to create a "shock and awe" effect on the enemy and significantly damage their capabilities before they are deployed. The difference, compared to the past, is that Operation Below the Belt, attributed to Israel worldwide, even by Hezbollah itself, was not accompanied by a massive ground or air assault. For now, it stands almost on its own.

Nevertheless, it can be seen as a move that could very soon lead to a full-scale war with Hezbollah, and the likelihood of this is not insignificant. Assuming that the stunning attack was indeed carried out by Israel, it is important to note its context, as mentioned in this column last week:  it occurred after Israel officially decided to shift the focus of its military efforts from the Gaza Strip to the northern front, for the first time since October 7th.

Until Defense Minister Yoav Gallant's remarks about shifting the focus to the north about ten days ago, and the cabinet's decision to add to the official war objectives the goal of "safely returning northern residents to their homes," the northern front was merely secondary to the fighting in Gaza. The military's defined objective in this arena was to carry out "offensive defense" only.

This time, Israel truly meant its declaration about shifting the focus, unlike the countless hollow statements and empty threats previously made against Hezbollah and the state of Lebanon. The result is a fundamental change in the situation in the north, which has already occurred: the possible scenarios for continuing the confrontation with Hezbollah have been reduced from three to two, and the entire arena is approaching a decisive crossroads.

A reminder: the fighting in Lebanon began on October 8, 2023, as a move by the Iranian axis aimed at making Israel pay a price for its attack on Gaza and forcing it to divide its forces. The fact that 60,000 residents have been evacuated from 43 communities for nearly a year now was seen as a "bonus" for Hezbollah and Iran. For Israel, this is a strategic blow and a severe hit to its deterrence.

Until this week, Iran was the biggest beneficiary of the bizarre reality that emerged in the north and the "balance of terror" that Nasrallah created against Israel, as it paid almost no direct price for the "ring of fire" it encircled Israel with or for the unbearable situation it created. No more. The recent moves have proven that Israel is determined this time to sever the link between the fighting in the south and the situation in the north, even at the significant cost of a full-scale war with Hezbollah deep within Israel’s home front.

So, the scenario of continued exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah below the threshold of full-scale war is now off the table. Only two possibilities remain: either Hezbollah and Iran will soon find some way to back down without losing face, which will lead to a cessation of Hezbollah's aggression through some diplomatic arrangement (one option being a return to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War), or we will rapidly slide into full-scale war—the very conflict both sides have tried to avoid so far. This weekend, the prospect of a Third Lebanon War seems more tangible than any "arrangement," but the situation is highly dynamic and could change quickly. In any case, the status quo is over.

In the case of a rapid escalation to war, Israel will need to make a strategic decision: whether to continue focusing solely on attacking Hezbollah or to also impose costs on symbols and assets of the entire state of Lebanon, such as power stations, ports, and bridges. Among the top brass of the General Staff, there are differing opinions on this matter.

In any case, it is important not to fall into euphoria after Operation Below the Belt and to recognize reality as it is: Hezbollah and the entire Iranian axis still possess unprecedented capabilities to strike Israel, and the defense systems are far from perfect. The cost we will pay on the Israeli home front will be heavy, and Hezbollah can target the IDF as well through UAVs, long-range and accurate anti-tank missiles, and other lethal means. We have seen this in the attacks that have already occurred since Below the Belt, which caused casualties on Thursday.

The Iranian angle

This coming weekend, it seems that the decision about where things will lead after "Below the Belt" primarily depends on Hezbollah's response, but in reality, it will be Iran that decides. It is worth noting that the Tehran regime was angry with Hezbollah's Secretary-General for initiating the kidnapping of soldiers that led to the outbreak of the Second Lebanon War 18 years ago on his own accord (Hassan Nasrallah did not foresee the severe Israeli response). The Iranians built up Hezbollah's strength as the primary threat to Israel in case of an attack on their nuclear facilities and did not want to "waste" that card on anything less. This consideration is still relevant for them, and even more so at a time when they are accelerating the production of components for their first nuclear bomb.

After the Second Lebanon War, Iran denied Nasrallah the ability to make significant independent decisions regarding combat against Israel, effectively assigning him a "mentor." This is why the decision on how to respond will be made very soon—in Tehran, not in Beirut.

But Iran itself is already in a strategic pit. It has not yet responded to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, which was carried out in the heart of Tehran, and its new leadership is warming the seat after the death of former president Ibrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash, which, based on new details about the circumstances, appears less and less like an innocent accident.

The newly elected president, Masoud Pizhehian, is considered a reformist, and if reality allowed, he would initiate a renewed "charm offensive" and lead to a renewed nuclear agreement with the powers that would leave Iran just a "step" away from its first bomb, but no further. However, reality is not working in Iran's favor. Blow after blow. The two options currently before it—either to restrain itself or to respond at the risk of full-scale war and significant destabilization of the ayatollahs' regime—are both very poor.

Fortunately for Pizhehian, the real decision-maker in Iran is the 85-year-old Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. It’s his headache to figure out. Despite all the intelligence achievements Israel has demonstrated recently, it is impossible to know what is going on in Khamenei's mind. The decision he makes will have significant consequences.

The Israeli angle: the challenges of the prolonged war

From the Israeli perspective, troubles are also abundant, and none of the options are favorable. The ongoing casualties in the fighting in the Gaza Strip illustrate that Israel has reached a point where the daily cost of the conflict there outweighs any tactical gains. However, the hostages must be returned. In this arena, the most serious threat to the forces now comes from the trap of thousands of courtyards and houses, such as the booby-trapped house that exploded this week, killing three Golani fighters and a female paramedic in the Tel al-Sultan neighborhood of Rafah.

As is well known, strategically, the IDF is built for short wars, and it has been operating "on the edge" for an unthinkable length of time. It is clear that the IDF could not continue fighting without the supply of munitions from the U.S. and a few other allies, despite the increasingly tightening sanctions against us. Even more evident is that Israel cannot manage a full-scale war against Hezbollah, which could escalate into a comprehensive regional campaign involving Iran, without full backing from the U.S. This is certainly a consideration taken into account by decision-makers and is discussed in high-level talks between Israel and the U.S., despite American anger over some government ministers and dissatisfaction with the possibility of ousting Yoav Galant and appointing Gideon Sa'ar in his place.

A commander I spoke with this week described the burnout in the IDF from the less-discussed aspect of personnel: "Beyond the well-known strain on the reserve forces, there is also damage to the training framework—after a year of fighting, there are already commanders whose entire training—from basic training to officer training—has taken place during combat and in a condensed manner.

“In the training of every soldier and commander, it is important to allow adequate time for physical, mental, and even professional preparation. When you continually shorten training periods, there will be a price to pay. Moreover, the greatest challenge is the unbearable burden on commanders who are in the heart of the fighting almost without breaks, month after month. They must have their terms shortened and be replaced before they collapse, but the IDF is facing a shortage of commanders at the field levels, partly due to the high number of casualties. It is not easy to fill the ranks of field commanders from nothing.

To conclude the column on this week, there is once again a silver lining: the glorious Operation Below the Belt was accompanied by an unprecedented awareness campaign aimed at increasing the embarrassment for the attacked side and restoring to Israel some of its deterrence and prestige in the eyes of Sunni Arab states and the world at large. Of course, this also includes national pride and the hope that the situation can be fundamentally changed. It is likely that the moves in the “awareness arena” will be published in separate articles by various authors in due time. For now, this is still not the main focus.

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