Analysis | Lessons from Vietnam: How Israel Can Avoid Prolonged Entanglement in Gaza
What can we learn from history? A comparison between the Vietnam War and the war in Gaza, and how past mistakes can be avoided
The Gaza Strip could have flourished like Singapore, but it is now devastated, and the fighting there may resemble another conflict in Southeast Asia, the Vietnam War, during the 1960s and early 1970s.
At the time, it was suggested that the war in Lebanon from 1982 until Israel’s withdrawal in 2000 was Israel’s own Vietnam War—a prolonged entanglement in a hostile land against determined and skilled guerrilla forces that used the terrain to their advantage. Israel must be cautious not to sink into another "Vietnam War," potentially even more extensive than the one in Lebanon, this time in Gaza. Despite the differences between the Vietnam War and the conflict in Gaza, there is a certain common ground.
The "Operation Iron Swords" began with a murderous attack on October 7, marked by a large-scale breach, assault, and infiltration into Israel, targeting various military and civilian sites. This bears some resemblance to the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968, though that occurred during the war and not at its start. Similarly, the October 7 attack was part of an ongoing conflict.
Both attacks started with complete surprise. The IDF, like the U.S. Army at the time, managed to regroup and retaliate. The October 7 attack, like the Tet Offensive, remains a significant event in the context of these wars, and may even be a turning point. October 7 already has major implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it might be just the beginning, depending largely on how Israel proceeds in Gaza.
The United States became embroiled in Vietnam for over a decade, and Israel might face a prolonged struggle in Gaza that could last many years. Despite its clear military superiority, such as in air power, the U.S. struggled to defeat its adversary in Vietnam. The IDF has a similar advantage over Hamas, but, as in Vietnam, this may not be enough due to the nature of the enemy, the type of warfare, and the challenging terrain.
During the Vietnam War, deep divisions emerged in American society over the war, which weakened the United States. In Israel, there is also significant polarization, although it is not strictly between supporters and opponents of the war. Still, the lack of consensus on how to manage the conflict weakens Israeli society and, consequently, the state. Similarly, during the Vietnam War, many outside the U.S. criticized its policies. Israel also faces sharp global criticism for its actions in Gaza.
North Vietnam received external aid, mainly from the Soviet Union, which enabled it to continue fighting. Hamas and Islamic Jihad receive support from Iran. In this sense, the U.S. viewed the Vietnam War as part of a global struggle against the Soviet Union, while Israel sees its war with Hamas as part of a regional conflict with Iran. The U.S. had its "domino theory," which held that a victory in Vietnam was necessary to prevent the spread of communism elsewhere. Israel also fears that an unsuccessful outcome in Gaza, especially one perceived as an Israeli defeat, could negatively impact other fronts.
The question remains: What is victory? In Vietnam, as in Gaza, the U.S. destroyed significant enemy infrastructure and forces, including targeted killings. But this was insufficient because Hamas, like North Vietnam, is ideologically driven and willing to pay a very high price in war.
The U.S. had local allies in Vietnam, but they were too weak to hold out on their own. Israel refuses to cooperate with the Palestinian Authority in Gaza due to political reasons, mutual distrust, and the PA’s own weakness in governing Gaza.
Given the difficulty in securing a clear victory and the high human, economic, and political cost, some in the U.S. eventually proposed simply declaring victory and leaving Vietnam. Israel might also consider a similar approach. Regardless, even if Israel declares victory and explains its stance, its adversaries will reject the rationale outright. Hamas or its remnants will declare victory, and its allies, like Iran and Hezbollah, will agree.
Globally, the response to an Israeli declaration of victory will align with Israel's supporters and critics. Furthermore, even those who support or understand Israel’s interests may view such a declaration as a way to end the war quickly. Within Israel, there will be debate over whether Israel actually won. The dominant trend will likely be a desire to forget the war, which, as Moshe Dayan said about the Yom Kippur War, was "long and costly in lives."
In hindsight, the U.S. might have handled its entanglement in Vietnam differently, focusing on limiting its scope, duration, and certainly its cost. Israel should learn the lessons of Vietnam to avoid a similar quagmire in Gaza.