Former Deputy Head of Israel’s NSC: Settlements Contribute to Continued Palestinian Radicalization in West Bank

A special interview with Col. (res.) Itamar Yaar, former Deputy Head of the NSC and CEO of Commanders for Israel's Security

Former Deputy Head of Israel’s NSC: Settlements Contribute to Continued Palestinian Radicalization in West Bank

Col. (res.) Itamar Yaar. Photo: Commanders for Israel's Security

Amid the war in Gaza, the State of Israel recently declared approximately 23,700 dunams as state land in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). "The year 2024 is a record year in terms of the scope of state land declarations," says a post on the Peace Now website.

This is the first declaration of state land made under the authority of Hillel Roth, the civilian deputy appointed by Minister Smotrich, to whom most of the powers of the head of the Civil Administration have been transferred. The staff work for these declarations was carried out under the directorate established by the government, intended to accelerate and enhance settlement activity in the West Bank.

The desire to accelerate land acquisition in Judea and Samaria should surprise no one. Bezalel Smotrich, minister of finance and a minister in the Ministry of Defense, openly declared this when the government was formed. He was the one who wanted the powers of land management to be transferred from a military authority to a civilian authority under his management.

"If the State of Israel takes the responsibility for managing Judea and Samaria from the military commander and transfers it to a politically guided civilian authority, it exposes Israel to international lawsuits. Control of occupied territory is supposed to be solely under military authority," explains Col. (res.) Itamar Yaar, former Deputy Head of the NSC and CEO of Commanders for Israel's Security.

Yaar explains that Israel's fundamental claim, which underpins the settlements and the seizure of lands, is that this is not occupied territory, as the West Bank was under Jordanian control but not Jordanian sovereignty until 1967. "It is disputed territory, with the status of the territories to be determined in future negotiations between the parties. The military force is in control, and in the eyes of international law, it is responsible for the security and lives of the residents living there, Palestinians and Israelis until an agreement is reached," Yaar explains.

"The Oslo Accords gave the Palestinian Authority responsibility over parts of the West Bank. Essentially, we are granting the Palestinians authority under the military commander. He allows the Authority civil and security control in Area A and in Area B. In Area C, it is Israel's full responsibility. Consequently, the IDF's entry into Area A when required stems from the overarching responsibility of the military commander. If the Authority does not fulfill its role in ensuring security, as a result of the agreement, the IDF can also enter Area A to do so."

Yaar states that under international law, there is a prohibition on transferring civilian populations into the area, but that the Israeli message was that the settlements do not determine the nature of the final status. The larger the scale of civilian transfer and the broader the civilian takeover of territories, the more permanent the move appears, reducing the likelihood of reversing the process as part of a future agreement. In the withdrawal from the Gush Katif bloc, Israel proved that it is possible to establish settlements and still evacuate them when necessary.

What about the Allon Plan? Wasn't it the basis for annexing territories in Judea and Samaria for the sake of national security?"

Yigal Allon, after the region was occupied in '67, defined how he believed the security arrangement should appear between us and Jordan or the Palestinians. He argued then that Israel would need to ensure that the Jordan Valley remained under Israeli security control, not necessarily Israeli sovereignty. Paradoxically, settling in the Jordan Valley is one of the country's major failures. Today, there are only a few thousand Israelis there. Why? Because our extremists understand that the most important area for undermining future stability is the hill ridge, where there is a dense Palestinian population," Yaar explains.

The settlements as operational damage

Yaar adds that the perception that citizens in the territory serve security needs arose before the establishment of the state. During the Mandate period, the Jewish understanding was that when the day came for the partition of the land, it would be based on the distribution of settlements in various territories, a principle that was indeed implemented in the UN's partition plan. Areas with more Jews would be allocated to Israel, and vice versa. The exception was the Negev, where there was a significant population mix of both groups.

“Take, for example, the settlement in the Ramim Ridge. Before the state's establishment, it was understood that if we wanted the Upper Galilee within Israel's territory, it was important to have Jewish settlements there. Indeed, the 'border' line in the north runs directly through the Jewish settlements. Today, this reality creates a security challenge. The principle in the state is that the army sits on the front line and defends its sovereignty, while civilians reside behind it and are protected by it. Before the establishment of the state, there was no army, and due to the circumstances, civilians were placed on the front line," says Yaar.

“Ten days before October 7th, I presented at a conference at Kibbutz Revivim that approximately 60% of the IDF's field forces are in Judea and Samaria, while the remaining 40% are forced to defend all other parts of the country, including the front lines against the Gaza Strip," says Yaar. "Even today, during the war in Gaza, there are more forces in Judea and Samaria than in Gaza. About 26 IDF battalions, many of them reservists, have been stationed in Judea and Samaria over time, not only to combat terrorism but also to secure the settlements, the legal ones as well as about 150 points where Jews live contrary to government decisions. It's not just about securing settlements, but also about the daily movements of hundreds of thousands of people on the roads, movements that stem from their lives within the region.”

Our actions in Judea and Samaria, aimed at preserving settlements, result in greater operational damage. As we expand settlement activities and seize territories, which Palestinians see and experience affecting their lives in the area, we encourage extremists among them to tell their community that their authority does not stand up against settler encroachments. Therefore, the only alternative they see is support for or joining extremists, namely Hamas and other factions."

Is it possible to negotiate the future of Judea and Samaria in the current atmosphere?

"Every negotiation begins with a preliminary process. Typically, negotiations come as a second stage in the process. Currently, there is no chance for a process, certainly not for negotiations. This is exactly what Smotrich wants. The more military actions we are forced to carry out in Judea and Samaria, the more violence there is against Palestinians and IDF soldiers, and the less enforcement of the law against violent elements, the further the process drifts away. All these elements are intentionally designed to prevent a diplomatic process from starting. The message to the other side is that there is no reason to engage in a process because Israel is not serious about it," Yaar explains.

"Take a map and see where the illegal outposts are located in Judea and Samaria. Almost all of them are far from the Green Line. The goal of establishing these illegal outposts is to influence the future borders. The settlement movement in Judea and Samaria understands this well. The movement operates according to a structured expulsion plan by Zeev Hever. Some of these points are defined as neighborhoods of existing settlements - sometimes a 'neighborhood' is established 20 km from the settlement. It could also be an outpost, observation post, farmstead, yeshiva, and so on. These points, many of them within densely populated Palestinian areas, are intended for one purpose - to prevent a reasonable Palestinian territorial continuity for a future state. Thus, the diplomatic process is undermined before it even begins.

"Conversely, a look at the map of legal settlements through Israeli eyes shows that all governments understood that eventually there would be a territorial division. Therefore, almost all legalized settlement have been established near the Green Line, facilitating separation through land swaps and avoiding the need to relocate settlements deep within Palestinian territory to accommodate a Palestinian territorial continuum."

What does Israel stand to lose from such creeping annexation?

"The biggest loss would be that between the Jordan River and the sea there would effectively be a bi-national state. If this happens, Palestinians will live under Israeli military rule, in a policy of institutionalized separation that the world will define as apartheid. In terms of demographics, today there are only 47% of Jews between the Jordan River and the sea. If it becomes one state, the ultimate goal of Zionism is lost. There won't be a solid Jewish majority, which is a condition for a Jewish national character," Ya'ar says.

"The takeover of hills in Judea and Samaria and the stifling of a diplomatic process will ultimately lead us to a bi-national state in an intermediate stage and eventually to a state similar to Lebanon. If we want to preserve a Jewish state, some form of separation is necessary. How, how much, and why? It's premature to say, but current efforts in Judea and Samaria are heading in the opposite direction."

Instead of 26 IDF battalions, we will need 50 battalions in Judea and Samaria. The deeper our activities in the territory without a horizon for resolution, the more Palestinians come to understand that organized struggle is their only alternative. This is not just a problem of settlers in the territories; it is a struggle over the nature of the state and its existence as a Jewish and democratic state, not a struggle over the territories. Therefore, this is the challenge facing all of us, citizens of the entire state. What erupted in our faces on October 7th is also a result of these processes, and it serves as evidence of that."