Analysis | Hezbollah in Lebanon: Inevitable Build-up or Strategic Mistake?

The Second Lebanon War in 2006 was initially considered a failure for Israel, but over time, the outcomes of the war took on a more positive view in the eyes of many. The relative calm that prevailed from 2006 until October 2023 was seen as a significant, though temporary, achievement.

During these years, there were hardly any significant incidents along the northern border, except for rare cases such as the January 28, 2015, attack, in which two IDF soldiers were killed by a Hezbollah missile. This relative calm was perceived as a success of Israel's deterrence and containment policy, but it proved to be a double-edged sword: Hezbollah gained strength in an uncontrolled manner.

With massive assistance from Iran, Hezbollah built a vast arsenal of missiles, rockets, and drones in a process that has continued since 2006. During this period, Israel had several options to act to curb Hezbollah's buildup. One possibility was to prevent Iran from sending weapons to Hezbollah through threats or military action against Iran itself, which Israel refrained from doing to avoid broader escalation. At the same time, Israel focused on delaying Iran's nuclear program, but with only partial success.

Regarding Syria, which served as a key weapons corridor for Hezbollah, Israel refrained from attacks on Syrian territory until the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2012, which weakened the Syrian army. Since then, Israel has attacked in Syria, but despite this, Hezbollah's buildup continued.

In Lebanon itself, Israel could have tried to pressure the Lebanese government to restrain Hezbollah, but in practice, the government was powerless against the organization, which had become part of it. The option of military action in Lebanon was rejected due to the fear of a quagmire similar to the First Lebanon War, and Israeli policy remained cautious and focused on deterrence.

The current reality, following the start of the war of attrition with Hezbollah in October 2023, presents Israel with a difficult dilemma. Any military action in Lebanon could quickly escalate into a broader war, with heavy costs for both sides. Additionally, the U.S. administration is wary of a wide-scale Israeli attack, fearing regional escalation, which adds complexity to Israel's strategic decisions.

The possible solution, though not ideal, may be to restore the relative calm in the north, while simultaneously attempting to end the fighting in the Gaza Strip, which would allow Israel to return to the situation that existed until October 2023, at least temporarily. The alternative, involving a large-scale war in the north, entails a heavy price and may not be advisable for Israel at this stage.