Commentary | Israel, North Korea, and a Nuclear War
Should a direct war erupt between Israel and Iran, Pyongyang might escalate the situation and threaten regional and global stability even more
Tehran, August 5th 2024. Photo: Fatemeh Bahrami / Anadolu via Reuters Connect
The likelihood of a direct war between Israel and Iran is now portentously high. What remains “in the shadows” is that such a war could quickly involve North Korean military assets. Even if Iran were to remain pre-nuclear, an already nuclear North Korea could potentially enlarge Iranian aggressions. In essence, North Korea – which has had active involvement in previous war and terror operations against Israel - would function as a witting Iranian surrogate.
The North Korean threat could present in variable forms. In a worst-case narrative, Israel would find itself facing a direct military conflict with Pyongyang without an upper hand during periods of escalating crisis. Any such fearful discovery would be the result of Israel no longer preserving its regional nuclear monopoly. More precisely, it would signify Israel’s potentially irremediable loss of “escalation dominance.”
What next? Purposeful Israeli solutions would be discoverable only by gifted strategic thinkers, not politicians or pundits. Regarding incentives for North Korea to undertake grave risks on behalf of Iran, the most recognizable encouragements would likely revolve around Iranian oil.
If Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthi terror attacks on Israel should lead to direct and protracted warfare between Israel and Iran, North Korean involvement could immediately harm the Jewish State. Israel would likely be in an unfavorable position to engage Iran’s PRK proxy because Israel is a “50 target state.” Even in its still pre-nuclear iteration and without tangible North Korean backing, Iran would be a “1000+ target state” – one with long-range strike capabilities.
Soon, Israel could have to face a newly-nuclear Iran and an already-nuclear North Korea simultaneously. And this is to say nothing about variously possible Russian and/or Chinese interventions undertaken for Iran, or about still-bewildering Indian and/or Pakistani involvements.
Pakistan, a nuclear Sunni Islamic state, is improving its ties to Shiite Iran while remaining supportive of Sunni Saudi Arabia. Nuclear India, long-time foe of Pakistan, is also strengthening its own ties to Iran. Pakistan has openly embraced a “counterforce” or warfighting strategy of nuclear deterrence, one that could sometime confront Israeli decision-makers with distinct existential hazards.
In the final analysis, it could be left up to the United States to support Israel’s survival against Iranian, North Korean and potentially Pakistani aggressions. This conclusion would identify scenarios in which Iran-backed jihadist terror attacks on Israel wind up retrospectively as the original precipitants of a regional or global nuclear war. Presently, Iranian surrogate forces are visibly operational in all Palestinian territories (especially Gaza), Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Mali and Somalia.
Looking forward from Jerusalem, multiple subsidiary and intersecting questions will need to be answered. If Iranian decision-makers are confident in their timetable to become nuclear, why should they need to solidify or enlarge alliance ties with North Korea? Exactly “how close” are Tehran and Pyongyang as military allies? Would it be prudent or cost-effective for Iran to strengthen its ties to North Korea when the Islamic Republic might still have to face Israeli preemptive strikes or other barriers to independent nuclear status? Are presumptive Iranian interests in a North Korean nuclear surrogacy actually sensible, rational and cost-effective?
Whatever North Korea’s policy on accepting nuclear surrogacy for Iran, the prospects for a widening conflict would inevitably be high. Because all pertinent scenarios would lack historical precedent, there could exist no science-based method of assigning numerical or statistical probabilities. At the same time, per axiomatic principles of mathematics, there would still remain reliable ways of conflict estimation.
Some further clarifications will be needed. By definition, an accidental nuclear war between Israel and North Korea would be unintentional, but an unintentional nuclear war would not necessarily be the result of an accident. An unintentional nuclear war between Jerusalem and Pyongyang could represent the outcome of decision-making miscalculation or irrationality by one or both adversaries.
At some point, Israel’s survival could depend on variously viable combinations of ballistic missile defense and defensive first strikes. But settling upon such untested combinations would exclude critical input from material or quantifiable historical evidence and present at the highest imaginable levels of existential risk. In residual circumstances, the offensive military threat to Israel could warrant some rational form of situational preemption.
It seems likely that Kim Jong Un would value his own personal life and the lives of his family above any other conceivable preference or combination of preferences. In corresponding scenarios, Kim could be presumed rational and remain subject to Israel/US nuclear deterrence. Still, it could be important for a negotiating Israeli leadership team to carefully distinguish between authentic instances of enemy irrationality and instances of feigned or pretended enemy irrationality. Also worth noting is that actual negotiations or bargaining with North Korea would likely be led by the United States, and any related or underlying diplomacy would be conducted with Iran.
There will be more to assess concerning an inadvertent nuclear war between Jerusalem and Pyongyang. Such conflict could take place not only as the result of misunderstandings or miscalculations between rational national leaders (Israeli, North Korean, Iranian and/or American), but also as the unintended consequence of mechanical, electrical, computer malfunctions or hackings. These last interventions could include the complicating intrusions of "cyber-mercenaries."
Regarding potential Iranian nuclear surrogate North Korea, Israel’s strategic policies should always emphasize the maintenance of stable intra-war nuclear thresholds. This would include a refined focus on the expected rationality or irrationality of key decision-makers in North Korea; the cumulative requirements of escalation dominance; the always-important distinctions between intentional, unintentional and accidental nuclear war; and Israel’s animating or core conflict with jihadist Iran. This last focus should serve as a reminder that Israel’s actual war would always be against Iran, and that North Korea would be operating against Israel solely as Iran’s nuclear surrogate.
Israel’s best path to nuclear war avoidance/nuclear war limitation with North Korea should involve prior strategic understandings with Iran and/or prior military actions against Iran. Also necessary for a “fifty target state” will be explicit Israeli assurances to both enemy states that Jerusalem would ultimately be willing to take strategic risk-taking to nuclear conflict levels. Accordingly, Israel will need to undertake visible and tangible nuclear policy shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.”
North Korea’s willingness to function as Iran’s nuclear proxy would be contingent on reasonably expected benefits for Pyongyang. North Korea would conceivably “win” an all-out nuclear war with Israel, but any such “victory” would effectively be for Iran’s benefit and would come at a very high price.
Summing up, though it is possible that a pre-nuclear Iran could sometime gain “escalation dominance” against an already-nuclear Israel (because Israel is only a “fifty-target state”), it is more likely that Iran would prefer to avoid warring against a capable nuclear Israel. One alternative, as we have just seen, would be to enlist surrogate nuclear assistance from North Korea. It follows, among other things, that Israel’s strategic focus in any impending war with Iran should emphasize this inconspicuous but increasingly plausible scenario.
LOUIS RENÉ BERES was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971). Born in Zürich at the end of World War II, he is the author of many books, monographs, and articles dealing with Israeli nuclear strategy. Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue, he has lectured on this topic for over fifty years at leading universities and academic centers for strategic studies. Dr. Beres' twelfth book, Israel's Nuclear Strategy: Surviving amid Chaos, was published by Rowman and Littlefield, in 2016 (2nd ed., 2018). In December 2016, Professor Beres authored a monograph at Tel-Aviv University (with a special postscript by retired USA General Barry McCaffrey), Israel's Nuclear Strategy and American National Security. In 2003-2004, he was Chair of Israel’s “Project Daniel” (Iranian nuclear weapons/PM Ariel Sharon).
Should a direct war erupt between Israel and Iran, Pyongyang might escalate the situation and threaten regional and global stability even more
Tehran, August 5th 2024. Photo: Fatemeh Bahrami / Anadolu via Reuters Connect
The likelihood of a direct war between Israel and Iran is now portentously high. What remains “in the shadows” is that such a war could quickly involve North Korean military assets. Even if Iran were to remain pre-nuclear, an already nuclear North Korea could potentially enlarge Iranian aggressions. In essence, North Korea – which has had active involvement in previous war and terror operations against Israel - would function as a witting Iranian surrogate.
The North Korean threat could present in variable forms. In a worst-case narrative, Israel would find itself facing a direct military conflict with Pyongyang without an upper hand during periods of escalating crisis. Any such fearful discovery would be the result of Israel no longer preserving its regional nuclear monopoly. More precisely, it would signify Israel’s potentially irremediable loss of “escalation dominance.”
What next? Purposeful Israeli solutions would be discoverable only by gifted strategic thinkers, not politicians or pundits. Regarding incentives for North Korea to undertake grave risks on behalf of Iran, the most recognizable encouragements would likely revolve around Iranian oil.
If Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthi terror attacks on Israel should lead to direct and protracted warfare between Israel and Iran, North Korean involvement could immediately harm the Jewish State. Israel would likely be in an unfavorable position to engage Iran’s PRK proxy because Israel is a “50 target state.” Even in its still pre-nuclear iteration and without tangible North Korean backing, Iran would be a “1000+ target state” – one with long-range strike capabilities.
Soon, Israel could have to face a newly-nuclear Iran and an already-nuclear North Korea simultaneously. And this is to say nothing about variously possible Russian and/or Chinese interventions undertaken for Iran, or about still-bewildering Indian and/or Pakistani involvements.
Pakistan, a nuclear Sunni Islamic state, is improving its ties to Shiite Iran while remaining supportive of Sunni Saudi Arabia. Nuclear India, long-time foe of Pakistan, is also strengthening its own ties to Iran. Pakistan has openly embraced a “counterforce” or warfighting strategy of nuclear deterrence, one that could sometime confront Israeli decision-makers with distinct existential hazards.
In the final analysis, it could be left up to the United States to support Israel’s survival against Iranian, North Korean and potentially Pakistani aggressions. This conclusion would identify scenarios in which Iran-backed jihadist terror attacks on Israel wind up retrospectively as the original precipitants of a regional or global nuclear war. Presently, Iranian surrogate forces are visibly operational in all Palestinian territories (especially Gaza), Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Mali and Somalia.
Looking forward from Jerusalem, multiple subsidiary and intersecting questions will need to be answered. If Iranian decision-makers are confident in their timetable to become nuclear, why should they need to solidify or enlarge alliance ties with North Korea? Exactly “how close” are Tehran and Pyongyang as military allies? Would it be prudent or cost-effective for Iran to strengthen its ties to North Korea when the Islamic Republic might still have to face Israeli preemptive strikes or other barriers to independent nuclear status? Are presumptive Iranian interests in a North Korean nuclear surrogacy actually sensible, rational and cost-effective?
Whatever North Korea’s policy on accepting nuclear surrogacy for Iran, the prospects for a widening conflict would inevitably be high. Because all pertinent scenarios would lack historical precedent, there could exist no science-based method of assigning numerical or statistical probabilities. At the same time, per axiomatic principles of mathematics, there would still remain reliable ways of conflict estimation.
Some further clarifications will be needed. By definition, an accidental nuclear war between Israel and North Korea would be unintentional, but an unintentional nuclear war would not necessarily be the result of an accident. An unintentional nuclear war between Jerusalem and Pyongyang could represent the outcome of decision-making miscalculation or irrationality by one or both adversaries.
At some point, Israel’s survival could depend on variously viable combinations of ballistic missile defense and defensive first strikes. But settling upon such untested combinations would exclude critical input from material or quantifiable historical evidence and present at the highest imaginable levels of existential risk. In residual circumstances, the offensive military threat to Israel could warrant some rational form of situational preemption.
It seems likely that Kim Jong Un would value his own personal life and the lives of his family above any other conceivable preference or combination of preferences. In corresponding scenarios, Kim could be presumed rational and remain subject to Israel/US nuclear deterrence. Still, it could be important for a negotiating Israeli leadership team to carefully distinguish between authentic instances of enemy irrationality and instances of feigned or pretended enemy irrationality. Also worth noting is that actual negotiations or bargaining with North Korea would likely be led by the United States, and any related or underlying diplomacy would be conducted with Iran.
There will be more to assess concerning an inadvertent nuclear war between Jerusalem and Pyongyang. Such conflict could take place not only as the result of misunderstandings or miscalculations between rational national leaders (Israeli, North Korean, Iranian and/or American), but also as the unintended consequence of mechanical, electrical, computer malfunctions or hackings. These last interventions could include the complicating intrusions of "cyber-mercenaries."
Regarding potential Iranian nuclear surrogate North Korea, Israel’s strategic policies should always emphasize the maintenance of stable intra-war nuclear thresholds. This would include a refined focus on the expected rationality or irrationality of key decision-makers in North Korea; the cumulative requirements of escalation dominance; the always-important distinctions between intentional, unintentional and accidental nuclear war; and Israel’s animating or core conflict with jihadist Iran. This last focus should serve as a reminder that Israel’s actual war would always be against Iran, and that North Korea would be operating against Israel solely as Iran’s nuclear surrogate.
Israel’s best path to nuclear war avoidance/nuclear war limitation with North Korea should involve prior strategic understandings with Iran and/or prior military actions against Iran. Also necessary for a “fifty target state” will be explicit Israeli assurances to both enemy states that Jerusalem would ultimately be willing to take strategic risk-taking to nuclear conflict levels. Accordingly, Israel will need to undertake visible and tangible nuclear policy shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.”
North Korea’s willingness to function as Iran’s nuclear proxy would be contingent on reasonably expected benefits for Pyongyang. North Korea would conceivably “win” an all-out nuclear war with Israel, but any such “victory” would effectively be for Iran’s benefit and would come at a very high price.
Summing up, though it is possible that a pre-nuclear Iran could sometime gain “escalation dominance” against an already-nuclear Israel (because Israel is only a “fifty-target state”), it is more likely that Iran would prefer to avoid warring against a capable nuclear Israel. One alternative, as we have just seen, would be to enlist surrogate nuclear assistance from North Korea. It follows, among other things, that Israel’s strategic focus in any impending war with Iran should emphasize this inconspicuous but increasingly plausible scenario.
LOUIS RENÉ BERES was educated at Princeton (Ph.D., 1971). Born in Zürich at the end of World War II, he is the author of many books, monographs, and articles dealing with Israeli nuclear strategy. Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue, he has lectured on this topic for over fifty years at leading universities and academic centers for strategic studies. Dr. Beres' twelfth book, Israel's Nuclear Strategy: Surviving amid Chaos, was published by Rowman and Littlefield, in 2016 (2nd ed., 2018). In December 2016, Professor Beres authored a monograph at Tel-Aviv University (with a special postscript by retired USA General Barry McCaffrey), Israel's Nuclear Strategy and American National Security. In 2003-2004, he was Chair of Israel’s “Project Daniel” (Iranian nuclear weapons/PM Ariel Sharon).
