Amir Rapaport’s Column: Between The Philadelphi and Netzarim Corridors

The excessive attention given this week to the question of Israel's control over the axis separating the Gaza Strip from Egypt has shifted the focus away from other challenges ahead. Nevertheless, let’s start with the Philadelphi Corridor (or Route). 

Undoubtedly, Israeli control over the corridor is crucial to prevent future strengthening of Hamas. It is also reasonable to assume that Iran has already transferred weapons to the extensive Sinai area that smugglers will attempt to bring into the Gaza Strip by any means. However, comparing the current situation in Philadelphi and its importance to the days before the Israeli disengagement from Gaza (2005) is far from accurate. 

First of all, there is nothing to long for: before 2005, Israel did not genuinely control what was happening in the Philadelphi Corridor. Back then, the Corridor was just a few hundred meters wide, and part of it ran right through the city of Rafah, adjacent to houses that served as entry points for tunnels. Below the ground, there was a highway of smuggling tunnels that Israel failed to prevent. The outposts along the Corridor were subject to constant attacks, both from below and from above ground.

May 2004, for example, was particularly deadly. At the beginning of the month, Tali Hatuel and her four daughters were murdered in the Kisufim axis. The terrorists who ambushed them ensured their execution at point-blank range. About two weeks later, six Givati soldiers were killed in the explosion of an old M-113 APC during an operation aimed at thwarting Qassam rockets and mortar fire in Gaza’s Zeitoun neighborhood. The APC was completely destroyed, and considerable effort was required to recover the bodies of the fallen soldiers.

Not a day passed before five more soldiers were killed, in the explosion of an engineering APC from the tunnel warfare team on the Philadelphi Corridor.Ttwo more were killed during their rescue attempts. In this disaster as well, the damage was immense due to an RPG hitting the many explosives carried by the soldiers in the APC. The image etched in the national memory from this tragedy was of soldiers kneeling and searching the soft sand for tiny remnants of their comrades, in the heart of the Philadelphi Corridor.

Following this tragedy, the IDF focused its operations on the Rafah area and the Philadelphi corridor. During the disengagement, it was already known that the issue of control over the Philadelphi corridor was one of the plan’s biggest blind spots. The controversial decision to withdraw from the Corridor was made only shortly before the disengagement itself. Initially, a multinational force was established to manage the Rafah crossings, but it collapsed within about a month. Two years after the disengagement, Hamas took control of the entire Gaza Strip, including the crossings to Egypt, leaving us with no choice but to rely on the Egyptians to prevent weapons smuggling.

But the smuggling industry thrived (mostly above ground, by the way, simply because it didn't require much effort, especially in the year when the Muslim Brotherhood ruled Egypt). After Abdel Fattah el-Sisi assumed power, he razed entire neighborhoods in Rafah to expand the Egyptian side of the Philadelphi Corridor. Since the IDF retook control of Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor a few months ago, it has done the same on the Gaza side. Now, Philadelphi is nothing less than a wide highway, which bears no resemblance to the corridor it was in 2005.

This sequence of events has proven beyond any doubt that Israel must control the Philadelphi corridor in the long term. Even when Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip down to the last meter and relinquished control over the crossings to Egypt, the world continued to view it as an occupying force responsible for the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, for some reason.

The issue is that after the IDF severely damaged Hamas and eliminated all its leaders, except for Yahya Sinwar himself, Hamas is no longer high on the list of security threats to Israel.

At the top of the list should be efforts to counter the Iranian nuclear threat and preparations for direct conflict with Iran. Of course, finding a solution to return residents of northern Israel to their homes is also essential, and securing the return of the hostages is a top priority. The goal defined for the IDF in this context is to create conditions for the return of the hostages, rather than returning them without an agreement, as this is not a viable option.

In the meantime, Hamas and Iran are intensifying efforts to open another bloody front in Judea and Samaria, and the prevention of car bombs and suicide attacks that threaten to return will not be successful indefinitely. All this is still without addressing threats from distant places such as those posed by the Houthis in Yemen or Shiite militias in Iran.

So what needs to be done to address such a wide range of threats, that will accompany us into the coming year? First and foremost, we need to unite Israeli society, ensuring both the commitment of blood, sweat, and tears, and a clear exit strategy and improvement in the strategic situation. This is not happening in practice. Particularly, the aspect of social cohesion is lacking. Even if Netanyahu has been trying to bring the people together, he is not succeeding.

Meanwhile, in Netzarim

The political front is challenging in itself, and Britain's decision to suspend arms shipments to Israel follows a prolonged period of coolness to an outright freeze in the military relations between the two countries. Once, we were close allies of the British military.

One of the main challenges facing Israeli society and the IDF is dealing with the enormous burden on a small group of reservists, who make up only a small percentage of the population, as well as on conscripted soldiers.

Regarding conscripted soldiers, the Ministry of Defense is determined to extend their service from two years and eight months to three years, which could increase the IDF's combat force by more than ten percent. The significant recruitment of ultra-Orthodox will not prevent this service extension. As for reservists, nearly all will serve more than 100 days next year, at best.

Let’s take, for example, the 252nd Division, the Sinai Division of Southern Command, which has been holding the Natzarim Corridor since July. This is an axis that divides the Gaza Strip into two parts, between Nahal Oz and the sea. Although it does not enjoy the same hype as Philadelphi, it was originally intended as a pressure tool on Hamas to end the war and return the hostages.

Until October 7th, the 252nd Division was at the bottom of the IDF’s priority list, and no one expected it would actually ever be called to fight. However, since then, it has managed to conduct three rounds of recruitment. For example, the division is currently operating the Jerusalem Brigade, the 14th Tank Brigade, and the 454th Artillery Brigade. Each infantry and armored soldier has already served in Gaza for three periods. This is an enormous burden. 

During the first recruitment on October 7th, the turnout was well above 100%, due to fighters who had already been removed from the regular forces. Currently, the turnout is 90 percent, which is still very high. The division is aware of the burden and strives to rotate between battalions and companies at least once a month.

And what about the Netzarim Corridor? It has been proving its worth, from a defense perspective. This week, for example, a tunnel measuring no less than four kilometers in length was destroyed near the corridor, which the IDF was unaware of. Some of the tunnels were dug to shallow depths for attack purposes.

Hamas has already transitioned to a full guerrilla warfare mode a few weeks ago. The IDF is most concerned about "stagnation," which is why Division 252 has initiated a series of offensive operations on both sides of the corridor in recent weeks, such as in the Zeitoun neighborhood to the north and the outskirts of Khan Younis to the south. The key is to avoid being exposed to Hamas attacks in a static manner.

The division decided to shift from "raids," after which Hamas would return to the areas the IDF had cleared each time, to holding territory, thereby gradually expanding the Corridor from week to week. Unfortunately, this expansion has resulted in quite a few losses in the past month. The main threat faced by the troops is from explosives and booby traps in yards and homes. The losses for Hamas are, of course, much greater: an average of ten fatalities per day in this sector alone, totaling 300 deaths per month. However, Hamas finds it easy to recruit replacements, and it is hard to see how the expanding operations in Natzarim significantly contribute to achieving the war's objectives.